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A b str a c t
This thesis aims to construct a conceptual framework for characterising 
the relationship between duties to refugees and duties to fellow nationals. The 
need for such a framework is generated by the current impasse on the policy 
debate about the nature and scope of refugee rights. The thesis examines a range 
of liberal political theories to see if they can provide an adequate account, 
evaluating them on three criteria: normative desirability; practical feasibility; and 
internal coherence.
The discussion criticises liberal theories on two levels. Firstly, it shows 
how liberal universalist theories raise a problem of moral motivation: they impose 
overly stringent ethical demands, and risk being counter-productive. Attempts to 
incorporate some notion of the significance of national ties or to justify a national 
social contract simply produce an incoherent amalgam of universalist and 
particularist premises.
Secondly, the thesis argues that these problems reflect a more profound 
weakness in liberal theories of moral agency and motivation. Liberal theory relies 
on an assumed dichotomy between a personal and an impartial perspective. The 
moral agent is assumed to abstract from her personal characteristics to adopt an 
“ethical” view-point. This notion of impartiality is descriptively implausible, and 
produces a highly problematic rationalist theory of motivation. The thesis argues 
instead for an account that sees the agent as motivated by her personal disposition 
and community values to respect refugee rights. On this account there is no 
necessary conflict between particularism and duties to non-nationals. I develop 
this non-rationalist account by providing (1) a philosophical theory of motivation; 
substantiated by (2) a theory of the psychology of moral development.
The thesis shows how this non-rationalist account is consistent with a 
substantive commitment to universal duties. Moreover, it fulfils the two 
additional criteria of internal coherence and feasibility, thus providing a superior 
conception of the relationship between duties to compatriots and to refugees.
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In tr o d u c t io n
1. The Crisis in International Refugee Policy
International refugee policy appears to be facing a crisis: an escalation in 
the level of refugee flows, accompanied by an increased reluctance of states to 
grant asylum to large numbers of refugees.1 Most commentators characterise the 
crisis as a conflict between refugee rights and national interests, especially in 
cases of mass refugee influx. Granting asylum to large numbers of refugees is 
considered to impose a financial and political burden on receiving states, running 
directly counter to their national interest. The crisis in refugee policy has cast 
doubt on the adequacy of current international legal provisions for protecting the 
rights of refugees. These provisions oblige states to respect a range of rights and 
standards for asylum-seekers and those with refugee status.2 The crisis also 
challenges the feasibility of recognising duties to respect the rights of those 
beyond borders. These moral duties are perceived by many to impose overly 
stringent requirements on states which are not realisable under current economic 
and political circumstances - especially not where they require absorbing large 
numbers of non-nationals.
Most of those defending refugee rights against this attack invoke liberal
1 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are around 
50 million refugees and displaced persons world-wide. See UNHCR, The State o f  the W orld’s 
Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda  (Oxford and N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 2; 
and Refugees and Others o f  Concern to UNHCR: 1999 Statistical Overview  
(http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/99oviewtoc.htm) . Moreover, as UNHCR writes, “It can be predicted 
with some degree o f  certainty that states will prove increasingly reluctant to open their borders to 
refugees and to provide them with effective protection.... [T]he exclusionary attitude o f  states is 
now firmly established in both richer and poorer regions o f  the world.” UNHCR, State o f  the 
World's Refugees (ibid.), p. 264.
2 The most important instruments are the Convention Relating to the Status o f  Refugees (Geneva, 
28 July 1951 (189 UNTS 137)) and its 1967 Protocol (New York, 31 January, 1967 (606 UNTS 
267)); but there are also a range o f  “soft law” provisions, notably United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions, and Conclusions o f  the UNHCR Executive Committee. For good 
overviews o f  these provisions, see James C. Hathaway, The Law o f  Refugee Status (Toronto and 
Vancouver: Butterworths, 1991); and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law  
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).
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universalist arguments to justify their claims about duties to refugees. Liberal 
universalism provides an accessible and cogent grounding for theories of duties to 
non-nationals, and its assumptions about the moral equality of human-beings 
deeply pervade moral and political discourse in liberal democratic societies. It is 
not surprising, then, that liberal universalist theories have a virtual monopoly on 
arguments for admitting greater numbers of refugees, and more generally for 
recognising moral duties beyond borders.
Yet despite this apparent facility for justifying refugee rights, liberal 
universalist theories are ill-equipped to provide an account of the relationship 
between duties to refugees and duties to fellow nationals. These theories have 
problems accounting for the significance of membership in particular states or 
communities. Starting from a premise of the moral equality of all individuals, 
pure liberal universalism denies the moral relevance of nationality and other 
characteristics that are not universally shared. And - unless liberal theorists can 
find practical or instrumental arguments for diluting this universal commitment 
(which many of them attempt to do4) - they proceed to derive theories of duties to 
refugees that seem hopelessly unfeasible. Consistent liberal universalist theories 
produce normative prescriptions that are at best utopian, at worst counter­
productive to their own ends. The liberal universalist claim about the moral 
equality of refugees and nationals of receiving states produces practical norms 
that seem increasingly out of touch with the current debate on asylum policies in 
liberal democracies.5
3 I use the term “duty” to denote the obligations generated by individual rights in liberal political 
theory. In some contexts, I also use the term to refer to other types o f  ethical duties not generated 
by rights - for example duties related to notions o f  charity and humanity, or “special” duties 
generated by particular relationships with others.
4
As I shall argue later on in the chapter, where liberal theorists have attempted to limit the moral 
demands o f  their theories, the outcome tends to be either based on dubious empirical claims, or an 
incoherent amalgam o f  universalist and communitarian premises.
5 On “utopian” applications o f  liberal universalism to the question o f  refugees or migration, see, 
for example, Peter Singer, "Insiders and Outsiders", in his Practical Ethics (Cambridge and New  
York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 247-163; Ann Dummett, “The Transnational 
Migration o f  People seen from within a Natural Law Tradition,” in Free Movement: Ethical Issues 
in the Transnational Migration o f  People and o f  Money, ed. Brian Barry and Robert E. Goodin 
(Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), especially pp. 174-7. See also Mark Gibney, 
ed., Open Borders? C losed Societies?: The Ethical and Political Issues (New York and London: 
Greenwood Press, 1989). On general theories o f  liberal universalism (often termed 
cosmopolitanism) that create this kind o f  problem o f feasibility, see Charles R. Beitz, Political
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The patent unfeasibility of these theories generates a risk that liberal 
universalist arguments will come to be seen as irrelevant to the refugee policy 
debate. By advancing such stringent conceptions of duties, liberal universalism 
may be effectively relegating itself to the margins of political discussion. The 
dangers inherent in this tendency are clear: if liberal universalism is seen as 
irrelevant, there is no alternative political theory that could provide anything like 
a substitute in terms of the breadth and persistence of its appeal. The 
marginalisation of liberal universalist arguments would leave the field clear for 
the defenders of “national interest”, or crude forms of communitarianism.6
This thesis is motivated by a concern to counter the marginalisation of 
liberal universalist notions of duties to refugees. Thus while I am deeply critical 
of the liberal universalist failure to recognise the importance of community, it is 
not my intention to embrace a communitarian political theory of special duties. 
While rejecting many of its premises, I am broadly sympathetic to the liberal 
universalist normative agenda of promoting a more generous asylum policy in 
liberal democracies. Indeed, it is precisely because of this ethical commitment 
that I am keen to salvage liberal universalist prescriptions from their nationalist 
and communitarian critics. But I believe that the best hope for rescuing liberal 
universalism is to significantly modify its ontological assumptions about the self, 
and in particular about moral agency. This project of salvaging liberal 
universalist theory will require ascertaining the reasons for liberal theory’s 
inability to provide a plausible account of duties to refugees. Once the underlying
Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Robert E. 
Goodin, “What Is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?,” Ethics 98:4 (1988), pp. 663-686; 
Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 
especially pp. 211-80; Onora O ’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f  
Practical Reasoning  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Henry Shue, Basic Rights: 
Subsistence, Affuence and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980). 
Similarly universalist accounts can be derived from the work o f  Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: 
Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1982); and Brian 
Barry, Justice As Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
6 Arguably, this tendency is already discernible in certain o f  the cruder forms o f  communitarian 
and post-modernist responses to the inadequacies o f  liberal universalist theory. The retreat from 
universalist ethics can be understood as at least in part a response to the problem o f the excessive 
motivational demands imposed by universalist morality. See, for example, Charles Taylor, 
Sources o f  the Self: The Making o f  Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1989), pp. 518-9; and Aaron Ridley’s account o f  the relationship between guilt and morality in
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problems are revealed, the thesis will need to revise the relevant liberal premises, 
and offer an alternative account that avoids this risk of marginalisation. I shall 
argue that the short-comings of liberal universalism can be traced to its 
assumptions about moral agency and motivation. Thus rather than targeting the 
liberal universalist first order commitment to universal duties, the thesis will 
challenge its assumptions about the role of particular ties, interests and values in 
moral agency.
Clearly, the general critique of liberal ontology is not new. Many theorists 
have challenged liberal assumptions about the self as somehow able to detach 
herself from her social context and autonomously choose her own interests and 
goals; or the moral agent as rationally deliberating on practical action, abstracted 
from her particular ties and values.7 But the line of argument pursued in this 
thesis is original in two senses. First, the specific focus of the thesis is on the less 
widely discussed question of liberal universalist assumptions about moral
Q
motivation. It will reject the deep-seated liberal commitment to the notion of a 
split between an impartial, ethical perspective, and a particularist, self-interested 
perspective. And in providing an alternative account, it will bring together moral 
philosophy and psychological accounts to provide a plausible conception of moral 
agency and motivation. In so doing, the theoretical analysis will provide an 
original contribution to the question of moral motivation and agency. Second, the 
theoretical analysis is driven by a practical concern to retain or extend 
conceptions of duties to refugees. Thus while the political and moral philosophy 
analysis will have broader relevance to a range of ethical issues, the discussion
Nietzsche, Neitzsche's Conscience: Six Character Studies from  the 'Genealogy" (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998), especially pp. 30-3.
7 For important contemporary critiques o f  liberal ontology, see Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and  
the Limits o f  Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Charles Taylor, 
Sources o f  the Self: The Making o f  M odern Identity (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1989), 
pp. 3-107.
8 On the question o f  motivation, critiques o f  liberal (usually Kantian) assumptions about 
motivation include those o f  Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in M oral Luck: 
Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), pp. 101-13; G. E. M. Anscombe, “On Practical Reasoning,” in Practical Reasoning, ed. 
Joseph Raz (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 33-45. RUdiger Bubner, 
"The Possibilities o f  Practical Reason", in Essays in Hermeneutics and Critical Theory, ed. 
Rudiger Bubner, trans. Eric Matthews (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 147-94. 
These discussions have rarely been taken up in political theoiy discussions o f  liberalism, and (as
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will also shed light on an immediate political problem. Putting these two points 
together, the aim of the thesis is to fundamentally revise liberal universalist 
assumptions about moral agency, whilst promoting the normative goal of 
recognising duties to refugees.
This type of combination of a critique of liberal ontology and adherence to 
substantive liberal values has been defended - on different grounds - by a number 
of political theorists and international relations scholars.9 These authors have 
attempted to avoid grounding their commitment to liberal values in a 
transcendental justification or "strong foundationalism". Instead, they have 
located the source of their commitment to liberal universalism in shared 
intersubjective values (Charles Taylor, Mervyn Frost and the later John Rawls); 
or have justified conceptions of liberalism or rights through a pragmatic 
justification that supposedly dispenses with strong foundations (Richard Rorty 
and Molly Cochran); or have defended a form of liberal universalism conceived 
as an inclusive dialogic community (Jurgen Habermas and Andrew Linklater).10 
However, while these authors have made valuable contributions to the debate on 
ethics and foundations, none of them is directly concerned with the specific 
configuration of issues raised by my thesis. This is so for two reasons. First, 
none of them - with the partial exception of Charles Taylor and Jurgen Habermas
far as I know) not at all in international political theory.
9
For important contemporary political theory accounts, see Taylor, Sources o f  the S e lf  (op. c/7); 
and Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), and "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", in On Human Rights, ed. Stephen 
Shute and Susan Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993), pp. 111-35. Arguably, Rawls' later 
work also falls into this category - see his Political Liberalism  (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993); so too, I would claim, does the work o f  Jurgen Habermas, "Discourse Ethics: Notes 
on a Program o f  Philosophical Justification", in M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 
ed. Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 43-115. For international theories with 
a similar combination, see Andrew Linklater, The Transformation o f  Political Community: Ethical 
Foundations o f  the Post-W estphalian Era  (Columbia: University o f  South Carolina Press, 1998); 
Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: Towards a Normative Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); several contributions by Chris Brown, including his recent 
"Universal Human Rights: A Critique", in Human Rights in G lobal Politics, ed. Tim Dunne and 
Nicholas J. Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 103-27; and Molly 
Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).
10 Arguably, some recent post-structuralist writers such as Richard Ashley, Rob Walker and 
William Connolly have embraced a similar combination o f  "anti-foundationalism" and an ethic o f  
freedom or "marginal conduct", although they would deny that this represents a substantive
10
- addresses the questions of moral agency and motivation to extend duties to non­
nationals, issues which are critical to the thesis. For this reason, in my discussion 
of motivation and moral agency I shall draw on liberal theorists who have dealt 
explicitly with questions of motivation (Chapters Two, Three and Four) and 
moral philosophers and psychologists who have written about moral agency 
(Chapters Five and Six), rather than theorists who have focused on questions of 
foundations. My rejection of liberal ontology flows from and is to a great extent 
shaped by my critique of liberal universalist theories of motivation and moral 
agency, rather than by a critique of their foundational claims per se.
Secondly, and related to this point, most of the attempts of international 
relations theorists to combine substantive liberal values with a critique of liberal 
ontology have been more concerned with the problem of value pluralism than that 
of motivation. They have been preoccupied with practical questions about the 
possibility of constructing an international community of shared values, 
justifications for intervention, or concerns about cultural imperialism. This has 
led theorists such as Mervyn Frost, Chris Brown and Molly Cochran down a 
somewhat different path, focusing on how one can justify particular norms and 
policies in the absence of an Archidemean point from which to evaluate different 
values. While such questions are clearly crucial to international relations, they do 
not directly address the practical problem of extending duties to non-nationals.
One exception to this is Andrew Linklater, who is explicitly concerned 
with the relationship between ethical duties to fellow nationals and to the rest of 
humanity.11 In his recent work, Linklater's central normative concern has been to 
demonstrate the possibilities of political and social forms within modem societies 
that promote the inclusion of minority groups and aliens. However, Linklater's 
project is primarily a sociological enquiry into the prospects and empirical 
conditions for this form of inclusiveness. Thus his account teases out common 
strands in current ethical and political debates on universalism and particularism
commitment to liberalism. See Linklater, Transformation {op. cit.), pp. 71-2; Cochrane, 
Normative Theory {op. cit.), pp. 133-5.
11 Linklater, Transformation {op. cit.), p. 56.
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and the social and political contexts in which such debates arise, in order to 
demonstrate the potential for inclusive dialogic communities. It does not 
systematically address the conceptual and ontological questions which I consider 
to be crucial for constructing an adequate conception of duties to refugees. Thus 
while I am sympathetic to Linklater's normative focus on problems of inclusion 
and exclusion, its more sociological focus nonetheless leaves unanswered the 
questions of moral agency and motivation which are the major concerns of this 
thesis.
In sum, while much attention has recently been devoted to questions of 
how to justify duties beyond borders in the absence of a universalist liberal 
ontology, existing literature fails to address the specific practical and theoretical 
concerns of the current thesis. Most contributions have concentrated on the 
problems of value pluralism, without grappling with questions of motivation to 
extend duties to others; or they have focused on the sociological conditions under 
which societies may extend duties to non-nationals, but without a detailed 
philosophical and psychological analysis of conceptions of duties and moral 
agency. This thesis aims to fill this gap, providing a conceptual and ontological 
analysis of the relationship between ethical duties to compatriots and to refugees. 
Its objective is therefore two-fold: to advance theoretical understanding of moral 
agency and motivation in liberal theory; and to help motivate a more generous 
policy towards refugees in liberal democratic states.
Given these two concerns -  the practical and the theoretical - it is 
important to elaborate the concerns that triggered this critique of liberal 
universalism. I shall do this below in sections 1.1 and 1.2, returning to the 
question of theoretical approaches to addressing the problem in 1.3 and 1.4.
1.1 The conflict between refugee rights and national interests
I suggested that refugee policy is facing a crisis, and that this crisis had 
generated doubts about the feasibility of international refugee law and the liberal 
universalist model. But in order to understand why the universalist model is so
12
vulnerable to attack, we should consider how the policy debate on this issue is 
framed. For it is partly as a result of the polarised nature of the debate that liberal 
universalism has come to appear so unfeasible.
Over the past two decades or more, the debate on strategies to respond to 
the refugee crisis has become polarised around two apparently incompatible 
perspectives. On the one hand, advocates of human rights and refugee protection 
berate states for restrictive measures and a failure to respect the standards for 
refugee protection defined in international law. These critics of state practice 
invoke international refugee law as the ethical standard for evaluating refugee 
policy, basing their normative prescriptions on universalist theories of individual
i ^
rights. On the other hand, states tend to draw on notions of national interest to 
justify restriction. They claim that national economic, strategic and social goals 
take precedence over duties to refugees. Defence of the national prerogative to 
restrict refugee influx may be couched in pragmatic, realpolitik language, or be 
defended in terms of the ethical relevance of national ties.13
The apparent incompatibility of these two perspectives -  the nationalist 
and the universalist -  would suggest that there is a conflict or trade-off between 
these two sets of interests. Indeed, most academics, human rights lobbyists, 
government and United Nations (UN) officials share a similar characterisation of 
the basic problem: a conflict between the rights of refugees and national interests 
in situations of mass influx.14 This notion of a conflict assumes that the two sets
12 See, for example, Jens Vedsted Hansen, "Non-Admission Policies and the Right to Protection: 
Refugees' Choice versus States' Exclusion", in Refugee Rights and Realities, ed. Frances 
Nicholson and Patrick Twomey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 269-88; 
Reinhard Marx, "Non-Refoulement, Access to Procedures, and Responsibility for Determining 
Refugee Claims", International Journal o f  Refugee Law 7:3 (1995), pp. 383-406; Arthur C. 
Helton, "What is Refugee Protection?", International Journal o f  Refugee Law, Special Issue
(1990), pp. 119-29.
13 The former category comprises realists who see the pursuit o f  such national interests as 
inevitable. See Rainer Baubock, "Legitimate Immigration Control", in Legitim ate and Illegitimate 
Discrimination: New Issues in Migration, ed. Howard Adelman (York, Canada: York Lanes Press, 
1995), pp. 3-40. The second category includes some communitarian thinkers, such as Michael 
Walzer, who argues that communities should be entitled to choose who to admit to membership.
See Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice {op. cit.), pp. 49-50.
14
For an overview o f  this debate, see Christina Boswell, "The Conflict Between Refugee Rights 
and National Interests: Background and Policy Strategies", Refugee Survey Quarterly, 18:2 
(1999), pp. 64-84.
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of considerations are shaped independently of one another. National interests 
reflect exclusively self-interested domestic concerns, and are shaped by interests 
and beliefs quite separate from those that define ethical duties. On this account, 
any coincidence between ethical duty and national interest is contingent on 
economic and political circumstances. The two sets of considerations may 
converge in certain periods, as indeed they did in the post-war decades, when the 
need for additional labour in industrialised states encouraged a more generous 
stance to both refugees and economic immigrants. But the current configuration 
of socio-economic conditions in most states, so it is argued, has generated a clear 
conflict between national interests and refugee rights.
It should not be any great surprise that the trade-off characterisation is 
favoured by those keen to restrict refugee influx. Defence of the national interest 
is often effective in mobilising political support - it conveys notions of 
pragmatism, skilful leadership and patriotism. By extension, those who seek to 
prioritise refugee rights over the national interest can be labelled as politically 
naive, unpatriotic or idealistic. The combination of realpolitik and patriotic 
loyalty is politically extremely effective - so that even where there is no vital 
political or economic interest at stake, the term can be invoked to cover a broad 
set of moral and pragmatic arguments. It is partly its lack of clear definition that 
makes it an effective political tool. Where duties to non-nationals are 
characterised as in conflict with the national interest, there is a cluster of ill- 
defined but intuitively persuasive arguments to limit the number of refugees 
recognised.
Given the political uses of this term, it is all the more surprising that many 
proponents of universal rights have tended to embrace a similar conception of the 
relationship between universal duties and national interests. They also share the 
notion that the “ethical” stance is in conflict with national interests, but they 
castigate the national interest as selfish and unethical. Any deviation from the 
requirements of universal rights reflects the self-serving and power-seeking 
nature of states. On many universal rights accounts, there is an implicit suspicion 
about the motives of states, and an idea that political objectives are somehow
14
impure and constraining of humanitarian and human rights goals.15 But while 
rejecting the legitimacy of pursuing the national interest over ethical duty, they 
nonetheless accept the assumed dichotomy between the two.16
Now it is certainly not my intention to undermine the aspiration of refugee 
rights activists to encourage a more generous refugee policy. Indeed, as I have 
already noted, one of the central aims of the thesis is to find a framework that can 
provide scope for encouraging the extension of duties to refugees. Nor do I want 
to question here whether there is a moral case to be made for prioritising the 
“national interest” over duties to non-nationals in any given situation. My aim is 
rather to question whether it is both descriptively accurate, and politically 
advisable, for proponents of refugee rights to accept a sharp distinction between 
ethical concerns and national interests. In other words, is it an adequate 
characterisation of the relationship between the interests of compatriots, and 
duties to non-nationals? And, if not, is there an alternative way of 
conceptualising this relationship, that avoids the descriptive and practical short­
comings of this trade-off characterisation? The answer to this question will take 
shape through the critical analysis of liberal universalism in the following 
chapters. For now, I shall limit my remarks to raising some initial doubts about 
the adequacy of this characterisation in the debate on refugee policy (in 1.2); and 
suggesting how its origins might be traced to more profound tensions in liberal 
political philosophy (1.3).
15 For example, the liberal theorist Brian Barry writes about a "celebration o f  selfishness" in UK 
and US foreign policy -  see Brian Barry, "Can States be Moral? International Morality and the 
Compliance Problem,” in International Ethics in the Nuclear Age, ed. Robert J. Myers (Lanham 
and London: University Press o f  America, 1987), p. 106. A good example o f  the tendency to 
juxtapose states and the "political" with refugee rights can be found in a piece by S. Alex Cunliffe 
and Michael Pugh, "UNHCR as Leader in Humanitarian Assistance: A Triumph o f  Politics over 
Law?", in Refugee Rights and Realities, ed. Frances Nicolson and Patrick Twomey (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 175-99.
16 This description is slightly caricatured, since many also acknowledge that ethical considerations 
may in certain cases influence states, or that ethical goals may coincide with self-interest. See, for 
example, John R. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, in association with the Royal Institute o f  International Affairs, 1986), p. 151. 
However, this characterisation o f  liberal universalism arguments nonetheless captures an 
important underlying assumption in the refugee policy debate about the basic dichotomy between 
the two interests or values, and one which - as I shall argue - has deep roots in liberal political and 
moral thought.
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1.2 Practical doubts about the trade-off model
First, in terms of the descriptive accuracy of this trade-off account, a large 
body of literature in international relations has cast doubt on simplistic notions of 
national interest. Many theorists have rejected the claim that there is a set of 
“real” interests that can be derived from a rational assessment of national 
economic and political considerations. Rather, notions of national interest are 
shaped by a range of values, beliefs and interests that are not directly determined
i n
by rational calculations of narrow domestic interests. One subset of this critique 
involves a rejection of the conception of nation-states as separate, bounded units 
of interest, instead stressing the role of transnational or sub-national interests and
I Q
ties in shaping political action. While this discussion is of general interest to 
the question of refugee policy, I am more concerned with a second type of 
critique that stresses the role of shared values in defining interests. The concern 
here is not so much linked to the empirical claim that political decisions are 
shaped by sub- or transnational interests. Rather, the point is that it is misguided 
to conceive of interests - whether individual, national, sub-national or 
transnational - as independent of ethical values.19 Just as it is simplistic to 
assume that an individual’s interests are independent of her values and beliefs, so 
too is it is misleading to conceive of a national interest that is independent of 
broader ethical considerations. Commitment to ethical values will create implicit
17 For a useful collection o f  these critiques, see Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its 
Critics (New York : Columbia University Press, 1986), especially Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces,
States and World", pp. 204-54; and Richard Ashley, "The Poverty o f  Neorealism", pp. 255-300.
18 For a selection o f  contributions that can be loosely grouped under this category, see John
Burton, World Society; see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. N ye, Power and Interdependence:
World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and
Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis", in Keohane, Neorealism and
its Critics {op. cit.), pp. 131-57; Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw
Materials Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), Part
One.
19 This point has been made by a number o f  international relations theorists associated with the 
revival o f  “normative theory” in international relations theoiy - see Andrew Linklater, 
Transformation {op. cit.), pp. 23-5; Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A 
Constitutive Theory {op. cit.), especially pp. 141-2. On realist assumptions about amoralism in 
politics, see Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Norm ative Approaches (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 97. For a discussion o f  the question in relation to 
refugee policy, see Randolph Kent, "Emergency Aid: Politics and Priorities", in Refugees and  
International Relations, ed. Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 63- 
84.
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norms and expectations about what constitutes acceptable or desirable behaviour. 
I do not want to exaggerate the role of such ethical norms in shaping refugee 
policy. But it would be equally wrong to overlook it, especially on an issue as 
normatively laden as that of duties to refugees. In short, the notion of a 
dichotomy or trade-off between refugee rights and national interests seems 
descriptively simplistic.
Second, quite apart from the descriptive problems with the trade-off 
conception, there are also considerable practical risks in embracing this account. 
Drawing a distinction between national interests and ethical duty is not a 
particularly effective strategy for motivating support for a generous refugee 
policy. If adopting an ethical stance is characterised as in opposition to one’s 
interests - as self-abnegating rather than personally fulfilling - then it is not 
evident how advocates of refugee rights could motivate support for their cause. 
Castigating the defenders of national interest as self-centred and calling for a 
more purist moral approach is likely to be counter-productive, especially in a 
climate where the claims of liberal universalism appear to be so unfeasible. 
Again, as we shall see in the thesis, there are parallels here with the moral 
philosophical distinction between the personal disposition and the requirements 
of morality. The traditional Kantian distinction between will and moral duty
seems to have pervaded the discourse on national interest and universal ethics,
► • • 20 bringing with it the associated problems with generating moral motivation.
In addition to this practical problem of encouraging motivation, the trade­
off characterisation has a second prescriptive weakness: it limits the scope for 
defining and evaluating possible alternative solutions to refugee problems. 
Couching the relationship in terms of refugee rights versus national interests 
precludes the possibility of defining approaches which could meet the concerns of 
both nationals and refugees. For want of a better term, the trade-off conception 
constrains the development of “positive sum” approaches to refugee problems. 
The requirements of ethical duty are defined in rigid terms, with any
20 I shall unpack this question in detail in Chapter Five.
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incorporation of national concerns representing a deviation from universalist 
ethics. Yet recent developments in refugee policy seem to have transcended this 
trade-off conception. A number of innovative policy approaches have been 
debated and implemented over the past decade, which do seek to address the 
concerns of states whilst meeting the needs of refugees. For example, the 
temporary protection regime for Bosnian refugees established a form of short 
term asylum which was designed to ensure the safety of refugees for the duration 
of the conflict, whilst minimising the burden on receiving countries. An 
increased emphasis on protecting the “internally displaced” and monitoring of 
refugees after they have repatriated also aims to ensure the human rights of 
refugees through alternatives to asylum. However, these innovations have been 
ad hoc and for the most part lacking a coherent rationale. Debate on and 
evaluation of these policies has also suffered from a marked lack of consensus on
91how to define their success. Trapped in the trade-off characterisation, refugee 
rights activists often criticise them as a “compromise” of refugee rights under 
pressure from states.
These descriptive and practical short-comings of the trade-off account - 
the simplistic definition of national interest, the problem of motivation and the 
lack of framework for designing and evaluating new policies - would imply that 
the current impasse in the policy debate is partly a conceptual problem. While it 
would be a mistake.to underplay the conflicts of interest between states and 
refugees, the main concern being addressed here is that the current 
characterisation may be inadequate, and even counter-productive to the normative 
goals of liberal universalism.
21 For general overviews o f  the issues raised, see James Hathaway, Towards the Reformulation o f  
International Refugee Law: Research Report 1992-97  (Center for Refugee Studies, York 
University, Canada, 1997); Pirkko Kourula, Broadening the Edges: Refugee Definition and  
International Protection Revisited  (The Hague: Martinus N ijhoff Publishers, 1997). For examples 
o f  those opposed to the new approaches, see James C. Hathaway, “New  Directions to Avoid Hard 
Problems: The Distortion o f  the Palliative Role o f  Refugee Protection”, Journal o f  Refugee 
Studies 8:3 (1995), pp. 288-300; and Mikhael Barutciski, “The Reinforcement o f  Non-Admission 
Policies and the Subversion o f  UNHCR”, International Journal o f  Refugee Law , 8:1/2 (1996), pp. 
49-110.
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1.3 The inadequacy o f applied political theory analyses o f the problem
The inadequacy of current conceptions of refugee rights and national 
interests becomes more evident if one considers recent offerings of liberal 
political theorists on the question. The relatively few attempts that have been 
made to apply political theory to the specific problem of refugee policy can be 
divided into two categories.
Firstly, a number of contemporary political theorists have defended 
particular approaches to refugee policy as one component of a broader theory of
• 99justice. In most cases, theories of justice are advanced in the first instance for 
application at the domestic level. Even where such theories are premised on 
universal rights, the restriction of immigration is justified by the need to preserve 
and nurture pre-established political institutions and principles in the domestic 
arena. As we shall see in the following chapters, the attempt to justify restriction 
on these grounds usually takes one of two routes. Either the theorist introduces 
particularist arguments for restricting immigration, in which case the argument 
tends to result in an incoherent jumble of different types of justification based on
• •  •  9T •  •  •conflicting premises. Or restriction is justified on tenuous instrumental 
grounds.24 Alternatively, where liberal theories do remain faithful to their 
universalist premises, they either rely on implausible empirical assumptions about 
the limited scale of the refugee problem or a high degree of motivation to admit
9 c • •  * #refugees. These liberal universalist arguments will be considered in detail in 
chapters two to five. What it is important to note for now is that these few
22See, for example, Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice, op. cit., pp. 49-50; Bruce Ackerman, Social 
Justice in the Liberal S tate  (Hew Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 95; Jurgen 
Habermas, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State”, in 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f  Recognition, ed. Charles Taylor and Amy Gutman
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 142-3.
23 This is a problem with David Miller’s account o f  duties to non-nationals, in his On Nationality
(Oxford and N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1995). For a full discussion, see Chapter Three.
24
See Ackerman, Social Justice {op. cit.), p. 95.
25
Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition" {op. cit.), pp. 142-3; Ann Dummett, “The Transnational 
Migration o f  People seen from within a Natural Law Perspective”, in Free Movement: Ethical 
Issues in the Transnational Migration o f  People and o f  Money, ed. Brian Barry and Robert E. 
Goodin (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 169-80.
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attempts to directly address the refugee question hold out little promise of 
advancing the policy debate. As I shall argue, they rely on the same assumptions 
about the conflict between national interests and universal duties that characterise 
the policy debate.
The implications of the conceptual inadequacy of liberal universalist 
notions of duties to refugees seems to be entirely lost on most political theorists. 
The refugee problem is deemed to represent an aberrant case which is atypical of 
the questions confronting liberal political thought.26 Liberal theorists on the 
whole are preoccupied with issues of how to regulate competing claims within 
multicultural states, or how to ensure a fair distribution of resources between 
citizens. Most theories dealing with justice at the international level are more 
concerned with norms of justice for regulating relations between states, or the 
question of how to export liberal values to non-liberal states. The question of the 
nature and grounds of duties to refugees is something to be worked out once these 
more important components of the theory are in place. The failure of these 
conceptions of justice to provide a convincing account of the relationship 
between refugee rights and national interests is not considered to pose a 
fundamental challenge to such theories. Rather, it encourages them to view the 
refugee question as an exceptional case.
This marginalisation of the refugee issue in political theory is partly
redressed by the second category of literature, which draws on broad traditions in
01political theory to clarify and address refugee-related policy issues. Some recent 
works on immigration policy raise many issues relevant to refugee policy, indeed 
the refugee problem is often treated as a subset of the question of immigration. 
However, by drawing unproblematically on current political theory conceptions, 
these contributions tend to encounter a similar problem to the theories discussed 
above. Their direct application of political theory to the problem of refugees
26 Thus John Rawls, for example, justifies his failure to address the question o f  duties to refugees 
on the grounds that flight "is eliminated as a serious problem in a realistic utopia". See his The 
Law o f  Peoples (Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 9.
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takes on board the same assumed dichotomy between universal ethics and 
national interests. As such, it obscures deeper flaws in the way political theory 
addresses the issue of duties to non-nationals.
Gibney, for example, introduces a collection of essays on ethics and 
immigration policy with the questions “[c]an closed borders be morally justified? 
To what extent should a nation be able to maintain its “communal autonomy” 
through its immigration policies?” Likewise Whelan highlights the problem of 
migration pressures caused by global disparities in wealth, and the need for 
political philosophers “to inquire into what (if any) justifications can be offered 
for the power universally claimed by states to exclude foreigners from their 
territory...” The policy issues these authors seek to address parallel those raised 
in this thesis: namely, conflicts between the (more or less morally founded) 
claims of immigrants, and national interests. Yet the sources of these conflicts 
are unlikely to be clarified - let alone resolved - by considering whether states 
may legitimately restrict influx. Such an approach already assumes a distinction 
between the requirements of universal ethics and the interests and goals of 
nationals of the receiving state. The former require that receiving states respect 
the universal rights of refugees and (certain categories of) immigrants. And the 
latter call for some restriction on unlimited immigration, based on the value of 
preserving the institutions and values of the receiving society. The question of 
determining immigration or refugee policy thus becomes a matter of finding the 
right balance in a trade-off between two sets of conflicting ethical demands.
As with the liberal theories of justice discussed above, these political 
theory discussions of immigration reinforce the notion of a dichotomy between 
refugee rights and national interests. The theoretical enquiry is defined from the 
outset in such a way as to preclude the influence of conceptions of universal
27 Gibney, Open Borders? {op. cit.); Barry and Goodin, Free M ovement {op. cit.); Rainer 
Baubock, Transnational Citizenship: Membership and Rights in International Migration
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994).
28Gibney, Open Borders? {ibid.), p. xiii.
29
Frederick G. Whelan, "Citizenship and Freedom o f  Movement: An Open Admission Policy", in 
Open Borders? C losed Societies?: The Ethical and Political Issues, ed. Mark Gibney (New York 
and London: Greenwood, 1989), pp. 3-4.
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duties on definitions of national interest. The only possible conclusion of such 
enquiries will be some form of trade-off or compromise between the distinct 
values of national interest and universal rights.
Drawing together these points, one of the reasons for the current impasse 
in the debate on refugee policies seems to be an inadequate account of the 
relationship between refugee rights and national interests. Attempts to apply 
political theory to the issue as thus defined can do little to resolve these issues, or 
even to clarify the nature of the conflict between the two sets of interests.
1.4 The need fo r  a critique o f liberal universalist accounts o f moral agency
The failure of applied political theory to address these questions suggests 
either that the wrong questions are being asked, i.e. that political theory is not 
being applied to the policy debate in the most constructive way. Or it implies that 
political theory is itself deficient - that the simplistic nature of the characterisation 
stems from the conceptual and theoretical poverty of political theory, and 
especially the liberal tradition. It is this more radical claim that will be pursued in 
the thesis. The claim is that the inability to adequately conceptualise the problem 
of refugee rights is symptomatic of a deeper, unresolved tension in liberal theory 
regarding the relationship between universal and particular duties. This 
inadequate conception originally shaped, and now serves to constrain, the debate 
on refugee policy. Thus the impasse in the refugee policy debate is not simply 
attributable to muddled or simplistic thinking: the origins of the trade-off model 
can be traced to a deeply ingrained assumption in liberal thought. Namely, the 
assumption that there is a dichotomy between a personal, particularist 
perspective, which comprises personal characteristics and interests, as well as 
particularist social ties, values and beliefs; and an impartial, ethical perspective, 
which is abstracted from these particularist elements, and which should serve as a 
constraint on the pursuit of self-interest.
In order to defend this claim, I shall present an analysis and critique of 
liberal universalist theories at two different levels. First, I shall consider whether
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liberal universalism can overcome the practical problems outlined above without 
fundamentally revising its ontological assumptions about moral agency and the 
relationship between personal and impartial viewpoints. This analysis will be 
predominantly first order, or what I term a “thin” critique: it will consider whether 
liberal universalism can overcome the problem of feasibility through revising the 
content of its normative prescriptions, or through elaborating a plausible theory of 
moral motivation. This initial thin critique is important for two reasons. First, 
given that the aim of the thesis is to bolster liberal universalist prescriptions of 
duties to refugees, we should consider whether this can be done without 
dispensing with the second order claims of liberal universalism. After all, the 
analysis is not primarily motivated by doubts about the philosophical foundations 
o f liberalism or its individualist conception of the self. The main concern is a 
practical question about how to justify refugee rights. The second order questions 
about liberal universalist ontology are only raised once it is firmly established that 
first order revisions will not suffice. In other words, once it becomes clear that 
more radical modifications are required to provide an adequate justification for 
first order liberal universalist claims. The second reason for analysing liberal 
universalist theories in some detail is that in the course of this “thin” critique I 
will be able to tease out tensions and problems that are common to these theories, 
and which will help indicate where the deeper fault-lines in liberal universalism 
are located. The question of duties to refugees enables one to draw out these 
problems in an especially clear way. For the configuration of moral and practical 
problems raised by refugee policy provides us with a unique insight into the 
weaknesses of liberal universalist assumptions about moral agency and 
motivation.
The second layer of more radical critique will build on the first section, 
examining the sources of these first order problems. It will locate the origins of 
the problem of feasibility in liberal universalism’s commitment to a rationalist 
conception of moral agency and motivation. This second order critique will argue 
that liberal claims about the role of reason and impartiality are untenable, and 
show how these claims are at the root of the problem of feasibility in liberal 
political theory. The thesis will offer an alternative account of moral motivation
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<and agency, which rejects the assumed split between an impartial and personal 
perspective. The account will be substantiated by drawing on psychological 
theories of moral development and motivation, which reinforce my claims about 
the relationship between personal and impartial viewpoints. This alternative 
account - which I term the “non-rationalist” account of moral agency - constitutes 
an attempt to overcome the practical problems associated with liberal 
universalism, whilst retaining its substantive first order commitment to refugee 
rights.
So while the thesis is motivated by a practical concern, it embarks on a 
theoretical discussion that has far wider repercussions for moral and political 
philosophy. For the practical problem of refugee policy is not simply an 
exceptional case that can be safely ignored by liberal universalism. Rather, this 
specific set of issues highlights the problem of motivation and moral agency in 
liberal universalist theory in a particularly stark fashion. It forces liberal theorists 
to confront a set of problems that have for the most part been overlooked by 
political theory, but which are highly relevant to a range of moral questions.30
To recapitulate, the linkages between theory and practice in this thesis are 
two-fold. On the one hand, the practical problem of refugee policy triggers the 
need for theoretical analysis. Theory must be applied to a specific practical 
problem to help overcome an impasse in the policy debate. But at the same time, 
the practical problem itself helps to unearth problems with theory that have been 
obscured in other discussions of liberal universalism. So the practical problem is 
not simply a catalyst for the theoretical discussion, but has a more active role in 
pin-pointing the flaws in liberal universalism.
30 One important reason for this neglect seems to be the supposed priority o f  other concerns - 
especially the problem o f  conflict - in the international sphere. These problems were often seen as 
taking precedence over questions o f  universal justice, and meant that the radical implications o f  
liberal universalism were not acknowledged (see Chapter Four for a fuller discussion o f  this 
point). The issues o f  refugees challenges this prioritisation, thus providing an excellent case for 
unpacking the problem o f  motivation in liberal universalist theory.
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2. Method of Analysis
2.1 A conceptual analytical approach
From the outset, the problem has clearly been defined as conceptual rather 
than empirical. The case has been made for reviewing how conceptions of the 
relationship between duties to refugees and compatriots may shape policy, rather 
than emphasising the role of empirical conditions, such as changes in economic 
policy or the nature of refugee flows. I am not denying that these empirical 
conditions are probably the most important factors shaping refugee policy. But I 
would also claim that shared beliefs and values significantly influence how we 
define refugee rights and national interests. In other words, the empirical 
conditions and the practical responses required could be conceptualised in a 
number of different ways. It is these different conceptions of duties to refugees 
that are the focus of this thesis. The aim is to find a way of conceptualising the 
current set of empirical conditions in a way that avoids the short-comings of 
liberal universalism, whilst retaining its general normative prescriptions regarding 
duties to refugees. The task of the thesis is therefore to examine the scope for 
changing conceptions of what duties we owe to refugees, under the assumption 
that the empirical conditions that have led to the current refugee crisis will largely 
hold constant. Any policy measures proposed will relate to possible ways of 
influencing conceptions of duties to refugees, rather than, for example, ways of 
influencing the level of flows, or modifying the international refugee regime. 
This is not because I do not think that such empirical changes are possible. It is 
because I believe that there is scope to address the current policy dilemma 
through a conceptual theoretical analysis that seeks to alter the way people 
understand this configuration of empirical conditions.
An important assumption underlying this conceptual approach is that 
prevalent political and moral ideas provide a framework within which people 
evaluate and rank the desirability of different actions and goals. By “prevalent” 
ideas, I mean the assumptions made about morality and society that shape 
philosophical and political debate on these questions, and the (often conflicting)
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theories and arguments invoked. These various concepts and theories of ethics, 
human nature and social interaction shape the policy debate and provide criteria 
for designing, justifying or criticising different approaches. In turn, changes in 
empirical conditions can also influence these concepts in three ways. Empirical 
changes can highlight internal inconsistencies in moral and political theories, 
reveal or imply the falsity of their assumptions about the phenomena they are 
describing or explaining, or demonstrate the practical impediments to the 
realisation of their goals.
But this claim about the interaction of ideas and events raises a further
question about how best to explain and influence these concepts. Here it is
important to distinguish between two different approaches to explanation. The
first, historical approach emphasises the role of historical analysis in
understanding and explaining the evolution of current conceptions of social
phenomena. It seeks to trace the development of different concepts and ideas,
and understand how these interacted with events to produce particular
1 1
conceptions of empirical phenomena. This type of historical account can help 
one understand how a particular configuration of ideas and events produced 
current conceptualisations of the relationship between refugee rights and interests.
The historical approach has considerable merits. It highlights the 
contingency of current conceptions, suggesting the fluidity of empirical 
conditions, providing an important reminder that things have not always been this 
way, and may change substantially in the future. And it suggests possible 
changes in the way in which such phenomena could be characterised. Perhaps 
most importantly, it can provide a standard of comparison or contrast to help 
characterise what is distinct about current phenomena and concepts. This 
approach is therefore clearly important for placing current policy problems and 
concepts in a broader perspective. It may also indicate the possible scope and 
direction of changes in empirical conditions and political and moral thought.
31 For a good example o f  this approach in the history o f  liberal political thought, see Ian Shapiro, 
The Evolution o f  Rights in Liberal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 6, 
18.
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Following this approach, Chapter One will briefly trace the evolution of concepts 
of duties to refugees and national interests, and how they were influenced by 
historical events in shaping current characterisations of the refugee crisis.
However, the historical approach cannot in itself provide a detailed 
inventory of existing alternatives to this conceptualisation, and does not therefore 
constitute an adequate basis for examining different available conceptions of 
duties to refugees. Nor does it offer much guidance for how one is to choose 
between different conceptions. Historical analyses are either silent on the issue of 
prescription, or where they are explicitly attached to normative goals, they tend to 
be teleological or determinist. So while it may be perfectly adequate for the 
purposes of explanation, historical analysis alone does not provide the requisite 
tools for policy prescription.
The second more conceptual approach helps address this deficiency. 
Rather than trace the evolution of concepts, it seeks to evaluate existing 
conceptions and theories using a number of moral, practical and conceptual 
criteria. Different theories are tested against these standards, which typically 
include factors such as moral intuitions or convictions and conceptual consistency 
and coherence. The procedure for evaluating different conceptions involves 
testing various available theories against the chosen criteria. Where the theory 
does not conform to the given criteria, it may either be modified or rejected. The 
conceptual approach to analysis is thus explicit about the criteria for an adequate 
theory or conceptual framework, setting out the grounds on which one chooses 
between different theories and conceptions.
Rawls’ notion of reflective equilibrium is a good example of a conceptual 
analytical approach. Reflective equilibrium involves testing “our considered 
moral judgements” against different conceptions of ethics or justice, to see which 
theories best fit these judgements. Reflective equilibrium is “reached after a 
person has weighed various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his 
judgements to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions (and
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the corresponding conception).” The process of revision is not necessarily one 
way: J. L. Mackie usefully characterises it as a process of adjusting either or both 
our judgements and some set of principles “until the most satisfactory coherent
' y ' i
compromise is reached.” The Rawlsian model is a good starting-point for the 
purposes of this thesis. Indeed, the process of matching different conceptions 
with one’s considered convictions seems to be a good method for ensuring that 
one finds a theory consistent with one’s first order commitments - in my case the 
commitment to promoting a more generous refugee policy. Rawls’ method also 
puts a premium on conceptual coherence, another important condition for an 
adequate theory. So I shall follow the Rawlsian model in adopting these two 
criteria for evaluating different theories: those of normative desirability, and 
conceptual coherence.
There is a third criterion I shall include, which concerns the practical 
feasibility of the conception. It was suggested in the section on political theory 
that questions of feasibility have an important bearing on the adequacy of a 
theory. This is not simply because an unfeasible theory is of little practical use. 
More seriously, I would argue that unfeasible moral or political goals may 
actually be counter-productive. As I suggested earlier in the discussion of liberal 
theories of universal rights, stringent conceptions of duty may seem impossible to 
realise, rendering them irrelevant to practical debate. This is not to say that 
fundamental normative goals should be abandoned simply because they are not 
considered feasible. But it does imply that where a theory is unable to show how 
people are or could be motivated to respect its requirements, we should consider 
it as deficient, at least for practical purposes.34 Indeed, it is precisely this type of 
practical inadequacy that leads me to question liberal universalist assumptions 
about moral agency. The importance of practical feasibility and how this should
32 John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 48.
33 J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1983), p. 105.
34 I am in agreement with Thomas Nagel on this point, when he argues that “The danger o f  
utopianism comes from the political tendency, in pursuit o f  the ideal o f  moral equality, to put too 
much pressure on individual motives or even to attempt to transcend them entirely through an 
impersonal transformation o f  the social individual. A nonutopian solution requires a proper 
balance between these elem ents...” Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality  (Oxford and N ew  
York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 24.
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influence one’s selection of political theory will be elaborated in the course of the 
thesis.
In summary, an adequate conception of duties to refugees should meet 
three criteria: normative desirability, internal coherence, and practical feasibility. 
These criteria will be applied to evaluate different liberal universalist theories in 
Part One of the thesis, and again in the Conclusion to assess the adequacy of the 
alternative non-rationalist account offered in Part Two.35
2.2 Scope
I have stressed that the thesis aims to address the policy problem of the 
perceived conflict between refugee rights and national interests. By taking this 
policy problem as the starting-point of the analysis, I am implicitly accepting a 
number of presumptions about the nature of the problem of refugee influx. Most 
importantly, I am accepting the existing legal definition of “refugee”. Refugees 
are defined in international law as those who have fled their country “owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.36 In practice, many 
states also offer various forms of protection and asylum to those fleeing more 
generalised violence and armed conflict. A number of commentators have 
questioned the relevance of this category on various grounds. It has been argued 
that those fleeing poverty or natural disasters are as much in need of asylum as 
those fleeing violence and persecution; and that the most serious victims of 
persecution and violence may not be able to cross international borders, or even
35 It should be noted that other criteria are employed to evaluate the moral philosophical and 
psychological theories discussed in Chapters Five and Six. Since these theories are more abstract 
than the political theories discussed in Part One, in does not make sense to subject them to the 
conditions o f  practical feasibility and normative desirability. Instead, they are evaluated on 
grounds o f  plausibility and internal coherence. See the introduction to Chapter Five and the 
Conclusion.
36 Article 1 (A.2), Convention Relating to the Status o f  Refugees (Geneva, 28 July 1951 (189
UNTS 137)).
37 See, for example, Hathaway, The Law o j Refugee Status {op. cit.), pp. 19-20; Goodwin-Gill, 
The Refugee in International Law {op. cit.), pp. 21-6.
29
to leave their homes. Indeed, I would agree that the distinction between these 
categories often has little ethical relevance within a framework of liberal 
universalism thought. The reason for retaining the narrower definition of refugee 
is political rather than ethical. In the current restrictionist climate, even those 
who meet the existing international legal definition are not guaranteed asylum. 
The continued respect for existing provisions on refugee rights is far from 
assured, let alone the acceptance of far greater numbers of forced economic 
migrants, or the extension of protection to those unable to flee. My priority is to 
tiy to encourage a more liberal policy towards those refugees who have at least in 
principle been acknowledged as legally entitled to asylum. The question of 
extending the legal definition to cover forced migrants and other victims of 
human rights abuse should only be broached once the recognition of this narrower 
category is assured.39
A second limitation in the scope of the thesis concerns the types of 
theories under discussion. I am limiting the discussion to an analysis of liberal 
conceptions of duties to refugees. Liberal political theory is the most obvious 
choice for characterising duties to refugees, partly because it has produced the 
universalist theories that underpin current international provisions on refugee and 
human rights. However problematic the refugee and human rights regimes may 
be, they have been the objective of a remarkable level of international consensus, 
and do exert a considerable - and I would argue generally positive - influence on 
the refugee policies of liberal democratic states. The liberal tradition in a broad 
sense also provides the prevalent moral framework for debating and justifying 
asylum policy in liberal democracies. This is not to say that liberal theories 
underpin a commitment to the international refugee regime in all cultures. 
Islamic, African or other concepts of asylum may provide a different justification
38 See Patricia Tuitt, "Rethinking the Refugee Definition", in Refugee Rights and Realities, ed. 
Frances N icholson and Patrick Twomey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.
106-18.
39 Indeed, many refugee campaigners and academics argue that opening up the current legal 
definition could lead to a further dilution o f  current provisions, given the current restrictionist 
climate. See, for example, the contribution by Erika Feller, Director o f  the Department o f  
International Protection, UNHCR, at the Portuguese Presidency Council Conference on Justice 
and Home Affairs, Lisbon, 15-16 June 2000 (http:/www.unhcr.ch/issues/asylum/lisbon).
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for recognising the rights of refugees in other cultures.40 But these cultural 
variations are not the concern of this thesis, which will focus on the more narrow 
range of political theories used to justify refugee rights in liberal democracies. 
Within this category of liberal democratic thought, I shall concentrate on what 
might broadly be characterised as the Anglo-Saxon tradition of liberal theory. 
And where I need to refer to more particular characteristics of the debate over 
refugee policy, I shall focus on the British context. Having said this, the analysis 
of political and moral theory may be more or less applicable to other 
industrialised liberal democracies. It may also have wider resonance, insofar as 
non-liberal states also adhere to standards of international refugee law grounded 
in similar moral and political values.
3. Outline of the Argument
The thesis is divided into two main parts. Part One, which comprises 
Chapters One to Four, provides a detailed analysis of liberal universalist 
conceptions of duties to refugees. Chapter One introduces the discussion by 
examining the historical origins of current conceptions of the crisis in refugee 
policy. It traces the origins of liberal concepts of duties to non-nationals, and 
considers how these conflicted with notions o f nationalism and the national 
interest. The chapter then discusses how these ideas influenced attitudes to 
refugee influx in Britain before the twentieth century, and then in response to the 
escalation of refugee flows in the inter-war period, the Cold War era, and since 
the 1970s.
Having examined the origins of the current crisis in refugee policy, 
Chapters Two, Three and Four take up the task of finding an adequate conception 
of duties to refugees in liberal theory. A range of different theories are assessed 
on the criteria of normative desirability, conceptual coherence and practical
40 See, for example, Gaim Kibreab, African Refugees: Reflections on the African Refugee 
Problem  (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985); Joseph Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on 
Human Rights for Contemporary China", in The East Asian Challenge fo r  Human Rights, ed. 
Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell; and for a more general discussion, John Charvet “The
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feasibility. Chapter Two examines utilitarian and right-based forms of liberal 
universalism. It argues that utilitarian accounts fail to meet the criterion of 
normative desirability - they are unable to produce a conception of duties to 
refugees that is ethically acceptable, suggesting the need for some theory of 
rights. However, right-based universalist theories encounter a serious problem of 
feasibility, imposing duties that are overly stringent and which deny the 
significance of particular ties.
Chapter Three attempts to rectify this short-coming of right-based 
universalism by examining theories that incorporate a layer of “special” or 
“particular” duties in addition to universal duties. However, the attempt to 
combine universalist and particularist values creates two types of problem. First, 
theories that embrace a conception of basic rights as trumping other particular 
interests encounter a similar problem of feasibility to that discussed in Chapter 
Two. Second, theories that do not accept the priority of universal rights result in 
a confused combination of universalist and particularist premises that creates 
conceptual incoherence.
In a final attempt to find a liberal universalist theory that meets the three 
criteria, Chapter Four examines social contract theories. These theories claim to 
address the problem of feasibility by deriving their norms from agreement 
between parties to a contract. But this creates two types of problems for social 
contract theories. Either they derive justice from the self-interested motivation of 
contractors, producing norms that are morally unacceptable and unlikely to 
extend beyond borders. Or they derive more ethically driven conceptions of 
global justice, but only by making highly implausible claims about the moral 
motivation of contractors. In this second case, social contract theories encounter 
the problem of feasibility described earlier on. The explicit treatment of the 
question of motivation in social contract theories helps elucidate the sources of 
the problem of motivation in liberal theory: namely, its assumptions about the 
split between impartial and personal perspectives in moral agency.
Possibility o f  a Cosmopolitan Ethical Order Based on the Idea o f  Universal Human Rights,” 
Millenium  27:3 (1998), pp. 523-41.
32
Having failed to find an adequate liberal universalist conception of duties 
to refugees, Part Two of the thesis undertakes a more radical critique of the 
ontological and psychological premises of these theories. I argue that it is only 
through a revision of liberal universalist second order assumptions that one can 
derive a conception of duties to refugees that meets the three criteria. Drawing on 
the critique in Part One, Chapter Five analyses liberal universalist assumptions 
about the role of reason in moral agency. It challenges two related premises of 
liberal universalist theory: the “rationalist” claim that moral action is motivated 
by reason rather than desire; and the “cognitivist” claim that moral norms are 
derived from reason or from the structure of language rather than shared values. 
Instead, I defend what I term a “non-rationalist” account, which posits the inter­
dependence of reason, beliefs and desires in motivating moral action. Moral 
motivation is generated by desire rather than reason, and then mediated by shared 
beliefs and reason.
This philosophical account of moral motivation requires some 
substantiation in psychological theory, which I aim to provide in Chapter Six. 
Here, I challenge the prevalent cognitivist conception of moral development and 
motivation, criticising it on the grounds of empirical plausibility. I suggest an 
alternative Kleinian account, which locates the sources of moral motivation in the 
individual’s disposition to empathy, rather than her cognitive capacities. I build 
on this account to show how this empathic disposition is mediated by reason and 
beliefs to create more sophisticated forms of sympathy. I also explain how a 
desire for affirmation motivates the individual to internalise intersubjective values 
and beliefs, thus explaining motivation to respect forms of morality not related to 
sympathy.
Chapter Seven considers the implications of this non-rationalist account of 
moral motivation for our conception of duties to refuges. While the account set 
out in Chapters Five and Six rejects the cognitivist and rationalist assumptions of 
liberal universalism, it is still compatible with a commitment to first order liberal 
values. However, commitment to these values will be contingent on historical 
and cultural conditions, rather than guaranteed by the essential characteristics of
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human beings or the structure of language. The non-rationalist account can 
therefore meet the criterion of normative desirability, but only insofar as 
conceptions of universal rights are constitutive of those socialised in liberal 
democratic societies.
In the Conclusion I reiterate the case for the non-rationalist account, 
demonstrating how it meets the three criteria for an adequate account of duties to 
refugees. Finally, I round off the argument by outlining some of the practical 
implications of this account for refugee policy.
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PART I
CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM
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Chapter One  
The Origins of  the Crisis in Refugee Policy
It was suggested in the Introduction that the current impasse in the refugee 
policy debate is partly attributable to political theory conceptions of the 
relationship between universal liberal ethics and particular interests and ties. 
Liberal universalist notions of the split between interests and ethical duty are 
rendering conceptions of refugee rights increasingly unfeasible. Not only do 
liberal notions of universal duties seem overly stringent in the current political 
context. By juxtaposing them with notions of interests, liberal theory makes it 
difficult to see how people could be motivated to comply with these ethical 
demands. But while I have argued that the perception of a crisis in refugee policy 
is a relatively recent phenomenon, notions of both universal rights, and of 
supposedly conflicting particularist theories, have a long history in political 
thought. So the question arises as to why this conception of conflict between 
refugee rights and national interests did not emerge before. At the level of 
political theory, the question is that of why the (now evident) short-comings of 
liberal conceptions of duties to non-nationals were not clearly exposed in the past. 
Why, in other words, it was not evident that consistent practical application of 
universal rights would imply unfeasible obligations to non-nationals.
To answer this question, it is necessary to trace the historical emergence of 
this notion of a conflict between refugee rights and national interests, and how the 
conceptions of this conflict have shaped responses to refugee influx. While such 
an historical approach is not the main focus of the thesis, as I argued in the 
Introduction, it is nonetheless important for helping us grasp the distinct nature of 
the current conception of conflict, demonstrating its fluidity, and suggesting 
possibilities for changing it.
Providing such an historical account raises a number of questions about 
the evolution of political thought and its interaction with empirical events, some
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of which were already raised in the Introduction. I shall return to these questions
in section one of this chapter. The remainder of section one will be devoted to
tracing the development of notions of duties to non-nationals and national 
interests in political thought before the twentieth century. Section two will 
provide a more detailed analysis of how these ideas shaped conceptions of the 
refugee problem as it emerged in the twentieth century, and how this generated 
the current conception of a conflict between universal duties and particularism. 
Finally, in section three I shall summarise the relevant developments in moral and 
political thought, and how these interacted with empirical events to produce the 
current impasse in the refugee policy debate.
1. Origins of the Refugee Crisis in Political Thought
1.1 Development o f political thought and the refugee problem
Contemporary theorists draw on two main sets of values to justify refugee 
rights and the defence of national interests. The first set comprises what I have 
referred to as universalist theories, which include various conceptions of human 
rights, international justice or universal duties. Most of these theories can also be 
characterised as liberal in the broad sense, and it is a liberal variant of 
universalism that explicitly underlies international human rights and refugee 
law.41 Proponents of refugee rights therefore tend to draw on liberal conceptions 
of universal rights and international justice to justify their claims. The second set 
of theories rejects the universalist premises of these liberal theories, taking as 
their starting point the local or particular - usually community or nation. Such 
particularist accounts place duties to fellow nationals above obligations to other 
groups. This second category includes an eclectic range of theories, including 
romanticist and communitarian accounts of the moral relevance of special ties 
and community practices, and realist theories of international politics that defend 
national interests on more pragmatic grounds.
41 I shall define the term "liberal" more clearly in the next chapter, where I categorise different 
liberal theories. For the purposes o f  this discussion o f  the evolution o f  liberal notions o f  rights, 
the term is used loosely to denote theories that place emphasis on the value o f  individual freedom.
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Now while both categories of ideas have a long history in western thought, 
there are two main reasons why the current conception of a conflict between 
universalism and particularism in the context of refugee policy has only recently 
emerged. First, as I shall argue later, earlier theories in both the universalist and 
particularist categories did not have a clearly developed conception of the sorts of 
practical implications of their theories for duties to non-nationals that have now 
emerged. Liberal theories of rights, although from early on grounded in some 
conception of the shared characteristics of humans, were only gradually extended 
in scope to apply to individuals of all races. And even once they were extended 
in principle, for a variety of reasons, liberal political theories rarely recognised 
positive duties to assist individuals in other states. Neither did earlier forms of 
particularist and nationalist theories clarify the now familiar notion of the national 
prerogative of controlling immigration until fairly recently. Here the change in 
political thought reflects the evolution of the system of sovereign states and the 
rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century, as well as the development of 
notions of community.
But the emergence of a conception of conflict between refugee rights and 
national interests was also clearly affected by a second major factor: the changing 
nature of refugee flows and conditions in receiving countries. While conceptions 
of duties to non-nationals were shaped by prevalent ideas in moral and political 
thought, empirical events have in turn revealed tensions or short-comings in 
political theory conceptions. Thus while notions of universal rights and 
particularism may from the outset have differed in their philosophical foundations 
and practical implications, the conflict between the two in the matter of refugee 
policy has only emerged as the refugee problem itself has escalated. In periods 
when immigration and refugee flows were not considered to be problematic, the 
question of duties to refugees and its conflict with national interests simply did 
not arise.
This account of the role of political thought and empirical events in 
producing the current conception of conflict between refugee rights and national 
interests does of course make a number of assumptions about the relation between
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ideas and historical events. As I stated in the Introduction, I am assuming that 
political and moral ideas provide a framework within which people evaluate and 
the desirability and feasibility of different actions and goals. I assume that 
changes in empirical conditions can influence these ideas, through drawing 
attention to their conceptual deficiencies or practical short-comings. In the case 
at hand, changes in the nature and scale of refugee movements influenced ideas 
about duties to refugees in two ways. The refugee crises of the twentieth century 
seemed to highlight the incompatibility of two different strands of political 
thought, i.e. nationalist and liberal universalist; and it implied the practical 
unfeasibility of realising universalist duties.
Before considering these developments in more detail, I should make one 
final point about political thought and empirical events. While I have argued that 
empirical change can generate the revision of existing political and moral ideas, 
the account o f political and moral thought in section one of this Chapter will not 
examine in any detail the role of empirical conditions in shaping moral and 
political thought. My interest in the interaction between ideas and empirical 
phenomena is not so much as a means of explaining the evolution of political 
thought in general. Rather, I am concerned to show the influence on political 
thought of a particular set of practical questions, viz. duties to refugees. These 
practical problems did not emerge in a clear-cut form before the end of the last 
century. My account of pre-twentieth century political thought will therefore be 
more narrowly focused on the emergence of ideas that were later to influence 
conceptions o f duties to refugees. Only in part three, which deals with the 
refugee phenomenon in the twentieth century, will I consider in more detail the 
influence of empirical change on these notions of duties to non-nationals.
1.2 The evolution o f conceptions o f  universal rights
There are many different ways of charting the development of notions of 
universal rights, but I shall limit the discussion here to two main aspects. First, I 
shall outline the initial emergence of a recognisable conception of equal rights in 
political thought; and second, I shall consider the failure until fairly recently to
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apply these theories to the question of duties to non-nationals. Rather than 
attempting to explain why rights emerged in their current form, then, the analysis 
focuses on the negative question of why rights in classical theories were not seen 
to generate duties to non-nationals. This will help explain why universal rights 
have only recently been perceived as generating such inordinate demands. And it 
will provide a good basis for showing how empirical changes in the last decades 
have influenced conceptions of duties to non-nationals.
The notion of individual rights can be traced back to the concept of “ / ms”  
in early Roman law.42 lus originally denoted objective right - that which was 
good or fair - and only acquired its subjective form in mediaeval natural law 
theories. In the twelfth century, natural lawyers asserted that property, or 
dominium, was a ius, thus implying a subjective claim that generated 
requirements on the part of others. The definition of ius was subsequently 
extended in the early fifteenth century to denote a faculty or ability, hence the 
possibility of talking about a natural ius to freedom.43 Over the next two 
centuries, discussions of the nature and scope of such a ius often revolved around 
questions of duties to other peoples. Spanish colonisation of America at the turn 
of the fifteenth century sparked a theological debate about the natural rights of 
slaves, with the Dominican Vitoria famously asserting that natural liberty could 
not be exchanged at any price except life itself.44 Religious wars and the Ottoman 
threat also influenced the emergence of theories of ius gentium in this period, 
notably Grotius’ theory of rights which denied a natural duty to obey the 
sovereign (although he retracted this by denying a right of resistance in practice). 
Grotius’ theory is also striking in its assertion of a right to intervene on behalf of 
the natural rights of subjects of other sovereigns, although again, this did not 
generate a practical right for subjects to rebel against their own rulers.45
42 Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 8.
43 Tuck, N atural Rights Theories {ibid.), p. 27.
44 F. de Vitoria, "De Indis", in Vitoria: Political Writings [1534], ed. A Pageden (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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The mediaeval and renaissance emphasis on the law of peoples shifted in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to a preoccupation with questions of 
national politics and the role of the state. The classical social contract theorists 
focused on the problems of political legitimacy and the property rights and civil 
liberties of citizens. Hobbes’ social contract theory contained many elements of a 
recognisably modem theory of rights. Rights were grounded in the natural 
capacities of man, and thus the good was equated with individual interest. His 
state of nature depicted men as naturally equal in power and reason, and this 
equality provided moral and pragmatic grounds for their equal participation in the 
contract.46 Locke’s liberal theory also stressed the equal capacity of individuals, 
although individual rights were derived from duties to God, rather than grounded 
in human interests. Nonetheless, these rights were also in the interests of human 
beings and knowable by reason, thus opening the possibility for a secular theory 
of rights. Locke also took the significant step of asserting a greater right to 
resistance, making the sovereign’s authority conditional on his respecting the 
rights of subjects.47
These classical theories already contained many of the central elements of 
modem liberal theories of rights: men in the state of nature have equal natural 
rights, and they are equal participants in the social contract. The claim that men 
had a natural interest in securing certain rights, and that they would recognise 
these interests through the exercise of reason, later became the explicit grounding 
for theories of the rights of man and subsequently human rights.48 Yet in light of 
the emergence of such individualist and universalist accounts of individual rights 
by the eighteenth century, it is all the more striking that these theories were not 
perceived to have explicit implications for duties to the nationals of other 
countries. If it was accepted that rights were the natural attributes of all men, in
45 Hugo Grotius, Grotius on the Rights o f  War and Peace [1625], trans. William Whewell 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953).
46
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan  [1651] (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1957), pp. 63-83.
47 John Locke, Second Treatise o f  Government [1690], ed. Richard Cox (Wheeling, Illinois:
Harlan Davidson, 1982), p. 128.
48 Consider, for example, Article 1 o f  the 1948 Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights (General 
Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) o f  10 December 1948), which declares that “All human beings 
are bom free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience.”
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retrospect it might appear odd that classical theorists did not construct theories of 
universal duties, especially given the extensive treatment of such issues in earlier 
natural law theories.
We can clarity this disparity between contemporary and classical 
treatment of the question by categorising the differences along two axes: the 
question of the scope of rights and the duties they generated; and that of the 
content of individual rights. This conceptual scheme will help indicate the types 
of historical explanations that might account for the relatively recent emergence 
o f notions of duties to non-nationals (although I will not elaborate such an 
account here49).
On the question of the scope of duties to non-nationals, one can 
distinguish three different senses in which the category of right-holders was 
restricted. First, despite the presumed equality of men in the state of nature, the 
scope of political rights was limited in classical contract theories. Women were 
not equally capable of reason, nor, in most theories, were those from non-civilised 
cultures, although it is not always clear if this is due to natural inferiority or a lack 
of development.50 Hence slavery was morally acceptable, at least until the 
emergence of the anti-slavery movement in the nineteenth century. These 
limitations in scope were echoed in the American and French declarations on the 
late eighteenth century, and went largely unchallenged at the national level until 
political mobilisation of the working classes and women’s movement in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Closely linked to the question of the moral subjects of rights was the issue
49 Clearly, a causal explanation o f  this “gafr” in rights theories would require an account o f  the 
socio-econom ic context in which these theories emerged, and the national and international 
political questions with which they were grappling. I shall narrow my focus to clarifying the 
nature o f  the disparities between current and past conceptions from a contemporary perspective.
50 For a fuller account o f  the treatment o f  women in classical liberal thought, see Diana Coole, 
"Women, Gender and Contract: Feminist Interpretations", in The Social Contract from  Hobbes to 
Rawls, ed. David Boucher and Paul Kelly (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 191- 
210. There was some debate on wom en’s rights in the late eighteenth century, especially 
following the publication o f  Maiy Wollstonecraft's Vindication o f  the Rights o f  Women [1792], 
ed. Miriam Brody (London: Penguin, 1992), although little progress was made on political rights
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of the level of development required to justify exercising natural rights. Thus 
many liberal theorists who believed in the natural equality of men (and even of 
women) argued for limiting the scope of legal rights of non-civilised cultures. 
Some of the most progressive nineteenth century British liberals argued that 
colonisation was beneficial to inferior peoples, who would benefit from the 
spread of civilisation. And Mill denied that there was a duty to intervene to 
protect the rights of subjects of other states, on the grounds that only peoples who 
were sufficiently mobilised to fight for their own rights were capable of 
exercising autonomy.51
The third sense in which the scope of rights was restricted concerns the 
preoccupation with political questions within the state. Liberal political theory 
from the seventeenth century onwards was dominated by national concerns, such 
as the problem of political obligation, and how to maximise prosperity. Rights 
were primarily instruments for ensuring the right balance of freedom and state 
interference. From a more negative point of view, the often precarious relations 
between European states in this period meant that questions of duties to non­
nationals became to a large extent irrelevant. Insofar as the international sphere 
was characterised by insecurity, the central problem of international political 
theory remained that of regulating conflict between states rather than ensuring the 
rights of all individuals. The apparent disparity between universalist 
justifications of theories of individual rights at the national level, and the lack of 
such rights in relations between states, reflected the perceived salience of the 
problem of conflict between states. This concern is clearly present in the 
(limited) writings of social contract theorists on international politics, with 
Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant more or less converging in their conclusion about the
until over a century later.
51 Both o f  these grounds for limiting the exercise o f  rights - the subjects o f  rights and the capacity 
to exercise rights - could, o f  course be explained in the context o f  an emerging capitalist class, 
concerned to defined their economic freedom and extend political influence, and in the case o f  
imperialism to exploit new markets. For the classic account, see Karl Marx, “On the Jewish 
Question” [1843] in K arl Marx: Early Texts, ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), pp. 
85-114; and for a Marxist history o f  classical social contract theory, C. B. MacPherson, The 
P olitical Theory o f  Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford and N ew  York: Oxford 
University Press, 1962).
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unfeasibility or undesirability of a global social contract.52
The second axis of change in concepts of duties to non-nationals concerns 
the substance of rights. The eighteenth and nineteenth century emphasis on 
negative liberty was predominantly geared towards limiting the role of the state.53 
Rights were used as tools for generating duties of forbearance, not obligations to 
assist individuals. The rights of non-nationals, where they were acknowledged at 
all, would therefore be best realised by a domestic contract between rulers and 
ruled. Yet the emphasis on “negative” liberty was clearly not common to all 
political and moral theories: there were other important strands in western 
thought that invoked a range of different values and objectives, and which also 
served to influenced liberal theories. Many of these other conceptions were 
integrated into liberal theories, enabling them to broaden out and encompass a 
greater range of conditions for human flourishing. So it should be stressed that 
while this emphasis on negative liberty and property rights was an important 
strand in eighteenth and nineteenth century politics, the development of liberal 
political thought was also profoundly influenced by a number of other 
conceptions of universal duty.
Among these influential strands in political and moral thought were 
Christian notions of charity and obligation, ideas which were central to the 
tradition of natural law and explicitly influenced the work of social contract 
theorists such as Locke, Rousseau and Kant.54 Also missing from this narrow 
conception are a variety of teleological moral and political theories, which found 
early articulation in ancient Greek philosophy and later influenced ideas about 
“positive freedom” and human flourishing in the thought of Rousseau, Hegel and 
Marx. Again, many of these theories influenced the development of liberal
52 Issues o f  duties to individuals in other states arose mainly in relation to the treatment o f  one’s 
own nationals or religious kindred in other countries. See Evan Luard, "The Origin o f  
International Concern over Human Rights", in The International Protection o f  Human Rights, ed. 
Evan Luard (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967), pp. 7-324.
53 J. W. Gough, The Social Contract: A Critical Study o f  its Developm ent (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1936), p. 147.
54 On the influence o f  Augustinian theology on Rousseau and Kant, see Taylor, Sources o f  the 
Self, {op. cit.), pp. 361-6.
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theories of rights. Another more teleological strand can be found in eighteenth 
century theories of moral sentiment and later utilitarian theories. These diverse 
notions of duties, benevolence and the good life influenced liberal as well as 
particularist theories, but in many cases their moral prescriptions were not until 
recently codified in the language of individual rights.55 Notions of duty and 
benevolence were often relegated to the private sphere of charitable institutions or 
the church, or couched in terms of social goals rather than individual rights.56 
The same applied to notions of duties to non-nationals, which were associated
•  • • <7with Christian duty or charity rather than duties generated by universal rights.
Nonetheless, theories of rights did eventually take on board a far wider 
conception of the conditions for individual freedom or flourishing. Liberal 
thought was profoundly influenced by changing conceptions of the role and 
functions of the state in the nineteenth century. These conceptions were in turn 
influenced by the demands of a politically mobilised working class, and the
f  o
articulation of more radical notions of emancipation and equality. Again, while
these social and economic claims were not initially couched in the language of 
rights, they were integrally bound up with aspirations to freedom. The “New 
Liberalism” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and what Shapiro 
terms the “Keynesian moment” in the history of liberal thought represented an 
important shift in notions of the material preconditions for the genuine exercise of 
autonomy.59 Once the link between socio-economic equality and liberty had been 
made in this way, it was a short conceptual step to asserting universal rights to
55 Thus, for example, Jeremy Bentham famously criticised the French Declaration o f  Rights - see 
"Anarchical Fallacies", in Human Rights, ed. A. I. Melden (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1970), pp. 28- 
39. Hegel and Rousseau did, o f  course, both advocate a conception o f  rights, but in both cases 
they were grounded in a rather different way, and had a somewhat different role than rights in the 
individualist theories o f  English liberalism.
56 Classical utilitarian theories defined the right in terms o f  maximisation o f  social utility rather 
than individual rights. Despite subsequent attempts to reconcile the two, the structural distinction 
between these approaches still influences rights discourse, with many claiming that more 
“positive” interests in welfare are not the legitimate subjects o f  rights, which should cover only the 
sphere o f  negative, or civil liberties.
57 For a good example, see Daniel Defoe, A B rief H istory o f  the Poor Palatine Refugees, Lately
Arriv'd in England (London: 1709).
58 The obvious examples are Marx and Engels, but such ideas were also propounded by left 
liberals such as Hobhouse and Keynes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
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subsistence, shelter, education, health-care and so on. Most contemporary liberal 
theories now advocate some combination of negative and positive freedom, 
although they strike the balance between social justice and legal freedoms in 
different ways.60 As I shall argue, it is partly this extension of the substance of 
rights that has rendered the demands of universal justice so difficult to meet.
1.3 Nationalism and the national interest
While conceptions of the scope and substance of liberal rights were being 
extended from the eighteenth century onwards, notions of nationalism were also 
becoming more prevalent in this period.61 The rise of nationalism and theories of 
the moral relevance of the nation-state was closely bound up with the processes of 
state consolidation and democratisation in Europe. These empirical factors also 
had a direct impact on the phenomenon of refugees: state consolidation and 
nationalism both generated large numbers of refugees; and encouraged 
restrictions on their entry in countries of refuge. In examining the emergence of 
theories of nationalism and the national interest and their impact on notions of 
duties to refugees, we therefore need to examine two sets of processes. First, the 
process of state formation and its relation to notions of nationalism. And second, 
the impact of these empirical developments and political ideas on refugees and 
asylum.
Central to understanding the emergence of moral and political theories of 
nationalism was the consolidation of a number of European nation-states from the 
fifteenth century onwards, notably Spain, France, England and Holland. A 
combination of industrial development, demographic changes and international
59 Ian Shapiro, The Evolution o f  Rights in Liberal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), p. 153.
60 Rawls’ theory o f  justice is an example o f  this, especially his notion o f  “primary goods”. See 
John Rawls, A Theory o f  ju stice  (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp.90-5.
61 I shall follow  Mayall in using the term “nationalism” in a loose sense, to denote the doctrine 
that “the world is (or should be) divided into nations and that the nation is the only proper basis 
for a sovereign state and the ultimate source o f  governmental authority." James Mayall, 
Nationalism and International Society  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 3. This 
definition has the advantage o f  encompassing both liberal and more “organicist” conceptions o f  
nationalism.
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conflict led to the gradual centralisation and rationalisation of the state’s control 
over a clearly demarcated territory and the population within it.62 This process 
was characterised by the growth of centralised administrative structures to 
implement policies of taxation, law and order, military recruitment and education. 
These nations were able to achieve military and economic power in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, and set an example to other aspiring nation-states. 63
The consolidation of the nation-state was often aided by, and in turn 
encouraged the development of, notions of national identity. The centralisation of 
administration and education and the imposition of a national language 
encouraged the emergence or strengthening of a shared national culture and 
identity. The development of such a sense of shared characteristics and common 
purpose was essential in order to ensure loyalty to the sovereign, raise taxes and 
mobilise soldiers for war. The moral and political relevance of such a sense of 
patriotism was articulated by Rousseau in the eighteenth century in his concept of 
the “general will” which transcended the aggregate individual interests of 
citizens. This more idealised concept of nationality was given impetus by the 
French revolution, which identified national self-determination with democratic 
popular resistance against monarchical rule. While the French conception of 
nationality was essentially liberal and had a civic conception of membership, the 
idea of popular national resistance was given a more particularist slant by 
subsequent theories and political movements. Rousseau’s notion of general will
62 For accounts o f  the early history o f  nation-state formation, see Charles Tilly, The Formation o f  
National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Hagen 
Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present, trans. William E.
Yuill (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
63 Different authors place relative emphasis on various o f  these factors. Gellner, for example, 
stresses the role o f  shared education and culture in creating a series o f  internally homogeneous 
cultural pools. See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, New Perspectives on the Past 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). Hobsbawm places more emphasis on the influence o f  state policies o f  
conscription and taxation on mobilising support for the nation state - see Eric J. Hobsbawm, 
Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). In the case o f  Michael Mann, the relevant factor was popular resistance 
against these state interventions, which motivated a “drive to democracy” and expanded functions 
o f  the state. Mann, "A Political Theory o f  Nationalism and its Excesses", in Notions o f  
Nationalism, ed. Sukumar Periwal (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 44- 
64. Others such as Schulze and Tilly {op. cit.) emphasise patterns o f  conflict within European 
states that generated the formation o f  national coalitions. W e need not decide between the 
different theories here - what is important for this analysis is the impact o f  these processes on 
conceptions o f  duties to non-nationals.
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was expanded in nineteenth century romantic thought, notably in Herder’s 
conception of volk, and his expressivist theory of language.64 National liberation 
and unification movements, as well as political elites seeking legitimacy, found it 
useful to highlight the distinctive linguistic or ethnic characteristics of 
nationalities in order to mobilise support for existing or aspiring states. The 
identification of ethnic or linguistic characteristics with state-building was to be a 
major cause of refugee flows from the late nineteenth century onwards, as we 
shall see in the next section.
But the growing importance of the nation-state and nationalism also had 
profound implications for the treatment of refugees. As the state’s jurisdiction 
over its population and territory was consolidated, the criteria of membership and 
thus the distinction between citizens and non-citizens became more important.65 
And the increasing democratisation of nation-states, part product of the need for 
popular support for state consolidation, lent a new significance to citizenship. 
Not only did the state guarantee security, it was also to become the guarantor of 
civil and political rights, and increasingly of social welfare. The perceived social 
and economic benefits of citizenship would encourage a reluctance on the part of 
citizens to share finite resources with non-nationals, especially in times of 
unemployment and depression. Although the rights accrued to citizens in 
democratic states were grounded in a characteristically universalist conception of 
equal rights, they still had the effect of reinforcing the significance of national 
membership. Hence it was not only explicitly particularist or exclusivist 
conceptions o f nationalism that generated hostility to non-nationals. While 
liberal conceptions of citizenship did not generate the types of persecution and 
expulsions of ethnic minorities that occurred in states attached to a particularist 
conception of nationality, they nonetheless encouraged a reluctance to extend the 
benefits of membership to non-citizens. Nationalism in both the French 
republican and the romantic organicist traditions influenced the nature and scale
64 Georg G. Iggers, The German Concept o f  History: The National Tradition o f  Historical 
Thought from  H erder to the Present (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1983).
65 See Andrew Linklater, The Transformation o f  Political Community (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1998), pp. 189-90.
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of refugee flows, as well as national responses to influx in the twentieth century.66
Finally, it is worth considering the role of international politics in 
solidifying national loyalties and narrow conceptions of national interests. The 
political use of nationalist sentiment was not limited to securing support for self- 
determination or state consolidation. It had helped mobilise support for 
Napoleon’s expansionist policy, and was subsequently important for enlisting 
popular support for empire building and the imperial conflicts of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.67 The combination of patriotic zeal and 
the racist theories invoked to justify imperialist practices lent an even more 
exclusionary aspect to nationalism. The rising inter-state tensions around this 
period, which climaxed in 1914, also reinforced notions about the priority of 
national interest over transnational cultural ties, free trade or duties to non­
nationals.
The “realist” theories of international relations that emerged in the 1930s 
and 1940s emphasised the primarily self-interested behaviour of states, and 
identified “national interests” with the search for power in international politics.68 
This conception of national interest, and especially its later forms in neo-realist 
theories, assumed that states defined their interests independently of their moral 
values, and that the objective of states was to promote the interests of those 
already within their jurisdiction. Unlike the communitarian or romanticist 
accounts of nationalism, the realist account was ostensibly descriptive rather than 
normative. And as such, it was in principle compatible with liberal universalist 
political theories. Many liberals still accept these realist descriptive claims about 
the nature of national interest, whilst diverging from realists’ practical
66 The strongest proponent o f  this thesis is Michael Mann - see his “A Political Theory o f  
Nationalism” {op. cit.)\ and “The Dark Side o f  Democracy: The Modem Tradition o f  Ethnic and 
Political Cleansing", New Left Review  235 (1999), pp. 18-45. Rogers Brubaker posits a similar 
distinction between “political” and “ethnocultural” nationalism, but is less pessimistic about the 
former variant and its impact o f  immigration policies. See his Citizenship and Nationhood in 
France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992).
67 Although much o f  the justification for imperial expansion was ostensibly liberal universalist -
see Mayall, Nationalism {op. cit.), pp. 43-5.
68 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace  (1954).
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prescriptions. On this account, the gap between “ideal theory” and the current 
state of international politics can be explained by the regrettable selfishness of 
states. And once again this produces a conception of national interest and 
universal duties as having separate sources -  the one self-interested, the other 
ethical, and both defined independently of one another.
2. Universal Rights, National Interests and Responses to Refugee Influx
I shall now examine how these potentially conflicting conceptions of 
universal duties and national interests influenced the treatment of refugees in the 
twentieth century. This section will give a brief account of the history of refugee 
flows in Europe, and consider the factors shaping responses to these flows, 
including domestic economic, international political considerations, as well as the 
influence of nationalist and liberal political thought. The historical account will 
be divided into three main periods. First, I shall consider the period before World 
War One, during which refugee and immigration flows were still fairly small, and 
emigration to the New World allayed fears about over-population. Debates on 
immigration and refugees mainly revolved around whether immigrants 
contributed to prosperity, although there was some discussion of “Christian 
duties” to assist refugees. The second period - the inter-war years and World War 
Two - saw a significant increase in refugee flows, but no clear definition of 
international commitment to protect refugees. Concerns linked to economic 
depression and international political tensions explicitly over-rode any conception 
of duties to refugees. Thirdly, the post-World War Two refugee regime codified 
a conception of individual rights of refugees. While embodying liberal 
universalist ideas, the feasibility of this approach was contingent on economic 
and political conditions that ceased to hold in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in 
the current crisis in refugee policy.
50
2.1 Refugees before World War I
Refugee flows -  at least as they are conceived in current definitions - 
began to occur in Europe from around the end of the fifteenth century. There had 
been substantial movements of people before then, but most instances of religious 
persecution in the Middle Ages were localised and sporadic cases, which did not 
give rise to mass movement. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, 
religious conflict in Europe and the growing power of nation-states led to more 
widespread and systematic persecution of religious groups.69 The first major 
movement of this kind was the expulsion of Jews from Spain in 1492. Further 
forced displacement in Western Europe followed the Reformation, the French 
Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years’ War. From the 1550s onwards, England 
began to serve as a place of refuge for displaced Protestants from the Spanish 
Netherlands, and French Huguenots. When the Edict of Nantes was revoked in 
1685, a further 200,000 Huguenots fled to England, indeed the term “refugie” was 
first coined to denote this group. It was subsequently adopted in English as 
“refugee”, and by 1796 the Encyclopaedia Britannica noted that it had been 
“extended to all such as leave their country in times of distress.”70
Most victims of religious persecution had little problem finding asylum. 
European states were generally apprehensive about population shortages, and 
were more interested in restricting emigration from their territory than preventing 
influx. By the second half of the seventeenth century, a number of English 
economists were asserting the economic importance of having a large labour 
force, which was seen as a means of improving the balance of trade and thus 
national wealth. The debate on immigration over the next century revolved 
around questions of population and national prosperity, and the right of
71 •Europeans to settle in colonial territories. There was some debate in the 1700s
69 Daniel Statt, Foreigners and Englishmen: The Controversy over Immigration and Population, 
1660-1760  (Newark, University o f  Delaware Press, 1995), pp. 25-6.
70 Cited in Michael Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the 20th Century (Oxford and
N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 8.
71 For a discussion o f  debates on the economic benefits o f  immigration, see Daniel Statt, 
Foreigners and Englishmen {op. cit.), pp. 43-51. For the classic work on population problems,
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about whether to restrict the entry of a wave of Palatine refugees, with some 
concerned that they would take jobs from Englishmen. But there was a perceived 
economic interest in accepting them, as well as a Christian duty to help fellow 
Protestants. Daniel Defoe, writing about the Protestant refugees from Germany, 
talked about “the People of England, who liberally and with open Hearts and 
Hands contribute to the Subsistance of their distressed Protestant Brethren.”72
Concern about population shortages were assuaged by the dramatic 
increase in population from the second half of the eighteenth century. European 
states for the first time began to encourage emigration to North America and the 
colonies, and by the 1820s most countries had removed existing restrictions.73 
Yet despite some concerns about over-population, the absorption of refugees did 
not pose a significant problem for most of the nineteenth century. Refugees 
usually arrived in small numbers, tended to be fairly affluent, and so were not 
considered to be a burden on receiving countries. In the first half of the century, 
many political exiles found refuge in European cities, including Polish, Russian, 
Spanish, Portuguese, Italian and German dissidents. By the 1850s, London was 
an important centre for European exiles, and there appeared to be genuine 
popular sentiment against restricting the entry of refugees, and for allowing them 
freedom to pursue political activities in exile as long as they respected English 
law.74 The Liberal Prime Minister Lord Palmerston is cited as referring in around 
1860 to
that law  o f  hosp ita lity  by w h ich  w e  have invariably been gu id ed  w ith  regard to  
foreigners seek in g  asylum  in th is country. A ny foreigner, w h atever h is nation, 
w hatever his p o litica l creed , w hatever h is p o litica l o ffe n c e s  against h is  
G overn m en t...m ay  find  in th ese  realm s a sa fe and secu re asylum  as lon g  as he o b ey s  
the law  o f  the land.75
Here a Liberal politician is articulating a clear notion of impartial treatment of
see Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principles o f  Population: Or, a View o f  its Past and
Present Effects on Human Happiness, etc  (London: Reeves and Turner, 1888).
72 Daniel Defoe, A B rief H istory o f  the Poor Palatine Refugees, Lately A rriv 'd  in England
(London, 1709), p. 9.
73 Sarah Collinson, Europe and International Migration  (London and N ew  York: Pinter
Publishers for the Royal Institute o f  International Affairs, 1994), p.30.
74 Marrus, The Unwanted {op. cit.), pp. 18-9.
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refugees, rather than special treatment for Christians or Protestants. The notion of 
duties to refugees was taking on a more secular tone, although it was still not 
couched as a universal right.
This liberal attitude was more difficult to sustain in the last third of the 
century, when the rise of nationalism and anti-Semitism was both a cause of 
large-scale movements, and heightened intolerance of refugee influx in receiving 
countries. From the 1880s onwards, there was a steady and large-scale flow of 
Jews escaping persecution in Russia and East Europe. Most of these were 
accepted by the United States -  around 2.25 million people between 1881 and 
1914 -  but significant numbers settled in Western European countries, including 
some 120,000 in Britain.76 In the 1880s, the United States, Canada and Australia 
began to impose restrictions on entry, and this had important repercussions for 
Europe, generating concern about the diminishing possibilities for emigration to 
the New World. At the same time, concerns at the continuing flow of East 
European Jews into West Europe, rising unemployment after 1901 and anti- 
Semitism in receiving countries brought the issue of immigration control to the
77fore. In 1904 a Conservative government introduced the first restriction of 
immigration through an Aliens Bill, designed to exclude “undesirable and 
destitute aliens.”78 There was considerable opposition to the bill from the Liberal 
Party, partly because of its implicit anti-Semitism, partly because it was seen as 
constituting an attack on political asylum. Liberal opposition succeeded in 
amending the 1905 Act, which contained safeguards for refugees, i.e. those who 
could prove they were “seeking admission to this country solely to avoid 
prosecution or punishment on religious or political grounds, or for an offence of a
• * * •  7 0political character, or persecution involving danger to life and limb.” Entry was
75 Cited in Statt, Foreigners and Englishmen {op. cit.), p.89.
76 Collinson, Europe and International Migration {op. cit.), p. 34
77 James Walvin, Passage to Britain: Immigration in British History and Politics
(Harmondsworth: Penguin in association with Belitha Press, 1984), pp. 63-4.
78 Cited in John A. Garward, The English and Immigration, 1880-1910  (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 46.
79 Garward, The English and Immigration {op. cit.), pp. 46 and 88.
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further restricted with the introduction of passport controls in 1914. The rise of 
nationalist feeling, domestic economic and social unrest, and concerns about the 
insecure international climate generated the first wave of immigration restrictions.
2.2 Refugee flows in the inter-war years and World War Two
The inter-war years saw a significant increase in the number of refugees, 
most of whom were fleeing religious and nationalist-based persecution, and 
fascist regimes. Most refugees in the 1920s were casualties of the processes of 
state formation and consolidation. The disintegration of the Hapsburg, Romanov 
and Ottoman Empires was accelerated by the war and the peace treaties of 1919- 
21. Conflict in the Balkans had already precipitated the “unmixing” of hundreds 
of thousands of Muslims and Christians, and the Turkish massacre of Armenians 
in 1915 had led to the flight of around 350,000.81 In 1913 a population exchange 
agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey had led to a transfer of roughly 50,000 
from each side. After the 1918 Peace Treaties, the unmixing of nationalities was 
seen as a necessary, albeit regrettable, means of consolidating the newly 
independent states.82 The nationalising process in central and east Europe led to 
the displacement of millions of ethnic and national minorities from Poland, 
Russia, the Ukraine, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Population exchanges were 
also generally accepted as a means of preventing conflict, with agreements for 
exchanges between Turkey, and - respectively -  Bulgaria and Greece, resulting in 
the mainly coerced movement of almost two million people. Many of the 
minorities who did not move were made stateless. Romanian citizenship law of 
1924, for example, made 100,000 Jews inside Romania stateless, and the Soviet
83Union stripped almost one million Russians of citizenship in the early 1920s.
While there was no recognition of international legal duties to assist these 
refugees, the 1920s did see the first international cooperation to address refugee
80 Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, Refugees in an Age o f  G enocide  (London and Portland,
Or.: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 44
81For figures, see Collinson, Europe and International M igration (op. cit.), p. 36.
82 Michael Mann, “The Dark Side o f  Democracy” (op. cit.), p. 65.
83 Marrus, The Unwanted (op. cit.), p. 174.
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policies. The League of Nations established a High Commissioner on Behalf of 
the League in 1921 “to coordinate the action of governments and private 
organisations for the relief of Russian refugees, to regulate the legal status of a 
large class of persons who had been rendered stateless, and to assist them to find 
permanent homes and work.”84 The High Commissioner’s services were 
extended in 1924 to cover Armenian refugees. The High Commissioner was 
successful in finding homes for most of these refugees, mainly because of labour 
shortages in Europe, and partly also because of the wide range of approaches 
used, including creating employment opportunities, and generally linking 
assistance to measures to promote European economic development.
However, international cooperation was seen as a provisional arrangement 
to address the temporary refugee problems caused by the upheaval of World War 
One and the creation of new states. The refugees under the High Commissioner’s 
mandate were defined on the basis of territory, nationality or religion, rather than 
on a more abstract and generally applicable definition of “refugee.” There was no 
conception o f universal refugee rights underlying international cooperation. 
Moreover, assistance to refugees was explicitly political, rather than 
humanitarian: methods such as population exchange sought to address security 
concerns as much as humanitarian needs, and many of the resettlement 
programmes were explicitly tailored to the labour requirements of receiving 
states. Unlike the current UN framework, inter-war arrangements were not even 
nominally founded on recognition of the universal rights of refugees.
Cooperation to address refugee flows was largely paralysed in the 1930s, 
with economic depression in Europe and America, and unstable international 
relations. There were large-scale movements from fascist regimes in Italy, Spain 
and Germany. Up to one million Italians were expelled by Mussolini, and around 
half a million Spanish Republicans fled to France. By the second half of the 
decade, there was considerable concern at the prospect of mass influx of German 
refugees into West European states. The flight of Jews from Germany began as a
84 Cited in John George Stoessinger, The Refugee an d the World Community (Minneapolis: 
University o f  Minneapolis Press, 1956), pp. 15-16
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small but steady flow in the early 1930s, increasing dramatically as Nazi anti- 
Semitic policies became more stringent in 1938. However, economic and 
political concerns were also motivating restrictive policies in this period. 
European receiving states faced economic depression in the 1930s, and France in 
particular had already absorbed large numbers of refugees from Spain and Italy. 
Already in 1933, the British Home Office was using a far less liberal rhetoric than 
in the past. As one official put it, “We do not...admit that there is a ‘right of 
asylum’; but when we have to decide whether a particular refugee is to be given 
admission to this country, we have to base our decision...on whether it is in the
Of
public interest that he be admitted.” The “national interest” prevailed over - as 
yet ill-defined - duties to refugees.
As the persecution of Jews intensified and the plight of refugees from 
Germany and Austria became more apparent to European states, public opinion in 
many countries called for the relaxation of restrictions on Jewish immigration. 
Simpson wrote in 1939 that the Dutch were “deeply stirred by the intensified 
persecution of German Jews in November 1938, and the Government was 
strongly urged to relax restrictions.” In Britain, too, heavy pressure on the 
government led to the establishment of a special cabinet commission to 
streamline procedures for receiving and assisting Jewish refugees.87 But with the 
onset of war in 1939, restrictions on emigration made it more difficult to flee 
Nazi persecution. Around 350,000 refugees had managed to escape Nazi 
persecution before the war broke out, but between 1939-41 only 71,500 managed
oo
to flee Germany and Austria.
The Second World War caused huge refugee flows, with an estimated 30 
million people displaced in Europe over the course of the war. The largest 
movements of refugees in Europe occurred in the last stages of the war, as
85 Quoted in Marrus, The Unwanted (op. cit.), p. 150.
86 Sir John Hope Simpson, Simpson, Sir John Hope, Refugees: A Review o f  the Situation Since
Septem ber 1938 (Oxford and N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 78.
87 Simpson, Refugees (ibid.), p. 69. On public pressure and local initiatives to assist refugees
from Nazism, see Knox and Kushner, Refugees (op. cit.), pp. 140 and 164-8.
88 Marrus, The Unwanted (op. cit.), p. 205.
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millions of people were displaced by intensive fighting and aerial bombardments 
in 1944-5. In 1943 the Western Allies established the UN Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) to provide relief and assist repatriation. 
Between 1943-6, UNRRA repatriated around fourteen million people in Europe. 
But around one million “unrepatriables” remained, most of whom were Soviet 
citizens who refused to return to the USSR. Again, while this period was marked 
by the movement of large numbers of refugees, the problem was characterised as 
the result of temporary conflict and upheaval in Europe. Once these displaced 
people had been repatriated, it was hoped that refugee flows would largely dry up, 
and there would be no further need for international mechanisms.
The inter-war years, then, had been characterised by large-scale refugee 
flows, mainly resulting from nation-state formation in the 1920s and fascism in 
the 1930s. The Christian and liberal notions that had influenced responses to 
refugees in the nineteenth century proved difficult to sustain in the face of 
economic depression and international security concerns. But as yet, no clear-cut 
conceptions of refugee rights had been codified, and so the notion of a conflict 
between refugee rights and national interests was still not conceptualised in the 
way it is today. However, in the post-World War Two era there was a discernible 
shift from refugee definitions based on group characteristics to a more general 
definition based on violation of individual rights. In particular, Cold War politics 
had a huge impact on the design and evolution of the post-war international 
refugee regime, producing an individual right-based conception of refugees and 
an emphasis on resettlement as the favoured response to refugee flows.
2.3 Refugee rights since World War Two
The shift towards a right-based and resettlement oriented approach first 
emerged in the context of discussions over the constitution of the new 
International Refugee Organisation (IRO), established to take over responsibility 
from the provisional UNRRA. In the negotiations over its mandate in 1946, there 
was a sharp division between communist countries and the West over whether it 
should assume responsibility for the million “unrepatriables” from the communist
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bloc. The Soviet Union was concerned that the IRO would block the repatriation
of these “traitors, quislings, and war criminals”, and use them as a source of
• 60 • recruitment for spies. The predominant Western view that repatriation must be
a voluntary decision eventually prevailed, and the Soviet Union refused to join
the IRO.
The IRO succeeded in resettling most of the remaining UNRRA caseload. 
There were substantial labour shortages in Europe, the Americas and Australia, 
and a clear political incentive to accept those fleeing communist regimes.90 
However, there were growing concerns on the part of the United States (US) 
about the international expansion of the IRO’s activities in the late 1940s. Indian 
partition, the Palestinian conflict and the Korean War all produced large 
movements of refugees, generating fears that refugee flows would not be limited 
to East-West movements.91 In 1950, the Statute of the current United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was accepted. The UNHCR had a 
limited mandate, and its influence was constrained by the refusal of both the US 
and the Soviet Union to join.92 Nonetheless, its definitions of "refugee” and the 
goals of international cooperation to deal with refugees still shape international 
refugee policy. A similar definition was adopted in the subsequent Convention 
on the Status of Refugees, drafted in Geneva in 1951. The Convention defined 
refugees as those who are outside their country “owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
QT •particular social group or political opinion.” Those party to Convention were 
obliged not to expel or send refugees back to countries where their “life or 
liberty” would be at risk, thereby establishing the right to “non-refoulement.”94
89 Stoessinger, The Refugee {op. cit.), p. 66
90 See Jacques Vemant, The Refugee in the Post-W ar World (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1953), p. 343, on the UK's interest in accepting refugees from displaced persons camps.
91 It should be noted that refugees from Palestine and Korea were covered by separate agencies -  
respectively the UN R elief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
(UNRW A) and UN Korean Reconstruction Agency.
92 The US did eventually sign the Convention in 1968, as the refugee question took on greater 
political significance.
93 Article 1A, Convention Relating to the Status o f  Refugees (Geneva, 28 July 1951 (189 UNTS
137)).
94 Article 33, Convention Relating to the Status o f  Refugees {ibid.).
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The definition of refugee was clearly based on a universalist theory of human 
rights, although -  as has subsequently been argued -  with a bias towards civil and 
political rights rather than economic, social and cultural ones.
At the time of drafting, there was already some anxiety on the part of 
states about the potential scope of duties it imposed. As the French delegate 
argued, “The right of asylum rested on moral and humanitarian grounds which 
were freely recognised by receiving countries, but which had certain essential 
limitations.”95 In particular, there was considerable debate over the applicability 
of the right to non-refoulement to large groups, with France, the Netherlands, 
Italy and Germany all arguing that the terms of the Convention should apply to 
individuals rather than mass influx. Indeed, the Dutch delegate “wished to have it 
placed on record that the Conference was in agreement with the interpretation, 
that the possibility of mass migration across frontiers or of attempted mass 
migrations was not covered by Article 33.”96 Nonetheless, the Convention sets 
no restrictions on the right to non-refoulement based on national interest, other 
than the extreme case in which a refugee may be expelled “on grounds of national 
security or public interest”, and even in this case the refugee has the right to 
appeal.97
The concerns voiced by some states in the course of these negotiations 
may have seemed rather exaggerated in the 1950s. The Convention included no 
right to asylum or nationality, and restricted its provisions to refugees who had 
become homeless due to events before 1 January 1951. The decision whether or 
not to include non-European refugees also remained a prerogative of 
governments. Yet regardless of the initial intentions of its members, the 
geographical and temporal scope of the Convention was subsequently expanded. 
Already from 1957 onwards, the mandate of the High Commissioner was being
95 Paul Weis, The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux Preparatoires Analysed  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 335.
96 Ibid., p. 335.
97 Article 32 (1), Convention Relating to the Status o f  Refugees (op. cit.). There are other grounds 
for the exclusion o f  a refugee from the terms o f  the Convention, but they are not directly related to 
the national interest - see Article 1 (f).
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extended to cover refugee problems in developing countries, including the 
refugees generated by independence struggles and post-independence civil
no
conflicts. Faced with the de facto expansion of international involvement in 
refugee problems, it was only logical that the right-based definition of refugees be 
extended to cover refugees from all countries. The provisions o f the Convention 
were given global application by a 1967 Protocol." Indeed, in many states the 
definition of refugee was also broadened to include those fleeing generalised 
violence and armed conflict, and more recently gender-based persecution.100
The expansion of the scope of refugee law was not perceived as 
particularly problematic in the 1950s and 1960s, which were dominated by East- 
West flows. The first major refugee flow was a result of the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution, when 200,000 refugees were in need of resettlement. A similar 
number fled Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion.101 But restrictions on 
emigration from the Soviet bloc for the most part kept the numbers of refugees 
limited, and the continued demand for labour raised no perceived conflict with 
national interest. Both of these factors, and the ideological symbolism of refugee 
flows from the East, led to a strong preference for resettlement.102 The 
repatriation emphasis of the inter-war years was replaced with what has now been 
characterised as an “exile bias”,103 as well as a reluctance to consider ways of 
addressing the causes of refugee flows. There was little if any discussion of the
98 In 1957 the mandate was extended to cover Tunisia and Hong Kong, and was subsequently 
extended to other groups through the High Commissioner's “good offices” function - see Cecilia 
Runstrom-Ruin, Beyond Europe: The G lobalization o f  Refugee A id  (Lund: Lund University Press, 
1993), pp. 22-3.
99 New York, 31 January, 1967 (606 UNTS 267).
100 On the former, see James C. Hathaway, The Law o f  Refugee Status (Toronto and Vancouver 
Betterworths, 1991), pp. 19-20; and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), pp. 21-6. On gender based persecution, see UNHCR, State o f  the 
W orld’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda  (Oxford and N ew  York: Oxford University Press), pp. 
196-7.
101 Collinson, Europe and International Migration (op. cit.), p. 40.
102 The political significance o f  East-West flows was particularly important in shaping US refugee
policy. Until 1980, refugee admissions were limited by law to those fleeing communist countries
and countries in the Middle East. See Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation
and the G lobal Refugee Crisis (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 58-9.
103 See Gervase Coles, “Approaching the Refugee Problem Today,” in Refugees and  
International Relations, ed. Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 
387.
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typically pre-war concern with the range of "solutions" to refugee problems.104 
UNHCR’s role was seen as essentially palliative, its task being to address the 
symptoms of conflict and human rights abuse rather than their causes.
The terms of the 1951 Convention and the focus on resettlement began to 
create problems in the 1970s. Since the mid-sixties, there had been concerns 
about racial tension in European states, and of societies being “saturated” with 
immigrants.105 The 1973 oil crisis and ensuing recession also led to a decline in 
the demand for labour, and by the late 1970s all industrialised receiving states had 
introduced legislation that largely halted immigration flows. With restricted 
possibilities for immigration, many people from developing countries turned to 
the remaining routes for entry into industrialised states: family reunification, 
illegal immigration and asylum. By the 1980s, European asylum systems were 
overwhelmed with applications, generating what is now perceived to be an 
asylum crisis.
2.4 The asylum crisis
Faced with large numbers of asylum-seekers they had little obvious 
economic or political incentive to accept, industrialised states found their 
international legal obligations difficult to fulfil. Two rather different but related 
problems emerged. One was the administrative and legal difficulty of sorting 
through large numbers of cases to sift out bona fide from what are now termed 
“bogus” applicants. This triggered a series of policy measures to reduce access of 
“economic migrants” to the asylum procedure, “streamline” the procedures for 
determining status, and enforce the return of asylum seekers whose claims were 
rejected (I shall describe some of these measures below). The focus was on 
distinguishing between genuine refugees and economic migrants.
104 For a discussion o f  these solutions, see Sir John Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem: Report 
o f  a Survey (London and N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 522-45. By 1953, when 
Vemant wrote his exhaustive volume on the refugee question, these options were barely 
mentioned. See Jacques Vemant, The Refugee {op. cit.).
105 Collinson, Europe an d International Migration {op. cit.), p. 51
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What is of more concern to this thesis is the second problem of how to 
respond to large numbers of bona fide refugees, i.e. those whose claims did meet 
the criteria for Convention status. The increase in refugee flows to industrialised 
countries presented a serious challenge to international refugee policy, one that 
went beyond questions of administrative efficiency and enforcement of 
restrictionist migration policy. Even if asylum procedures could be reformed to 
sort through genuine cases quickly and reliably, it is certain that there would still 
be too many Convention refugees -  or at least many more than liberal 
democracies would be willing to take at present. The feasibility of the 1951 
Convention had been contingent on small-scale flows and a willingness of 
governments to receive refugees. While these flows remained limited and there 
was a demand of labour in industrialised countries, these provisions were 
interpreted generously, with states usually granting a wide range of social and 
political rights and often permanent residence. But by the 1980s the generosity of 
these provisions and the “exile bias” became a problematic model for responding 
to mass influx. For the first time, the universal duties embodied in the 
Convention seemed clearly to conflict with national interests in restricting 
immigration.
The perceived conflict between refugee rights and national interests was 
exacerbated with the end of the Cold War. By 1989, the ideological symbolism 
of accepting refugees from the East had given way to concerns about potential 
mass influx from eastern Europe and the Soviet Union once emigration 
restrictions were eased. The increase in illegal immigration had also raised 
concerns about migration and security, with a rise in the incidence of trafficking 
in illegal immigrants, often linked to drugs trafficking. Finally, the prevalence of 
ethnic conflict in Africa, the Confederation of Independent States (CIS) and the 
former Yugoslavia created large-scale movements of refugees to western Europe, 
with little prospect for conflict resolution and repatriation in the short term. The 
refugee flows caused by conflict in Bosnia dealt a final blow to confidence in 
existing arrangements, with refugee law seemingly imposing unfeasible 
requirements.
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With the post-World War II regime seeming to be less and less relevant, 
industrialised states began to consider new approaches for preventing, containing 
or redirecting refugee flows, and for encouraging repatriation. First, 
industrialised states began to introduce a series of measures designed to avoid 
abuse of the asylum system - or, as critics would argue, to restrict access for 
asylum seekers. These “streamlining” measures included introducing accelerated 
procedures for “manifestly unfounded” applicants; visa restrictions and lists of 
“safe third countries” to which asylum seekers could be returned; sanctions for 
airlines that carrying passengers without valid documents; and limited social 
welfare benefits and employment rights for asylum seekers.106 Second, European 
states and North America introduced new forms of “temporary protection” for 
those fleeing violent conflict, which established a set of rights and conditions of 
stay that fell short of those set out in the Geneva Convention. This form of 
temporary protection was widely applied in the case of those fleeing conflict in 
Bosnia and Croatia in the 1990s, and was criticised by many for representing a 
dilution of standards of refugee protection.107 Thirdly, the 1980s saw a new wave 
of interest in measures to address the “root causes” of forced migration and 
refugee flows.108 There was also a renewed interest in the kind of broader range
106 These measures have been introduced in Europe at both national and regional levels. At the 
regional level, European Union “harmonisation” o f  asylum policies have generated criticism o f  
attempts to construct a “fortress Europe”. See Daniele Joly, "A N ew  Asylum Regime in Europe", 
in Refugee Rights and Realities, ed. Frances Nicolson and Patrick Twomey (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp. 336-56; Khalid Koser and Richard Black, "Limits to 
Harmonisation: The Temporary Protection' o f  Refugees in the European Union", International 
Migration 37:3 (1999), pp. 521-43; and Helene Lambert, "Building a European Asylum Policy 
under the ’First Pillar1 o f  the Consolidated Treaty Establishing the European Community", 
Inernational Journal o f  Refugee Law  11:2 (1999), pp. 329 - 37. More generally, there has been 
wide criticism o f  national policies to restrict access to asylum systems and manage influx. See 
Jeremy Harding, The Uninvited: Refugees at the Rich Man's G ate (London: Profile Books; 
London Review o f  Books, 2000); Patricia Tuitt, False Images: The Law's Construction o f  the 
Refugee (London: Pluto, 1996); and UNHCR, The State o f  the World's Refugees: A Humanitarian 
Agenda  (Oxford and N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1997), especially pp. 189-203.
107 Mikhael Barutciski, “The Reinforcement o f Non-Admission Policies and the Subversion o f  
UNHCR”, International Journal o f  Refugee Law 8:1/2 (1996), pp. 49-110; S. Alex Cunliffe and 
Michael Pugh, "UNHCR as Leader in Humanitarian Assistance: A Triumph o f  Politics over
Law?", in Refugee Rights and Realities, ed. Nicolson and Twomey (op. cit.), pp. 175-99.
108 Sadruddin Aga Khan, “Study on Human Rights and M assive Exoduses”, UN Commission on 
Human Rights (E/CN.4/1503, 1981). For a good overview o f  these measures, see Aristide 
Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from  Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis 
in the Developing W orld  (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). On European 
Union measures, see European Commission, Communication on Immigration and Asylum Policies 
((COM(94) 23 final) Brussels 1994); and Comelis D. de Jong, “Elements for a More Effective EU
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of solutions to refugee problems that characterised inter-war responses. These 
“new solutions” included the prevention or containment of conflict situations that 
might trigger refugee flows; the establishment of safe havens and other forms of 
intervention to protection displaced persons in their countries of origin; and 
efforts to protect and assist the repatriation of refugees in the aftermath of 
conflict.109
The refugee crisis which began to emerge in the 1970s sharply focused the 
notion of a conflict between universal rights and national interests. The theories 
of universal duties that underpinned the post-World War Two international 
refugee regime had evolved over centuries, from natural law theories in the 
sixteenth century, through the Enlightenment and nineteenth century liberalism. 
But prior to this century, the applicability of liberal universalist theories of rights 
to refugee issues had never seriously been put to the test. The increase in refugee 
flows in Europe from the end of the nineteenth century onwards implicitly 
challenged the feasibility of universalism as the basis for determining asylum 
policies. But the conflict between liberal universalism and notions of national 
interest most clearly emerged in the second half of the twentieth century, when 
the universalist implications of liberal rights were given substance in international 
refugee law. The liberal universalist conception of refugee rights embodied in the 
Geneva Convention was seen as feasible in the context of the Cold War and 
economic growth. But with changes in the nature and scale of refugee flows, and 
economic and social tensions in receiving countries, these international 
obligations seemed to impose overly stringent demands. And the nationalist ideas 
and narrow definitions of the “national interest” that had been influencing 
immigration restriction since the 1900s seemed to be incompatible with universal 
duties.
Response to Situations o f  Mass Influx”, in International Journal o f  Refugee Law  8: 1/2 (1996),
pp. 156-68
109
For an overview o f  these different approaches, see UNHCR, People o f  Concern, Report o f  a 
Conference on Refugees (Geneva: 21-3 November 1996), especially the report on the session on 
“Refugees: N ew  Approaches to Traditional Solutions”; and Christina Boswell, "The Conflict 
Between Refugee Rights and National Interests: Background and Policy Strategies", Refugee 
Survey Quarterly, 18: 2 (1999), pp. 64-84.
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3. Reconsidering Liberal Universalist Conceptions of Duties to Refugees
This perceived conflict between refugee rights and national interests has 
raised serious questions about the feasibility and, in some quarters, the 
desirability of recognising universal duties to refugees. So what, then, are the 
prospects for rescuing liberal universalist conceptions from this critique, and 
encouraging a less restrictionist policy to refugees?
Liberal universalist theories are now caught in a difficult position. Having 
successfully codified a conception of universal rights in international refugee law, 
there is a risk that this conception will become increasingly marginalised because 
of its perceived conflict with national interests. To many, it no longer seems 
feasible to expect states to perform duties that run so directly counter to their 
political and economic interests. This problem of the feasibility of realising 
refugee rights is partly a product of the liberal universalist notion of a split 
between universalist ethical duty and self-interest. Liberal universalists have 
tended to assume a separation between the spheres of impartial ethics and 
interests, a separation that is also reflected in the liberal universalist conception of 
rights framed in the current international refugee regime. Existing provisions on 
refugee rights are thus premised on the notion that states should and will be 
motivated to adhere to their international obligations from liberal or humanitarian 
principles, rather than because it is in the national interest.
These requirements of refugee law seemed feasible in the 1950s and 
1960s, when recognising refugee rights appeared to coincide with national 
interests. This meant that the problem of feasibility did not arise, and there was 
no real need to question whether states were motivated to respect refugee rights 
out of moral duty or self interest. However, since the 1970s there has been a 
growing perception of the economic and social costs of refugees, and hence a 
perception that these international obligations conflict with the national interest. 
Many consider that it now seems unrealistic for states to respect their 
international obligations on refugee rights: the only motivation to do so would be 
moral, a question of pure ethical principle, rather than through any interest the
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state may have. And this is the source of the current problem of feasibility for 
liberal universalist theories. Not only are ethical considerations viewed as 
separate from political and economic interests, as they were in the 1950s-60s. 
They are now perceived as being directly in conflict with them, and the only 
reason to respect refugee rights seems to be a purely altruistic - some would say 
utopian - commitment to moral principle.
There are two possibilities for overcoming this perceived conflict and 
avoiding the marginalisation of liberal universalist conceptions of refugee rights. 
One would be a change in the empirical conditions that have prompted states to 
see refugees as a threat to national interests.110 Such a shift could create a 
coincidence between current conceptions of national interests and duties to 
refugees. I have already explained why I am not pursuing this sort of empirical 
analysis (see section three of the Introduction). My focus is on the potential for 
changing conceptions of the relationship between refugee rights and national 
interests. This second possibility for resolving the perceived conflict between 
refugee rights and national interests involves rejecting the liberal universalist (and 
realist) assumption of a split between duty and interests. The claim is that 
conceptions of ethical duty can shape national interests, and that it is simplistic to 
assume any clear or necessary separation between the two.
The task of the next three chapters is to examine current universalist 
conceptions, and to suggest the origins of this problem of marginalisation. Using 
the criteria outlined in the introduction -  normative desirability, practical 
feasibility, and internal coherence -  it will critically evaluate the main variants of 
different liberal theories in turn. This first part of the thesis will clarify the 
weaknesses of liberal notions of duties to non-nationals, and the source of the 
problem of feasibility. The second part of the thesis will proceed to construct an 
alternative account that addresses the problem of feasibility by rejecting the 
notion of a split between duty and interests, whilst retaining a substantive liberal
110 For example, some demographers have argued that ageing populations in industrialised states 
will create a need for additional foreign labour. See "Europe’s Need for Immigrants", The 
Economist ( 6 - 1 2  May 2000).
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commitment to extending duties to refugees.
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Chapter Two
Liberal Universalism and the Problem of  Feasibil ity
Most legal and ethical arguments for extending duties to refugees derive 
their justification from some form of liberal universalist theory. As I observed in 
the last chapter, international refugee law is grounded in a conception of universal 
rights, and proponents of a more generous asylum policy tend to invoke notions 
of universal duties to defend their claims. I also showed how notions of universal 
duties could be traced through a long tradition of liberal moral and political 
thought. It therefore makes sense to start our discussion of conceptions of duties 
to refugees with an examination of liberal universalist theories. These theories 
would appear to provide the best route for deriving an account of duties to 
refugees that is consistent with the normative criterion outlined in the 
Introduction.
This chapter will start by categorising different varieties of liberal 
universalist theory, distinguishing in particular between utilitarian and right-based 
theories. Both of these types of universalism have been used by theorists to 
provide an account of duties beyond borders, so there are a number of good 
exemplars to consider. Sections two and three will discuss two types of utilitarian 
accounts of duties to non-nationals: those that aim to maximise utility; and those 
that aim to eliminate suffering. The first variety of utilitarian theory encounters 
problems defining, measuring and ensuring a fair distribution of utility, and is 
thus inadequate as a framework for defining duties to refugees. The second 
variety avoids many of these problems, but its focus on the alleviation of 
suffering has the effect of undermining autonomy and other valuable goods in the 
longer-run. Both of these accounts fail to meet the criterion of normative 
desirability, and should therefore be abandoned as possible frameworks for 
defining duties to refugees. The weaknesses in both accounts also strongly 
suggest the need to incorporate some notion of rights.
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Section four moves on to a discussion of right-based liberal universalism, 
arguing that these theories better meet the normative criterion of an adequate 
conception of duties to refugees. But while right-based theories provide a good 
substantive conception of duties, they face a serious problem of practical 
feasibility. The problem of feasibility that was mentioned in Chapter One is 
elaborated in more detail, and the discussion argues that liberal universalists 
cannot address these problems without substantially altering either their 
commitment to universalism, or their assumptions about motivation.
It should be noted that the discussion employs a number of different types 
of critique to assess the adequacy of theories. The main criteria are of course the 
three outlined in the introduction - normative desirability, practical feasibility and 
internal coherence. But some of the criticisms based on these criteria will be 
applicable to all theories within the category under discussion (e.g. the criticism 
will apply to all utilitarian theories, or all universalist theories). Others will apply 
only to particular exemplars of the theory (e.g. the criticism will be specific to the 
theory of J. S. Mill, or Robert Goodin). Of course, the first type of more general 
criticism is more important for sorting through which type of account will best 
suit our purposes. But the second type of critique is also worthwhile, as it 
provides a more comprehensive review of different political theories available, 
and is of general interest to scholars in the field of international ethics. I shall 
specify in the course of the discussion which criticisms are general and which are 
specific.
1. Refugees and Liberal Political Theory
1.2 Categorising liberal universalist theories
A universalist moral or political theory is one which gives equal weight to 
the interests or well-being of all human-beings. Thus whatever the theory’s 
conception of the good or the conditions for human well-being, it will start from 
the premise that every individual has an equal moral claim to this good and/or the 
means for pursuing it. Universalist theories are based on an assumption of the
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moral equality of human beings. This implies that (at least part of) the morally 
relevant characteristics of human-beings are those which are universally shared, 
for example the capacity for reason, or interest in maximising pleasure. A radical 
or “thick” universalist theory will assume that the only morally relevant features 
of human-beings are those that are universal. The theory will give equal 
consideration to the interests of each individual, regardless of their particular 
characteristics, ties, or other non-universal features.111
Universalism, as noted in Chapter One, should be contrasted to 
communitarian or “particularist” theories, which hold that the proper subject- 
matter of morality is specific groups or communities rather than all people qua 
human-beings. Such special moral claims may be grounded in scepticism as to 
the possibility of establishing a universally accepted system of ethical values, or 
more radical moral relativism. This may provide an argument for limiting the 
scope of moral duties to the relevant sphere of shared ethical values.112 
Alternatively, particularism may be based on a theory of morality that holds that 
certain groups or individuals have a greater moral claim by virtue of their 
relationship to the moral agent. For example, family members may have a special 
moral claim even if the conditions for their well-being sire universally shared. 
Their interests may generate special duties on the part of particular agents (in this 
case other family members), despite the fact that these interests may be common 
to all human beings. A “thin” universalist theory may incorporate elements of 
particularism, for example by according limited moral relevance to non-universal 
considerations such as membership of a particular community. On this account, 
while certain aspects of human interests are universal and should be given equal 
consideration, the moral agent may have special moral responsibilities towards 
members of her family or community, for the reasons mentioned above.
l n There may be good reasons for treating certain individuals as the objects o f  special duties, for
example we may be in a better position to advance the well-being o f  those around us than those at
the other end o f  the globe. However, in a universalist theory this special treatment is justified only
on instrumental grounds, insofar as it is an effective means o f giving equal consideration to the
interests o f  all -  it is an efficient division o f  labour.
112 It could be consistent with a form o f  “contingent” universalism -  i.e. a thesis that holds that it 
is empirically true that there is in fact universal adherence to the same set o f  values, even though 
these values are not derived from the universally shared characteristics o f  all human beings. I 
shall return to this question in Chapter Seven.
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While universalist theories all give equal weight to the claims of 
individuals, they differ on the question of which universal characteristics give rise 
to claims to equal treatment. Broadly speaking, liberal theories are characterised 
by the importance they attach to liberty. Thus the relevant shared characteristics 
in liberal theory will be the individual’s interest in freedom or the conditions for 
realising freedom. But beyond this loose definition of liberal universalism, there 
is considerable divergence between different theories. For the purposes of this 
analysis, two distinctions between the various types of theory are of especial 
relevance. The first is the distinction between consequentialist and deontological 
liberal theories. And the second is the distinction between two types of 
deontological account: need-based and consent-based accounts.113
Regarding the first distinction, deontological theories hold that the 
morally relevant characteristic of human-beings is their rationality, or capacity for 
autonomy. The purpose of political theory is to ensure the equal distribution of 
freedom to enable individuals to exercise these capacities. The equal distribution 
of freedom is usually ensured through a system of rights, which enable 
individuals to realise individual freedom. The guarantee of the relevant rights 
over-rides other goods, for example the pursuit of social goals or maximisation of 
pleasure. As mentioned above, there are two main types of deontological 
theories. First, there are those that derive and justify rights and theories of justice 
through consent. These are better known as social contract theories, which aim to 
secure individual autonomy through a procedure which enables individuals to 
select terms for regulating their interaction. Most social contract theories have 
traditionally been designed to construct rules for a given group of people or 
society, typically for separate states. In this sense they are less straightforwardly 
universalist, as many (but not all) of them see their object as to secure compliance 
on rules to regulate the interaction of given communities.114 The focus on the
113 These categories are fluid. Shapiro, for example, rejects the sharp distinction between 
utilitarian and deontological liberal theories, claiming that most liberal theories combine a mixture 
o f  the two. See Ian Shapiro, The Evolution o f  Rights in Liberal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), pp. 273-4
114 As Scanlon puts it in his discussion o f  Rawls’ contract theory, justice “applies only to persons 
who are related to one another under common institutions. The problem o f  justice arises...for 
people who are engaged in a cooperative enterprise for mutual benefit, and it is the problem o f
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domestic social contract raises a number of issues distinct from the discussion of 
purer forms of right-based universalism, and will be examined in Chapter Four. 
The second type of deontological theory comprises those theories that derive 
rights from a specific conception of interests and needs. The discussion in section 
three of this Chapter will focus on this second variety of right-based universalist 
theories, which define the distribution of rights on the basis of a more detailed 
elaboration of the conditions for freedom or well-being, rather than a procedure 
for selecting principles.
In contrast to right-based theories, utilitarian theories consider the morally 
relevant characteristic of humans to be their interest in happiness, pleasure or 
some other conception of well-being. Utilitarianism holds that the rightness of 
wrongness of an act or rule depends on its effect on the welfare of all human 
beings. Welfare in this context can be defined in a number of ways. Bentham 
defined it in a narrow sense, as pleasure and the absence of pain, while Mill 
famously distinguished between “higher” and “lower” pleasures, according a 
privileged status to intellectual well-being over sensual pleasures.115 Some recent 
utilitarians have broadened it to encompass more general conceptions of well­
being, including notions of the “good” that are at least partially independent of 
their contribution to pleasure and the absence of pain.116 The emphasis on utility, 
however defined, does raise a number of issues about what counts as a legitimate 
interest, need or desire. In particular, it will make a significant difference to the 
theory whether utility is measured according to subjective, perceived well-being, 
or defined on the basis of some external standard. I shall return to this distinction 
later in the discussion.
Two main elements distinguish utilitarian theories from deontological 
theories. The first is their consequentialist structure. They evaluate acts
how the benefits o f  their cooperation  are to be shared.” See M. Scanlon, "Rawls' Theory o f  
Justice", in Reading Rawls, ed. Norman Daniels (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), p. 202.
115 Mill, John Stuart, "Utilitarianism" [1861], in On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray 
(Oxford and N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 139-43.
116 A notable example is Amartya Sen. See his “Plural Utility”, in Utilitarianism and its Critics, 
ed. Jonathan Glover (New York: Macmillan Pub. Co; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 
1990), pp. 78-88.
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according to their effect on the well-being of people, rather than on the grounds of 
any intrinsic value of the act or principle in question. Their central concern is to 
promote the greatest good for all people: they do not attribute moral significance 
to the typically deontological concern with integrity or intentions. Secondly, 
utilitarian theories do not accord any intrinsic value to individual freedom. 
Liberty is valued insofar as it is instrumental to well-being or happiness, but is not 
an end in itself. Nonetheless, most utilitarians argue that liberty is an essential 
component or precondition for well-being, and thus defend a robust conception of 
liberty on utilitarian grounds. Utilitarian theories may therefore be classified as 
“liberal” in a broad sense, and it is to these liberal utilitarian theories that I now 
turn.
2. Maximising Utility
Utilitarianism might initially appear to provide a good basis for 
characterising duties to refugees. Indeed, a number of theorists have employed
• • 117utilitarian theory to construct accounts of duties to non-nationals. The 
universalist premises of utilitarian theories mean that they attach no special moral 
relevance to nationality, over and beyond duties to humanity in general. A 
utilitarian theory of duties to non-nationals would give equal consideration to the 
interests of all. Any recognition of special duties would have to be justified on 
instrumental grounds -  as the best means of realising universal utility. As the 
utilitarian theorist Goodin points out, on this account the “duties that states (or, 
more precisely their officials) have vis-a-vis their own citizens are not in any deep 
sense special. At root they are merely the general duties that everyone has toward
I l keveryone else worldwide.”
117 Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis o f  our Social Responsibilities 
(Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1985), and “What is So Special About Our Fellow  
Countrymen?”, Ethics 98:4 (1988), pp. 663-86; Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Anthony Ellis, “Utilitarianism and International 
Ethics”, in Traditions o f  International Ethics, ed. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 158-79.
1 1 k
Goodin, “What is so Special” {op. cit.), p. 681.
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However, this section and section three will highlight a number of 
problems with utilitarianism, which suggest the need for a right-based account. 
The discussion of utilitarianism will involve critiques of two different variants of 
the theory. First, this section will discuss problems with theories that aim to 
maximise utility. 2.1 will consider the problem of subjective preferences in 
defining and measuring utility. And 2.2 will discuss the question of distributing 
utility. It will be argued that utilitarian theories require some system of rights in 
order to ensure a satisfactory distribution of fundamental goods. Section three 
will discuss the second type of utilitarian theory, which attempts to avoid these 
problems through employing a narrower conception of avoidance of harm. 
However, this negative conception of utility fails to address more long term 
questions of justice. Again, the best route for the utilitarian seems to be to adopt 
a system of rights.
2.1 Utility and the problem o f subjective preferences
The first major hurdle for a utilitarian theory is the problem of how to 
define “utility”. Classical utilitarians defined utility as a subjective state 
experienced by individuals. On this account, utility denoted the individual’s 
happiness, or pleasure and the absence of pain. The level of happiness or 
pleasure experienced by the individual provided the main criterion for assessing 
the rightness of acts and evaluating rules and goods. The quantity of utiles (units 
of happiness) experienced was, according to this form of classical utilitarianism, 
the sole basis for such evaluations. Thus the goal of any act or policy would be to 
maximise the utility of all people, including non-nationals.
One central problem with this classical account is that it fails to make any 
qualitative distinctions between the sorts of goods that may contribute to utility. 
As Mill was to point out, the account allows for no distinction between different 
sorts of pleasure. Thus there is no scope for prioritising more enriching 
experiences over, for example, instant gratification of the senses, except on the 
grounds of the quantity of pleasure derived. So a contented slave could be said to 
derive as much utility as an angst-ridden philosopher who enjoyed a far higher
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level of autonomy and intellectual satisfaction. This will clearly not do for a 
conception of duties to refugees. It would fail to make the relevant qualitative 
distinction between different types of pleasure or pain. For example, it could not 
adequately capture the qualitative distinction between the subjective state of a 
refugee who had been able to escape persecution but felt lonely and disoriented in 
his country of asylum; and one who had been imprisoned in his country, but 
continued to enjoy the friendship of fellow inmates. Both may derive the same 
level of utility -  or the second may derive even more -  but many would value the 
freedom of the refugee over the pleasure felt by the prisoner. The classical 
concept of utility seems too crude a measurement for evaluating the desirability of 
different states.
Mill’s solution was to introduce a qualitative distinction between higher 
and lower pleasures, while maintaining that these different types of pleasure all 
fell within the same category of “utility”. He thus qualified the purely 
quantitative account of pleasure provided by classical utilitarians, but without 
abandoning utility as the sole and ultimate standard of evaluation. Mill’s 
justification for this qualitative distinction is extremely weak. It is difficult to see 
how one can defend a qualitative distinction between different types of pleasure, 
solely on the grounds that “higher” pleasures produce a greater quantity of utility. 
In other words, Mill seems to be implicitly accepting the existence of a standard 
of evaluation which is independent of the criterion of pleasure. What he refers to 
as the heterogeneity of pleasure surely reflects an acknowledgement of a plurality 
of values. The “intrinsic superiority” of higher pleasures such as academic study 
over, say, eating chocolate is based on the value attached to intellectual 
achievement, knowledge, or independence of thought. And the superiority of 
seeking asylum over imprisonment is based on the intrinsic value attached to 
liberty. In addition to pleasure, then, one might want to introduce additional 
criteria for assessing the value of different goods. Such criteria might include the 
contribution of acts or goods to the development of virtues (for example 
intellectual excellence, compassion or creativity); or the intrinsic value of
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exercising certain capacities (autonomy, reason or moral integrity).119 Even if 
one accepts Mill’s argument that those who have experienced higher and lower 
pleasures will tend to prefer the former - and this is a highly dubious empirical 
claim - it is far from clear that this preference is based solely on the contribution 
to utility. Rather, it would imply that utility is not the sole standard of evaluation. 
In short, the concept of subjective utility will not suffice on its own.
There is a second problem with the subjective account. In addition to the 
problem of qualitative distinctions, relying on subjective states may produce 
extremely unpalatable patterns of distribution. Certain people might have very 
expensive or demanding tastes, and require a greater amount of a particular good 
to achieve the same level of utility. An especially difficult case for the utilitarian 
is that of how to deal with those with morally objectionable preferences. For 
example a racist person’s utility might be increased through the restriction of 
asylum. If duties to refugees are determined on the basis of the equal 
consideration of individual preferences, then these racist attitudes would be 
factored into the equation of utility distribution. If the strength of racist feeling 
were sufficiently high, then the loss of utility resulting from taking in refugees 
might provide grounds for restricting influx. Yet most liberal theorists would not 
accept racist attitudes as a morally acceptable ground for limiting refugee influx. 
While they may in fact influence government policies on restriction, liberals 
would not consider such views to constitute moral grounds for justifying a 
particular distribution. Accepting such attitudes as a basis for distributing utility 
would produce a pattern of distribution that would seem to contradict the
190universalist principles on which utilitarian theory is based.
In conclusion, not only does the exclusive reliance on the standard of 
utility deny the existence of other values. It also potentially legitimises morally 
dubious preferences. The only acceptable route for utilitarians seems to be to 
introduce a broader conception of utility, which embraces a plurality of values
119 The former list o f  goods would be compatible with a consequentilaist account; embracing the 
latter might necessitate incorporating some form o f  deontological theory.
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that contribute to human well-being. And, moreover, to define well-being on the 
basis of certain external, non-subjective criteria. Indeed, many utilitarians have 
argued that the problems raised by relying on subjective utility justifies the 
introduction of objective criteria for measuring welfare.121 Thus utility should be 
defined in terms of objectively definable goods, such as wealth, healthcare, 
accommodation, security, and so on. Utilitarian theories based purely on the 
notion of the individual’s subjective happiness seem to be untenable. And this 
represents the first of a number of retreats from utility towards some theory of 
rights.
2.2 Distributing utility: aggregate maximisation and equality
Once the question of what to distribute has been settled, the issue arises of 
how to distribute these goods. The two most famous distributional principles are 
the maximising or “aggregating” principle, and the egalitarian principle. Let us 
consider the maximising principle first, often termed the “aggregate utility” 
principle. According to this principle, the ultimate goal of any action or 
institution is to maximise the total amount of utility or welfare. The aggregate 
utility principle has been widely criticised as failing to be sensitive to the 
distribution of utility between individuals. If what matters is the maximisation 
of total aggregate utility, then this goal may be achieved through profoundly 
unequal patterns of distribution. For example, one person’s interests might be 
legitimately sacrificed for the sake of a smaller increase in the well-being of a 
large number of people. The possibility of such sacrifice raises familiar 
objections to utilitarianism, notably its conflict with widespread intuitions about 
justice. As Rawls puts it, on a utilitarian account “there is no reason in principle 
why the greater gains of some should not compensate for the lesser losses of
120
See, for example, Ronald Dworkin on the problem o f  racist attitudes, in Taking Rights
Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1996), p. 235.
121
For a discussion o f  the debate on subjective and objective criteria, see John Elster and John E.
Roemer, eds., Interpersonal Comparisons o f  Well-Being (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992).
122 Critiques include John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 26; 
Bernard Williams, "A Critique o f  Utilitarianism", in Utilitarianism: For and Against, ed. J. J. C. 
Smart and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 77-150.
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others; or more importantly, why the violation of the liberty of a few might not be
• 1 made right by the greater good shared by many.”
The case against this extreme form of aggregate utility is now widely 
accepted, and most contemporary utilitarian theories have defended some 
alternative principle for distributing utility. The most obvious alternative is to 
embrace an egalitarian principle of distribution. Egalitarian theories aim to 
achieve equal utility for all, giving equal consideration to the welfare of each 
individual. One can find an example of this type of average utility approach in 
the work of Peter Singer, who advocates a principle of equal consideration. In his 
discussion of the distribution of welfare, he argues that this principle of equality 
“acts like a pair of scales”, which “favour the side where the interest is stronger or 
where several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of similar 
interests.”124 In other words, the distribution of goods is determined on the basis 
of an evaluation of relative interests. The distributive principle should give 
precedence to more pressing concerns over less fundamental interests. It would 
also mean that the claims of those with less of the good in question are given 
priority over those with a greater quantity of the good. The principle of equal 
consideration would therefore necessitate a redistribution of goods until the 
interests of all parties are equally met, thus achieving a “balance” of equal 
consideration.
Singer applies this principle of equal consideration to the question of 
refugees.125 He argues that since the concern to escape from persecution is 
clearly more pressing than the concerns of those in receiving countries to limit 
admission, there are grounds for a considerable extension of duties to refugees. 
Where there is a conflict between the interests of refugees and rich receiving 
states, the latter should be expected to make greater sacrifices of welfare than they 
currently do. The utility gained for the refugee by avoiding torture or death will
123 Rawls, Theory o f  Justice {op. cit.), p. 26.
124 Singer, Practical Ethics {op. cit.), p. 22.
125 See Peter and Renata Singer, “The Ethics o f  Refugee Policy”, in Open Borders? C losed  
Societies?: The Ethical an d Political Issues, ed. Mark Gibney (New York and London:
78
be far greater than the utility sacrificed by receiving countries through a rise in 
taxes, or a more densely populated country.
However, Singer is aware that the “scales” model of equal consideration 
could imply substantial loss of utility for receiving countries.126 A generous entry 
policy would be likely to encourage far more people to emigrate from poorer 
countries, potentially leading to mass influx into richer states. This could 
jeopardise the more fundamental interests of receiving countries. On the 
principle of equal consideration, restrictions on entry would only be justified in 
cases where the sacrifice of individuals in the receiving state outweighed the 
benefits derived by refugees. But this might lead to a situation in which the utility 
of both refugees and receiving states is scaled down to a significantly lower level. 
Rather than increasing the welfare of refugees, the principle of equal 
consideration might imply a decline in the welfare of receiving states until it was 
equal to that of the refugee sending state. Singer acknowledges that this would be 
problematic when he writes,
S ince the interests o f  th e  refu gees in resettlem ent in a  m ore prosperous country w ill 
a lw ays be greater than the con flic tin g  interests o f  the residents o f  those countries, it 
w ould  seem  that the p rin cip le o f  equal consideration  o f  in terests points to a w orld  in 
w hich  all countries con tinu e to  accept refugees until th ey  are reduced  to  the sam e
standard o f  poverty  and overcrow din g as the third w orld  cou n tries from  w hich  the
127refugee are seek in g  to f lee .
Not only does this conception of duties to refugees seem to be totally 
unfeasible, it also leads to what Joseph Raz has termed a problem of "wastage". 
Singer’s "scales" model fails to distinguish between policies that equalise utility 
by withdrawing a good or entitlement; and those that ensure an equal distribution 
through granting this good to those that do not have it. In the former case, the 
principle of equal consideration would cause wastage of utility. Where equality
Greenwood, 1989), pp. 111-30; and Peter Singer, "Insiders and Outsiders", in Practical Ethics
{op. cit.), pp. 247-63.
126 On the problem o f  the sacrifices required by richer states, see Chris Brown, International
Relations Theory: New Norm ative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992),
pp. 166-7.
127 Singer, “Insiders and Outsiders” {op. cit.), p. 261.
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of utility is the main goal, it may result in a substantial decrease in the utility of 
each person. In this sense, it would conflict with the goal of utility maximisation. 
As Barry puts it, “the principle of equal utility, if interpreted strictly, would 
require us to say that a situation of equally shared misery was morally preferable 
to a situation in which everyone was very happy but some were more so than 
others.”129
The best way of avoiding these distributional problems would be to 
introduce a threshold of welfare or utility, below which individuals should not 
morally be required to fall. This is the approach implicitly adopted by Singer to 
respond to the problem of wastage. He argues that there are certain grounds on 
which it would be justifiable to restrict influx prior to the point at which the 
welfare of receiving countries was scaled down to that of refugees. For example, 
where there is a threat of irreparable damage to the environment, or a serious 
danger to security, “the balance of interests would have swung against a further 
increase in the intake of refugees.”130
This is a reasonable condition, but it is not one that Singer can easily 
incorporate into his scales model. The scales model assumes that goods should 
be maximised, consistently with their equal distribution. Loosely stated, the goal 
is to achieve the greatest possible amount of utility for each person. But the 
introduction of the notion of a threshold implies that the goods in question have 
other characteristics not captured by this distributive principle. First, it implies -  
as we have seen - that there is a minimum level of welfare, below which 
individuals should not be expected to fall, even if this means that others remain 
even worse off. This means that there is a minimum acceptable quantity of the 
good, and that ensuring the minimum amount for some could take precedence 
over ensuring equal distribution for all at a level beneath this minimum. So the 
distributive principle becomes more complex than a question of simply 
maximising utility consistent with its equal distribution. A second feature of
Joseph Raz, The M orality o f  Freedom  (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 227.
129 Brian Barry, Theories o f  Justice (Berkely and Los Angeles: University o f  California Press, 
1989), p. 79.
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goods not recognised by the scales model is what Raz has termed “satiability”. 
Raz argues that maximising principles such as the one advanced by Singer are not 
sufficiently nuanced to capture the notion that most claims to utility or welfare are 
“satiable”. In other words, they are demands that can be met by a given level of 
distribution. Any allocation of utility above this level becomes unnecessary, or at 
least a less urgent concern. Satiable goods are also “diminishing”, in that the 
more of the good a person has, the weaker the reason to give her more of this 
good.131
According to Raz, “[t]he ideals at the foundation of morality and politics
1 I*)are all diminishing and satiable principles.” Be this as it may, the sorts of 
goods at stake in the conflict between refugee rights and national interests would 
seem to be satiable and diminishing. These would include interests of refugees in 
securing physical security and material welfare, and the interests of receiving 
goods such as a healthy natural environment, or a tolerant society. These are not 
goods that it would make sense to maximise indefinitely. For example, the 
interest in physical security or living in a tolerant society involve goods that will 
be satiated at a certain level. Such satiable goods allow one to define a level of 
needs, or threshold of welfare, below which individuals or groups should not be 
expected to fall. And the notion of satiability enables one to distinguish between 
priority cases, where individuals are lacking even the most basic needs, and cases 
where basic needs are satisfied and thus of less urgent concern. This notion of 
satiation departs from utility maximising principles, introducing a layer of needs. 
It is a concept that is simply not captured by utilitarian models based on equality 
and/or maximising principles. This is true not just of Singer’s theory, but of all 
such utilitarian accounts.
130 Singer, “Insiders and Outsiders” {op. cit.), p. 262.
131 An example o f  a satiable and diminishing good is that o f  human needs, which might be
embodied in the principle that everyone’s needs should be met. This good is satiable, in that the
needs in question can be met, and it is diminishing in that the closer a person is to having these
needs met, the less she will benefit from a further increase in the relevant good. Conversely, as
Raz writes, “the further one is from the point o f  satiation the stronger is one’s right to the benefit
conferred by the principle.” Raz, M orality {op. cit.), pp. 236-7.1
Raz, Morality {ibid.), p.241.
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To summarise the argument so far, utilitarian theories face a number of 
problems that point strongly to the need for a conception of rights. Firstly, 
theories that rely on subjective states have problems defining utility, and can lead 
to morally unacceptable patterns of distribution, necessitating the introduction of 
some external or objective criteria for measuring welfare. Secondly, utilitarian 
theories have difficulties with distributive principles. Theories based on an 
aggregate maximising principle will be insufficiently sensitive to questions of 
distribution. Utilitarians have attempted to avoid this problem through adopting a 
principle of average utility maximisation. However, this averaging principle 
creates its own problems. Strict equality may call for distributions that simply 
scale down the average utility, rather than tolerating some inequality at a higher 
level of utility for all. The discussion will now consider whether alternative 
accounts of utilitarian theory can avoid these problems.
3. Alleviating Suffering
Before turning to right-based theories, it is worth examining a second 
variety of utilitarian theory that appears to avoid these problems. Rather than 
seeking to maximise utility, such theories have the more modest goal of 
alleviating suffering. One of the more sophisticated theories of this kind is 
provided by Robert Goodin. Goodin’s theory of universal duties avoids many of 
the short-comings of utility maximising theories. He defends a consequentialist 
theory of duties to non-nationals that is defined on the basis of an objective 
criterion of well-being - the concept of vulnerability. He argues that individuals 
have a duty to protect and assist those who are dependent on them or vulnerable 
to their actions and choices. The theory is universalist, in that it denies the 
intrinsic significance of special duties to compatriots. Non-nationals and refugees 
in principle have an equal claim to be protected and assisted. As he writes, “the 
state’s special responsibility to its own citizens is, at root, derived from the same 
considerations that underlies its general duty to the refugee.” As such, “it would 
be wrong for any state to press the claims of its own citizens strongly, to the
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disadvantage of those who have no advocate in the system”, i.e. refugees.133
3.1 Protecting the vulnerable
The notion of vulnerability seems to overcome the two central problems 
with the theories discussed in the last section: the need for thresholds, and the 
problem of relying on subjective preferences. First, the vulnerability principle is 
not an exclusively maximising principle, in that it does not aim at an unlimited 
increase in utility. Nor does it aim to maximise total utility at the expense of 
equal distribution. Rather, it has the more negative aim of avoiding harm and 
suffering. The notion of avoiding harm clearly assumes a threshold of welfare 
below which individuals should not be expected to fall. Where they are below 
this level, other agents are morally required to assist or protect them in order to 
attain the acceptable threshold of well-being. In the case of refugees, one might 
define the threshold as including protection from physical threats, assistance to 
meet material needs, or some other list of conditions linked to the 1951 
Convention definition of refugee.134 Since the principle is based on a threshold 
concept rather than a scales model, it would not justify redistribution which 
involved denying these goods to those who already enjoyed them, for the sake of 
achieving the goal of equality.
Secondly, the vulnerability thesis is less susceptible to the problem of 
subjective preferences. The conditions necessary for avoiding harm and suffering 
would be objectively definable, and would apply equally to all human-beings. 
They would be based on a conception of universally shared human needs, and 
thus the quantity required for each individual would not vary significantly (or at 
least not on morally arbitrary grounds). Thus the problem of inter-personal 
comparison would not arise.
However, there are a number of rather different problems with Goodin’s 
account. One of these is specific to his theory - i.e. his argument for limiting the
133 Goodin, "What is so special about our fellow countrymen?” (op. cit.), pp. 684-5.
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scope of duties. Other problems stem from the consequentialist structure of the 
theory, and are problems characteristic of all utilitarian accounts. I shall deal with 
the first problem in this section, and the more general critique of 
consequential ism in 3.2.
The first difficulty for Goodin’s theory, then, is that of how it responds to 
the problem of feasibility. If all individuals are morally obliged to protect and 
assist others, then there seems to be no limit to the moral demands of the 
vulnerability thesis. It would imply the obligation to extend protection and 
assistance to all those below the relevant threshold, thus imposing potentially 
limitless duties on moral agents. In terms of refugee policy, the vulnerability 
thesis would deny the relevance of special duties to compatriots, and thus 
advocate a far more generous refugee policy. Goodin attempts to avoid the 
problem of feasibility by arguing that there are instrumental or pragmatic grounds 
for dividing responsibility for protection, on the basis of an agent’s relation to 
other individuals.
On balance, persons relatively  near to  u s in sp ace and in tim e probably w ill  b e rather 
m ore vulnerable to us. T heir interests are m ore lik ely  to be affected  m ore h ea v ily  b y  
our actions and ch o ices  than are the interests o f  persons m ore distant; and our nearer  
neighbours in space and tim e are m ore lik e ly  to  be d ep en din g  on us, m ore or le ss  
e x c lu siv e ly , for assistance and p rotection .” 135 
The notion of allocation based on vulnerability, then, provides the justification for 
a moral division of labour on instrumental grounds. Goodin argues that a moral 
agent has special duties to those who stand in a particular relation to her. “What 
is crucial, in my view, is that others are depending on us. They are particularly 
vulnerable to our actions and choices. That, I argue, is the true source of all the 
standard special responsibilities that we so readily acknowledge.”136 On this 
account, the moral agent has a special responsibility to people who are currently 
dependent on her support, thus presumably limiting the scope of moral duty to 
manageable proportions.
Yet it is difficult to see how one can sustain a distinction between actual
134
See Chapter One.
135Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable (op. cit.), p. 121
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and potential dependency. Why should a moral agent have a duty to assist those 
currently dependent on her, but not to extend protection and assistance to all those 
who might potentially benefit from it? The distinction between actual and 
potential dependants seems to rest on some implicit notion of the instrumental 
benefits of division of labour. Such instrumental arguments for dividing 
universal duties -  as will be seen in the next chapter -  tend to be based on some 
argument about why an agent will be better qualified to assist or protect those 
nearer to her. For example, one could justify a division of labour on the grounds 
that people with close geographic or cultural ties would have better information 
about people’s needs, or could be more efficient in supplying the goods necessary 
to meet their needs. I may have a better understanding of the needs of people 
from my tribe or neighbourhood, or may be better located geographically to 
deliver food to people living near to me.
Now while some of these arguments may justify a division of labour on 
instrumental grounds, Goodin's account does not seem to provide a very 
convincing defence of such an arrangement. The criterion of actual dependency 
does not seem to be a legitimate ground for allocating responsibility. It may 
potentially be far more effective for a particular agent to perform duties to a given 
group of people who are not currently dependent on her. For example, she may 
have a particular talent for conflict mediation or be especially motivated to help 
lepers in Calcutta. Even though they are not actually vulnerable to her actions, 
there would be strong utilitarian grounds for her to carry out duties of assistance 
to these leprosy sufferers or attempt to resolve conflict between two ethnic 
groups. Conversely, one could imagine a group of people living in extreme 
poverty on a desert island, with no particular ties to other peoples. In this case 
their welfare would not be directly dependent on the actions of any specific
i  0*7
agents, and thus there would be no obvious candidates for assisting them. The 
division of responsibility according to actual dependence does not seem to be 
justifiable on utilitarian grounds. It will not be the most effective means of
136 Ibid., p. 11.
137See O ’N eill’s discussion o f  the scope o f  moral duties, and especially the notion o f  the moral 
relevance o f  “connectedness.” Onora O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive
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meeting needs, and will thus fail to promote universal welfare.
Quite apart from the dubious justification of the division of moral labour, 
there is also a significant practical problem with the thesis. As has been argued, 
the relation in which an agent stands to her dependants is not permanently fixed. 
If the vulnerability thesis were to provide a universal principle for the distribution 
of responsibility, then it would presumably lead people to alter their relations so 
that they could derive increased benefit from agents. If one person or state is in a 
good position to extend protection and assistance to others, then it is likely to 
encourage more people to enter into a relationship of dependency on this state. 
This would clearly be the case with refugee policy. On Goodin’s account, a state 
would have special responsibility for those who are claiming asylum at their 
borders or in their territory. Since these people are especially vulnerable to the 
actions of receiving states, this would generate special duties on the part of the 
state to accept them. But this would presumably encourage much larger numbers 
of people to travel to the state in question so that they too would be in a similar 
dependency relation.
Goodin does suggest that where possible, richer states should cooperate to 
share the responsibility of receiving refugees. But where other states are 
unwilling to share the burden, the duty would fall exclusively on the first country 
of asylum: "Suppose that no other nation is prepared to share the refugees (or the 
costs). Then our nation would be under a peculiarly strong responsibility, a sort 
of international equivalent of an individual responsibility, to offer them
11ft •sanctuary." The problem here is that a conception of duties based on actual 
dependency would encourage many more people to transfer dependency to 
receiving countries, even where they were not necessarily high-risk cases. The 
dependency thesis would justify extending asylum to a far wider category of 
immigrants, providing they were able to travel to the borders of the receiving 
country and become dependent on it for assistance. And this would make such a 
basis for defining duties to refugees highly unfeasible. Goodin’s conception of a
Account o f  Practical Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 100-6.
138 Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable {op. cit.), p. 168.
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division of labour based on dependency is practically unworkable, as well as 
ethically unjustifiable.
3.2 Vulnerability and dependency
There is a second problem with the potential consequences of adopting the 
vulnerability thesis, and this is common to all utilitarian theories that employ a 
notion of harm avoidance, or what I shall term the negative conditions for basic 
well-being. One of the virtues of the vulnerability thesis, as we saw, was its 
ability to define objective conditions for avoiding harm that were equally valid for 
all human-beings. Yet defining the theory’s telos as avoidance of harm and 
protection of the vulnerable provides only a partial conception of well-being. The 
classical utilitarians - problematic as their theories were - did at least have a 
conception of well-being which incorporated happiness as well as the absence of 
pain. And the provision of such a positive conception is vital for a 
consequentialist theory. After all, these theories evaluate acts according to the 
desirability of their consequences. So without a full account of desired 
consequences, one can only have a limited assessment of the desirability of the 
act.
The absence of a fuller conception of flourishing would not be so 
problematic if securing these minimum conditions were a pre-condition for 
achieving positive well-being. But the difficulty for the vulnerability thesis is that 
achieving its goals detracts from and even undermines the search for human 
flourishing. If one limits the political goal to the avoidance of harm, then there is 
a risk that this will limit the scope for seeking more satisfactory solutions that 
address the causes of vulnerability, and achieve a fuller form of human 
flourishing. Relieving distress and protecting the vulnerable would encourage 
dependency on short-term assistance, in turn detracting from the longer term goal 
of addressing the conditions that gave rise to dependency, and also limiting the 
development of autonomy.
We can illustrate this point by considering the implications of the
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dependency thesis in the area of refugee policy. A reliance on immediate 
assistance and protection would risk encouraging dependency on external aid, to 
the neglect of actions to address the causes of refugee flows. In particular, a 
greater dependency would undermine the longer-term capacity to improve 
conditions in sending countries. The provision of assistance would therefore fail 
to address the causes of vulnerability, and may well even be counter-productive to 
this goal. Indeed, concerns about an exclusive emphasis on relieving symptoms 
prompted a shift of emphasis in the early 1980s towards measures to address the 
“root causes” of refugee flows.139 The root cause approach advocated forms of 
redistribution and the promotion of human rights in sending countries, through 
measures such as debt relief, trade liberalisation and foreign direct investment. 
Although this was largely motivated by the desire to limit refugee flows and thus 
relieve the burden on receiving countries, it was also seen as a means of 
improving the situation in sending countries as an end in itself. Measures to 
“empower” those in areas of potential emigration was seen as ethically preferable 
to providing assistance and protection once people were forced to flee.140
Likewise, at the level of political theory, the problems of relying on a 
notion of vulnerability have generated criticism from justice theorists. Brian 
Barry, for example, has argued that theories of justice are far better placed than 
notions of humanity to achieve a fair distribution of resources. The principle of 
humanity sets a limited task of relieving suffering where it occurs. By contrast, 
justice provides guidance on the best procedures and mechanisms for ensuring a 
fair distribution of resources. In Barry’s words, “humanity is a question of doing 
good; justice is a question of power.”141 The just distribution of resources 
provides the means of empowering people, and hence can both address the causes 
of vulnerability, and provide the conditions for autonomy. Such a conception of 
justice would involve the distribution of rights, rather than the distribution of
139 See references in note 108, supra .
140 Indeed, the problem o f  “dependency syndrome” has long been a concern in refugee policy, and 
has encouraged those working with refugees in camps and with asylum-seekers to consider ways
o f  “empowering” people rather than simply distributing assistance.
141 Brian Barry, “Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective”, in Ethics, Economics, and the 
Law , ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, Nomos XXIV (New York: New York 
University Press, 1982), p. 245.
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goods that immediately relieve vulnerability.
This notion of autonomy implies commitment to a more positive 
conception of human flourishing, one that is central to liberal political thought. 
Yet it is a conception that is not adequately captured by utilitarian theories. As I 
have tried to show, conceptions of the negative conditions for basic well-being, 
such as Goodin’s vulnerability thesis, provide only a partial account of the goal of 
political and moral action. The notion of avoiding suffering is not only 
insufficient as a telos, it also potentially undermines the achievement of more 
positive goals, through encouraging dependency on outside assistance. On the 
other hand, we should also recall that utilitarian theories that do try to incorporate 
a thicker conception of flourishing have problems defining and distributing the 
goods necessary for individual well-being. The more complex the conditions for 
human flourishing, the more problematic it becomes to ensure the fair distribution 
of these conditions. In particular, where individual autonomy is central to the 
conception of flourishing, as it is on the liberal account, then the utilitarian 
account is ill-equipped to ensure proper distribution. What all of this points to is 
the need to introduce objective entitlements or goods that enable individuals to 
realise these goods - in short, a theory of rights.142
Utilitarian theories do not after all appear to be very good candidates for 
characterising the relationship between refugee rights and national interests. The 
arguments against utilitarian accounts in this section have been various, and it is 
worth briefly recapitulating the main steps of the critique. First, theories based on 
subjective preferences or conceptions of welfare failed to produce morally 
acceptable patterns of distribution. As a conception of duties to refugees, the 
utility maximising, subjective preference model would lead to morally 
unacceptable patterns of distribution. Moreover, the emphasis on utility 
maximisation failed to take into account notions of satiation and diminishing 
returns, implying the need for some notion of threshold. Many critics of utility 
maximising theories therefore point to the superiority of right-based theories in
142 This is not to say that palliative action is not essential once people have fled. I simply mean 
that it should not be the exclusive concern.
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ensuring adequate distribution.
Having dismissed utility maximising accounts, the discussion considered 
whether Goodin’s vulnerability thesis could avoid these two problems. He 
introduced a satiable and diminishing conception of welfare based on external 
criteria. However, the theory encountered a different set of short-comings. The 
first problem of the grounds for dividing labour was specific to his theory, and it 
is also a problem that recurs in different forms in right-based theories. So it was 
relevant to the critique of Goodin’s account, but did not imply that we should 
reject all negative utilitarian accounts. The second problem, however, was 
common to all such theories. It was the point that the focus on avoidance of 
suffering would be likely to encourage further dependency on assistance, thereby 
increasing the problem of feasibility. And dependency on the provision of 
immediate assistance and protection might lead to a neglect of the causes of 
vulnerability.
Utilitarian theories seem to face a choice between a positive conception of 
utility that faces insurmountable problems of distribution; and a negative 
conception that undermines the achievement of human flourishing. Again, the 
preferable alternative seems to be a theory of justice that distributes the means for 
achieving autonomy and self-sufficiency. So I shall now turn to an examination 
of right-based theories.
4. Right-Based Universalism
Deontological or right-based theories may derive and justify rights from a 
number of different assumptions about the nature of human-beings. Typically, 
liberal theories derive rights from a conception of the individual as having an 
interest in freedom. This interest in freedom justifies imposing duties on others 
to respect one’s freedom. Such duties should of course be consistent with the 
equal distribution of such a right to freedom. Since all people have a common 
interest in freedom, there is an equal right to such freedom, and hence duties 
should be imposed so as to ensure the equal distribution of this right.
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Some liberal theorists have argued that all rights derive from the basic 
right to freedom.143 On this account, the assertion of any right presupposes a 
commitment to a fundamental right to freedom. This attempt to trace all rights 
back to a basic right to freedom does, however, have the effect of excluding a 
large body of liberal rights theories that do not ground all rights in the 
individual’s interest in freedom.144 For example, it would exclude need-based 
theories, which hold that rights are grounded in other basic interests, such as the 
need for subsistence and physical security.145 Since I want to consider this second 
class of theories as potential candidates for a conception of duties to refugees, I 
shall adopt a broader definition of rights. A right can be understood as an interest 
of an individual that is important enough to generate requirements of action on 
the part of others. According to Raz’s definition, “‘X has a right’ if and only if X 
can have rights, and other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his 
interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a 
duty.”146 The notion that there is some such set of universal rights and that these 
rights are the fundamental principles of morality seems to accord with the 
prevalent human rights framework.147
Right-based universalism has certain prima facie advantages as a
141
The classic account is by H. J. L. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?”, in P olitical
Philosophy, ed. A. Quinto (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 53-66.
144 This point is drawn from John Charvet, Theory and Practice o f  Human Rights, Summer
School Lectures, London School o f  Economics and Political Science (unpublished, 1999).
145 See, for example, Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and UK Foreign Policy  
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980). The definition also excludes religious accounts, 
such as Locke’s grounding o f  rights in duties to God, although this omission is o f less concern, as
the discussion is focusing on modem western, secular theories.
146 Raz, M orality {op. cit), p. 166. Raz himself rejects right-based theories.
147There has been extensive writing on the meaning and grounding o f  human rights in 
international law. For good overviews, see Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and  
Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); John R. Vincent, Human rights and  
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in association with the Royal 
Institute o f  International Affairs, 1986); and Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Human Rights 
in G lobal Politics (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). It should be 
stressed that although universalist right-based theories may derive some o f their appeal from their 
embodiment in international human rights law, the analysis o f  universalist theories in this chapter 
does not treat universal right-based approaches as necessarily supportive o f  the existing regime. 
Right-based theories may defend a variety o f  views on the substance and grounding o f  human 
rights, which may or may not accord with prevalent conceptions o f  human rights in international 
law. In order to maintain a distinction between prevalent conceptions o f  human rights and various 
right-based theories, the latter will be termed “universal” (rather than “human”) rights in the 
course o f  the discussion.
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candidate for reconciling refugee rights and national interests. As with 
utilitarianism, since nationality has no intrinsic moral relevance, the interests of 
compatriots are accorded no special weight. Conflicts of interest between 
refugees and receiving countries can be resolved on the basis of a common scale 
of value, with each person’s interests accorded equal weight. Duties to 
compatriots would have no special quality or strength over and above duties to 
the rest of humanity. I shall argue in this section that right-based theories fare 
better them utilitarianism in meeting the criterion of normative desirability.
However, such theories encounter serious problems of feasibility. The 
practical demands of guaranteeing an equal distribution of universal rights would 
generate immense duties on states to assist the nationals of other states, including 
a duty to admit a substantially higher level of refugees than at present. There is 
evidently a significant gap between the requirements of such universalist theories 
of rights, and the current practice of states. The gap between ethical norms and 
practice should be of no great surprise, and does not in itself provide grounds for 
rejecting the theory. What is more problematic is the failure of right-based 
universalism adequately to explain the gap and to suggest how it might be 
bridged. Right-based universalist theories tend to respond to this problem in two 
ways: by defining the gap between theory and practice as a problem of 
motivation; or by justifying some restriction on instrumental grounds. This 
section will argue that neither defence is satisfactory, thus calling into doubt the 
practical feasibility of liberal universalism as a conception of duties to refugees.
4.1 Universal rights and the problem o f  feasibility
As with utilitarian theories, right-based universalist theories hold that the 
only morally relevant features of individuals are those which are common to 
human beings in general. An individual’s nationality will therefore not affect the 
weight accorded to her moral claims. This implies that where certain universal 
rights are considered fundamental to well-being, each individual should have an 
equal right to live in a state where these rights can be enjoyed. From this equal 
right to enjoyment of universal rights, one can derive a universal right to move. If
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there is a disparity in the quality of universal rights between states, and a person’s 
fundamental rights are not being guaranteed in her home country, she has a right 
to move to a country where her rights will be better protected. The right to
• 14.8relocate may be understood as derivative of fundamental universal rights. 
Equally, the fact of being a member of a particular state does not in principle 
affect the nature and strength of duties to compatriots. Duties to refugees are just 
as binding as duties to compatriots. While there may be good arguments for 
dividing up responsibility for enforcing these duties on the basis of a system of 
separate states, thereby generating a system of special duties between 
compatriots, such special duties would be justified in an instrumental rather than 
an intrinsic sense. As we saw in 3.1, they would be justified on grounds of 
efficiency, for example because of proximity or mutual dependence or local 
knowledge. But these instrumental arguments for a division of labour would be 
likely to prescribe the extension of duties to those seeking asylum in one's state, 
since the receiving states would be well placed to provide practical assistance.
On the right-based universalist account, then, there would be no good 
justification - either intrinsic or instrumental - for privileging the rights of fellow 
nationals over non-nationals. Indeed, the existence of inequalities between states 
in terms of the enjoyment of universal rights would imply a duty to admit 
refugees. The receiving society has no moral justification for restricting influx, 
except where admission will infringe the universal rights of its nationals to an 
equivalent or greater degree than the infringement of the universal rights of non­
nationals which results from non-admission. As one right-based universalist 
argues:
On th is v iew , the co lle c tiv e  interest o f  a receiv in g  so c ie ty  cou ld  not be w eigh ed  
against the in d iv id u al’s right to  m ove, in the sense that the interests o f  an econ om y, 
a  culture or a theory o f  the nation cou ld  not be advanced against the right. O n ly
148 Whether or not the right to relocate implies the right to migrate into a given country raises a 
number o f  difficult questions, some o f  which are dealt with later in this chapter. One question 
there is no space to deal with is that o f  whether a right should be conditional on the feasibility o f  
its being simultaneously enjoyed by large numbers o f  people. Barry argues that the existence o f  a 
right to immigration - like any activity subject to congestion - “depends upon not too many people 
exercising it.” See "The Quest for Consistency: A Skeptical View", in Free Movement: Ethical 
Issues in the Transnational M igration o f  People and o f  Money, ed. Brian Barry and Robert E. 
Goodin (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 279-87.
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infringement o f  recognised individual human rights could justify exclusion.149
As with the utilitarian universalist accounts considered in the previous 
section, the most glaring problem with this account is the question of feasibility. 
States’ refugee policies do not remotely approximate to this universalist theory of 
ethics, nor do states appear to recognise such duties as morally binding. Right- 
based universalist theories tend to respond to this problem of feasibility in two 
ways. First, some acknowledge the gap between existing practice and the 
requirements of universalist rights, defining the problem as a lack of moral 
motivation. On this account, individuals and their political leaders are simply too 
selfish to perform the required ethical duties to refugees. In terms of individual 
nationals of the receiving state, the lack of moral motivation would be 
characterised as a conflict between duty and self-interest, in which the latter 
prevails. At the group level, it may be defined as a conflict between universal 
rights and national interests, in which domestic strategic and economic concerns 
override duties to non-nationals.
I already raised doubts about the practical implications of this account in 
the previous chapter. Explaining the gap between current practice and the 
requirements of universal ethics as a problem of motivation is not problematic 
simply because it produces an unfeasible theory. More seriously, it is potentially 
counterproductive to its own objectives. Where a theory defines the requirements 
of morality at an unattainable level, non-compliance with these standards can 
produce an outcome which is further from the desired goal than the successful 
realisation of less demanding, or “second best” moral rules. The possible effects 
of non-compliance therefore need to be taken seriously. If people are simply not 
motivated to comply with the relevant moral rules, it suggests the need for a more 
critical evaluation of the assumptions being made about moral motivation.
I shall examine the problem of motivation in more depth in subsequent 
chapters, where I will be arguing that liberal universalist theories rely on an
149 Anne Dummett, “The Transnational Migration o f  People seen from within a Natural Law 
Perspective”, in Barry and Goodin (eds.), Free Movement {op. cit), p. 177.
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implausible theory of motivation. The practical problems liberal universalist 
theories face generating motivation to comply with their demands reflect a deeper 
flaw in their assumptions about moral motivation and moral agency. This more 
radical critique of liberal universalism raises a number of second order 
philosophical and psychological questions, which go beyond the scope of the 
present chapter. For the time being, then, I shall limit my critique to expressing 
more practical doubts concerning liberal universalist assumptions about 
motivation. Defining the gap between duties and practice as a problem of 
motivation at best fails to provide a realistic account of duties to refugees; at 
worst, it is potentially counter-productive to its own ends.
4.2 Instrumental justifications for restriction
The second response of right-based universalist theories to the problem of 
feasibility is to introduce a series of instrumental arguments for justifying the 
restriction of refugee influx. This is a more common route for universalist right- 
based theorists, many of whom argue that there are universalist liberal grounds 
for limiting the equal distribution of rights to refugees in practice. For example, 
the maintenance of law and order may be a precondition for guaranteeing the right 
to freedom from arbitrary killing. Likewise, a degree of stability will be required 
for the effective functioning of social institutions, again a necessary condition for 
the protection of universal rights. Such preconditions for individual rights could 
override equal distribution of rights, as indeed Dummet argues this when she 
admits that the goal of national security could trump the right to immigrate.150
This limited claim about the need to preserve national security is fairly 
uncontroversial. Indeed, it would be rather paradoxical to argue on universalist 
grounds for the erosion of the conditions necessary for the realisation of universal 
rights. Yet the goal of ensuring national security would not provide grounds for a 
significant restriction of influx. It would still commit liberal receiving states to 
admitting far higher levels of refugees than at present - possibly millions.
150 Dummett, "Transational Migration" (op. cit.), p. 177.
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Arguments based on the protection of current welfare state provisions or 
employment for nationals would not be morally accepted grounds for restricting 
influx. So the introduction of the goal of national security as a precondition for 
the effective exercise of universal rights would not solve the problem of 
feasibility.
Other liberal universalists have provided more extensive instrumental 
grounds for justifying restriction, incorporating a wider list of goods or goals 
which may be considered pre-conditional for the enjoyment of universal rights. A 
number of liberal political theorists writing on the subject of immigration argue 
that a range of public goods is necessary for the nurturing of liberal values and 
institutions. These may be concrete procedural or institutional arrangements, 
such as the rule of law, due process and a democratic constitution, or more 
abstract concepts such as the values of tolerance and fairness. Ackerman, for 
example, argues that citizens must be willing and able to engage in a liberal 
dialogue, which justifies restriction of immigration “to protect the ongoing 
process of liberal conversation.”151
Yet as the list of requirements gets longer and more complex, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to evaluate the respective demands of universal rights, and 
the goods necessary for the longer term enjoyment of these rights. There seems to 
be a wide margin of variation in assessments of the preconditions for the 
preservation of universal rights in liberal states. Liberal universalist instrumental 
arguments could be used to justify a range of immigration policies, from almost 
open borders to extreme restriction. As Nardin observes, “liberal egalitarianism 
sometimes looks like little more than a vehicle for whatever opinions happen
1 S?currently to be in favour in democratic societies.”
The possibility of defending highly restrictionist policies on such 
seemingly nebulous instrumental grounds does raise doubts about the adequacy of
151Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press
1980), p. 95.
152Terry Nardin, “Alternative Ethical Perspectives on Transnational Migration”, in Barry and
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the right-based model. It seems to create a high level of indeterminacy. The 
impact of the admission of non-nationals on the goods that are preconditional for 
the exercise of rights is at best uncertain. Liberal rights theorists would insist that 
this grey area of indeterminacy could be cleared up - at least in principle - by an 
assessment of the empirical preconditions for the exercise of rights. The problem 
of indeterminacy is simply a reflection of the complexity of evaluating exactly 
how the goods in question will contribute to the enjoyment of rights. In short, a 
right-based universalist may argue that indeterminacy is not a sufficient reason for 
abandoning right-based universalism as a framework for refugee policy.
However, the grey area of indeterminacy does beg a number of questions. 
On the universalist right-based model, as we saw, the problem of indeterminacy 
allows for a range of justifiable stances on refugee policy. Disagreement over 
policy revolves around questions of which public goods are necessary for 
securing universal rights in receiving states and for exporting these rights to other 
countries, and the extent to which influx of refugees may undermine these goods. 
Yet it is patently false that disagreements of this kind account for the spectrum of 
policy positions on admission, or even that they are characteristic of the current 
policy debate. Those advocating more restrictionist policies tend to do so on 
domestic-centric grounds, rather than on the basis of tenuous arguments about the 
longer term protection of universal rights. Such arguments do not start from an 
impartial, universalist perspective, but particularist considerations, often premised 
on the moral relevance of nationality.153
Right-based universalism would deny the legitimacy of such 
considerations in designing refugee policy. Particularism is simply a 
“rationalization of selfishness”.154 Yet in many cases, their instrumental
Goodin, Free M ovement {op. cit.), pp. 276.
153 According to Barry, impartiality involves “not being motivated by private considerations”, and 
implies that “you must not do for one person what you would not do for anyone else in a similar 
situation.” See Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford and N ew  York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), p. 12. If we accept this definition, impartiality can be assumed to be a requirement o f  
right-based universalism (at least as characterised in this chapter). The concept o f  impartiality and
Barry’s theory o f  justice are discussed in more depth in Chapter Three.
154 Andrew Belsey, “World Poverty, Justice and Equality”, in Robin Attfield and Barry Wilkins 
(London: Routledge, 1992), p. 41.
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arguments for restriction arrive at suspiciously similar conclusions to those of 
particularists. It would be difficult to dispute that a certain minimum of security 
is necessary for realising the basic rights of fellow nationals to subsistence and 
physical security, and civil liberties. But it is far from evident that the right to 
housing benefit or use of public parks could trump the right of a non-national to 
freedom from torture. At any rate, this prioritisation of the rights of compatriots 
could not be justified on universalist grounds. To put it bluntly, the instrumental 
arguments for protecting liberal institutions appear somewhat disingenuous -  
they seem to be excuses for smuggling in a commitment to special ties and the 
protection of particular ways of life. It is not my intention to deny that such 
particularist values may be worthwhile. The point is rather that they cannot be 
justified on purely universalist grounds.
There is a further reason for incorporating at least some form of 
particularism, which is not central to the argument but is nonetheless relevant. 
Thus far, it has been argued that the grey area of indeterminacy in evaluating the 
competing interests of refugees and receiving states may disguise a commitment 
to particularism. Some account of the significance of particular ties and projects, 
and their relation to moral motivation, will be vital if the universalist perspective 
is to provide an adequate theory of duties to refugees and to compatriots. Yet 
there is also a case for incorporating some notion of particularism on the basis of 
the diversity of values. As was noted in the previous section, a number of liberal 
theories justify restriction to protect a complex bundle of rights and goods in the 
receiving state. On a universalist account, the value of these goods and rights is 
wholly derivative of universal rights. Yet if one considers the sheer diversity of 
the sorts of goods and rights which are valued in different states, it seems 
implausible to claim that their value is derived from their contribution to the same 
set of universal rights. Even if all societies do share an interest in enjoyment of 
these rights, these rights do not necessarily exhaust that society’s conception of 
ethically relevant rights, goals and goods, or -  to put it another way - of the 
conditions for well-being.155
155 I say that this argument is not central because the problem o f  cultural diversity does not 
directly arise in the case o f  duties to refugees. The fact that refugees are seeking asylum in a
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The need for a layer of additional or supplementary rights and goods, 
combined with a recognition of the diversity of such rights and goods in different 
societies, is a powerful argument for introducing some degree of particularism 
into universalist theory.156 It is at least prima facie plausible that such 
considerations could co-exist with recognition of certain universal duties, 
including duties towards refugees. One possible objection is that incorporating 
particularist considerations may legitimise a more restrictive refugee policy. 
Recognising the moral relevance of (some) special duties is hardly the most 
promising route for motivating a sense of duty towards refugees. Yet the force of 
particularist concerns in motivating action cannot be overlooked, and may be 
integral to understanding the moral relevance of special ties and values. 
Moreover, as suggested earlier, the requirements of universalist ethics are so 
demanding that it may be preferable to legitimise some degree of particularism 
under certain specified criteria, rather than retain standards of morality which are 
likely to be disregarded. The danger of excessively high standards is that lapses 
or lack of motivation are indiscriminately unethical: the model does not allow for 
degrees or prioritisation of different forms of immorality. Incorporating a theory 
of legitimate particularism will at least allow for a more nuanced evaluation of 
the various types of non-ethical (particularist) actions. The next chapter will 
consider whether the types of “thin universalism” produced by such a theory 
could be good candidates for the task.
particular state implies a willingness to accept the political culture o f  that society, and does not 
raise serious problems o f  cultural conflict - at least not in the case o f  most asylum-seekers in 
liberal democracies. However, the question o f  cultural diversity is relevant insofar as it challenges 
the claim o f  liberal universalism to provide a comprehensive or exhaustive ethical theory. In other 
words, the problem o f  cultural diversity does not arise i f  liberal universalist theories aim to cover 
only questions o f  duties to non-nationals and related ethical matters. But it does become 
problematic if  the theory claims to cover the full set o f  values and rights that should regulate 
human interaction in all societies. In this case, the fact o f  diversity may cast doubt on the claims 
o f  liberal universalism to provide an exhaustive ethical theory.
156It should be stressed that the argument from difference does not imply acceptance o f  radical 
relativism. It is perfectly consistent to recognise the diversity o f  cultural and ethical values whilst 
adhering to a theory o f  universal rights which are necessary - but not sufficient - for human well­
being.
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4.3 Conclusion
In summary, the chapter considered two forms of liberal universalism: 
utilitarianism and right-based theories. Having categorised different theories in 
the first section, the second and third sections of the chapter considered the short­
comings of two distinct variants of utilitarianism. The first account relied on a 
concept of utility that raised problems with measurement of utility, and with 
distribution between individuals. These difficulties suggested the need for a 
conception of well-being that was objectively definable and measurable, and that 
included a notion of thresholds of basic welfare. Goodin's vulnerability thesis 
addressed both these needs, but raised additional problems of its own. Its partial, 
negative account of welfare had potentially damaging consequences for 
autonomy, and raised concerns about justice.
The fourth section of the chapter discussed whether a theory of universal 
rights could provide a better account of duties to refugees. It was argued that 
these theories provided a better substantive conception of duties to refugees, thus 
meeting the criterion of normative desirability. However, these theories failed on 
the criterion of practical feasibility. Section four considered two possible 
responses to the problem of feasibility. First, right-based theorists could define 
the gap between moral duty and practice as a problem of motivation. Initial 
doubts were raised about the practical implications of this approach, although a 
more detailed analysis of the assumptions about moral motivation and agency was 
deferred until later in the thesis. The second response was to justify restriction on 
instrumental grounds. Yet neither was this approach satisfactory -  it seemed to 
represent a tacit defence of special ties.
It was suggested in conclusion that universalists may provide a better 
conception of the relationship between duties to non-nationals and compatriots by 
incorporating a (limited) commitment to particularism. Such theories of "thin 
universalism" are considered in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three  
Thin Universalism and the Problem of  
Internal Coherence
There have been a number of attempts to reconcile universalism with 
recognition of the moral relevance of duties to compatriots. This chapter will 
discuss two main approaches to the question. The first approach, discussed in 
section one, takes as its starting point a commitment to ensuring basic rights, 
which trump non-basic rights and goals where they conflict. By keeping the list 
of universal rights to a few very basic requirements, such theories hope to limit 
the scope of universal duties to manageable proportions, and to allow for the 
value of special duties. The second type of account, dealt with in section two, 
starts from a particularist perspective, and attempts to show that this is compatible 
with a commitment to at least some universal duties. The particularist approach 
explicitly defends the value of special ties and interests, but argues that 
attachment to these goods still leaves room for performing duties to non­
nationals. Both of these approaches thus attempt to find a means of combining 
universalist and particularist duties.
In the discussion that follows, it is important to bear in mind the rationale 
for incorporating particularist considerations into universalist theories. Pure 
universalism encountered a problem of practical feasibility, and was unable to 
show how people could be motivated to respect the requirements of universal 
ethics. It also faced a second problem with accounting for the diversity of rights, 
goals and goods that are valued in different communities. Prima facie, thin 
universalist theories seem to avoid both problems because they allow for a layer 
of particularist values, thereby both limiting the stringency of the requirements of 
ethics, and allowing for cultural diversity. Most importantly for the current 
discussion, they attempt to address the practical problem of motivation by 
restricting the content of universal duties.
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However, I shall argue that the various theories of thin universalism 
considered in this chapter fail to address these problems. Basic rights theories do 
not avoid the problem of motivation for the question of duties to refugees; and 
they are committed to a rigid hierarchy of rights that does not stand up to scrutiny. 
As in the case of pure universalist theories, they encounter a problem of 
feasibility. Theories starting from particularist premises, meanwhile, embrace a 
confused mixture of universalist and particularist justifications that simply 
heightens the conflict between duties to compatriots and to non-nationals. In 
terms of our criteria for an adequate account, I shall suggest that these theories 
encounter a problem of internal incoherence. In light of this, the chapter argues 
that the attempt to address the problem of motivation by introducing a first order 
commitment to particularism fails to meet the criteria for an adequate account. 
The chapter will conclude in section three by showing how these problems 
highlight a more profound theoretical problem with the assumed separation 
between particular and impartial perspectives in political and moral thought.
1. Basic Rights Theories
Theories of basic rights limit universal rights to a restricted list of core, or 
essential claims. As one theorist writes, they offer “a relatively narrow and 
manageable focus” for duties to non-nationals, and thus do not seem to create the 
problems of feasibility discussed in the last chapter.157 And since they do not 
claim to cover all aspects of well-being, they allow for a degree of cultural 
diversity in the definition of non-basic rights and goals. This section will 
consider whether theories of basic rights can provide an adequate conception of 
duties to refugees. I shall start by arguing in 1.1 that on closer examination, these 
theories do not solve the problem of motivation. And the various attempts to 
limit universal duties through a division of responsibility for guaranteeing rights 
fail to overcome the problem. I shall then proceed in 1.2 to challenge the claim 
that basic rights should have priority over all other goods in all cases, questioning 
whether basic rights theories can provide a tenable hierarchy of different rights.
157 Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1989), p. 42.
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1.1 Basic rights and motivation
Basic rights are usually taken to mean rights which are in some sense
* * 1 S Ressential for well-being or action. According to these theories, basic rights do 
not exhaust the conditions for human well-being. Nor is the enjoyment of basic 
rights necessarily more rewarding or worthwhile than the enjoyment of non-basic 
rights or goods. The point is rather that such rights are conditions for the exercise 
of all other rights and goods. As Alan Gewirth argues, basic rights “have as their 
objects the essential preconditions of action, such as life, physical integrity, 
mental equilibrium.”159 These rights are an essential prerequisite for human 
action. Where basic rights conflict with non-basic rights, the former should be 
given priority: “Basic rights must be fulfilled before other rights.”160 A similar 
theory is advanced by Shue, who holds that the enjoyment of the basic rights to 
physical security and subsistence “is essential to the enjoyment of all other 
rights.”161 Shue’s theory is especially worth pursuing, as he deals explicitly with 
questions of duties to non-nationals, so in the discussion that follows I shall focus 
on his account. However, the criticisms I level at his theory apply to other 
theories of basic rights, including that of Gewirth.
Shue does not explicitly incorporate particularist values into his theory of 
basic rights, but the structure of his theory is (at least superficially) compatible 
with a form of thin universalism which allows for the intrinsic value of 
particularist rights and goals. Shue’s list of basic rights is limited to the right to
• IA7 •  • •  •subsistence and physical security. He calls these rights “inherent necessities” - 
their enjoyment is an essential component of the realisation of other rights. Shue 
argues that these universal basic rights generate duties that should trump the 
enjoyment of non-basic rights and goods. “One is required to sacrifice, as 
necessary, anything but one’s basic rights in order to honor the basic rights of
158 Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification an d Applications (Chicago: University 
o f  Chicago Press, 1992); Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U. S. Foreign
Policy  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).
159 Gewirth, Human Rights {op. cit.), p. 12.
160 Ibid., p. 12
161 Shue, Basic Rights {op. cit.), p. 19.
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1others.” Shue’s theory of basic rights is clearly intended to cover duties to non­
nationals, indeed part of his book on the subject is devoted to a discussion of US 
foreign policy. He does not consider that realisation of universal basic rights will 
raise a serious problem of feasibility: since the list of basic rights is so restricted, 
it will be unlikely to impose overly stringent duties.
Yet even on the basis of his minimalist list of rights, the problem of 
motivation remains. Ensuring the enjoyment of the rights to subsistence and 
physical security would require an enormous investment of resources by wealthy 
states in developing countries. It would require not only radical redistribution of 
wealth, but also intervention or stringent enforcement mechanisms to ensure the 
relevant political and economic changes in a number of states. The question of 
motivation is even more problematic in the case of refugee influx. Refugees have 
by definition fled actual or threatened human rights violations, and a refusal to 
admit them may be tantamount to failure to carry out a duty generated by basic 
rights. So simply scaling down the list of universal rights to a bare minimum may 
not bring us any closer to finding a practically feasible and normatively desirable 
candidate for characterising duties to refugees: even basic rights theories may 
encounter problems in motivating action consistent with their ethical 
requirements.
One response to the problem of motivation mentioned in Chapter Two 
was to introduce an instrumental justification for dividing responsibility for 
ensuring rights. In the discussion on utilitarianism, I considered Goodin’s theory 
for dividing responsibility. While this instrumental defence was difficult to 
sustain, I did not rule out the possibility of justifying a division of labour on other 
instrumental grounds. Such an argument could justify apportioning responsibility 
to sovereign states for protecting their own citizens, thereby limiting the problem 
of motivation to accept refugees. It is worth considering whether basic rights 
theorists could overcome the problem of motivation by invoking alternative 
arguments for a division of labour.
162
Shue, Basic Rights {op. cit.), p. 20.
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There are a number of arguments for dividing responsibility for duties to 
non-nationals. Rights may be more effectively guaranteed by those with 
geographical proximity, greater power or resources, or better information or local 
knowledge. However, it is difficult to sustain any of these arguments in the case 
of refugees. On the issue of geographical proximity, asylum seekers have by 
definition arrived in or at the border of the territory of the receiving country. 
Thus the geographical proximity argument would not justify apportioning 
responsibility to the country of origin, but would if anything suggest that the 
receiving country was more responsible than any other country for protecting 
these refugees. Thus the problem of motivation to assist refugees would remain. 
As concerns a possible division of labour based on resources, industrialised states 
are clearly in a better position to assist refugees from poor countries. Again, this 
would not justify limiting the duties of receiving countries vis-a-vis refugees. 
And regarding the argument that those with better knowledge of the needs or 
interests of the refugees in question should assist them, this is not evidently the 
case with issues of refugee protection. Refugees have often fled countries 
precisely because of persecution on cultural, religious or ethnic grounds, and will 
get the best protection in states that are not divided along similar ethnic lines. 
Moreover, the form of assistance and protection requested by refugees is to a 
large extent cross-cultural -  immediate security and material assistance. In short, 
none of these justifications for a division of labour between states seem to apply 
in the case of refugees.
There is an another frequently invoked reason for such a division of 
labour, which concerns the problem of dependency. It has been argued that 
assisting non-nationals creates dependence on external assistance, undermining 
the country of origin’s willingness and ability to perform duties in the longer 
term. This argument may be compelling in the context o f economic assistance to 
other countries or military intervention. Yet it is far from clear that this division 
of moral labour would apply in cases of refugee influx. Admitting refugees is 
unlikely to create economic dependency on the part of those in the country of
163 Ibid., p. 114.
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origin. Given that the definition of refugee limits the legitimate grounds for 
claiming asylum to flight from persecution or security threats and not economic 
hardship, the problem of dependency on external assistance does not really arise. 
The performance of duties on the part of the receiving state is very unlikely to 
affect performance of these duties by the country of origin. If anything, the 
receiving state is more likely to try to pressure the sending country to ensure 
respect for these rights, in the hope of facilitating the return of refugees, thereby 
shifting responsibility for their protection. The desire to create conditions for 
refugee repatriation may therefore lead to greater pressure on sending countries to 
ensure basic rights.
Shue's argument for a division of labour pursues a slightly different line, 
arguing that the “burdensome” duties of any one individual should be limited 
through institutional arrangements.164 Shue distinguishes between negative duties 
not to infringe the rights of others, and positive duties which require the 
expenditure of resources to ensure that others enjoy their rights. While negative 
duties are universal, these more burdensome positive duties can and should be 
divided up between duty bearers. He argues that “[o]ne cannot have substantial 
positive duties toward everyone, even if everyone has basic rights. The positive 
duties of any one individual must be limited.”165 The best means of parcelling 
out these positive duties is through organisations and institutions which can both 
perform duties more efficiently, and also provide an important “psychological 
buffer” to avoid needless anguish and guilt when individuals are unable to 
perform all the duties that seem to be required of them. The performance of 
duties through institutional arrangements generates indirect “duties to create, 
maintain, and enhance institutions that directly fulfill rights.”166
This account raises two main concerns. First, it is not clear what sorts of 
duties fall on individuals in the absence of the appropriate institutional 
arrangements. Second, the problem of motivation would still arise in cases where
164
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institutions were unable to limit individual duties to share finite resources. I shall 
deal with each problem in term.
On the first point, Shue does not specify whether or not performance of 
duties is strictly conditional on the effective functioning of the relevant 
institutions. If institutional mechanisms for co-ordinating duties fail for any 
reason, it is not clear on Shue’s account whether individuals are obliged to fill the 
gaps and ensure full coverage of rights, or whether the absence of institutional 
arrangements effectively lets them off the hook. In the former case, the absence 
or break-down of institutional arrangements would imply that individuals had 
positive duties to ensure the basic rights of others. For example, if there were no 
institutional provision for assisting refugees once they had arrived in one’s 
country, individuals would be morally bound to meet the basic rights of refugees 
by providing them with food, shelter and physical protection. Alternatively, in 
the second case, the claim would be that individual duties were conditional on the 
existence of effective institutions. Where such institutions did not exist, 
individuals would have no obligation to assist refugees.
It is highly doubtful that Shue would commit himself to this second claim 
that duties were contingent on the existence of institutional arrangements. This 
would be tantamount to arguing that the division of labour was valued solely for 
its ability to limit individuals’ duties, rather than because it was the best means of 
realising the basic rights of those in need. It would imply a limited commitment 
to realising basic rights, which does not seem consistent with Shue’s robust moral 
defence of the universal scope of these rights, and their status as trumping other 
rights and goods where they conflict. Yet if Shue accepts the alternative claim 
that institutions are simply the best means for ensuring the goal of realising basic 
rights, then the failure of these arrangements would mean that individuals faced 
potentially unlimited positive duties to guarantee basic rights. And in this case, 
the problem of motivation would remain.
Of course, it could be argued that the failure of institutional arrangements 
would generate a duty to establish relevant public provisions, or to strengthen
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those that already exist. Yet even assuming this were feasible, there is a second 
major problem with Shue’s argument. Institutions may render the performance of 
duties more efficient or simple, and may thus limit the “burden” of performing 
positive duties in many cases. But they will not significantly limit the
requirements of universal duties in cases involving the division of finite 
resources. In the context of refugee policy, there are already a number of 
institutions at national, regional (European Union) and global levels which 
perform these duties on behalf of individuals. Yet they have certainly not 
provided a neat solution to the problem of individual motivation to perform 
duties. This is to a large extent because the duties generated by refugee rights 
cannot be neatly sectioned off for performance by designated institutions. 
Refugee influx could potentially affect the lives of citizens of receiving societies 
at many different levels. Delegating responsibility to institutions for ensuring the 
welfare and security of refugees will not serve to alleviate nationals of the 
receiving society of their duties to refugees.
None of these attempts to divide responsibility for performing duties 
generated by refugee rights seems to circumvent the problem of motivation. The 
duties generated by basic rights simply are immensely demanding in the context 
of refugee influx. This implies that many of the descriptive and prescriptive 
problems attributed to right-based universalism in the last section equally apply to 
thin universalist theories of basic rights.
1.2 Basic rights and well-being
The second criticism of basic rights theories revolves around their grounds 
for prioritising certain rights over other values and goods. I shall challenge the 
claim that one can construct fixed hierarchies of different rights, arguing that core 
rights cannot be systematically prioritised over other goods. I shall briefly 
consider two possible responses to this problem: the extension of the list to 
include additional rights; or the rejection of any set formula for prioritising 
different goods. The first response simply leads us back to the problem of
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cultural diversity mentioned in Chapter Two. The second will be explored in 
more detail in section two.
As we have seen, basic rights theorists argue that these rights represent the 
necessary conditions for the enjoyment of all other rights and goods.167 For 
example, I cannot realise my right to read The Satanic Verses or enjoy an art 
exhibition if I am suffering from severe malnutrition; nor will I be likely to 
appreciate clean air if I am in constant danger of being shot by armed gangs. This 
distinction between basic rights and non-basic rights and goods seems to be an 
effective way of recognising cultural diversity whilst retaining duties to respect 
the basic rights of those from different cultures.
Yet the notion of rights as preconditional to the enjoyment of other rights 
and goods becomes problematic in cases where rights conflict. If basic rights are 
to be trumps in cases of conflict with non-basic rights, then the implication is that 
basic rights are in some sense more fundamental to well-being than other rights 
and goods. Shue argues that while basic rights are “inherent necessities” of well­
being168, they are not necessarily of special intrinsic value: “rights are basic only 
if enjoyment of them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights, irrespective 
of whether their enjoyment is also valuable in itself.”169 For example, the right to 
education may be “much greater and richer -  more distinctively human -  than 
merely going through life without ever being assaulted.”170 This implies that the 
relationship between basic and non-basic rights is more complex than that of 
straightforward hierarchy. Basic rights may be the sine qua non for the (long 
term) enjoyment of other rights or goods, but their actual enjoyment is not 
necessarily of intrinsic value, or at least is less intrinsically valuable than the 
enjoyment of non-basic rights.
167 Shue, Basic Rights (op. cit.), p. 27.
168 Ibid., p. 26.
169 Ibid., p. 67.
170 Ibid., p. 20.
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However, theories prioritising basic rights seem to assume that the 
supplementary rights and goods that are supposedly made possible by the 
realisation of basic rights will in fact simultaneously or subsequently by realised 
in the society in question. In other words, basic rights may in themselves have 
little intrinsic value, but they are necessary for laying the foundations for the 
enjoyment of a further set of intrinsically fulfilling goods and rights. The value of 
basic rights lies in their role in enabling the realisation of other rights. Basic 
rights theorists would presumably acknowledge that a life in which basic rights 
were realised but no other rights or goods were realisable would not be fulfilling. 
Yet this creates problems where there is a conflict between the enjoyment of basic 
and non-basic rights. If one is forced to choose between the two, it is not evident 
that basic rights will be valued over non-basic ones. For example, a person may 
prefer to relinquish the right to physical safety, in order to retain the self-respect 
and fulfilment derived from, say, pursuing her chosen career, or expressing her 
political convictions, or having a homosexual relationship. In a more extreme 
scenario, one could imagine a society in which all but the most basic rights have 
been forsaken to secure the basic rights of others. In this case, life without non- 
basic rights and cultural enrichment may simply not be worth living. Many if not 
all people would choose to risk physical insecurity and poverty in order to enjoy 
at least some non-basic rights and goods. This could be the case even if 
immediate enjoyment of non-basic rights at the expense of basic rights would be 
life threatening or undermine the possibilities for enjoying any rights or goods in 
the long term.
The issue of the prioritisation of basic rights is more evidently 
problematic in cases where the individual’s rights conflict with the basic rights of 
others. Under these circumstances, Shue argues that the individual should forego
171all non-basic rights and goods if they conflict with the basic rights of others. 
Where basic rights come into conflict with supplementary or particularist rights, 
goals and goods, basic rights must be trumps. This involves sacrificing, in 
ascending order of importance, preference satisfaction, cultural enrichment, and
171 Ibid., p. 114.
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1 77non-basic rights. This raises the question as to whether rights and goods 
essential to one’s well-being -  but which are not “basic” in Shue’s sense - should 
be sacrificed for the sake of more hollow and less intrinsically valuable basic 
rights. There seems to be little point in retaining basic rights and giving up all 
other rights and goods, if the former are valued only as instrumental to enjoyment 
of the latter.
Shue avoids confronting this problem by asserting that “in fact it is most 
unlikely that anyone would need to sacrifice anything other than preferences, to 
which one has no right of satisfaction and which are of no cultural value, in order
1 7^to honor everyone’s basic rights.” Yet the possibility of such sacrifices is not 
so unlikely in the context of mass influx. The rights of refugees in such cases 
could plausibly conflict with, for example, access to welfare state provisions and 
services and employment; or with more abstract public goods such as living in a 
tolerant and liberal society. In some cases, it is not unimaginable that an 
individual would choose to forego basic rights in order to secure non-basic rights 
or goods.
The point here is not so much that of whether this level of sacrifice is 
justified, but rather it concerns the criteria for distinguishing and prioritising 
different rights. It is not being denied that refugee rights may justifiably require 
immense sacrifices on the part of the receiving country. Rather, the point is that 
Shue’s hierarchy may not be an appropriate prioritisation of the goods and rights 
that we would be willing to renounce, and the order in which we would wish to 
renounce them. Shue’s account assumes that rights that are preconditional to the 
enjoyment of non-basic rights should not be traded in for non-basic rights, even 
though the value of these basic rights may be purely instrumental. This may well 
be a useful prioritisation for the purposes of foreign aid or intervention. In these 
cases, promoting the enjoyment of basic rights by non-nationals may not directly 
conflict with the rights of citizens in the donor country. Moreover, the focus on 
basic rights allows for national or local autonomy in designing institutions and
112 Ibid., p. 115.
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policies that embody the values of the particular society. As such, the basic rights 
model is able to define duties towards non-nationals in a precise and practically 
useful way, which nonetheless respects the diversity of particularist values and 
institutions in different societies. Yet the case of refugee influx reveals the 
inadequacy of this prioritisation in cases of extreme conflict between the rights 
and interests of nationals and non-nationals.
Donnelly makes a similar point in his critique of basic rights. He 
considers a number of attempts to produce an ultimate list of core writes, but 
argues that they all
share a common and fatal problem. They could all be fully enjoyed, and still people 
could be left living anomic, degraded lives, unable to speak their minds, to choose 
their religion, to become involved in politics, to have a reasonable chance of finding 
a job, to get an education, to associate with whom they choose, and so forth.174 
Donnelly’s point is that basic rights cannot be separated from the wider list of 
human rights that all should enjoy. He argues for a more exhaustive list of 
universal rights that would incorporate all the rights necessary to “protect human 
dignity”. Yet this alternative to basics rights theories simply takes us back to 
the types of thick universalist theory criticised in the previous chapter. Basic 
rights theories may be committed to an untenable hierarchy of rights; but more 
comprehensive theories of rights encounter the old problems of motivation and 
cultural diversity. So the answer cannot be to supplement the list of basic rights, 
as Donnelly proposes.
An alternative response to the criticism of basic rights theories is to deny 
the possibility of laying down rigid norms about the priority of basic rights at all. 
Rather than supplement the list, this approach would involve the rejection of any 
absolute prioritisation of moral claims. Bernard Williams puts this point 
cogently, arguing that an individual’s projects may be so integral to his existence
Ibid., p. 114.
174 Donnelly, Universal Rights (op. cit.), p. 41
175 Ibid., p. 41.
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11Athat life without them would be meaningless and not worth living. If these 
projects conflict with the requirements of universalist ethics -  in our case with the 
basic rights of refugees -  it may not be reasonable or desirable for people to give 
up the source of meaning in their lives for the sake of others. “There can come a 
point at which it is quite unreasonable for a man to give up, in the name of the 
impartial good ordering of the world of moral agents, something which is a 
condition of his having any interest in being around in that world at all.” 
Williams’ point is that it may not be reasonable to demand that basic rights trump 
non-basic rights or goods if  the latter are more critical to well-being. This would 
imply that there could be legitimate space for personal projects or special ties that 
are not ethical in the universalist sense, but are nonetheless essential to the 
individual’s well-being.
Whether or not this is a reasonable demand which would be compatible 
with any form of thin right-based universalism will be considered in the next 
section. It will be argued that this kind of thin universalism is unconvincing, 
partly because of its reluctance to abandon the separation of the impartial and 
self-interested perspectives.
2. Particularism and Basic Rights
Basic rights theories, as we have seen, fail to overcome the problem of 
motivation, and have problems justifying a rigid hierarchy of rights in cases of 
conflict. An alternative approach to combining universalist and particularist 
claims is to start from particularist premises, and then show how such a position 
could be combined with commitment to at least some universal rights. In this and
176 See Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality" in M oral Luck: Philosophical 
Papers 1973-1980, ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 14.
177 Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality" {ibid.), p. 14. W illiams’ point is not simply that 
the demands o f  impartial ethics are unreasonable in the sense o f  demanding inordinate or overly 
stringent sacrifice or heroism. It is the more radical claim that failure to respect the strictures o f  
impartial ethics may not be unethical at all. Indeed, ground projects “may be altruistic, and in a 
very evident sense moral” (p. 13). This second claim is based on W illiams’ argument that the 
impartial perspective is a misrepresentation o f  moral agency, which leads to an artificial 
dichotomy between self-interest and impartial ethics. This theme, and W illiams’ arguments, will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.
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the following section I shall consider two varieties of this argument. The first 
defends a communitarian conception of moral duty, but argues that such an 
approach could nonetheless accommodate basic rights. I shall argue that this 
mixture of different ethical justifications leads to theoretical incoherence and 
practical confusion. The second variety, discussed in section three, claims that 
there is a legitimate sphere of self-interest that should be protected from 
encroachment by the demands of universal ethics. In this case the starting-point 
is a consideration of self-interest rather than an ethical commitment to special 
ties. I shall argue that the attempt to limit moral requirements introduces an 
arbitrary cut-off point between duty and self-interest that cannot be justified on 
moral or pragmatic grounds. In conclusion, I shall suggest a more profound 
problem with both theories, linked to their basic assumption about a dichotomy 
between universal ethics on the one hand, and special ties or self-interest on the 
other.
2.1 Miller and basic rights
In his discussion of the “ethics of nationality”, David Miller attempts to 
find “some compromise view” that combines a commitment to particularist and
1 7Runiversalist ethics. Having rejected universalist attempts to incorporate 
particularist considerations, he suggests that it would be more productive to start 
from the other direction, incorporating universal duties into a particularist ethical 
theory. His attempt to do so clearly illustrates the problem with such approaches, 
and will thus provide us with a good exemplar of this sort of argument.
Miller starts from a particularist perspective which accords intrinsic value 
to special relations between members of families, communities and nation-states. 
He rejects “the view that the subject matter of ethics is persons considered merely 
as such, independent of all local connections and relations.” Instead, he adopts “a 
second view of ethical agency in which the subject is seen as already deeply 
embedded in social relationships. Here the subject is partly defined by its
178 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press), p. 51.
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relationship and the various rights, obligations and so forth that go along with 
these, so these commitments themselves form a basic element of personality.”179 
Such particular relationships and characteristics create special duties, which are 
not reducible to or derivative of general duties to human beings. Special duties 
may be generated at a variety of levels, for example between family members, 
ethnic groups, or compatriots.
While asserting the ethical relevance of such ties, Miller is reluctant to 
embrace fully-fledged particularism, and deny the existence of any duties to 
humanity at large. “There are generic conditions for living a decent life which 
can be expressed in terms of rights to bodily integrity, personal freedom, a 
minimum level of resources, and so forth. We have obligations to respect these 
rights in others that derive simply from our common humanity.” These rights 
may “include rights to provision, for example in cases where a natural shortage of 
resources means that people will starve or suffer bodily injury if others do not
* 1 fiO •  •  •provide for them.” This basic rights thesis establishes a form of thin 
universalism which, according to Miller, is consistent with his particularist 
perspective. He “can see no reason why those who hold particularist views
t ft 1should not also endorse such a list of basic rights.” The assumption seems to 
be that a commitment to particularist or special duties leaves space for the 
performance of universal duties that are grounded in basic rights. The two sets of 
duty are, nonetheless, grounded in distinct types of justification, which, as Miller 
acknowledges, represent “two competing accounts of the structure of ethical 
thought.”182
This combination of different ethical commitments raises the question as 
to which approach should have priority when the demands of the two perspectives 
conflict. And here Miller’s argument is ambiguous. Miller argues at one point 
that basic rights should be over-ridden if they prove too costly to respect. If
179
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intervention to uphold the basic rights of those in other countries conflicts with 
duties to compatriots, it is not necessarily the case that basic rights should trump 
special duties.183 He qualifies this slightly by allowing that obligations generated 
by very basic rights -  for example the obligation to protect people from death by 
starvation -  should probably not be trumped by less basic special obligations, but 
again, “provided the cost of protecting these rights is relatively small.”184 The 
implication is that where protecting basic rights implies more than a “relatively 
small” cost, special duties should trump basic rights. This seems to reflect a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the moral implications of a commitment to a 
theory of universal rights. If Miller really believes that we have universal 
obligations to ensure the conditions for the basic well-being of others, then he 
cannot waive this duty where it conflicts with special duties. The theory of basic 
rights he endorses claims that the enjoyment of basic rights is in an important 
sense core or fundamental to the individual’s interests: they are the precondition 
or necessary requirement for the enjoyment of all other rights.
Now I did of course challenge this type of rigid hierarchy in the previous 
section, suggesting that attempts to lay down a definitive prioritisation of rights 
were difficult to sustain in cases of conflict with other rights and goods. But the 
way to overcome this problem is to reject absolutist lists of basic rights tout court. 
The short-comings of basic rights theories will not be avoided simply by 
defending a parallel commitment to particularist ethics. Indeed, the combination 
of a particularist ethical theory with a commitment to basic rights will produce 
even greater problems on both theoretical and practical levels. I shall consider the 
theoretical and practical problems in turn, before returning to the question of how 
Miller seeks to overcome these problems in his account.
On the level of theory, I observed in the last chapter that particularist and 
universalist theories rely on very different assumptions about the validity of moral 
claims. Universalist theories hold that certain rights or duties are universally 
valid, and hence applicable across all cultures. Their validity is not contingent on
183 Ibid ., p. 75.
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historical or cultural conditions, but is grounded in the essential and universally 
shared characteristics of human beings. By contrast, the particularist theory 
espoused by Miller sees moral claims as derived from the shared values of 
particular communities. How, then, can the two commitments be incorporated 
into the same moral theory? One possibility is to conceive of the notion of 
universal rights as a moral belief particular to specific communities. A 
commitment to the universal scope of rights could be defended on particularist 
grounds if the community in question were committed to a substantive conception 
of universal rights. In this case, members of that community would share a 
commitment to duties to non-nationals. But the commitment would be contingent 
on intersubjective values, rather than grounded in the objective characteristics of
1R5 •  •human beings. Miller rejects this justification for basic rights, instead 
grounding them in a universalist account of the “generic conditions for leading a
1 fiAdecent life’\  This justification is clearly at odds with his central account of the 
source of moral values.
The confusion here is more than theoretical: it has practical implications 
in cases of conflict between universal rights and particular ties. We have seen 
that universalist defences of basic rights claim that these rights trump other rights 
and goods. And indeed they must defend such a hierarchy if they are to be 
consistent in their reasoning. A basic rights theory would be incoherent if it did 
not involve a claim that such rights should have priority over non-universalist 
considerations. Yet a consistent commitment to basic rights, as we have seen, 
could potentially generate substantial duties in the case of refugee influx, thus 
conflicting with particularist goods and special duties to compatriots. Given 
Miller’s commitment to the ethical relevance of nationality, he would surely be 
reluctant to accept the consequences of basic rights theories of particularist 
values. Miller cannot be both universalist and particularist in equal measure - he 
must choose which claim should have priority. If particularist considerations 
trump universal rights, then he cannot consistently defend a commitment to basic
185 I shall be discussing this justification for substantive universal rights in more depth in Chapter 
Seven.
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rights. And if basic rights over-ride particularist considerations, then we are once 
again confronted with the problems of motivation and hierarchies discussed in the 
previous section.
Nonetheless, Miller appears to believe that he can avoid this practical 
conflict between the requirements of universal rights and special ties. He bases 
his argument on two rather problematic claims: an empirical claim that such 
conflicts would not in fact arise, or at least that they would not be serious; and an 
ethical argument that limits duties to intervene to assist non-nationals.
Now we have already seen that the first argument fails in the case of 
refugees. Contrary to what Miller claims, the case of duties to refugees could 
generate a serious conflict between basic rights and duties to fellow nationals (see 
1.2). The second argument takes a rather different tack, and it is worth 
considering the problems it raises.
Miller argues that his commitment to the ethical significance of 
nationality also generates a moral justification for not intervening to realise the 
rights of nationals of other countries. As he writes, “if we want to take nationality 
seriously, then we must also accept that positive obligations to protect basic rights 
(e.g. to relieve hunger) fall in the first place on co-nationals, so that outsiders 
would have strong obligations in this respect only where it was strictly impossible
1 8 7for the rights to be protected within the national community.” In this form, the 
argument for the special duties of fellow nationals is fairly weak: there would still 
be a duty to intervene if it was “strictly impossible” for the relevant state to 
realise the rights of its nationals (however this condition may be interpreted). But 
Miller goes on to make a stronger claim, effectively relinquishing responsibility 
for realising the basic rights of others, even where they cannot be met by the other 
state.
If bad policies or vested interest in nation A mean that some of its citizens go needy, 
then, if nation C decides that its own welfare requirements mean that it cannot afford
186 Miller, On Nationality (op. cit.), p. 74.
187 Ibid., p. 79.
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to give much (or anything) to the needy in A, it has not directly violated their rights; 
at most, it has permitted them to be violated, and in the circumstances this may be 
justifiable.188
In effect, then, the relevance of nationality trumps the duty to intervene. And in 
this case, Miller would be committed to claiming the priority of particularist over 
universal basic rights. Yet once again his stance is ambiguous, and at other parts 
in the argument he seems to retreat from this conclusion. While his defence of 
non-intervention seems to be based on a claim about the moral relevance of 
nationality and the responsibilities of governments towards their citizens, he also 
criticises the liberal commitment to self-determination. As he puts it, “Why make 
a fetish of self-government if your basic rights will be better protected by
1 ftQoutsiders?” Rather surprisingly given his commitment to communitarian 
ethics, he suggests that advocates of self-government “ought to take seriously the 
case for benevolent imperialism.”190
While I have dwelt at some length on the inconsistencies in Miller’s 
argument, the purpose of this critique was not simply to highlight the problems 
with one theorist’s account. The point was rather to shed light on the problems 
inherent in any such combined approach. Miller’s failure to take a clear line on 
the problem of conflict between particularism and universalism, and his 
inconsistent prescriptions on the question of intervention, reflect the basic 
theoretical and practical tension between a commitment to particularist and 
universalism. Theories of basic rights as trumps fail; but so too do theories that 
attempt to combine particularist and universalist ethics without according clear 
priority to either. We should now turn to a third variant of thin universalism, 
which limits the requirements of universal ethics. Examining the reasons for the 
failure of this third account will elucidate a deeper problem that is common to all 
thin universalist theories: the assumed dichotomy between the sources and moral 
demands of universal and particular duties.
188 Ibid., p. 79.
189 Ib id , p. 78.
190 Ib id , p. 77
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3. The Limits of Ethical Obligation
A number of writers have argued for the legitimisation of a sphere of self- 
interest, which limits the requirements of universal ethics. Such theories assert 
that the agent should be free to pursue a range of personal goals without being 
constrained by the requirements of ethical duty. These arguments for limiting 
moral obligation, which I shall consider in this section, do not defend personal or 
particularist claims on moral grounds (as, for example, Miller's argument did), but 
on grounds of self-interest or pragmatism. The claim is that it is unreasonable to 
expect people to act in accordance with the requirements of morality on all 
occasions, as such unlimited duties would lead to an inordinate sacrifice of self- 
interest. Such arguments are usually based on an acknowledgement of the 
stringent demands of morality and the problem of motivation. They argue that 
universal ethical theories -  whether utilitarian or right-based -  do not adequately 
reflect the nature of persons.191 Just as I suggested in Chapter One, these theories 
claim that consistent application of universalist ethics can present unrealistic 
demands. And the remedy proposed by these theories is to justify the imposition 
of a range of limitations on these demands. In this respect, they would seem to be 
good candidates for addressing the problem of motivation already discussed.
A good example of such an argument is provided in the work of James S.
I cn • • •  •Fishkin. Fishkin argues that the “difficulty in consistently applying this 
principle [the requirements of impartial ethics] is that we would be led, step by
1QTstep, to sacrifices of heroic proportions.” It is therefore reasonable to establish 
limits to the level of sacrifice demanded of universalist morality. More 
specifically, the universalist conception of ethics fails to allow sufficient scope 
for two main types of particularist or what Fishkin terms “agent-centred” claims. 
The first is special duties to particular groups, such as one’s family or country,
1 Q1
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and personal projects. The conflict between such particularist claims and 
universal duties was considered in the discussion of Miller’s account, where I 
criticised attempts to combine these with a theory of basic rights. But Fishkin 
concentrates on a second type of agent-centred claim, which seeks to justify 
imposing limits on the demands of morality, providing scope for the legitimate 
pursuit of personal goals and interests.
Under this second category of agent-centred claims, Fishkin makes a 
further distinction between two types of limits on moral demands. Firstly, the 
“cut-off for heroism” limits the level of sacrifice demanded of any individual. 
Thus there are certain levels of sacrifice that should not be morally required of 
people. And secondly, the “robust sphere of indifference” prevents moral 
requirements from pervading every aspect of daily life, allowing “a substantial 
proportion” of our actions to fall “within the zone of indifference or permissible 
free choice.”194 As Fishkin observes, these devices justify the abandonment of 
the type of equal weighting for every-one's interests that is defended by 
universalist theories. On this non-universalist account, the individual is not 
required to consider the interests of all from an impartial perspective. Indeed, 
these limitations on moral duty "appear to give extra weight to the interests of 
particular persons...compared to the interests of everyone considered 
impartially."195
Fishkin does not argue that one should ignore the demands of ethics 
altogether: he is not advocating that people behave in a wholly egoistic way. 
Rather, he advances what Kagan has termed a "moderate" position,196 defending a 
limited commitment to ethical duty. Yet this intermediate stance between pure 
egoism and ethical universalism creates problems for the account. As I shall 
argue, by refusing to embrace either a purely universalist ethical or a purely 
egoistic account, Fishkin is unable to provide well-founded criteria for 
determining when these limits should be imposed. I shall elucidate this problem
194 Fishkin, "Theories o f  Justice and International Relations" {op. cit.), p. 4.
195 Ibid., p. 8.
196 Kagan, Limits o f  M orality {op. cit.), p. 6.
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by considering two main weaknesses of the moderate position. The first relates to 
criteria for balancing conflicting considerations; the second to the relationship 
between the two sets of considerations. I shall deal with the first question in this 
sub-section, the second in section 2.3.
First, on the moderate account, as Kagan points out, the agent is permitted 
to give more weight to her own interests than to the interests of others. 
Considerations linked to securing the agent’s own happiness, or realising her 
rights, count for more in her moral decisions than the happiness or rights of 
others. Yet the question arises as to the grounds on which such extra weighting is 
permitted. And there are two possible answers to this question: on egoistic, or on 
ethical grounds. The first type of egoistic justification is clearly problematic for 
Fishkin’s theory. While he argues for limitations on universal duty, Fishkin does 
not want to deny his commitment to (at least some) moral duties. His aim is 
simply to ensure that they are limited to manageable proportions. Yet if he 
imposes limitations on egoistic grounds, then it is difficult to see how he can be 
committed to any moral duties beyond those which people are already willing to 
perform. If the argument for limiting duty is that people’s motivation is limited, 
this implies that moral duty is being defined on the basis of existing motivation. 
And in this case, morality becomes a legitimisation of existing interests, and there 
is no reason to encourage people to extend duties beyond their present scope. In 
the case of refugees, this would imply either retaining the present level of 
restriction, regardless of the plight of future possible refugees; or it may even 
imply diminishing current levels, if public opinion feels that existing duties 
seriously conflict with their self-interest.
Perhaps it could be contended that people do in fact recognise some moral 
duties, and that basing a definition of ethics on existing motivation will still 
enable one to retain a commitment to a (limited) ethical theory. Thus most 
people do accept at least limited duties to a certain number of refugees. But even 
this limited moral commitment will be undermined by an egoistic-based account 
of the limits of morality. If people believe that they can legitimately curtail duties 
if it is not in their interests to perform them, then there seems to be little to stop
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them from ratcheting down current obligations. The notion of a moral “ought” 
would lose its force: morality would no longer set out norms and standards to 
which individuals should aspire. And in this case, even the limited duties to 
which they are currently committed could be discarded on egoistic grounds. If 
morality really is an elaboration of self-interest, then it is hard to see how Fishkin 
can retain any commitment to even limited universalism. While Fishkin clearly 
does not intend such a whole-scale abandonment of ethics, this seems to be the 
implication of an attempt to limit duty on self-interested grounds. Once egoism is 
defined as trumping the claims of universal ethics, there seem to be no grounds 
for constraining the priority of egoism over duty.197
The alternative route for Fishkin would be to justify the limitation of
universal duty on ethical grounds. He could offer a particularist or an
instrumental universalist argument for limiting the demands of universalist
morality. Thus rather than defining the personal sphere as self-interested, he
could define it as a sphere of particularist values, or as a means of meeting 
108universalist demands. On either account, the balance between universalist and 
particularist duties would be determined by evaluating different moral claims and 
the best means for realising them, rather than through defence of the self- 
interested sphere. Now I have already suggested that arguments for allowing 
particularist considerations to trump basic universal rights lead to incoherence. 
As we saw in the discussion of Miller’s theory, the structure and justification of 
basic rights theories preclude the possibility that other ethical claims may 
legitimately trump its requirements. One cannot retain a consistent thin 
universalist position whilst allowing its requirements to be over-ridden by special 
duties. So the particularist justification for limiting universalist duties fails. The 
other route open to Fishkin is an instrumental argument for the division of
197 The only basis for justifying universalism would be on the grounds that it was demanded by 
egoism itself. But clearly the coincidence o f  egoism and universal duties would be quite
contingent and provide an extremely patchy and unreliable grounding for such duties.
198 It should be noted that this would imply a broad rather than a narrow conception o f  morality. 
According to Mackie, the narrow conception views ethics as a constraint on the pursuit o f  self- 
interest; while the broad conception o f  morality includes “whatever body o f  principles” is 
permitted as reasons for a person to do something. J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Rights and  
Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977), p. 106.
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responsibility for securing universal rights. Again, I shall not rehearse the 
arguments against this account, which were discussed in the first section of this 
chapter. Such instrumental arguments ultimately fail to limit universal duties to 
feasible proportions, especially in cases like that of refugee influx.199
The special weighting of agent-centred claims, then, cannot be coherently 
defended on egoistic or ethical grounds. If self-interest trumps universal ethics, 
then it becomes difficult to sustain any commitment to ethics at all. Alternatively, 
if one accepts a combination of particularist and universalist values, then basic 
rights or their equivalent must have priority over particularist claims. Finally, 
instrumental justifications for special duties fail to provide sufficient grounds for 
restricting the requirements of universal morality. In short, there seem to be no 
clear criteria for balancing the claims of universal ethics against non-universalist 
considerations, without conceding priority to the former. Fishkin’s account 
seems to be based on his own intuitive feelings about the appropriate level of 
ethical duty, without any convincing justification to back up the account.
What these arguments suggest is that the demands of universalist ethics 
cannot be curtailed without changing the substance and/or justification of 
universalist theories. Universalist theories are grounded in a conception of 
individuals as meriting equal consideration. And this commitment to moral 
equality cannot simply be watered down by introducing egoistic or particularist 
claims. Such attempts to combine universalism with special duties create 
muddled amalgams of theories with very different premises. Universal duties 
cannot be limited by invoking agent-centred claims, for this perverts the core
199 Fishkin him self suggests an argument for limiting ethical universalism on grounds o f  the value 
o f  individual liberty. I shall not consider this in detail, as it is extremely muddled, and does not 
advance our understanding o f  the different routes for attempting to justify limiting ethical 
requirements. It is not clear on Fishkin’s account whether liberty should be equally distributed, or 
whether it can be claimed by the agent without considering whether the claim is consistent with the 
equal right to freedom o f  all. As such, it is not clear whether Fishkin’s argument fits into the 
category o f  egoistic, particularist or universalist justification for limiting universal ethics. Perhaps 
it is a classical liberal argument o f  the Smithean type, based on an assumed harmony o f  interests. 
On this account, Fishkin could argue that the happiness o f  all would best be achieved through each 
individual acting in accordance with her own self-interest. But in this case, the problem o f  
inordinate moral duties would not arise. And if  Fishkin accepted this harmony o f  interests account, 
there would be no need to introduce limits to the demands o f  morality in the first place.
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commitment of universalism to the impartial consideration of the rights and 
interests of all individuals. And it contradicts the universalist commitment to a 
conception of human-beings as morally equal. A theory of ethics that privileges 
the claims of some over others - that abandons the requirements of impartiality - 
cannot be coherently combined with a universalist theory. The only means of 
limiting the requirements of universal ethics is to argue from the other direction: 
to change the substance and justification of universalist theories, rather than to 
take universalist ethics as a given and impose limitations on grounds of self- 
interest or particularism. Hence the possible routes to constraining the 
requirements of ethics are either to change one’s definition of ethical duty, for 
example by limiting universalism to a list of basic rights (see previous section); or 
to change the way in which universalist theories are grounded - a possibility that 
will be developed in Chapter Five.
4. The Dichotomy between Impartial and Personal Perspectives
These observations lead us to a more general problem with the attempt to 
limit the requirements of universal ethics. This second point concerns not so 
much the criteria for balancing universalist and particularist or self-interested 
claims, but rather the relationship between the two. One problem with Fishkin’s 
argument for limiting universal duties was that he implied that these 
requirements, and the particularist considerations which limit them, are 
determined independently of one another. In other words, the balance between 
universalist and particularist concerns is characterised as a trade-off between two 
conflicting sets of interests. This account precludes from the outset the 
possibility of universalist duties influencing particularist considerations. If one 
defines the limits to morality exclusively on the basis of the agent’s self-interest, 
there is no scope for such agent-centred concerns being influenced by the 
demands of impartial morality. Fishkin’s concepts of zones and thresholds fail to 
recognise the dynamic relationship between self-interest and impartial ethics. 
They do not allow for any interaction or mutual influence between the partial and 
impartial spheres.
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The problem of a supposed split between impartial and personal 
perspectives is clearest in the case of Fishkin’s theory, but it equally applies to the 
theories of basic rights and Miller’s particularist/universalist theory discussed 
earlier in the chapter. In the case of basic rights theories, the impartial 
perspective was captured by the commitment to a core list of universal rights, 
which served to constrain pursuit of personal or particular interests. And in 
Miller’s theory, the attempt to incorporate a commitment to universal rights 
within a particularist ethical theory led to incoherence precisely because he 
retained this assumed dichotomy between two different perspectives. His 
acceptance of a notion of universally valid, impartial norms could not be 
consistently combined with a commitment to a particularist perspective that could 
trump these universalist considerations.
This notion of a dichotomy between two independently defined sets of 
considerations is of course parallel to the characterisation of the refugee policy 
debate outlined in Chapter One. In that case, as I argued, the discussion on 
responses to refugee influx is constrained by the assumed conflict between 
refugee rights and national interest. The parallel between the dichotomy 
conception of national interest/refugee rights and self-interest/universal ethics is 
no coincidence. The assumed separation of a universal, impartial perspective and 
a self-interested, particularist sphere is widespread in liberal thought, and has 
undoubtedly shaped our wider assumptions about the relationship between ethics 
and self-interest. Whether at the level of individual or national interests, this 
characterisation encourages us to see the personal perspective as exclusively 
agent-centric, the national perspective as solely domestic oriented. And this 
assumed dichotomy can be seen as at least partially responsible for many of the 
problems with universalism discussed in this and the previous chapter. I shall 
illustrate this claim by briefly recapitulating the problems of motivation and thin 
universalism raised so far, from the point of view of this dichotomy between self- 
interest and ethics.
First, on the question of motivation, the assumed dichotomy makes it 
difficult to encourage an extension of universal duty where it is seen as
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conflicting with self-interest. As I argued in Chapter Two, this has the effect of 
rendering universal rights theories hopelessly unfeasible: not only do they impose 
a set of stringent duties, but they hold out little prospect of motivating people to 
comply with these. The separation of self-interest and the requirements of ethics 
creates serious practical problems of motivating compliance with duties to non­
nationals.
Second, the various attempts by thin universalist theories to address the 
problem of motivation are again hampered by the dichotomy characterisation. 
Where universalism is combined with particularist or egoistic considerations, 
what is being attempted is the simultaneous defence of two independent and 
separately justified perspectives. And a balance between the two is bound to lead 
to incoherence and practical confusion where the demands of the two conflict. In 
such cases, the theory must claim either that universal ethics trumps egoism, or 
vice versa. In the former case, the outcome may be theoretically coherent, but it 
does not address the problem of motivation. In the latter case, where egoism 
trumps universal ethics, this must imply the abandonment of a coherent 
commitment to universalism. Theories of particularism or egoism as trumping 
universal ethics contradict the basic premises of universalism.
These two implications of the assumed dichotomy between universalism 
and particularism - the problem of motivation, and the inability to combine the 
two considerations in any acceptable fashion - strongly suggest that we should 
search for an alternative account. An adequate account of duties to refugees 
needs to avoid the problems of incoherence and unfeasibility we encountered in 
the discussion of right-based universalism and thin universalism. I hinted above 
that universalist theories could in principle avoid these problems in two possible 
ways: by changing their content, or by grounding their claims in a different way.
The first route would require a revision of first order conceptions of the 
nature and scope of duties to non-nationals. This chapter considered several such 
attempts to alter the content of universalist theories, but none was successful. 
Liberal universalism simply does impose stringent demands, and it seems
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impossible to alter this without rendering the theory incoherent. The short­
comings of liberal universalism cannot be overcome by introducing particularist 
values. Retaining this form of universalism requires a consistent application, or 
else we might as well abandon this conception of morality altogether.
However, there is one more possible route for addressing the problem of 
feasibility without abandoning the assumed split between personal and impartial 
perspectives, or the universalist grounding of such theories. This would involve 
providing a more plausible theory of motivation, that could demonstrate how 
universal theories of duties to refugees might indeed be practically feasible. I 
shall consider this less drastic revision of liberal universalism in the next chapter 
on social contract theory. These theories define and justify duty on the basis of a 
notion of consent. People are obliged to conform to a set of rules to which they 
have given their (hypothetical) consent. As I shall explain in the next chapter, 
social contract theories attempt to solve the problem of motivation by tying duty 
to agreement. The content of duty varies depending on what people agree to (or 
would agree to under specified conditions). However, the basic moral 
justification for most social contract theories remains a liberal universalist 
commitment to a conception of individuals as free and equal. Consent is valued 
(in most cases) because it enables individuals to realise their capacity for reason 
or autonomy. So social contract theories retain two of the central premises of 
liberal universalism: a universalist grounding, and an assumed dichotomy 
between impartial and personal perspectives.
It is important to consider whether social contract theories are able to 
define an adequate conception of duties to refugees while retaining these two 
premises. For if they can provide an account of duties to refugees that is 
conceptually coherent, empirically plausible, and normatively desirable, then 
there will be no need to further challenge universalist assumptions about the 
foundations of liberal theory. If social contract theories are successful in this 
task, then the critique of liberal universalism will be limited to the forms of right- 
based universalism discussed in this and the previous chapters. In this case, there 
would be no need to probe second order liberal universalist assumptions.
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However, rather than solving the problem of motivation, the discussion of social 
contract theory will demonstrate why a more radical, second order critique is 
necessary. And it will elucidate the more profound flaws common to all liberal 
universalist theories of duties to non-nationals.
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Chapter Four  
Social Contract  Theory and Moral Motivation
Social contract theory can be classified as a variant of liberal 
universalism, but one that is more explicitly concerned with the question of 
motivation. Social contract theories claim to ensure that people will be motivated 
to comply with rules of justice. The way in which theorists justify this claim 
varies, but all contractarians share a commitment to the notion of consent. By 
securing the consent of participants, contract theories claim to ensure cooperation 
with rules of justice. For most social contract theorists, consent has a dual role: it 
both generates morally desirable norms; and it ensures that people have good 
reason to obey these norms. In other words, achieving agreement on rules of 
justice produces a coincidence between what people should do and what they will 
be motivated to do. As such, social contract theory would appear to be a good 
candidate for defining duties to refugees. It is liberal universalist in substance200; 
but also claims to address the problem of feasibility, through ensuring consent to 
its terms of justice.
This chapter will consider whether social contract theories can provide a 
good framework for characterising duties to non-nationals. Of primary interest 
for us at this stage of the argument is the question of motivation and the role of 
consent in social contract theory. We need to examine whether or not social 
contract theories can address the problem of motivation whilst retaining a liberal 
universalist conception of duties to refugees. The argument will therefore be 
structured to address this question. The first section will categorise different 
social contract theories according to how they define the role of consent. This 
categorisation will provide the framework for a discussion of three social contract 
theories: those of Thomas Hobbes, John Rawls, and Brian Barry. These three
200 This is true o f  most social contract theories, although Hobbes is a notable exception - his 
theory certainly does not produce liberal prescriptions, although the structure o f  his contract was 
replicated by other contract theorists to produce more a liberal conception o f  justice.
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theories offer good exemplars for drawing out short-comings of different types of 
contract theory.
Two main weaknesses are highlighted in particular. First, theories that 
derive rules of justice in order to regulate conflict between individuals yield 
morally deficient theories, and fail to provide a normatively adequate conception 
of duties to refugees. This is the central problem with Hobbes’ account, and is 
also a problem for most interpretations of Rawls’ theory of justice, as discussed in 
sections two and three. Barry’s theory seeks to avoid this problem, providing a 
more robust conception of duties to non-nationals. His theory of justice as 
impartiality thus provides the best bet for constructing a truly global contract. 
However, Barry’s theory reveals a second main weakness: the problem of 
feasibility. Although Barry claims to address the problem of motivation, I shall 
argue that his theory will not generate compliance at the global level. Moreover, 
the brittle structure of his theory renders the problem of motivation even more 
acute than it was in the case of theories of universal rights. The chapter will 
conclude by considering what the critique of global contract theory can add to our 
understanding of the more fundamental tensions in liberal universalist theory.
1. The Goals of Social Contract Theory
Before examining specific theories, it is worth making a few general
comments about the structure and aims of social contract theory. Social contract
theory, or contractarianism, has a long tradition in liberal political thought dating
™  |
back to the seventeenth century , and has recently been revived in the works of 
Rawls, Scanlon and Barry. Contract theory originally revolved around the
201 For a classic history o f  contract theory, see J. W. Gough, The Social Contract: A Critical 
Study o f  its Developm ent (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1936); see also David 
Boucher and Paul Kelly, eds., The Social Contract form  H obbes to Rawls (London and N ew
York: Routledge, 1994).
202 John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972); Thomas M. Scanlon, 
“Contractualism and Utilitarianism”, in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard 
Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 103-28; Brian Barry, Justice as 
Im partiality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia  (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1974) - although this latter can be categorised as libertarian rather than liberal. The
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question of political obligation and aimed to ensure the negative freedom of 
citizens from encroachment by the sovereign. Yet there was also an important 
related question of how to ensure cooperation between individuals who were - 
according to most theorists - naturally self-interested, and who were competing 
for scarce resources.204 Under these conditions, or what Hume termed the 
“circumstances of justice”, cooperation could only be ensured by means of a set 
of rules for regulating conflict between competing interests or conceptions of the 
good. In other words, the natural self-interest of individuals and the scarcity of
• • • one mresources necessitated rules of justice. It is this concern with principles for 
regulating social interaction that has been the central preoccupation of recent 
social contract theory. Contractarianism in political theory has come to be used 
as a hypothetical device for justifying one particular set of rules or principles for 
regulating social interaction over others. The basic rules for regulating social 
interaction are derived from a hypothetical agreement of parties to a contract.
Understood in its broadest sense, then, the social contract is a hypothetical 
agreement between individuals about the rules that should govern their social 
cooperation. But beyond this general function of ensuring agreement, social 
contract has more specific uses in different theories. Contractarians tend to argue 
for the significance of the contract for two different types of reason. First, they 
may see the contract as a device for ensuring compliance with a set of rules in 
order to avoid conflict. The contract guarantees the cooperation of all 
participants, and therefore ensures stability and may also maximise the individual 
benefits of cooperation. A second reason for valuing the contract is because of 
the moral significance of autonomy. On this account, what is important about the
contractarian approach is also, arguably, employed in the theory o f  Jurgen Habermas. See Chapter
Five for a fuller discussion o f  this.
203
Gough, The Social Contract {op. cit.), p. 147.
204
Interestingly, John Charvet has argued that the problem o f  motivation arose as a result o f  the 
secularisation o f  political theory: liberal theorists needed to show why individuals would naturally 
want to comply with rules o f  justice, in the absence o f  divine directives. John Charvet, Theory 
and Practice o f  Human Rights, Summer School Lectures, London School o f  Economics and
Political Science (unpublished, 1999).
205
For David Hume’s development o f  the notion o f  the “circumstances o f  justice”, see A Treatise
o f  Human Nature [1739], ed. Ernest C. Mossner (London: Penguin, 1969), pp. 535-49.
206
Contemporary variants have incorporated the notion o f  the positive benefits o f  cooperation as 
an incentive to cooperate, as well as the motive o f  avoiding death or harm.
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contract is not so much that it ensures a stable outcome, but that it defines terms 
of justice that rational agents would (at least hypothetically) agree to under 
conditions of equal autonomy. On this account, the significance of the contract is 
that it guarantees morally just terms, i.e. terms that contractors would consent to 
qua rational and autonomous actors.
While most social contract theories draw on some combination of these 
two notions of consent, the distinction between the two is nonetheless important. 
Placing relative emphasis on either the problem of conflict, or the moral value of 
autonomy, will have a bearing on the practical norms that one derives from the 
contract, and on the question of motivation. Regarding the content of the norms 
chosen, to put it simply, if conflict is defined as the basic problem for political 
theory, then the motivation to comply with rules of justice will usually be derived 
from the self-interested desire to avoid conflict or to maximise individual gains. 
This is the approach adopted by Hobbes, and more recently David Gauthier.207 In 
their theories, the content of justice will be defined according to the self-interest 
of the parties, and the scope of justice will be contingent on the existence of 
conflict between individuals. Non-nationals will only be included in the contract 
if they threaten the stability of the society in question, or if  their cooperation in 
some way brings additional benefits to current members. On the other hand, if 
consent is motivated by ethical considerations -  as in the case of Barry’s theory, 
and on some interpretations of Rawls - then terms of justice are likely to be 
defined on the basis of a commitment to fairness or impartiality. In this case, the 
scope of the contract may also incorporate a wider sphere of individuals, and the 
terms of justice are more likely to include a commitment to the rights of non­
nationals.
These two ways of deriving a theory of justice from consent also reflect 
different conceptions of the relationship between justice and motivation. The first 
takes existing motivation as a starting-point, thence deriving terms of justice. On 
this account, terms of justice are an extension of the desire to avoid conflict or to
207 David P. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
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preserve one’s life or liberty. The second approach defines a moral conception of 
justice, and then tries to show how and why people will be motivated to respect 
its strictures. As one commentator has more cynically put it, in social contract 
theory “two winning moves are possible: either interest must be reduced to duty,
• 70Sor duty must be derived from interest.”
The paramount concern of this thesis is to find a theory that allows for a 
conception o f duties to non-nationals, and the conflict-based model seems 
unlikely to be able to provide this. Indeed, as I shall argue in the discussion of 
Hobbes, a morally adequate theory of international justice must be (at least partly) 
morally driven, rather than based on egoism. So Rawls’ and Barry’s morally 
driven theories seem to provide the best hope for deriving a global conception. 
Nonetheless, it is useful to start by examining Hobbes’ theory, in order both to 
grasp the structure of contract theory, and also to understand the deficiencies of 
the conflict-based account. The theories of Rawls and Barry can be best 
understood through contrasting them with the purely egoistic account of 
Hobbes.209
2. Hobbesian Theories: Deriving Duty from Interest
The best known example of deriving duty from self-interest is that of 
Hobbes’ social contract theory, which produces a theory of justice which has been
91 ncharacterised as “justice as mutual advantage” or justice as a modus vivendi. 
Hobbes starts from the assumption that people’s motives for entering into a social 
contract are purely self-interested. In Hobbes’ Leviathan, people sacrifice a 
portion of individual freedom and enter a social contract in order to ensure their 
own preservation.
208Gordon J. Schochet, “Intending (Political) Obligation: Hobbes and the Voluntary Basis o f  
Society”, in Mary Dietz (ed.), Thomas Hobbes and P olitical Theory (Kansas: University o f
Kansas, 1990), p. 6.
209 Indeed, the critique broadly follows the structure o f  Barry’s discussion in Justice as 
Impartiality (op. cit.), which elucidates his ethically driven theory through building on a critique
o f  the Hobbesian account. See pp. 28-79.
210 See, respectively, Barry, Justice as Im partiality (op. cit.), p. 28; and Thomas W. Pogge, 
Realizing Rawls (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 101.
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The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion 
over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see 
them live in Commonwealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a 
more contented live thereby.211 
Compliance with a set of rules for regulating social interaction is preferable to 
risking death in a violent and anarchical state of nature. Indeed, the object of 
Leviathan is “without other design, than to set before mens eyes the mutuall
919Relation between Protection and Obedience.” Hobbes’ political theory is 
constructed on the basis of what he understands to be human motivation, and 
moral duty is simply an extension of self-interest. As such, self-interest 
necessarily coincides with duty, and the rules of justice generate motivation on 
purely egoistic grounds.
Hobbes does not offer his contractors a choice between different sets of 
rules: those entering society face a more stark choice between almost 
unconditional obedience to the existing Sovereign, or a return to the dreadlul state
91^of nature. Nonetheless, his theory of human motivation and reason yields a 
particular theory of justice. Given that the only reasons for accepting rules 
constraining individual freedom is that they promote the individual’s self-interest, 
then by definition it must be advantageous to the individual to comply with just 
rules. The existence of mutual advantage is a necessary condition for ensuring 
obedience. Significantly, it is also a sufficient condition for those rules to be just: 
justice is no more than a set of mutually advantageous rules for regulating social 
intercourse. As the contemporary Hobbesian Gauthier writes, “not only do we 
undertake obligations only for prudential reasons, but the undertaking extends 
only to what we have prudential reasons for carrying out.”214
211Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [1651] (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1957), p. 87.
2,2 Ib id , p. 391.
213
The only condition o f  the Sovereign’s authority is that he preserve the lives o f  his citizens - a
condition which o f  course corresponds to the motive for entering a contract in the first place.
214 This equally applies to Gauthier’s reformulation o f  Hobbes’ theory. See David P. Gauthier, 
The Logic o f  Leviathan: The M oral and Political Theory o f  Thomas H obbes (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1969).
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2.1 The moral critique
A number of commentators have criticised this conception of justice as
91 5morally defective. For the purposes of this argument, the more narrow concern 
is the implications of such a theory for the nature and scope of duties to refugees. 
Can the Hobbesian theory of justice account for duties to non-nationals, and 
adequately characterise their relationship with duties to compatriots? Barry’s 
critique highlights two main problems with the theory which are relevant here. 
Firstly, justice as mutual advantage does not establish criteria for rules that 
correspond to what we would normally consider to be just or fair. Those in a 
position of relative strength will be able to influence rules to their personal 
advantage. This has negative implications for the extension of justice to refugees 
in two respects: they may not get fair treatment under the terms agreed to, or 
alternatively they may be excluded from the contract altogether. The second main 
critique is an internal problem of the relationship between motivation and justice: 
just rules will not necessarily trigger motivation to comply with them. Even if 
most or all parties to the contract accept that these rules are just, it may not be in 
every individual’s self-interest to comply with the rules in every instance. Again, 
this may create problems for application of the theory to the international sphere, 
where there may be a greater number of instances in which just behaviour will 
require action which does not coincide with prudential interest. The two 
problems will be discussed below and in 2.2.
The first problem is that justice as mutual advantage, in the words of 
Barry, fails “to correspond in crucial respects to what is normally considered to be 
just.” Justice as mutual advantage implies that complying with rules of justice 
will only be relatively advantageous to each individual, compared with their 
situation in the absence of these rules. If those choosing principles of justice start 
from unequal positions in terms of wealth or power, then a mutually
215 Nagel, for example, argues that “Hobbes’ feeling that no man can ever act voluntarily without 
having as an object his own personal good” ruins “any attempt to put a truly moral construction on 
Hobbes’ concept o f  obligation.” See Thomas Nagel, “Hobbes’ Concept o f  Obligation”, in Thomas 
Hobbes: Critical Assessments, Volume II, ed. Preston King (London and N ew  York: Routledge, 
1993), p. 122.
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advantageous contract may produce fundamentally inegalitarian rules. Justice as 
mutual advantage has nothing to say about what sorts of distributions are fair, or 
how the benefits and burdens of social cooperation should be shared. It provides 
no moral basis for claims to equal or fair treatment, except insofar as such 
principles may be necessary to ensure that the rules of justice are mutually 
advantageous to all parties to the contract. Yet in the absence of equal starting- 
points, weaker individuals may agree to principles that produce a relative 
improvement in their situation, but which do not correspond to what we would 
consider to be just principles. As Barry writes, “so long as even very rough 
equality of strength obtains among the parties to rules of justice, the rules 
recommended by justice as mutual advantage will tend to correspond to those that 
we would ordinarily think just... Where this rough equality fails to obtain, the 
correspondence will break down.”217
In this scenario, the terms of justice would be worked out on the basis of 
characteristics that most liberals would consider to be morally arbitrary, such as 
political power, wealth, intelligence or physical strength. The agreement reached
"y i ftmay well incorporate favourable treatment for the more powerful. The 
possibility of such a scenario makes the extension of justice as mutual advantage 
to refugees highly problematic. Assuming that they are in fact admitted to a state, 
individual or small groups of refugees will tend to be in a weaker bargaining 
position, and therefore unable to secure fair terms. The receiving state will be 
able to decide how many refugees to admit, and under what conditions. If justice 
is an extension of self-interest, is not at all clear that those granted asylum will get 
fair or even tolerable treatment. If one were to follow the logic of a theory of 
justice based on self-interest, the standard of treatment of refugees would be 
significantly lower than is currently the case.
More seriously, it is probable that refugees would not be included in the 
contract at all. If the scope of justice is determined merely by considerations of
216 Barry, Justice as Impartiality {op. cit.), p. 48.
217 Ib id , p. 45
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mutual advantage, then the inclusion of refugees will depend on the extent to 
which those in the receiving country are dependent on the cooperation of 
refugees. In the case of a national social contract, it has traditionally been argued 
that compatriots are more dependent on one another’s cooperation to avoid 
conflict, and that it is therefore in their interest to establish and maintain mutually 
acceptable rules. But there will be little or no motive to establish fair terms of 
justice with those on whom one is not dependent in this sense, for example 
refugees. Individual or small groups of refugees do not generally pose a threat to 
stability, and thus their cooperation is not required in order to prevent conflict; 
and they are often perceived as lacking the resources to make a positive 
contribution to society, i.e. unable to provide goods which would benefit the 
members of the society in question. Refugees are therefore seen as lacking the 
skills or resources to render their inclusion mutually advantageous to the 
receiving society. The country of refuge is not dependent on their consent to 
ensure peace or to generate additional resources. This question of dependence 
has raised problems for Hobbesian social contract theories at the domestic level. 
Gauthier, for example, writes of his own theory that “animals, the unborn, the 
congenitally handicapped and defective, fall beyond the pail of a morality tied to 
mutuality. The disposition to comply with moral constraints... may be rationally 
defended only within the scope of expected benefit.” Following this logic, it 
would also be rational to exclude refugees from a system of reciprocal benefit. 
Those currently outside the sphere of interdependence are unlikely to be included 
in a social contract motivated by self-interest, let alone one whose terms are fair.
The only way theories of justice as mutual advantage can establish their 
applicability to the international sphere seems to be by showing that receiving 
states are in fact dependent on the cooperation of refugees. The refugee policy 
debate would then revolve around an empirical question of the actual reliance of 
nationals on non-nationals. It would be extremely difficult to establish a case for 
admitting refugees on these grounds. Perhaps one could imagine an extreme case
218 Barry illustrates this point with the example o f  the treatment o f  indigenous populations in 
Australasia and North America by European settlers. Ibid., p. 41
219
David P. Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 268
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where the presence of refugees outside of the relevant state would pose a threat to 
national security. In this case, establishing mutually advantageous rules for 
regulating cooperation between refugees and nationals may be in the interest of 
the receiving country. But this is a rather far-fetched scenario. Moreover, the 
extension of justice to these refugees would be entirely contingent on the 
coincidence of self-interest and the terms of the contract. It would not establish 
principles of justice for regulating interaction with refugees in general, but merely 
with regard to particular case-loads. Refugees who did not pose a similar threat 
to security would not be included in such an agreement.
A second possible route for establishing dependence would be to argue 
that refugees had resources or skills which were useful or necessary for the 
receiving state. In this case, entering into a contract with refugees would be 
advantageous to nationals because of refugees’ positive contribution to society. 
This type of consideration clearly influenced a number of western European states 
in the 1950s and 1960s, when they absorbed large numbers of immigrants to 
provide labour in a period of economic growth. Yet as with the previous
example, the willingness to admit refugees would be a function of the extent to 
which they would be advantageous from a purely self-interested perspective. In 
many cases the self-interest of nationals would not coincide with the interests of 
refugees. This motive for admitting refugees does not provide a consistent and 
reliable basis for grounding duties to refugees, and represents an extremely 
impoverished account of the nature of our duties to refugees.
An alternative to arguing for dependence on refugees would be to concede 
that refugees fall outside the sphere of justice, and define duties to refugees as a
79 1question of humanity, rather than one of justice. Again, this is a profoundly
unsatisfactory option. I already touched on the inadequacy of notions of humanity 
as a basis for duties to refugees in Chapter Two (see section 3.2). Such an 
approach would imply that all those who are too weak or unimportant to be
220
See Chapter One, section 2.3.
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included in the contract would not be the subject of justice but rather of charity or 
supererogatory duties. This category would presumably include the congenitally 
handicapped as well as refugees. Given that these categories would normally be 
considered to be the subjects of some form of justice or fair treatment, their 
exclusion from the scope of justice demonstrates the inadequacy of theories of 
justice as mutual advantage. This inadequacy is a clear consequence of 
attempting to derive duty from self-interest.
2.2 The problem o f  compliance
Before abandoning the theory of justice as mutual advantage, it is useful 
to consider a second problem which further casts doubt on the theory’s account of 
individual motivation. Quite apart from the scope of the contract or the fairness 
of its terms, it is difficult to see how the rules established by justice as mutual 
advantage would generate motivation to comply with all of the rules all of the 
time. Several commentators have argued that this creates a “free rider” problem: 
assuming that every-one else (or most people) cooperate, it may be in my self- 
interest not to cooperate, at least in certain instances.222 Justice as mutual 
advantage has the structure of a prisoner’s dilemma, in which the social contract 
is agreed to because cooperation is preferable to conflict. But if every-one else 
cooperates, then it may be rational for me not to cooperate, provided that my non- 
cooperation does not jeopardise the stability of the whole agreement. As Barry 
writes:
Settlements underwritten by justice as mutual advantage are no more than truces.
As soon as one side or the other feels it can improve its position, there is nothing 
to restrain it so long as (measured within its own conception of the good) the 
prospective gains outweigh the anticipated costs.223 
He concludes that the “pursuit of advantage does not provide an adequate motive 
for compliance with rules that would be mutually advantageous if generally
221
For a good account o f  the distinction between the two, see Brian Barry, “Humanity and Justice 
in Global Perspective,” in Ethics, Economics and The Law, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W.
Chapman, Nomos XXIV (New York: New York University Press, 1982), pp. 219-52.
222 For a clear summary o f  the problem o f free-riders in contract theory, see Rawls, Theory o f  
Justice (pp. cit.), pp. 267-70
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observed.” 224 In other words, the exclusive dependence on self-interest to 
motivate compliance creates a very fragile system of social cooperation. The 
system is fragile in the sense that just rules do not seem capable of generating 
compliance on every occasion. Thus not only do the rules derived from self- 
interest fail to correspond in important respects to what we would normally 
consider to be just. Even if we accept the adequacy of justice as mutual 
advantage as a system for regulating social interaction, it is not at all clear that the 
system would be stable.
Many commentators have attributed both of these weaknesses - the moral 
inadequacy of the theory of justice, and the failure of just rules to generate 
motivation - to the simplistic nature of Hobbes’ theory of motivation. This has 
led several commentators to supplement the theory with a more complex account 
of human motivation 226 In doing so, they have avoided the problem of making 
compliance contingent on the individual’s egoistic interest in obeying every rule 
on every occasion. Richer theories of motivation can also provide non-egoistic 
reasons for agreeing to a particular set of rules, thereby allowing for a fairer 
conception of justice, and for the inclusion in the contract of those with whom it 
is not in one’s self-interest to cooperate. This would open up a possibility for 
including refugees in a social contract. The next section will consider Rawls’ 
attempt to base his theory of justice on a more complex account of motivation.
3. Rawls and Justice as Fairness
Rawls’ theory of “justice as fairness” has a rather different conception of 
the conditions under which people should select principles of justice. His 
contract is designed to yield fairer terms of justice, which do not discriminate
223 Barry, Justice as Impartiality {op. cit.), p. 39
224 Ibid., p. 48.
225
Brown, for example, describes it as “incredibly crude and plainly false.” See S. M. Brown, 
“Hobbes: The Taylor Thesis” in Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, Vol. II, ed. Preston King 
(London: Routledge, 1993), p. 101. Rawls takes a more lenient view, viewing Hobbes’ account o f  
motivation as no more than a “common foothold for political argument.” See John Rawls, “The
Idea o f  an Overlapping Consensus”, Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies, 7:1 (1987), p. 2.
226 I shall discuss two such attempts below - i.e. those o f  Rawls and Barry.
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between individuals on what liberal universalists would consider to be morally 
arbitrary grounds. Unlike Hobbes, the terms of justice do not establish a mere 
modus vivendi between individuals with conflicting ends. Instead, he introduces 
certain hypothetical conditions to ensure that his contractors will choose terms of 
justice that do not discriminate on grounds of wealth, talent, social status, gender 
or race. Rawls’ theory is Kantian in inspiration, basing its theory of justice on a 
conception of individuals as autonomous choosers of their own ends. It therefore 
avoids the moral deficiencies of the Hobbesian account, and would appear to 
offer a better basis for deriving a contract that recognises duties to refugees.
However, as I shall argue in this section, Rawls retains a basically 
Hobbesian conception of rationality, assuming that the parties to his contract are 
motivated by self-interest. The commitment to a Kantian conception is 
introduced through a separate device - the “veil of ignorance” - which is imposed 
on the parties to ensure a morally desirable outcome. The separation of self- 
interested motivation and the veil of ignorance creates problems in deriving a 
morally adequate conception of duties to refugees. I shall conclude the section by 
considering Barry’s critique of Rawls, which locates the problem in Rawls’ 
theory as his procedural separation of egoistic motivation and impartial morality.
3.1 Motivation and the veil o f  ignorance
Rawls’ theory of justice can be understood as an attempt to combine two 
theories of the role of consent: a Humean account of the circumstances of justice; 
and a Kantian commitment to a conception of individuals as free and equal. The 
Humean premise implies that justice is required to solve a problem of conflict, 
thus making the application of rules of justice contingent on the “circumstances 
of justice”. In contrast, the Kantian element suggests a moral commitment to a 
universalist conception of individuals as worthy of equal consideration, and hence 
a global contract. It is worth considering how Rawls incorporates each of the two 
strands, and examining their implications for international justice and duties to 
refugees.
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First, as observed above, Rawls explicitly embraces a Humean
• # 7 7 7interpretation of the “circumstances of justice.” He argues that there are certain 
“background conditions” which give rise to the need for principles for choosing 
arrangements to regulate social interaction. These circumstances obtain 
“whenever mutually disinterested persons put forward conflicting claims to the 
division of social advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity.”228 This 
would imply that justice is required to solve a cooperation problem: it is required 
to avoid conflict between persons of roughly equal strength competing for scarce 
resources. On this account, society is no more than what Rawls sometimes refers
7 9 0to as a “cooperative venture for mutual gain”, with justice simply a set of rules 
for avoiding conflict and ensuring social stability. It should be noted that a 
consistent application of the circumstances of justice account would yield no 
more than a modus vivendi. If the need for stability were the sole reason for 
advocating justice, then one could solve the problem with recourse to a 
Hobbesian theory of justice. And if one assumes that parties to the contract are 
mutually disinterested people competing for scarce goods, then one would expect 
them to agree to some form of justice as mutual advantage.
Yet Rawls’ theory of justice aims to do more than provide rules for 
ensuring stability and cooperation. If justice were required solely to avoid 
conflict caused by scarcity and natural selfishness, then Rawls would not require 
his parties to choose principles from behind a "veil of ignorance". The veil of 
ignorance requires the parties to adopt what amounts to an impartial ethical 
perspective. The parties have no knowledge of their social and economic status,
9T0natural assets, psychological disposition or conception of the good. The veil of 
ignorance is designed to avoid an “outcome biased by arbitrary contingencies”, in 
other words to preclude principles that are chosen on the basis of partial
7*^ 1considerations.
Indeed, he writes that his conception o f  the circumstances o f  justice “adds nothing essential” to
Hume’s account. See Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice {op. cit), p. 127.
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But although Rawls introduces a moral component, it is kept separate 
from the motivation of the parties to the contract. While the parties are obliged to 
adopt the impartial perspective represented by the veil of ignorance, this ethical 
perspective is independent of their self-interested rationality. Contractors in what 
he terms the "original position" are thus motivated by prudence or self-interest. 
The moral component of the choice of principles is guaranteed by the imposition
of an external mechanism which ostensibly has no basis in the psychological
•  •  •  •make-up of the parties. Thus Rawls introduces a sharp division between
impartial and self-interested perspectives. The impartial perspective is captured 
by the fact that people voluntarily take on the veil of ignorance, which avoids an 
outcome influenced by morally irrelevant factors. While the self-interested 
perspective is captured by the rationality of the parties.
Now as I suggested at the beginning of this section, this creates serious 
problems for deriving an adequate conception of duties to non-nationals from 
Rawls’ theory. In 3.2 and 3.3 below, I shall consider the ways in which Rawls’ 
theory could be applied to the international sphere, and hence its implications for 
refugees. I shall consider applications of his theory derived from, respectively, 
the notion of the circumstances of justice, and from his Kantian moral theory.
3.2 The circumstances o f justice
One way of applying Rawls’ theory of justice to the international sphere is 
to emphasise the significance of the circumstances of justice in deriving terms of 
justice. On this account, the scope and content of justice would be determined on 
the basis of empirical criteria. Namely, it would depend on the existence of a 
situation in which individuals with roughly equal power were competing for 
scarce resources. While establishing the existence or not of these empirical 
conditions would appear to be a relatively straightforward matter, there has been 
some controversy over whether or not the relevant conditions hold in the 
international sphere; and, if they do, whether they are characteristic of relations
232 I shall elaborate this question o f  the psychology o f  motivation in Chapter Six.
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between individuals, or between states.234 I shall consider in turn the possibility 
of deriving a global or an inter-state contract from an argument about empirical 
conditions.
The first possibility is that the argument for a global contract theory could 
be based on a claim about the existence of circumstances of justice between all 
individuals. This interpretation of the global implications of the theory of justice 
has been most famously pursued by Charles Beitz. Beitz challenges Rawls’ 
assumption that justice should be limited to relations between individuals at the 
domestic level. He argues that Rawls derives this conclusion about the limited 
scope of justice from an incorrect empirical claim about the self-sufficiency of 
states. Beitz argues that there is a substantial degree of economic 
interdependence between states, which creates a “non-voluntary society-wide 
system of economic institutions which defines starting positions and assigns 
economic rights and duties.” Beitz argues that these institutions constitute a 
basic structure which should be regulated by Rawls’ principles of justice because 
“by defining the terms of cooperation, they have such deep and pervasive effects 
on the welfare of people to whom they apply regardless of consent.” Given the
233 Rawls, Theory o f  Justice (pp. cit.), pp. 142-50.
234 For an overview o f  applications o f  social contract theory to problems in international relations, 
see David R. Mapel, “The Contractarian Tradition and International Ethics”, in Traditions o f  
International Ethics, ed. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), pp. 180-200; and John Charvet, "Contractarianism and International Political 
Theory", in The Social Contact from  Hobbes to  Rawls, ed. David Boucher and Paul Kelly
(London and N ew  York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 175-90.
235 See Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1979); "Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment", Journal o f  Philosophy 80 
(1983), pp. 591-600; “Justice and International Relations” in International Ethics, ed. Charles R. 
Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Scanlon and A. John Simmons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), pp. 282-311; and “Sovereignty and Morality in International Affairs”, in 
Political Theory Today, ed. David Held (Oxford: Polity, 1991), pp. 236-54. For an account o f  the 
evolution o f  his applications o f  Rawls' Theory o f  Justice, see M olly Cochran, Norm ative Theory in
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 23-41.
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237 Beitz, "Justice and International Relations" (op. cit.), p. 303
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extensive and nonvoluntary nature of interdependence, then, the principles of 
distributive justice must apply “in the first instance to the world as a whole, then 
derivatively to nation-states.” 239
However, we should be careful about following Beitz down this path. 
Beitz appears to misunderstand the significance of interdependence in the work of 
Rawls. On Rawls’ account, empirical assumptions about the level of 
interdependence between individuals do play an important role in determining the 
scope of justice. But the relevance of economic and social interdependence stems 
not so much from the ethical significance of human interaction, but rather from 
the need to ensure cooperation between people with different interests or 
conceptions of the good. Interdependence creates a need for agreement on 
principles for regulating social interaction because without such principles there 
would be conflict for scarce resources. It is not significant for ethical reasons, as 
Beitz seems to suggest. Beitz is conflating an argument about the ethical 
significance of interdependence with an argument about the circumstances of 
justice.
This confusion leads Beitz to misapply Rawls’ theory in his prescriptions 
about the scope and content of justice. His misunderstanding of the notion of 
interdependence as employed by Rawls leads him to characterise all individuals 
as interdependent at a global level. Now such a form of global interdependence 
may be relevant in an ethical sense. For example, one could argue that the actions 
of each individual could potentially affect the well-being of any other person, and 
that this (potential) interdependence of all human beings provides ethical grounds 
for regulating the interaction of all individuals in a global theory of justice.240 But 
this does not follow from Rawls’ conception of interdependence, which describes 
a state of actual dependence on others, requiring cooperation to ensure stability. 
On this conception, it is certainly not the case that all individuals are dependent 
on one another. In fact, as Rawls himself argues, this situation of mutual
239 Ibid., p. 305.
240 See, for example, Onora O ’N eill’s account o f  the relevance o f  “connection”, in Towards 
Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f  Practical Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge
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dependence is more characteristic of relations between states.
Rawls himself has derived two different international accounts from his 
theory of justice, the first o f which constitutes an argument for inter-national rules 
of justice, derived from the circumstances of justice.241 Thus in his first lecture 
on the subject in 1993, he emphasises the significance of the Humean element of 
his theory in deriving principles of international justice.242 Rawls argues that 
principles of justice should be worked out in the first instance for the “basic 
structure of a closed and self-contained democratic society.”243 Only once this is 
done will the parties consider principles of international justice, extending 
outwards to construct principles for the “law of peoples.” In this second stage, 
the parties to the contract represent the societies of peoples who have already 
worked out their domestic principles of justice. They do not deliberate behind a 
veil of ignorance, but select inter-national principles in full knowledge of their 
nationality and the terms they have agreed to at the domestic level. The 
principles agreed to are far looser than the conception of justice as fairness. 
Notably, they omit the egalitarian and redistributive features of the domestic 
conception.244 The resulting conception of the law of peoples is based on 
“familiar principles” of international law, including the right of states to self- 
defence; duties of non-intervention, observance of treaties and certain restrictions 
on the conduct of war.245 Rawls does also include a general commitment “to 
honor human rights”, which are later listed as “such basic rights as the right to life 
and security, to personal property, and the elements of the rules of law, as well as 
the right to a certain liberty of conscience and freedom of association, and the 
right to emigration.”246 But these rights are not nearly as comprehensive as those 
enjoyed by participants in the domestic contract - indeed, Rawls stresses that they
University Press, 1996), pp. 105 and 113-21.
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must not be “peculiar to our Western culture”, but acceptable to those from what 
he terms “well-ordered” non-liberal societies.247 In essence, this amounts to 
limiting the conception of justice at the international level to a modus vivendi. 
Terms of justice are designed to ensure a stable international environment, in 
which states can get on with the more important business of ensuring domestic 
justice and stability.
Rawls' first contribution to the subject of international justice generated
wide-spread criticism. One criticism frequently levelled at account is that his
focus on the domestic basic structure leads him to treat groups of people rather
•  •  •than individuals as the relevant moral unit in the international sphere. Rawls 
does not provide a conception of duties to those outside of the relevant sphere of 
social cooperation, thus wholly overlooking the question of duties to non­
nationals and to refugees.249 This omission of duties to individual non-nationals 
is largely explained by the narrowly defined purpose of Rawls’ principles for 
international cooperation. The law of peoples is not designed to achieve global 
fairness or rectify violations of human rights. Rather, it should be understood as a 
means of establishing rules between societies that already meet basic human 
rights standards. “[Djefense of well-ordered peoples is the first and most urgent 
task.”250 Well-ordered states can find sufficient common consensus to agree to 
principles which will provide the best international context for realising domestic 
justice. The principles adopted for the international sphere are thus seen as
247 Ibid., p. 70. Indeed, it is difficult to see how Rawls can derive even this limited conception o f  
human rights as part o f  his “law o f  peoples”, given that contractors are strictly only interested in 
ensuring international stability. Perhaps he considered that international respect for human rights 
was a means o f  preventing conflict, but he does not advance this as a justification. The only 
comment he makes on possible motivation to agree to the international respect o f  human rights is 
that “systematic violation o f  these rights is a serious matter and troubling to the society o f  peoples
as a whole.” {ibid., p. 68). But he does not explain what he means by this in his 1993 essay.
248 See Mark R. Wicclair, "Rawls and the Principle o f  Nonintervention", in John Rawls's Theory 
o f  Social Justice: An Introduction, ed. H. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth H. Smith (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1980), p. 297; and Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory o f  Justice (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 133.
249 That is, unless they fall under the category o f  “mutual assistance between peoples in times o f  
famine and drought.” Rawls, "Law o f  Peoples" {op. cit.), p. 56. However, the implications o f  this 
commitment in terms o f  how liberal states should respond to violations o f  human rights in other 
countries, or how such principles are to be reconciled with the right to non-intervention, are not 
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Rawls, “Law o f Peoples” {op. cit.), p. 73.
148
secondary to the central question of achieving stability and consensus on 
principles of justice for the basic structure. The main impetus for considering 
questions of international justice seems to stem from its potential threat to these 
domestic arrangements. The neglect of individual justice is therefore not an 
aberrance. Rather, it can be understood as the logical outcome of a conception of 
justice as triggered by the circumstances of justice that hold between states.
3.3 Morally driven agreement and the “strains o f  commitment ”
However, we have seen that there is another interpretation of Rawls, 
which emphasises the Kantian rather than the Humean strand of his theory. On 
this account, Rawls is committed to a conception of individuals as free and equal, 
and it is this moral premise that should determine the nature and scope of justice. 
As Pogge argues, for example, Rawls’ neglect of individual justice beyond 
borders is inconsistent with his “conception of all human beings as free and equal 
moral persons.”
This emphasis on the moral element in Rawls’ theory raises an important 
question about the foundations of his commitment to Kantian ethics. In his recent 
work, Rawls has argued that his conception of justice should not be understood as 
grounded in a metaphysical account of the essential and universal characteristics 
of human beings. Rather, this conception is derived from the shared values of 
individuals of a certain cultural context. Thus the moral values embodied in the 
veil of ignorance are not universally valid, but describe the moral beliefs of 
inheritors of liberal democratic institutions and a liberal tradition of political 
thought.252
251 See Pogge, Realizing Rawls (op. cit.), p. 240. In fact, Pogge’s grounds for “globalising” 
Rawls’ theory are extremely ambiguous - they seem to comprise a mixture o f  a Kantian
metaphysical conception o f  persons, and an empirical claim about shared values.
252 This is what Rawls terms the “political” conception o f  justice. For a discussion o f  the political 
conception, see Ethics 99:4 (1989), especially contributions by Kurt Baier, "Justice and the Aims 
o f  Political Philosophy", pp: 771-90; and Jean Hampton, "Should Political Philosophy Be Done 
without Metaphysics", pp. 791-814. See also O ’Neill, Justice and Virtue (op. cit.), pp. 46-7. It 
should be noted that there are two central features o f  this political account, (a) The conception o f  
justice is not comprehensive, i.e. it is a political rather than moral, and can be embraced by people 
with a range o f  religious and cultural beliefs. This “thin” conception is designed to appeal to
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Now on this non-metaphysical reading, justice as fairness must be 
understood as deriving its ethical content from the intersubjective values of 
contractors. As such, justice as fairness will only be chosen by those committed 
to the liberal conception. And commitment to this conception is clearly 
contingent on the historical and cultural context of the contractors. It is most 
likely to be agreed by citizens of liberal democracies, and not members of non- 
liberal non-democratic states. Once again, this seems to pull us back from a 
global contract to one agreed between members of liberal democratic societies. 
The applicability of the veil of ignorance is thus limited to particular societies, 
and - short of a major shift in the values of all non-liberal societies - will not be 
applicable to the global sphere. And without the application of a veil of 
ignorance, justice will be determined on the basis of the need to avoid conflict.
This is indeed the conclusion derived from Rawls' second contribution to 
the subject, which is more consistent with his concept of justice as "political not 
metaphysical". In the 1999 version of the Law of Peoples, Rawls rejects his 
earlier assumption that the veil of ignorance would not be applicable to a contract 
between peoples. Instead, parties to the inter-national contract deliberate from a 
position of ignorance of a number of important characteristics. They do not know 
the size of their territory, population or their military strength, the extent of their 
natural resources or their level of economic development.254 The imposition of 
this veil of ignorance is justified because the contractors are committed to a 
principle of mutual respect and recognition between peoples. All of the peoples 
participating in the contract have an interest in political independence, freedom 
and security, and as such "are fully prepared to grant the very same proper respect
members o f  multicultural liberal democracies. And (b) the conception is derived from shared 
values. So its source is the liberal tradition o f  moral and political thought, rather than derived from
reason. It is this second aspect that is o f  interest to the present discussion.
253 Rawls does o f  course believe that there is a possibility o f  overlapping consensus in 
multicultural societies, where liberal values are understood as “political” rather than 
“comprehensive” . See John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical”, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 14:3 (1985), p. 252; but as he argues in his “Law o f  Peoples”, he is less 
confident about agreement on the conception o f  justice as fairness by non-liberal societies {op. 
cit., pp. 68-9).
254 Rawls, Law o f  Peoples (1999, op. cit.), pp. 32-3.
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and recognition to other peoples as equals". Their moral commitment to 
principles of liberty and individual rights also leads them to agree to a stronger set 
of international rules on human rights. Thus they agree to promote the human 
rights of other peoples, if necessary through sanctions and even intervention. 
And unlike in Rawls' earlier account, national rights of autonomy and self- 
determination are explicitly contingent on respect for human and minority 
rights.257
However, it should be recalled that this 1999 account is derived from a 
political conception of justice. And as such, the scope of the contract is limited to 
the members of nations that would be morally committed to the principles 
embodied in the veil of ignorance. It can therefore be binding only on "decent 
peoples", namely peoples that recognise human rights, have a "decent
■ICO
consultation hierarchy", and allow a "right of dissent." This would exclude 
most major refugee producing countries (for example Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, 
Iraq or Sierra Leone); and, given that the parties must be peoples and not 
individuals, the terms of the contract would not cover individuals fleeing these 
countries. It would only cover individuals fleeing liberal and "decent" states. 
This implies a tension between a commitment to human rights that are universal 
in scope, and the requirement that only peoples already committed to these 
principles can be subject to these international rules. In other words, while 
individuals in liberal democracies would presumably be morally driven to 
promote human rights in non-"decent" states, they would be prohibited from so 
doing by the limited scope of the contract.259 Thus we seem to be left again with 
a morally inadequate conception of duties to refugees. Rawls’ political conception 
of justice is unable to generate a global contract. If one accepts that justice as 
fairness is derived from shared values rather than metaphysics, the scope and
Ibid, p. 35.
256 Ibid., p. 81.
257 Ibid., pp. 38, 79.
25S Ibid, p. 61.
259 Rawls does acknowledge that his theory fails to cover the case o f  migration and refugee flows, 
but is content to assume that the causes o f  flight will be "eliminated as a serious problem in a 
realistic utopia." Refugee flows "would disappear in the Society o f  liberal and decent Peoples." 
Law o f  Peoples  (1999, op. cit.), p. 9.
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content of the social contract is limited to peoples with the appropriate political 
and moral values.
If Rawls' political conception of justice yields an inadequate conception of 
duties to refugees, perhaps it would be more fruitful to derive a global conception 
of justice from Rawls’ earlier work, prior to his explicit abandonment of a 
metaphysical conception. If one understands the Kantian commitment to 
universal rights as universally valid rather than derived from shared values, this 
could potentially yield a global contract that would ground duties to refugees. A 
global application of Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness would require imposing 
a veil of ignorance on all individuals, or on the representatives of each state - 
whether the peoples in question were "decent" or not. In addition to deliberating 
from a position of ignorance of their wealth, power and other moral arbitrary 
characteristics, contractors would also be deprived knowledge of whether they 
were actual or potential refugees. Presumably this would encourage them to 
introduce an extensive set of refugee rights, with provisions far more generous 
than those currently in place. And the terms would cover all individuals, 
regardless of whether they originated from "decent" or "non-decent" countries.
Now the problem with such an agreement would be that it would be 
unlikely to secure continued compliance once the veil of ignorance was lifted. It 
should be recalled that Rawls’ procedure assumes that parties are motivated by 
rational self-interest. The moral component of their agreement, which ensures 
that fair  terms are accepted, is only guaranteed by the imposition of a veil of 
ignorance. But once the terms of justice have been agreed upon, the veil is lifted 
and people are once again aware of their socio-economic situation and personal 
characteristics. And given their self-interested motivation, those who are 
privileged in terms of natural assets, wealth or social status will be unlikely to be 
motivated to continue to comply with the chosen terms.
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The problem of continued compliance outside of the original position 
gives rise to what Barry has termed the “strains of commitment” .260 The 
principles of justice chosen in the original position must be acceptable once the 
veil of ignorance has been lifted. This means that those who are worst off under 
the terms should nonetheless still consider that the chosen principles of justice are 
better than other principles that could have been selected in the original position. 
Hence those who lose substantial privileges as a result of the redistributive 
implications of the principles should nonetheless continue to comply with them. 
This implies a requirement of unanimous agreement for the principles not only in 
the original position, but also once people are aware of their actual position and 
natural assets, social and economic status, and so on.261 In fact, the test of the 
strains of commitment is far more challenging for Rawls’ theory of justice than 
ensuring the relevant terms are chosen in the original position. As Barry argues, 
the test has a crucial role in ensuring consent for principles. As he writes, “the 
implicit criteria determining what principles are consistent with the ‘strains of 
commitment’ test are actually the criteria for principles of justice.”262 Only the 
strains of commitment test will ensure cooperation once people know about their 
characteristics and socio-economic status 263
Barry argues that this problem arises because of Rawls’ assumption of 
self-interested motivation. It is his characterisation of the parties to the contract 
as unmotivated by moral considerations that obliges Rawls to impose a veil of
260 Barry, Justice as Impartiality (op. cit.), p. 52
261 The distinction between the two conditions for agreement are equivalent to N agel’s distinction 
between the impartial perspective and the requirements o f  unanimous agreement -  see Thomas 
Nagel, Equality and Partiality Equality and Partiality (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), especially chapters two, three and four. The latter requirement o f  unanimous 
agreement allows those who have least to gain from a set o f  rules effectively to impose a veto (pp.
38-9).
262 Barry, Justice as Impartiality (op. cit.), p. 67.
263
It should be noted that Barry’s point is directed primarily at the problem o f  how Rawls derives 
his principles from behind a veil o f  ignorance. He argues that deliberating on terms o f  justice in 
the Original Position could generate agreement on utilitarianism. According to Barry, it is the 
strains o f  commitment test - not Rawls’ procedure for selecting principles - that ensures this option 
is ruled out. The strains o f  commitment test allows those who turn out to do worst under the 
chosen arrangements once the veil is lifted to veto these terms. While the current discussion is not 
directly concerned with this question o f  vetoing arrangements that do not adequately incorporate 
respect for individual rights, Barry’s point about the “strains o f  commitment” does o f  course have 
more general relevance to the problem o f  motivation.
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ignorance. Barry argues instead for a conception of motivation that includes a 
moral component. This would render the veil superfluous. “Where the parties 
are assumed to be pursuing their own interests, a veil of ignorance is essential. 
But where they are assumed to be motivated by the desire to reach an agreement 
on reasonable terms, a veil of ignorance is an optional feature -  a heuristic device 
which can be resorted to on occasion but does not have to be relied on to create 
solutions.”264 Barry favours a procedure for agreeing terms of justice that 
resembles Rawls’ strains of commitment test, rather than his original position. 
The next section will consider whether the theory he produces - justice as 
impartiality -  can produce a better conception of duties to refugees.
4. Justice as Impartiality
Barry’s theory of justice as impartiality in many ways resembles Rawls’ 
theory of justice. Indeed, Barry characterises Rawls’ theory as a variant of justice 
as impartiality: it is “the best-known, most influential, and the most fully 
developed variant of justice as impartiality.”266 The main difference between 
Barry’s and Rawls’ early theory lies in the procedure for agreement to terms of 
justice. Rather them representing the impartial or moral perspective through the 
imposition of a veil of ignorance, Barry assumes that the parties to the contract 
are aware of their social and economic status and natural assets. Nonetheless, 
they are able and willing to abstract from these morally arbitrary characteristics 
and choose fair principles. There is no device for making a sharp distinction 
between moral motivation and self-interested rationality: impartial and personal 
perspectives are assumed to coincide in Barry’s conception of reason. Barry 
prefers to conceive of contractors as motivated by the desire for fairness. On this 
account, the impartial perspective is not conceptually or psychologically distinct 
from the interests of contractors. Rather, it is assumed that the contractors have 
an interest in or desire to accept impartial terms.
264 Brian Barry, Theories o f  Justice (op. cit.), p. 331.
265 As Barry writes, it “constitutes an independent version o f  justice as impartiality, and one that 
would if  systematized lead us to the theory proposed by T. M. Scanlon.” See Justice as
Impartiality (op. cit.), pp. 112-3.
266 Barry, Justice as Impartiality (op. cit.), p. 8.
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In terms of its characterisation of individual psychology, Barry’s failure to 
make a clear distinction between egoism and altruism seems at least prima facie 
to be a more accurate portrayal of people’s motivation: reasons for action 
invariably involve a complicated mixture of egoism and altruism, and it is 
difficult in practice to disentangle one from the other. However, at the conceptual 
level it creates a new set of problems for Barry’s account. Not only does his 
theory still rest on an assumed dichotomy between self-interest and impartial 
ethics. Paradoxically, his attempt to deny the dichotomy through the notion of a 
desire for fairness leads to a number of serious practical problems with his 
account. By blurring the conceptual distinction between self-interested and 
ethical motivation in his procedure for selecting principles, he is unable to explain 
impediments to motivating the global application of justice. Moreover by linking 
motivation so tightly to terms of justice, his theory risks being counter­
productive. Where the relevant motivation is not triggered, there will be no terms 
of justice at all.
4.1 The desire for reasonable agreement
Barry argues that people are motivated to agree to his criteria for just rules 
precisely because of their desire for reasonable agreement.267 The concept of 
“reasonable agreement” is the key phrase in this formulation, and needs some 
unpacking. Barry takes this construction from Scanlon’s “contractualist” account 
of morality, according to which the nature of moral wrongness can be stated as 
follows:
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by 
any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour which no one could 
reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.268 
This rather skeletal statement calls for several explanatory remarks. First, the 
agreement must be one that is informed in the sense of not being “based on 
superstition or false belief about the consequences of actions.” Second, it
267As we shall see, the precise formulation is in the negative - i.e. the desire to agree to terms that
no-one could reasonably reject.
268 Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism” (op. cit.), p. 110.
269 Ibid., p. 111.
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should be unforced in order to rule out coercion to agree to terms from a weaker 
bargaining position. And thirdly, the notion of that which can be “reasonably 
rejected” is designed to “exclude rejections that would be unreasonable given the 
aim of finding principles which could be the basis of informed, unforced general
77 0agreement.” A rejection will be reasonable only if it is based on the desire to 
find principles which others similarly motivated could not reasonably reject. It is 
therefore assumed that all parties to the contract are similarly motivated. Scanlon 
prefers the stronger condition “no-one could reject” to “every-one could accept” 
in order to rule out agreements involving substantial levels of self-sacrifice for 
some people. It is possible that some would voluntarily sacrifice their own 
interests in accepting an agreement, on terms that it would be perfectly reasonable 
for them to reject, a possibility that Scanlon wants to avoid.
While acknowledging that Scanlon intends his contractualist construction 
as a conception of the nature of morality, Barry employs it for a narrower 
purpose. He sees the construction as a “device for talking about what is fair, on a
• 771certain fundamentally egalitarian conception of fairness.” Barry does not 
consider the notion of contractualism to be a complete theory of the nature of 
morality, but it is one that captures the notion of fairness which is at the heart of 
his theory of justice. Scanlon’s construction can be seen as a device for agreeing 
to a conception of justice, and Barry argues that the theory chosen will be justice 
as impartiality.
Justice as impartiality certainly appears to be a more plausible candidate 
for grounding duties to refugees than justice as mutual advantage. The notion of 
reasonable agreement ensures that the terms established under the contract are 
not contingent on power or other morally arbitrary characteristics. And since self- 
interest is no longer the sole motivation for compliance, one would expect parties 
to the contract to agree to fair terms for vulnerable groups such as refugees. 
Justice as impartiality does in this sense correspond more closely to what liberals 
would normally consider to be just. But are the assumptions it makes about
210 Ibid., p. 111.
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motivation plausible, and will this conception of motivation be generated by the 
criteria for just rules?
The plausibility of Barry’s theory of motivation will hinge on whether a 
desire for reasonable agreement really does motivate people in the requisite sense, 
or at the very least whether people can be encouraged to develop such a 
motivating desire. Barry holds that the desire for reasonable agreement 
presupposes the existence of “the desire to live in a society whose members all
• • • • • 9 7 9freely accept its rules of justice and its major institutions.” Barry does not 
provide an account of the source of this desire in Justice as Impartiality, or its 
relationship to more narrowly defined self-interest. He apparently takes the 
existence of this type of motivation as an uncontroversial fact of human 
psychology. “I do not think the agreement motive presents a serious problem. 
The desire to be able to justify actions and institutions in terms that are in
979principle acceptable to others is, fortunately, widespread.”
But as with other liberal universalist theories, as soon as one attempts to 
apply his conception to the international sphere, it appears to be completely 
unfeasible. Even assuming that justice as impartiality would be selected as a 
principle for regulating interaction at the domestic level, it seems far-fetched to 
assume that people would be motivated to extend the scope o f this agreement to 
govern interaction with non-nationals. Such extension would mean that refugees 
would have an effective veto on unfair or partial terms governing their rights. 
Refugees would be justified in “reasonably rejecting” terms that did not treat 
them with impartiality, thus implying the duty to extend the same treatment to all 
actual and would-be refugees as that already afforded to current nationals. As I 
have already argued in other cases, such an arrangement would not motivate the 
compliance of the citizens of receiving states. They would be extremely reluctant 
to extend their domestic terms of justice to govern the treatment of non-nationals.
Ibid., p. 113.
272 Barry, Justice as Im partiality {op. cit.), p. 164.
273 Ibid., p. 168.
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The recurrence of this problem of motivation is in one sense not 
surprising: we have encountered similar problems of feasibility in Chapters Two 
and Three. Yet Barry’s theory did initially seem to hold out the prospect of 
addressing the problem of motivation. He claimed that his account - unlike that 
of Rawls - would show why people would be motivated to comply with impartial 
justice. Barry argued that the desire for fairness would guarantee a practical 
commitment to engage in his procedure for selecting rules of justice, and to 
continue to comply with these rules. But his empirical claim that people are 
motivated by the desire for fairness is not justified, at least not as regards the 
extension of justice to non-nationals.
This is a rather worrying problem for Barry’s theory. For the effective 
functioning of his contract presupposes that the parties will be motivated in the 
relevant sense. The existence of the desire for reasonable agreement is 
preconditional for securing agreement to justice as impartiality. So if this 
empirical precondition is not met, his terms of justice will not gain the consent of 
the parties, and justice as impartiality will not apply. The application of the terms 
of justice is contingent on the existence of the correct type of motivation. Perhaps 
Barry is right to assume that the desire for fairness motivates parties at the 
domestic level. But this desire certainly does not extend to agreement at the 
international level. And given this, there is a risk that he will be unable to derive 
any terms of justice whatsoever for the global sphere. If agreement on terms is 
conditional on the existence of a desire for fairness, then parties are unlikely to 
agree to any rules of justice for regulating interaction with non-nationals.
Moreover, there is a second problem with extending motivation to the 
international sphere. The problem of motivation is of course common to all the 
theories of liberal universalism we have discussed so far. But in Barry’s case, the 
difficulty is exacerbated by his failure to distinguish conceptually between moral 
and self-interested motivation. By combining the two elements in the notion of 
the desire for fairness, Barry makes it difficult to locate the impediments to 
motivation at the international level. In other words, there is no way of 
explaining why the desire for fairness is more reliably triggered at the national
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than at the international level. With Rawls’ theory, it was at least possible to 
separate out the self-interested from the ethical component, and attempt to explain 
why self-interest might impede motivation to apply principles internationally. 
But for Barry, the coincidence of self-interest and moral motivation in the desire 
for fairness makes it difficult to explain the limits of moral motivation to extend 
terms of justice to refugees. The desire for fairness does not differentiate between 
the significance of agreement on terms of justice at the domestic and the 
international sphere. It simply assumes that parties to the contract will be 
impartial between the two, an assumption that is clearly empirically incorrect.
Having discussed some of the practical and heuristic problems created by 
Barry's conception of motivation, I would like now to probe what I consider to be 
the source of these problems in his theory: namely, Barry's underlying 
assumptions about reason and desire. For the practical problem of feasibility 
generated at the international level stems ffom a fundamental deficiency of his 
theory that is also common to Rawls' theory of justice. Both are committed to 
what I shall term a “rationalist” theory of motivation. Prima facie, this may 
appear to be a strange claim: after all, Barry talks about a "desire" for fairness, 
implying that moral motivation is based on sentiment rather than reason. But I 
shall argue in the next section that, like Rawls, Barry's theory of motivation can 
only be coherent if it assumes that agents are motivated by reason. Barry and 
Rawls' theories are both implicitly committed to an assumed split between an 
impartial perspective and a personal viewpoint. This split creates problems for 
explaining motivation to comply with terms of international justice. While the 
two theorists attempt to patch up the problems created by this assumed split in 
different ways (Rawls through the veil of ignorance and Barry through blurring 
moral and self-interested motivation), both are fundamentally flawed by their 
implicit attachment to this simplistic conception of moral agency.274
274 It should briefly be noted that this section provides only a brief introduction to the problem o f  
rationalism. The issue is discussed in more depth in Chapter Five.
159
4.2 The source o f the desire for fairness: egoism, sentiment or reason?
What, then, is this underlying theory of motivation that causes problems 
for both Rawls’ and Barry’s accounts? There are three traditional accounts of the 
sources of moral motivation: it could be held to be located in self-interest, 
sentiment, or a more moral conception of rationality. I will briefly consider each 
of the alternatives to see which is compatible with Barry’s theory. The purpose of 
this quick review of theories of motivation is not so much to evaluate the merits 
or weaknesses of each in their own right - this will be one of the subjects of the 
next chapter. Rather, my aim is simply to show why Barry is committed to a 
rationalist theory of motivation.
The first option for Barry is to derive the desire for fairness from self- 
interest. This possibility is clearly ruled out by Barry in his rejection of egoistic 
social contract theories. More specifically, in a discussion of Rawls’ work, Barry 
agrees with what he understands to be the latter’s assumption that there “is an 
independent motive for behaving justly stemming from the recognition of others
*yic
as having legitimate claims to have their interests taken into account.” This 
independent motive is not based on considerations of mutual advantage or 
reciprocity, but would seem to be an altruistic concern, i.e. a concern for the well­
being of others which is not reducible to self-interest or prudence. It should be 
noted that Barry’s rejection of a purely self-interested account of motivation is 
somewhat qualified by an acknowledgement that “the experience of dependence 
on others is an important predisposing factor” in creating the desire for fairness, 
and hence that it is “more likely to come to the fore in conditions of
• • * •  • 9 7  ( \approximately equal power than in conditions of radical inequality.” While 
this notion of predisposing conditions is evocative of Hume’s account of the 
“circumstances of justice”, Barry seems to attribute less weight than does Hume 
to the significance of conditions of dependence or equality in motivating justice. 
His argument seems to be that the desire for fairness exists regardless of these
275 Barry, Theories o f  Justice (op. cit.), p. 324.
276 Ibid., p. 289-90.
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empirical conditions, although it is likely to be stronger where rough equality of 
strength between the parties obtains.
Yet Barry must also forego a sentiment-based account of motivation. As 
Scanlon argues, the type of motivation required for a contract based on reasonable 
agreement cannot be based on sympathy. The utilitarian notion of sympathy is 
unlikely to yield consistent and even-handed treatment of all individuals.277 It can 
motivate us “because of our sympathetic identification with the good of others. 
But as we move from philosophical utilitarianism to a specific utilitarian formula 
as the standard of right action, the form of motivation that utilitarianism appeals
' ) tJ Q
to becomes more abstract.” In other words, motivation generated by 
sympathetic identification does not seem to be triggered by the more abstract 
notion of aggregate well-being. By contrast, the desire for fairness is impartial in 
its choice of objects, and is concerned with justifying action on the basis of what 
would normally be considered as just. Presumably this makes it a better 
candidate for accounting for people’s desire to perform duties to a more abstract 
set of objects, with whom they have no particular identification. It would 
certainly be more effective at motivating people to accept refugees with whom 
they have no particular sympathy or affinity. Assuming that the desire for 
fairness does have motivational force, it would seem to trigger moral motivation
77Qmore systematically than sympathetic identification.
Both the sentiment and the self-interest based theories of motivation 
would seem to yield an overly partial or particularist conception, which would not 
be appropriate for generating compliance with impartial justice. So if the desire 
for fairness is not based on either sympathy or egoism, it must have at its source 
some concept of reason. On this account, Barry’s theory of motivation would be 
more akin to the Kantian variant: reason, rather than sentiment or self-interest, 
motivates us to comply with the requirements of morality. Our commitment to
277
Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism” {op. cit.), p. 115-6.
278 Ibid., p. 115.
279 Scanlon’s argument here reflects a wider problem with combining a sympathy-based account 
o f  motivation with a theory o f  impartial justice. Such a combination o f  empirical assumptions and 
moral theory would commit Barry to extemalism - see the discussion in section one, Chapter Five.
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impartial justice is generated by rational deliberation on the requirements of 
universal morality. I shall discuss the more general problems with the Kantian 
account in Chapter Five. The point I want to make here is that Barry’s theory of 
motivation must embrace some such conception of reason. If morality is defined 
as adopting an impartial perspective, then only a reason-based account of 
motivation will supply the appropriate motivation.
Now a Kantian conception of reason, as we have seen, would produce a 
commitment to the impartial application of terms of justice. This would mean 
that those engaging in practical deliberation on the requirements of justice would 
be motivated by a conception of justice that did not differentiate on the grounds 
of nationality, race, wealth, and so on. And refugees would thus be included in 
the scope of the agreement on terms of justice. If the moral component of 
motivation is guaranteed by impartial reason, then the empirical limitations of 
moral motivation must be explained by self-interest or sentiment. It is these 
partial or particularist considerations that constrain motivation to extend justice to 
non-nationals. This would seem to tally with Barry’s account - indeed this 
characterisation of a conflict between particularist considerations and impartial 
justice seems to explain why the desire for fairness is not so reliably triggered at 
the international level.
But this unfortunately takes us back to the problem with the Rawlsian 
account. In the discussion of Rawls, we saw that the application of justice as 
fairness was contingent on continued commitment to terms agreed behind a veil 
of ignorance. Rawls’ separation of self-interested rationality on the one hand, and 
an externally imposed veil of ignorance on the other, made it difficult to 
understand why people would comply with terms once the veil of ignorance was 
lifted. Barry’s theory aimed to overcome the problems caused by this division of 
self-interest and impartiality, combining the two in a description of the desire for 
fairness. But once we unpack Barry’s notion of the desire for fairness, we 
encounter exactly the same problem. Justice is motivated by impartial reason, 
and as such should not differentiate between national and non-national subjects of 
justice. But this form of moral motivation is constrained by particularist
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considerations - be they egoistic, or related to sympathetic identification with a 
particular group of people. And this produces a division between the personal 
perspective and the requirements of impartial justice. This split is along precisely 
the same lines as the division between the veil of ignorance conception of 
impartiality and the self-interested rationality of the parties that we found in 
Rawls.
To make matters worse for Barry, his attempt to plaster over this split gets 
him into a fresh set of difficulties. As I suggested in 4.1, his notion of the desire 
for fairness simply obscures the division, exacerbating the problem of explaining 
limited motivation. By presenting a conception of motivation that merges 
egoistic and moral reasons for action, it is difficult to pinpoint the impediments to 
extending motivation to non-nationals. And this explanatory weakness in turn 
makes it more difficult to find ways of encouraging motivation to expand the 
scope of justice.
In addition this practical problem of pin-pointing impediments to 
encouraging motivation, as we have seen, there is a structural problem with 
Barry’s theory of motivation. By combining self-interest and altruism in the 
single concept of the desire for fairness, he creates a rather brittle theory of 
motivation, which cannot allow for the legitimacy of or even evaluation of 
compromise or “second best” options. It has been argued that once the desire for 
fairness is triggered, it is more systematic than more emotional sources of 
motivation, notably feelings of sympathy. This was described by Scanlon as a 
virtue, as motivation is thus not dependent on unreliable and morally arbitrary 
identification with particular people or situations. Yet the quality of being 
systematic works the other way: if the desire for fairness is not triggered in its 
pure form, there is no nuanced or weaker version of the desire which will 
motivate people to accept second best terms. While terms of justice may be 
more or less fair, and their scope may cover a smaller or greater range of people, 
the desire for fairness does not recognise the significance of these differences.
280 Examples o f  “second best” approaches in refugee policy are given in Chapter One, in the 
discussion o f  new approaches to refugee protection. See section 2.4.
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Where the desire for fairness is triggered, rules of justice will apply impartially to 
all people, regardless of nationality. Where it is not, justice will not apply at all. 
Barry’s framework seems to rule out non-systematic or less than full-scale 
principles of justice. Justice must be full-fledged impartiality, embodied in the 
condition of reasonable rejectability, or it is not justice.
Both Barry and Rawls face problems generated by the assumed split 
between personal and impartial perspectives. This makes it difficult to explain 
motivation to extend justice to non-nationals. Hence these morally driven social 
contract theories fail to address the problem of motivation. Indeed, in tying 
agreement so closely to justice, through the notion of consent, they are left with a 
rather stark choice as exemplified in the different interpretations of Rawls: either 
a Hobbesian account in which justice is based on egoistic motivation and is 
limited to the domestic level; or a Kantian account in which justice is global in 
scope, but does not generate motivation. In the latter case, we are back to the 
problem of the feasibility of liberal universalist theories. But we also have an 
additional problem, generated by the close link between justice and consent. If 
the relevant motivation is not forthcoming, then the contract cannot function. 
This problem, as we saw, was especially acute in the case of Barry’s theory. 
Since on his account justice is so closely tied to a certain kind of motivation, once 
this motivation fails to be triggered, justice as impartiality simply will not apply.
One way of understanding this problem of motivation is by considering 
the role of the procedure in social contract theory. Contractarianism derives a 
procedure for selecting terms of justice from some background conception of 
fairness or impartiality. It then puts forward this procedure as a stand-alone, self- 
justifying device for testing the fairness of rules of justice. Thus Rawls justifies 
his terms of justice by the fact that they would be agreed from the original 
position, and Barry justifies his norms by virtue of the fact that they are not 
reasonably rejectable. But these procedures are detached from any richer ethical 
justification, for example an account of why contractors would value justice or 
fairness. And this detachment of the procedure from a background justification 
places an excessive emphasis on procedure, creating problems when the
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procedure fails to function. If people are not motivated to adopt an impartial 
perspective, then the ideal rules of impartial global justice will fail to be 
generated. And the stand-alone contract has no mechanism for defining 
alternative terms of justice that achieve partial or second best distributions. The 
impartial perspective is an ideal conception of moral agency abstracted from the 
very values and goods from which it was derived.
As a concluding thought, we should consider why social contract theories 
seemed to offer such good prospects for addressing the problem o f motivation in 
the first place. Their reputation for generating compliance with terms of justice 
was earned through their apparent success in the domestic sphere. For at this 
level, there is likely to be a far greater coincidence between the need for stability, 
and the moral goal of ensuring impartial justice. Social contract theory for the 
domestic sphere seems to solve both the problem of conflict, and to ensure fair 
principles. But the apparent facility for addressing both of these problems did not 
extend beyond the national level. The overlap between the need for stability and 
the goal of securing individual justice seemed to break down when it came to 
questions of global justice. The confidence social contract theorists seem to have 
in the coincidence between these two functions leads many of them to tie 
motivation to justice in a rigid way. The epitome of this tendency can be found in 
the work of Barry, and his notion of the desire for fairness. These high 
expectations are not fulfilled at the global sphere, and the rigidity of the link 
between the two makes it impossible to effect a partial retreat from the relevant 
terms of justice. There is no scope for ratcheting down the requirements of 
impartial justice, short of rejecting them wholescale.
5. The Limits of Liberal Universalism
The critique of social contract theories presented in this chapter should 
now be considered in conjunction with the discussion of right-based theories in 
chapters Two and Three. For by now our broader critique of liberal universalist
281 This argument draws on Charles Taylor's critique o f contractarianism, discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Seven.
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theories should be taking a more coherent form, and we need to start extracting 
the common elements.
The main weakness of liberal universalism examined in Chapter Three, it 
should be recalled, related to its inability to incorporate a commitment to the 
significance of particularist ties and values. The concern to include such values 
was triggered by the practical problem of motivation as defined in Chapter
' jQ'y
Two. But this concern could not be addressed by theories of thin universalism: 
these theories either encountered the same problem of motivation (in the case of 
basic rights theories), or were based on untenable mixtures of universalist and 
particularist grounds. Such mixed premises produced both theoretical 
incoherence and practical confusion. The failure of thin universalism to produce 
a conception of duties to refugees that was both internally coherent and 
practically feasible left us with three options. We could consider changing either 
the content of the ethical theory; or our account of motivation; or the foundations 
of the theory.
On the first possibility, Chapter Three already represented an attempt to 
change the content of the theory, examining theories that tried to ratchet down the 
demands of liberal universalism. None of these theories succeeded in redefining 
the demands of morality in a way that was practically feasible and internally 
coherent. Yet any further modification of the content of liberal universalist 
theory would be highly problematic. Given the thesis’ goal of finding a 
normatively adequate conception of duties to refugees, we need to retain a 
substantive commitment to universal rights. We saw in Chapter Two that a 
conception of individuals as free and equal was the best way of grounding that 
commitment. So while it is recognised that this commitment to a liberal 
universalist conception generates unfeasible requirements, a rejection of this 
substantive conception would imply abandoning the normative criterion, as set 
out in the Introduction.
282 And also by the recognition o f  cultural pluralism - although this second factor is not as 
important as the motivation question, given our central concern with extending duties to refugees.
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The second option was to search for an alternative account of motivation, 
which would generate compliance with these substantive liberal universalist 
duties. If the problem of motivation were solved in this way, then there would be 
no need to modify the substantive content of universalist ethics. The possibility 
of revising the account of motivation whilst retaining a commitment to liberal 
universalism was considered in this chapter. Social contract theories represented 
an attempt to show how people would be motivated to comply with terms of 
justice. But linking motivation to justice in this way led to two possible 
outcomes, both of which were problematic: either people were motivated to 
comply with morally deficient terms of justice; or the terms were more ethically 
palatable but failed to motivate compliance for the international sphere. Social 
contract theories held out the promise of ensuring motivation to respect the 
demands of liberal universalism. In order to achieve this coincidence of ethics 
and motivation, they structured their theories so that the procedure for deriving 
terms of justice presupposed willingness to comply. Paradoxically, this tight 
relationship between justice and motivation meant that once the relevant 
motivation was not forthcoming, the procedure would break down and it would 
be impossible to derive any terms of justice at all.
Before going on to consider the third possible route for finding an 
adequate conception of duties to refugees, it is worth drawing out the common 
theme that unites the criticisms of liberal universalism in Three and Four. In 
Chapter Three, I reached the conclusion that liberal universalism could not 
incorporate a commitment to particularism; in this chapter is was argued that it 
could not provide an adequate account of why people should be motivated to 
respect the terms of impartial justice. But the discussion has done more than 
simply produce a list of separate flaws in these accounts. The strand running 
through the critique is the set of problems flowing from the assumed dichotomy 
between personal and impartial perspectives. I suggested in Chapter Three that 
the reason why particularist and universalist values could not be coherently 
combined related to their very different assumptions about moral agency and the 
source of moral beliefs. Liberal universalism assumes that the moral agent must 
adopt an impartial perspective, abstracting from her particular values and
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interests. If one is committed to this conception of two separate perspectives, it 
will not be possible for particularist considerations to legitimately over-ride 
impartial ones - at least not for questions of basic or core rights. The two must be 
characterised as in conflict with one another.
The accounts of motivation discussed in this chapter likewise seem to 
suffer from their commitment to the personal-impartial divide. The morally 
driven social contract theories simply fail to explain why the individual would be 
motivated to comply with the global application of rules of justice as impartiality 
or fairness. And this is linked again to a separation of the requirements of an 
impartial perspective and the personal sphere. In Rawls’ theory, the gap between 
the two was clearly evident: motivation was kept separate from moral duty 
through the procedural division between the rationality of the parties and the veil 
of ignorance. Barry merged the two in his procedure, but retained a conception of 
impartial moral agency. The difference was that he assumed that people simply 
would be motivated to respect the requirements of impartial morality. But this 
empirical claim was unfounded, and merely served to beg the question of how to 
explain why people were less motivated to extend duties to non-nationals.
So the common strand in the critique revolves around a faulty conception 
of moral agency. And this brings us to the third possible option for providing an 
adequate conception of duties to refugees: challenging the foundations of liberal 
universalism. The discussion thus far seems to suggest that the best way of 
overcoming the problems of liberal universalist accounts would be to challenge 
the assumed dichotomy between the personal and impartial perspectives. This 
will require unpacking in more detail the assumptions about moral agency and 
motivation that underlie these theories. More specifically, we must examine 
assumptions about the role of impartial reason in defining and motivating 
morality, and how this conception of reason is related to the personal or particular 
perspective. These issues are dealt with in the next chapter.
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PART II
CONSTRUCTING A 
NON-RATIONALIST ACCOUNT
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Chapter Five 
The Role of  Reason in Moral Motivation
The critique of liberal universalist theories developed in the last three 
chapters has focused on the failure of these theories to meet the three criteria for 
an adequate account of duties to non-nationals. None of the theories discussed 
can offer a normatively desirable first order account, that is both practically 
feasible and internally coherent. After outlining the problem of practical 
feasibility encountered by pure liberal universalism, the discussion examined 
whether this problem could be addressed by altering the content of liberal theory, 
or changing its account of motivation. As I argued at the end of the last chapter, 
neither of these tactics worked, and it is necessary to turn to the third, more 
radical route. This will involve challenging the liberal universalist account of the 
sources of moral norms and moral motivation. In particular, I will challenge the 
notion of a dichotomy between an impartial perspective, in which the moral agent 
is motivated by reason; and a personal perspective, which comprises the person’s 
partial interests, ties and particular characteristics.
This chapter pursues such a critique of the dichotomy model by 
challenging liberal universalist assumptions about the role of reason in defining 
and motivating moral action. The chapter will argue that the failure of these 
theories to provide an adequate theory of motivation can be traced to the 
importance they attach to reason in both motivation and in defining morality. By 
exaggerating the role of reason in motivation, they fail to provide a plausible 
account of moral agency, and to account for the significance of particular ties. 
And by inflating the role of reason in defining morality, they fail to account for 
the diversity of moral norms in different cultures, and the influence of 
intersubjective values and beliefs on conceptions of justice. The non-rationalist 
account outlined in this chapter will be far better placed to explain the 
significance of personal characteristics and ties in motivating moral action, and 
the role of intersubjective values in defining the moral perspective.
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The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first two sections 
address the question of moral motivation. Section one will examine the rationalist 
account of motivation. It will question the plausibility of this theory, and show 
how different rationalist theories attempt to overcome the problem. Section two 
considers problems with the traditional Humean alternative to rationalism, 
concluding with a defence of a theory of the interdependence of reason and desire 
in motivating action. Section three moves on to the related question of the role of 
reason in defining morality. It argues that moral norms cannot be derived from 
reason alone. What is required in addition is either an assumption about the 
circumstances of justice and prudential reasons to enter some arrangement of 
mutual benefit; or a substantive commitment to some conception of equal or just 
distribution, which is not derivable solely from reason. In conclusion, section 
three suggests an alternative account of the role of reason in motivation and 
morality, according a more modest but nonetheless significant status to reason. 
This alternative account will be developed in more detail in Chapter Six.
It should be noted that parts of the discussion of rationalist theories will 
cover similar ground to the themes dealt with in Chapter Four, in particular in the 
discussion of some of the problems with neo-Kantian social contract theories. 
However, the critique in this chapter is on a second order level, unlike the 
predominantly first order discussion of Chapter Four, and will employ rather 
different arguments. The challenge to liberal univeralism in this chapter is not 
drawn directly from a critique based on the criteria of coherence, normative 
desirability and practical feasibility. These criteria still comprise the necessary 
conditions for an adequate conception of duties to refugees. But we have found 
that liberal universalist theories cannot meet these criteria whilst retaining the 
assumptions about moral agency outlined at the end of the last chapter. So it is 
now necessary to challenge these second order assumptions - to fundamentally 
revise liberal theories of moral motivation and moral agency - in order to 
construct an account that can meet the three criteria. So this chapter will criticise 
liberal universalism at a more philosophical level. On the basis of this critique I 
shall proceed to construct an alternative account of moral agency, from which I
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can then derive a conception of duties to refugees that meets the three criteria for 
an adequate account.
1. Reason and Moral Motivation in Kantian Thought
Before proceeding with the critique of liberal universalist assumptions 
about the role of reason in moral motivation, 1.1 will briefly define some of the 
terms used in this Chapter. By way of introducing the problem, it will then set 
out some general concerns about the rationalist theory of motivation. 1.2 will 
elaborate the problem with rationalism through a brief discussion of Kant’s moral 
theory. And in 1.3 I will show how the problem of motivation persists in 
contemporary Kantian theories. I shall argue that the weakness of social contract 
accounts of motivation can be traced to problematic assumptions about the role of 
reason in moral motivation. The section concludes by arguing that these 
criticisms strongly suggest that we should reject the rationalist theory of 
motivation.
1.1 Rationalism: some initial doubts
The main target of criticism in this chapter is a group of theories that will
be labelled “rationalist”. On the definition used in this thesis, a rationalist theory
• ,)0 ')
is one that accords a central role to reason in motivating moral action. Such 
theories are usually contrasted with theories of motivation that accord a central 
role to feeling or sentiment.284 In this context, “reason” will denote the activity of 
reasoning - i.e. the exercise of logical or cognitive categories and rules to
283 Rationalism in ethical theory has also often been used to denote the claim that there can be a 
priori intuitions o f  moral truths, which are derived ftom reason (rather than from experience, or 
sentiment). However, I would like to employ the narrower definition o f  rationalism as referring to 
a certain sort o f  theory o f  motivation. This is so I can distinguish between rationalist theories o f  
motivation, and the claim that morality is derived from reason - a theory that 1 term cognitivism.
284 The question as to whether morality is motivated by reason or sentiment is usually framed 
around the rival accounts offered by Hume and Kant, both o f  which will be discussed in the course 
o f  the chapter.
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deliberate from premises to conclusions. And practical reason will refer to
• • n o rrational deliberation from premises to conclusions about what one should do.
Rationalism in this sense should be carefully distinguished from 
cognitivism - the claim that moral judgements have universal validity. 
Admittedly, those committed to a rationalist theory of motivation are in most 
cases also committed to cognitivism. For rationalists, the capacity for reason is 
usually said to be an attribute of all individuals, and all mentally sound persons 
are at least potentially capable of being motivated by the requirements of 
morality. And if it is the universal faculty of reason that enables us to act in 
accordance with the requirements of reason, then it follows that moral obligation 
is binding on all rational agents. Hence accepting a rationalist theory of 
motivation implies a commitment to cognitivism.287
But although rationalists must be cognitivists, it is important to stress that 
cognitivists are not necessarily rationalists. Indeed, the reason for clarifying the 
distinction between rationalism and cognitivism is that a cognitivist may not be 
committed to a rationalist theory of motivation. She may be committed to the 
view that some moral judgements are universally valid, but hold that the agent is 
motivated to respect the requirements of morality through sentiment or egoism or 
fear of divine retribution. In other words, the motivation to comply with 
universally valid norms derives from a separate characteristic in the individual, 
unrelated to the source of moral norms. In this case, the existence of a motivation 
to comply with moral norms would be contingent on the existence of the relevant 
desire or interest in the individual. And there would be no guarantee that the 
individual would be motivated by recognising the validity of moral norms. The
285 I shall not commit m yself to a conception o f  reason as any particular set o f  a priori categories - 
this is not required in the context o f  a critique o f  rationalist theories o f  motivation, in which the 
target o f  criticism is the role attributed to reason as an activity, rather than the categories o f  which
it is comprised.
286 See G. E. M. Anscombe, "On Practical Reasoning", in Practical Reasoning, ed. Joseph Raz
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 33.
287 See, for example, Harold I. Brown on the close tie between rationalism and universalism. 
Brown, Rationality (London and N ew  York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 5-14.
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non-rationalist cognitivist is therefore committed to extemalism. These 
categories may seem somewhat pedantic, but they will emerge as important 
distinctions in the discussion that follows. So having clarified the categories, let 
us now consider the claims of rationalist theories of motivation.
According to the rationalist view, it is reason (rather than desire) that 
moves us to act in accordance with the requirements of morality. Moral 
motivation is not dependent on the presence of interest or desire, but is 
guaranteed by the agent’s rationality and her beliefs about the requirements of 
morality. The motivation to act in accordance with the requirements of morality
•y o n
“comes from the requirements themselves.” According to Thomas Nagel, the 
agent is motivated precisely because she recognises that this is the morally correct 
action. Motivation is not contingent on any independent component of human 
nature, such as a Hobbesian fear of death, or sympathy, as in the case of Hume. It 
is the moral nature of the requirements that motivates, rather than the existence of 
other conditions or dispositions.290 In this sense, the rationalist account is 
internalist: a moral conviction and appropriate beliefs about the world provide 
sufficient reasons for action. As we saw, the rationalist account is also 
cognitivist, in that at least some moral convictions are universally valid 
judgements.291
We have already seen how this emphasis on reason is a central feature of 
theories of impartial justice. According to these accounts, the moral agent is
288 On a classic account o f  extemalism and the problems associated with the position, see William  
K. Frankena, “Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy”, in Essays in M oral 
Philosophy, ed. A. I. Meldin (Seattle: University o f  Washington Press, 1958), pp. 40-81); and 
Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons”, in his M oral Luck: Philosophical Papers 
1973-1980  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 101-13. For a more recent 
critique o f  extemalism, see Thomas E. Wren, “The Possibility o f  Convergence between Moral 
Psychology and Metaethics”, in The M oral Domain: Essays on the Ongoing Discussion between  
Philosophy and the Social Sciences (Cambridge Mass, MIT Press, 1990), pp. 15-37. Thomas 
Nagel also discuss the problem o f  extemalism in his The Possibility o f  Altruism  Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 7-9.
289 Nagel, The Possibility o f  Altruism (op. cit.), p. 12.
290 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
291 The distinction between these categories is not crucial to the argument, but may be useful for 
locating these theories in contemporary moral philosophy debates. For a clear introduction to 
these debates, see McNaughton, M oral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1988), pp. 46-50 and 106-17.
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abstracted from her particular situation and characteristics and is moved by 
reason, rather than personal desires or attachments. Whether this form of 
abstraction involves subjecting one’s maxims to the test of universalisability, 
deliberating behind a veil of ignorance, or considering which norms would be the 
object of reasonable agreement, the rationalist account claims that the agent is 
moved to respect the requirements of morality through reason. Rational 
deliberation on the requirements of morality is sufficient to motivate the agent, so 
motivation is possible without any additional sentiment or self-interest. What is 
being claimed by the rationalist, then, is that reason alone can provide the agent 
with reasons for respecting the requirements of morality. The agent is motivated 
to act morally simply by exercising certain cognitive capacities, specifically by 
engaging in practical reasoning about what action she ought to take.
It should be emphasised that on this account, the role of reason is not 
simply instrumental to realising pre-given desires (for example, personal interests 
or goals). For if reason were simply a device for working out how to achieve 
certain given ends, then it could not claim motivating force. In this case, it would 
be the original desires, rather than reason, that motivated action. And it is 
precisely this point that critics of rationalism find implausible. Anscombe, for 
example, argues that practical reasoning simply involves reasoning from a given 
premise or set of premises to conclusions about what one should do. It is the 
general moral premises from which one reasons that contain the conception of 
moral duty. While it is possible that an agent could employ reason to deliberate 
from general moral premises to a conclusion about what moral action to take, she 
will only be motivated to engage in this type of reasoning if she has already 
accepted the moral premise in question. And as Anscombe writes, “it is clear that 
such general premises will only occur as premisses of practical reasoning in 
people who want to do their duty.”292 A similar point is made by Williams when 
he argues that rational deliberation cannot motivate us to perform a moral duty, 
unless we are already motivated to engage in this form of deliberation and to 
accept the conclusions it may yield. In other words, we must be committed to the
292 Anscombe, “On Practical Reasoning” {op. c/7.), p. 45.
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value of this type of deliberation in order to be motivated by its conclusions. A 
reliance on practical reason as a source of motivation merely begs the question of 
what motivates us to engage in practical reasoning in the first place.
This point can be elaborated through considering Nagel’s account of 
moral agency. He argues that adopting a moral perspective involves abstracting 
from and thus (temporarily) abandoning the personal point of view. While 
Nagel holds that the agent does this out of respect for reason alone, the agent can 
surely only be motivated to abandon her personal perspective for reasons present 
to her in the personal perspective. But if this is the case, then it is not abstract 
reason alone that motivates action in accordance with the requirements of 
impartial ethics. Rather, we are motivated to adopt an impartial perspective by a 
reason or set of reasons already present in our personal perspective. The problem 
arises because the exercise of reason requires abstracting from certain personal 
characteristics or ties. If reason alone can motivate the individual to engage in 
this form of abstraction, then it is difficult to see how the person will initially be 
motivated to obey the dictates of reason. The switch from personal to impartial 
perspective requires the exercise of reason, yet this exercise of reason is not 
possible unless one has already adopted this viewpoint. Adopting the impartial 
perspective would appear to be both the precondition and the outcome of the 
exercise of reason.
What this suggests is that the rationalist account of motivation cannot be 
established merely by pointing to the role of reason in practical deliberation. The 
rationalist will have to show how reason can actually motivate us to accept the 
relevant premises of moral argument. In other words, if practical reason is 
understood as the use of logical rules to deliberate from premises to conclusions 
about what one ought to do, then moral motivation depends on one or both of the 
following conditions. First, as Anscombe suggests, it depends on the agent being 
motivated to accept the general moral premises from which she then reasons to
293
For his discussion o f  abstraction and moral motivation, see Thomas Nagel, The Possibility o f  
Altruism {op. cit.), pp. 99-115; and his Equality and Partiality  (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), pp. 10-20.
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practical conclusions. And second, it depends on the agent being motivated to 
commit herself to accepting the practical conclusions of a process of deliberation 
from these premises. It should be stressed that the question here is not so much 
that of how rational deliberation determines what we should do in the sense of 
laying down moral rules (although this question is clearly linked). Rather, the 
emphasis in this section is on how such deliberation can provide us with reasons 
to respect the requirements of morality. In short, it concerns the relationship 
between reason, morality and the will.
1.2 Kant and the problem o f moral motivation
Rationalist theories of motivation need to overcome this sort of criticism 
by showing how reason can influence the agent’s will. There have been a number 
of attempts to provide some form of rational link between reason and moral 
agency, although none of them ultimately succeed. A good route for 
understanding these accounts is through considering the problems faced by Kant’s 
theory of motivation, and subsequent attempts of neo-Kantians to overcome this 
problem. The intention here is not so much to provide a complete account of 
Kant’s moral theory, which would require a far more detailed treatment of his 
concepts of reason. Rather, it is useful to sketch the problem of motivation in 
Kant insofar as it can help shed light on the problems faced by contemporary 
rationalist accounts. It will also provide a good basis for categorising such 
theories, according to how they attempt to address this problem of motivation.294
Kant asserts that the will can become moral or a “good will” through the 
exercise of reason. Pure reason can exert influence over the will through 
qualifying its subjective rules of action or maxims. It is through subjecting these
294 The discussion that follows draws partly on critiques provided by Rudiger Bubner and 
Albrecht Wellmer, although it differs from these discussions in its exclusive focus on the role o f  
reason in motivation  (these accounts discuss this question along with the related issues o f  the role 
o f  reason in defining morality). See Rudiger Bubner, "The Possibilities o f  Practical Reason", in 
Essays in Hermeneutics and Critical Theory, ed. Rudiger Bubner, trans. Eric Matthews (New  
York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 147-94); and Albrecht Wellmer, "Ethics and 
Dialogue: Elements o f  Moral Judgement in Kant and Discourse Ethics, in The Persistence o f  
Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmodernism , ed. Albrecht Wellmer, trans. David 
Midgley (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 113-231.
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maxims to the directives of reason that the agent’s will becomes good. The 
device through which subjective maxims are qualified by reason is the 
Categorical Imperative, which sorts through existing maxims to select those 
which are universalisable. The Categorical Imperative commands us to “Act 
only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should
7Q f \become a universal law.” Or in its negative formulation, the requirement is 
that “I ought never to act except in such a way that I  can also will that my maxim
7 0 7  . . , ,should become a universal law ” This formula provides a process of selection 
or test to establish which subjective rules of action quality as moral. The good 
will comprises that which is left over from the will once all non-universalisable 
maxims have been discarded as rules for action.
Leaving aside the difficulties raised by the Categorical Imperative as a 
device for testing maxims, Kant’s account faces a serious problem explaining 
how reason can transfer its influence to the will. In Kant’s system, the reason 
shaping the will must be pure, in the sense of being untainted by the contingent
7 Q O
and particularist considerations of the empirical world. Pure reason belongs to 
the intelligible or noumenal world, and must be unconstrained by the phenomenal 
world if it is to be immune from the influence of partial and changing interests. 
By contrast, the practical reason normally exercised by the agent in the empirical 
world is influenced by such particularist considerations. The challenge is to show 
how this practical reason can be influenced by pure reason - to construct a bridge 
between the intelligible and phenomenal worlds, in order that practical reason 
may become moral.
The connection between pure and practical reason is established through 
Kant’s notion of free action. Free action denotes a series of empirical events 
whose cause is not empirically conditioned, but free. It is through such free
295
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork o f  the M etaphysic o f  M orals [1785], ed. and trans. Herbert 
James Paton as The M oral Law  (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 68.
296 Ibid., p. 84.
297
Ibid., p. 67. The different versions o f  the statement have been the subject o f  much debate - see, 
for example, Herbert James Paton’s The Categorical Im perative (pp. 157-64); and Wellmer, 
“Ethics and Dialogue” {op. cit.), pp. 121-44.
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action that the purity of reason in the noumenal realm is supposedly transferred to 
the realm of practical action. So pure practical reason - practical reason 
unconstrained by partial and contingent factors - is only possible if we assume the 
possibility of unconditioned causality. In the absence of such a concept of 
freedom, the will could not be rendered good.
But this still begs the question of how the agent is motivated to apply pure 
reason to the practical sphere. Such motivation must be generated in the 
phenomenal world, if it is to influence the action of actual wills. Yet on Kant’s 
account, the phenomenal self is subject to partial and changing interest, so the 
motive to subject one’s maxims to the test of the Categorical Imperative would 
not be pure in the desired sense. It must be the empirical will that decides to 
undergo the influence of pure reason, for otherwise pure reason could have no 
influence on conduct. But this presupposes the existence of an empirical 
disposition to be motivated to respect the requirements of the Categorical 
Imperative, a disposition which is in some sense prior to the influence of pure 
reason.299 Kant would reject this, claiming that pure reason must be capable of 
motivating the agent, without any pre-existing desire of the will to be so 
motivated. He retains a separation between the motivational constitution of the 
empirical will, and the structure of morality, but claims that the latter may 
nonetheless shape the former. And in so doing, his account of pure practical 
reason remains somewhat obscure. Kant argues that we must simply presuppose 
the possibility of the freedom required to render practical reason pure.300 But he 
gives no cogent justification as to why we should presuppose any such thing.
The question of how practical reason becomes pure is in fact a version of 
the problem encountered in the critique of rationalism in the previous section 1.1. 
If reason is to be attributed motivational force, then there must be some account 
of how reason can influence the will. Yet the will can only accept such influence 
if it is already motivated in the relevant sense. Kant’s attempt to overcome this
298 Kant, Groundwork (op. cit.), p. 88.
299 If this disposition is contingent (for example, if  it depends on the existence o f  a separate 
interest or desire) then the account would be externalist.
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circularity through the notion of free action is obscure at best, and simply fails to 
provide a plausible account of motivation.
1.3 Neo-Kantian acco unts
Before turning to non-rationalist accounts, it is useful to consider how 
some contemporary neo-Kantians have attempted to address the problem. This 
will also provide an opportunity to review the critique of social contract theories 
in Chapter Four, from the point of view of the current critique of rationalism. 
Have any theorists managed to bridge this gap between empirical will and moral 
obligation through the notion of motivating reason - in other words, been able to 
provide a tenable rationalist account? The different responses offered to this 
problem can be categorised along the lines established in Chapter Four to 
distinguish between different theories of justice. The various accounts of the 
relationship between personal and impartial perspectives discussed in that chapter 
are parallel to the account of the relationship between moral obligation and the 
will.
We should start by recalling how Hobbes derived moral duty from an 
egoistic conception of the will. On this account, there is no gap between 
reason, the will, and the requirements of morality. Reason is understood as 
prudential rationalist - as instrumental to maximising self-interest - and moral 
duty requires no more than the rational pursuit of these egoistic ends. The gap 
between will and morality is closed, but at the price of accepting a morally 
deficient theory of justice as mutual advantage.
A similar conception of rationality is adopted by Rawls, who also equates 
prudential reason with the individual will. Yet Rawls is not content with a theory 
of justice as mutual advantage, preferring a more Kantian, impartial conception of 
justice as fairness. Since prudential reason alone will not yield the appropriate
300 Kant, Groundwork {op. cit.), p. 89
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terms of justice, Rawls is obliged to introduce an external filter for sieving out 
morally unacceptable considerations from the choice of rules of justice. The veil 
o f ignorance serves as a replacement for the Categorical Imperative, ruling out 
considerations that are partial and particularist. The individual’s will is therefore 
constrained by a test of impartiality in the original position. Yet as Barry points 
out, the original position is entirely divorced from the actual motivation of the 
parties, understood as prudential rationality. This is why the real test of Rawls’ 
agreement seems to be whether the terms of justice can withstand the “strains of 
commitment” - the motivation to cooperate with terms once the veil of ignorance 
is lifted. In essence, Rawls’ account exacerbates the problem faced by Kant, 
through widening the gap between the will and the requirements of morality. His 
concept of reason fails to provide any sort of bridge between the egoistic will and 
the perspective from the veil of ignorance, since it is simply instrumental to 
realising self-interest.
Now as we saw in Chapter Four, the Rawlsian account is able to close the 
gap between the will and morality - at least in Rawls' later work - by abandoning 
its cognitivist claims. Since reason cannot lead the will to respect morality, then 
the individual’s will must be conditioned to be moral through some other means. 
Rawls establishes an empirical link between the will and the requirements of 
morality, through showing how both will and morality are shaped by the same 
social matrix. Commitment to moral norms is acquired through a particular 
social context and this same environment also shapes the individual’s will. The 
veil of ignorance therefore loses its status as the embodiment of universalist 
impartiality, and becomes a device for representing the values of particular 
cultures - liberal democratic societies. In the later Rawls, then, morality 
influences the will not through reason, but through a particular process of 
socialisation. Motivation to respect the requirements of morality is not generated 
solely by the exercise of reason, but through some non-rationalist account of a 
will shaped by shared values.
301 Needless to say, Hobbes cannot by classified as a Kantian - but it is useful to recall his 
conception o f  justice and motivation, as it has been used as a component o f  some neo-Kantian 
accounts.
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A rather different neo-Kantian account of the relationship between will 
and morality is offered by Barry. Barry appears to retain a more theoretical 
conception of reason i.e. one that denotes the employment of cognitive capacities 
to deliberate from premises to conclusions, rather than a prudential conception of 
reason as an instrument for maximising self-interest. Yet Barry, as we saw, fails 
to acknowledge any gap between the requirements of morality and actual will. 
Reason is employed by the agent to deliberate on terms of justice in order to find 
rules that could not be reasonably rejected by anyone. Both the agent reflecting 
on these terms, and the subjects who are being considered as potential rejecters of 
the terms, are assumed to be motivated by a desire for fairness. And this desire 
corresponds exactly to both existing will, and the requirements of morality. In 
other words, there is a perfect coincidence of will and morality, achieved through 
the exercise of reason. But this coincidence is not achieved through pure reason 
influencing the will, as in Kant’s account. Rather, it seems to be the case that the 
existing will as it stands is motivated to accept the requirements of reason. There 
is no gap between morality and the will because people do actually want to be 
moral. This account, it was argued in Chapter Four, is open to the objection of 
empirical implausibility. It is simply not true that people are motivated in this 
way, at least not for questions of duties to non-nationals.
A third neo-Kantian solution is to abandon the requirements of a link 
between the will and some specified conception of moral duty, as in the case of 
discourse ethics. These theories do not specify the content of moral duty, but 
only the procedure for deriving norms. They also claim that this procedure is not 
based on particular conceptions of morality, but is built into the structure of 
language. Discourse ethics thus denies any commitment to first order moral 
values. On this account, moral rules are not philosophically grounded but are the 
outcome of agreement through rational dialogue aimed at achieving consensus. 
The terms of this dialogue replace Kant’s Categorical Imperative, and supposedly 
also the commitment to a particular first order conception of justice as 
impartiality.
302 This route has been best developed by Jurgen Habermas, whose theory o f  discourse ethics will 
be discussed later in the chapter.
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Now discourse ethics is of course only relevant to this discussion if it can 
be classified as a liberal universalist theory, and more specifically if  it can 
guarantee a commitment to some conception of duties to refugees. The answer to 
this question is complex, and I can only touch on it here. Put in the briefest 
terms, if discourse ethics is liberal universalist in the relevant sense, then it will 
face the same Kantian problem of a gap between will and the requirements of 
universalist moral duty. For on this reading, the procedure will necessarily 
generate agreement on a universally valid conception of duties to refugees, and 
thus create a problem of motivation. On the other hand, if it is not a liberal 
universalist theory - and its procedure does not guarantee agreement on duties to 
refugees - then the problem of motivation and the relationship between morality 
and the will does not arise, since there is no prescribed conception of moral 
duties. But in this case, discourse ethics should be considered as irrelevant to the 
discussion. For it would not guarantee that the outcome of dialogue in a 
particular community will produce our desired first order conception of duties 
beyond borders.303 In short, either discourse ethics is a purely formal procedure, 
immune from substantive moral commitments, and therefore does not count as a 
cognitivist theory; or it is a moral theory facing the same set of problems 
encountered by Kantian accounts. This issue will be tackled in section three on 
cognitivist theories.
In summary, the rationalist accounts considered fail to bridge the gap 
between will and morality in a convincing way. Reason in both its prudential and 
its theoretical sense is ill-equipped to motivate the will to respect the 
requirements of morality. We shall now turn to Humean theories and the “belief- 
desire” theory of motivation to see if it provides a more satisfactory account.
303 Such a conception may well be the likely conclusion o f  a discourse on these matters in liberal 
democracies. But the outcome would be contingent on the participants being from a liberal 
society, and hence the outcome would not be guaranteed by the dialogue p e r  se, but because o f  the 
beliefs o f  people from this particular liberal culture. And if  the theory accepts that the outcome is 
contingent in this sense, then it will not be cognitivist.
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2. The Humean Alternative and Charvet's Interdependence thesis
If the rationalist theory is flawed, the obvious next step is to consider the 
traditional Humean rival. This section starts by considering Hume’s account of 
moral motivation in 2.1., but finds that it overlooks the role of reason and 
intersubjective beliefs in motivation. In 2 .2 ,1 sketch an alternative account that 
avoids the problems of both rationalist and Humean accounts, through conceiving 
of reason and desires as interdependent. The account will be filled out and 
substantiated by the discussion of the psychology of morality in Chapter Six. But 
before moving on to this question, as I argue in 2.3, we need to clear up a further 
moral philosophical question: the implications of the interdependence thesis for 
the question of the source of moral norms, i.e. the question of cognitivism.
2.1 Hume and the belief-desire theory
In contrast to the rationalist account, belief-desire theorists reject the role 
of reason in motivation, asserting that action can only be motivated through 
desire. On this account, beliefs are merely passive representations of the world: 
they may supply information relevant to action, but cannot in themselves motivate 
action. Desires, on the other hand, are active and seek to change the world to 
conform to their aspirations, thus motivating action to bring about such change. 
As Hume writes: “Reason being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and 
directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the 
means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery."304 In Hume’s view, people are 
motivated to be moral out of a specific type of desire or sentiment, sympathy. 
Not only is the existence of sympathy a necessary condition for moral motivation,
304 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles o f  
Moral, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 294. 
Strictly speaking, belief-desire theorists are split into two main camps: moral realists and 
subjectivists. Moral realists hold that the good exists independently o f  human desires and 
attitudes. Non-cognitivist realists are thus committed to the view  that while moral requirements 
may be binding, our recognition o f  this will not necessarily motivate us to respect them. 
Motivation will be dependent on the presence o f an independent desire. Non-cognitivist realism 
has significant problems in explaining motivation. If the existence (or not) o f  a motivating desire 
is quite independent o f  the recognition o f  moral duty, the question o f  whether or not one is 
motivated to respect the requirements o f  morality simply becom es a matter o f  chance. Hume’s 
internalist theory, considered below, provides a more plausible account.
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it defines what morality is. This sentiment is logically prior to ethics, in that the 
disposition to sympathy creates or defines moral duty. In other words, the desire 
is not simply a condition of motivating moral action, but it determines what is of 
value. On the basis of our desires, we project onto the world the property of 
value. Moral value is thus not independent of or prior to motivation, as on the 
rationalist view, but is simply a projection of desires.
One problem with this account is the role it ascribes to desire in 
determining what is of value. If desire creates value, then the property of being 
valuable is no more than an ascription by a particular subject. There is no 
independent quality of “valuableness” or “good” which can be said to be a 
property of the object, beyond the fact that an individual desires it. The property 
of value is simply a mental state of the subject, a projection of the individual’s 
desire onto objects. If this is the case, then the Humean theory will have 
problems accounting for the possibility of being mistaken about what is valuable. 
G. E. M. Anscombe uses the example of a person who desires to collect bits of 
bone three inches long for no reason other than that he thinks this is a desirable 
thing to do.305 The collection of bits of bone is not instrumental to any other 
ends, but is perceived to be of intrinsic value to the individual. If desire creates 
value, then we would be committed to the view that collecting pieces of bone is a 
valuable activity, at least for this individual. But we would clearly want to 
question the value of collecting three-inch pieces of bone, even if we 
acknowledge the person’s desire to do so. In order to ascribe value, we would 
need to define some quality or objective of this activity independent of the 
individual’s desire that would justify its value. For example, we might argue that 
the pieces of bone had aesthetic value, or the act of collecting them was 
therapeutic for the individual. In the absence of such an additional reason or 
belief, the ascription of value by desire, as Charvet observes, renders the 
foundations of the value quite arbitrary. More specifically, we would need to 
link desire to an independent conception of what it is rational or worthwhile to
305 G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), pp. 75-6.
306 John Charvet, The Idea o f  an Ethical Community (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 
28.
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desire. This may require a theory of needs or some teleological account of the 
conditions for well-being or human flourishing. This would provide a test of 
value independent of the individual’s desire, thus avoiding the arbitrariness and 
subjectivism of the Humean account. But it would also mean rejecting the purely 
desire-based account: for if desires could be shown to be irrational (according to 
the relevant conception of rationality/the good), then they would not be the sole 
determinants of value in the world.
The second glaring weakness of the Humean account is its inability to 
account for the role of reason and belief in modifying or eliminating desire. To 
return to the case of the bone collector, we might want to influence his desire by 
demonstrating that this activity would not further his interests or well-being. 
Having determined that his ascription of value to this activity was irrational, we 
might attempt to make him understand that he was mistaken about the value of 
collecting pieces of bone. And it would not be unreasonable to expect our 
arguments to influence the person’s desire to collect three-inch pieces of bone. 
By supplying reasoned argument or additional information, in this case about the 
contribution of this collection to the individual’s well-being, we might expect to 
be able to eliminate or at least modify the person’s desire to collect pieces of 
bone. If this is a possibility, then the role of belief would go beyond that of 
simply guiding pre-existing or intrinsic desires. Reason and belief about what is 
valuable would be capable of modifying desires. On this account, beliefs and 
reason would provide criteria independent of desires which would at least in part 
determine what is of value. These beliefs and reason would also have a role in 
influencing desires. For if our beliefs about what is valuable change, so too will 
our desires. It follows that if beliefs and reason have a role in ascribing value, 
they must also influence desires. This would depart from the Humean account, 
which limits the role of reason to that of affecting beliefs about how best to 
realise our desires. On this alternative conception, reason would be capable of 
affecting both instrumental and intrinsic desires.
These two problems with the Humean account - its reliance on subjective 
states and its full-scale denial of any role to reason - in part account for the
186
persistence of rationalist accounts. The pure Humean account implies a retreat 
into a form of subjectivism or emotivism, according to which neither reason, nor
1 A 7
intersubjective beliefs, play any role in modifying subjective desires. Now 
while this form of subjectivism is plainly unacceptable, neither do we want to 
return to the rationalist theories criticised in section one. What is needed is a 
theory of motivation that conceives of desires and reason as interdependent, a 
conception that can be found in the work of John Charvet.
2.2 The interdependence o f  reason and desire
Charvet builds on both of these criticisms of what he terms the "desire- 
fulfilment" theory, developing a theory of motivation that characterises beliefs 
and desire as interdependent. He criticises both rationalism and desire-fulfilment 
theory for conceiving of desire and reason as independent of one other. Belief- 
desire theorists, as we have seen, deny the role of reason in shaping desires in any 
more than an instrumental sense. While rationalists deny the role of desire in 
motivating moral action. By insisting on this separation of belief and desire in 
moral action, both rationalists and Humeans render the interdependence of the 
two in rational action unintelligible.308 Charvet concedes the Humean argument 
to a point, agreeing that motivation requires the existence of a desire, and that 
beliefs play a role in guiding desires. But he departs from the belief-desire theory 
in attributing a more fundamental influence to beliefs: the role of these beliefs is 
not limited to that of providing information to help satisfy pre-existing desires. 
Beliefs play a more formative role in the development and shaping of desires 
from their very inception. Indeed, desire arises in the individual “as a specific 
desire directed onto some object.”309 Desire can only operate under the influence 
of beliefs. In turn, the belief system does not operate in isolation from desires,
307 For a discussion o f  this point, see Barry Stroud, Hume (London and New York: Routledge, 
1988), pp. 180-4; and Annette Baier, A Progress o f  Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Tratise 
(Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 180-1 - although both
defend Hume against the accusation o f  emotivism.
308 Charvet, The Idea o f  an Ethical Community {op. cit.), p. 22.
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but is concerned with “the progress and satisfaction of its owner’s desires.”310 
The two systems are therefore distinct but interdependent. As Charvet writes, 
“[t]he impulsive force must be given a specific and directed form by belief and
Ti lthe activity of the belief must be guided by desire.”
The claim here is that while the presence of a desire is indeed necessary 
for motivation, such desires are not fixed, but may be modified by both beliefs 
and reason. Beliefs and reason are therefore not simply instrumental in satisfying 
desires, but themselves influence and shape desires. Desires are mediated by the 
individual’s cognitive structure and beliefs about the world.
Now it might be objected that this account offers no basic improvement 
on the Humean account. If motivation requires the existence of desire, then as we 
saw in section 1.3, it is also the case that the individual must have a desire to 
adopt certain beliefs and to exercise reason in the first place. If this is true, then 
the beliefs and reason that modify desires are themselves motivated by desire. 
And in this case, desire can only be modified if the agent has a pre-existing desire 
to do so, in which case reason and beliefs are merely instrumental to realising 
desires.
This is true in a superficial sense, but it is also misleading in that it 
overlooks the diversity and complexity of the types of desire in question. Desires 
are not necessarily egoistic, and insofar as they have as their end the welfare of 
others or of society at large, they may be subject to modification by changing 
beliefs or engaging in reasoning about what is best for others. Even prudential 
self-interest, for example the desire to be rich all of one’s life, may lead one to
311
Ibid., p.29-30. It should be noted that on Charvet's account, desires are themselves generated 
by the basic needs and drives o f  the organism, specifically its need for survival, reproduction and a 
more vague need to flourish in a particular environment. The interdependent systems o f  b elief and 
desires initially arise as a function o f  the need to satisfy these drives. As I shall argue below, on 
my theory the two desires that are most relevant for explaining moral motivation - the desire for 
affirmation and the empathic disposition - must also be seen as generated by the basic organic 
needs o f  human-beings. Both desires can be understood as derived from the mutual dependence 
o f  human-beings on one another in order to survive, and they thus presuppose certain innate 
human needs (although in my argument the needs that generate moral motivation are relational
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modify existing desires through reason and beliefs about what is required to 
realise this desire. Deliberation on the best course for ensuring one is rich in old 
age may lead one to modify a desire to spend this week’s salary on a holiday. In 
cases such as this, the more fundamental interest in promoting the welfare of 
others or of oneself in the long term can generate motivation to subject at least 
some of one’s desires to rational scrutiny. And the outcome of this deliberation 
may result in the modification of one’s desires. Thus reason will have changed 
desires and thereby affected what one will be motivated to do. But it will still be 
true to say that it is the desire that motivated the individual to act.
What this of course means is that we must distinguish between two main 
categories of desire. As we have seen, some desires are abstract and general, 
for example the desire to promote the welfare of one’s society, or the desire to be 
respected by others. These desires may generate additional, more specific desires 
which are understood by the agent to be instrumental to realising general desires. 
For example, the desire for respect may generate a desire to have one’s work 
praised, or to be viewed as a good father. While these derivative desires may be 
modified by beliefs about how to gain respect in different contexts, the general 
desire is likely to remain more or less fixed.
In the case of moral motivation, two basic desires seem to be especially 
significant. These will be developed at length in Chapter Six, so I shall only 
provide a quick sketch here. First there is a desire for recognition or affirmation, 
which under normal circumstances will motivate the individual to internalise the
• • • T i lintersubjective codes to which she is exposed. Reason helps the individual to 
establish a link between this desire for affirmation and the required moral action.
rather than individualistic).
312 Nagel introduces a similar distinction, i.e. between motivated and unmotivated desires. 
However, he draws a quite different conclusion. Nagel claims that where a desire has been 
motivated through rational deliberation, the action motivated by this “motivated desire” is an 
action motivated by reason. He concludes that reason can motivate action, without the presence o f  
an “unmotivated desire”. See The Possibility o f  Altruism (op. cit.), p. 32. However, as Charvet 
argues, his argument involves the implausible claim that reason can influence desires without any
desire for it to do so. See The Idea o f  an Ethical Community (op. cit.), p. 25.
313 This is not to say that the individual necessarily internalises these norms uncritically, or that 
she might not rebel against them. I shall return to these questions in Chapter Seven, section three.
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An agent motivated by this desire will engage in rational deliberation, reasoning 
from premises about the moral values she has internalised, to conclusions about 
what she should do. The second type of desire is the disposition to empathy, 
which motivates the individual to be concerned about the well-being of others.314 
This disposition may be mediated through reason, which can indicate how best to 
act on this general concern, and help to channel empathy into more sophisticated 
forms of sympathetic identification. In addition, the disposition to empathy may 
also be mediated by intersubjective beliefs about how best to channel empathy, 
whether it be through charity work, political activism, prayer, or visiting a sick 
friend.
The relationship between these two types of desire, and how they are 
mediated by reason and beliefs, will be elaborated in the next chapter. For the 
purposes of the present discussion, what is important to note is the role of reason 
in motivation. Reason is vital for specifying how to realise basic desires, and may 
also modify derivative desires. It can do so directly, if rational deliberation leads 
the agent to modify her derivative desires. Or it can do so indirectly, by 
modifying beliefs that in turn modify such desires.
2.3 Implications o f  the interdependence thesis for cognitivism
The interdependence thesis clearly denies reason the motivational force 
that it is attributed by rationalist theories. The function of reason is relegated to 
that of mediating desires and beliefs, so that while it may influence desires, it 
cannot in itself motivate action. Now while reason on this account has a less 
important role than in the rationalist account, it is nonetheless an important 
ingredient of practical deliberation, and thus of moral action. It may even still be 
claimed that reason plays a crucial part in defining morality. In other words, one 
could accept the interdependence thesis while still defending a cognitivist account
314 I am terming this disposition a “desire”, although it might more accurately be defined as an 
“affective state”. The point is that it is an affective state that usually involves a desire to bring 
about some sort o f  change in the external world, and is thus equivalent to a desire in its 
motivational force. This will become clearer in the more detailed psychological discussion in the 
next chapter.
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of morality as valid for all rational agents. Let us consider how such a cognitivist 
account could be compatible with a rejection of rationalism.
The account outlined in 2.2 argued that both reason and beliefs may 
mediate desires and thus play a role in moral motivation. The source of moral 
motivation, it was argued, should be understood as a set of general and abstract 
basic desires, which are then given more precise direction and specification by 
beliefs and reason. Beliefs and reason show how these desires may be fulfilled, 
and in turn help create and modify derivative desires. Beliefs in this context could 
include beliefs about the natural and social world (facts), as well as moral beliefs 
(norms).
Now the first thing to note is that the question of the source of these moral 
beliefs was left open. In fact, they may be understood as deriving from two 
possible sources. Moral beliefs may either be held to be universally valid claims, 
or they may consist of values that are particular to a given group of people. 
Secondly, it was not clearly specified in the account above exactly how reason 
could influence these beliefs. Again, there are two main possibilities. If one 
accepts that moral beliefs are universally valid claims, then one is likely to be 
committed to the view that these moral beliefs are derived from reason. This 
view, which I have termed cognitivism, would hold that reason defines some or 
all moral duties. Alternatively, if one holds that moral beliefs are derived from 
shared values, then reason is likely to have a less significant role in shaping moral 
beliefs, for example it may be simply useful for ironing out inconsistencies 
between different values, or demonstrating their practical unfeasibility.315 In 
short, the interdependence thesis seems to leave open the matter of whether moral 
beliefs are universally valid or derived from shared values.316
315 In this case it would have a function similar to Rawls’ reflective equilibrium. See the
Introduction to this thesis, section one.
316 O f course, if  the former is the case, it is still open whether such beliefs are derived from a 
universally shared capacity for reason, or some other source (e.g. divine revelation, or intuition). I 
shall focus on the reason-based argument, which I consider to be the most plausible account, and 
the only serious rival to my non-rationalist account.
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The answer to this question is important to the present discussion for two 
reasons. Firstly and most obviously, the question of the source of moral norms 
will have a bearing on the foundational status of liberal universalism. If we reject 
cognitivism, this will imply that the claims of liberal universalism are not 
universally valid, but specific to particular historical-cultural contexts. This is of 
course a central issue for any moral theory. But at the same time, it is not directly 
relevant to the problem of motivation to perform duties to non-nationals, which 
was after all the starting-point for this analysis. The foundational status of moral 
norms is only relevant insofar as it affects the question of motivation.
However, the question of cognitivism does have a more direct bearing on 
the question of motivation in a second sense. As I mentioned in 1.1, there are 
problems with combining a non-rationalist account of motivation with a 
cognitivist theory of morality. It implies driving a wedge between the sources of 
moral motivation and belief. Thus while it may be held that moral duties are 
defined through reason, the motivation to respect the requirements of morality 
would be contingent on the existence of an independent disposition - a desire for 
affirmation, disposition to empathy, and so on. Now while such an externalist 
position is not necessarily untenable, it does seem to be counter-intuitive, and will 
create problems explaining how a commitment to moral norms can generate 
motivation to comply with these norms. In fact, my non-rationalist account will 
avoid this externalist position. In the next section I shall reject the cognitivist 
account for a number of different reasons, thus placing my account firmly in the 
internalist camp.
In summary, while I have outlined a non-rationalist account of motivation 
based on the interdependence thesis, we still need to clarify the issue of the 
sources of moral norms. For the question of whether these norms are 
intersubjective (and derived from shared beliefs) or universally valid (and derived 
from reason) will have important implications for the relationship between moral 
norms and motivation.
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3. The Role of Reason in Defining Morality
The cognitivist claims that it is through reason that the individual comes 
to recognise her moral duty. The human capacity for reason enables her to derive 
certain universally valid principles for guiding action. By contrast, the non- 
cognitivist holds that reason plays a less decisive role in defining morality. 
Reason merely modifies beliefs and desires through applying certain logical rules 
of coherence, consistency, and so on. Both these positions, it has been argued, 
are in principle compatible with the interdependence thesis, although combining 
the interdependence thesis with a cognitivist account would commit one to an 
externalist view of the relationship between morality and motivation.
This section will examine whether the cognitivist position is tenable. It 
will consider two different types of account of the role of reason in defining 
morality. According to the first, moral rules are established through some form of 
reasoning from the agent’s own wants or interests to the recognition of a duty to 
respect similar wants in all rational beings. This broadly Kantian account should 
be distinguished from the second account, offered by discourse ethics, which 
derives universally moral rules from the structure of language, or 
“presuppositions of argumentation”. The section will argue that in the case of 
both Kantian and discourse ethics accounts, the derivation of moral rules also 
requires the existence of certain beliefs about the value of persons. These beliefs 
cannot be derived purely from reason, but are contingent on particular 
intersubjective values.
3.1 Attempts to define morality through reason: the Kantian route
One way in which theorists have attempted to derive morality from reason 
is through reasoning from the presuppositions of rational action to a principle of 
the universal right to freedom. In order to derive moral norms in this way, the 
agent would have to draw a number of inferences about moral duty, based on a 
conception of herself as a rational agent. Bernard Williams suggests a version of
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this form of reasoning, involving three steps.317 First, the rational agent 
recognises her interest in freedom, and thus her interest in the absence of 
constraints on this freedom. Second, she claims a right to the conditions 
necessary for exercising this freedom. And third, she accepts the same right of 
other individuals, grounded in their similar interest in freedom. If this account is 
correct, then all rational agents are committed to accepting the principle of an 
equal right of humans to freedom. And this principle is derived from a process of 
reasoning from subjective interest to the obligation to respect the right of all 
rational beings to freedom. In other words, the moral duty is derived simply 
from the agent’s recognition of her interest in freedom, qua rational being. All 
that is required to get from this premise of oneself as interested in freedom to the 
conclusion that there is a universal right to freedom is the recognition of others as 
relevantly similar, and rational deliberation will generate this practical 
conclusion.
As Williams argues, however, the steps from premise to conclusion 
require more than rational deliberation. While the first and third steps seem to be 
sound, it is the second step that is more problematic. The first step, it should be 
recalled, involved the agent recognising her interest in freedom, and thus in being 
free from constraint. The existence of such an interest seems to be plausible as a 
premise. And the third step involved a universalisation of the right to freedom. If 
the interest in freedom qua rational being grounds a right to freedom, then it 
follows that all rational beings with a similar interest should have a similar right.
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What grounds a right for one person must ground a right for others. The 
problem arises with the second step: the inference from the fact of having an 
interest, to the claim that others should respect one’s right to having this interest 
realised.
317 Williams points out that this version is simpler than Kant’s account, avoiding many o f  the 
difficulties specific to Kant’s account. He suggests that it is more akin to contemporary Kantian 
accounts - particularly Alan Gewirth’s account in his Reason and M orality (Chicago: University 
o f  Chicago Press, 1978). See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f  Philosophy (London: 
Fontana, 1985), p. 55. But it also highlights the basic problem with the claim o f  Kantian accounts
to derive moral norms from reason.
318 It should be recalled that this interest is not grounded in the fact o f  its being my interest. In 
other words, it is not an “agent-relative” reason, but an objective description o f  m yself as one who 
wants freedom.
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The difficulty here is not so much that considerations like these are not 
used to ground rights in liberal theory. The point is that the inference from 
interest to right cannot be made simply through rational deliberation. Rather, it 
involves making a normative claim about the value of freedom. The simple fact 
of not wanting someone else to interfere with my freedom does not in itself 
generate any prescription about rights and duties - as Williams puts it, it is not 
“enough to lead each agent into morality.”319 There is no reason why others 
should recognise my freedom as a good, merely because I desire it. I can only 
conclude that they are morally bound to do so on the assumption that they should 
be committed to a conception of the self as worthy of freedom. In this case, I will 
indeed be committed to respecting similar characteristics in others, and thus 
recognising the rights of all rational beings. But again, this rests on a substantive 
moral belief about the value of freedom.320
To illustrate this point, one could consider other sorts of characteristics 
apart from a capacity for autonomy that might also be deemed morally relevant, 
and thus ground alternative universal norms. For example, some cultures might 
value bravery or moral virtue, others humility before God, or deference to one’s 
elders in all practical decisions. A more familiar example might be a society that 
values physical and economic security above freedom. Now in these cases, 
rational deliberation from subjective interests to universal norms would establish 
rather different moral obligations. For example, it might justify norms forbidding 
sexual freedom, or a hierarchical conception of rights based on age. 
Alternatively, in the case of the society that values security, members of this 
community might conclude through rational deliberation that there should be 
substantial constraints on freedom in order to promote the goal of national 
security or to increase national prosperity. It is quite plausible that the agent 
would consider capacities or interests such as these to be the morally relevant 
characteristic of human-beings, and if so it would be rational to universalise these 
beliefs. The rationality that allows one to reason from premises to conclusions is
319 Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f  Philosophy {op. cit.), p. 64.
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no more than a set of formal rules, which only derive substantive content from 
moral premises. I am not denying that many, including myself, are committed to 
a conception of the individual as a free and rational agent. But the point is that 
this commitment is not derived from rational deliberation. It is premised on a 
substantive belief about the morally relevant features of human-beings.
There is one alternative route for reasoning from subjective interest to 
rights without necessarily being committed to a view of persons as free. One 
could justify individual rights solely from considerations of mutual interest. In 
this case, the subject would not have to assume that her interest in freedom was 
morally worthy of respect by others, but simply posit that it would be in the 
mutual advantage of all to establish a system of reciprocal rights and duties to 
maximise the interests of all. This would of course require the empirical 
assumption that all participants in this contract did in fact have an interest in 
freedom, but it would not require a substantive normative commitment to the 
value of such freedom. Needless to say, this would lead us back to the Hobbesian 
conception of justice as mutual advantage, with its simplistic psychological 
assumptions and morally unacceptable terms of justice.321
In summary, the attempt to derive moral norms through reasoning from 
subjective maxims to universal norms requires an additional commitment to 
certain morally relevant features of human-beings. Since this substantive value 
could not be derived from reason itself, its source must lie in a commitment to a 
conception of the self as rational and free. And it is precisely this type of 
discussion over the morally relevant features of the self that is the object of first 
order debate between different moral systems. The alternative is to deny 
commitment to a particular conception of the self and return to the contingencies 
of a system of rules based on overlapping self-interest. Since neither account is 
satisfactory, we shall now turn to the second main variety of cognitivism.
320 Alasdair MacIntyre advances a similar argument against Alan Gewirth's derivation o f  rights 
from the agent's desire for freedom. See After Virtue: A Study in M oral Theory (London: 
Duckworth, 1997), pp. 66-7.
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3.2 Cognitivism and discourse ethics
Discourse ethics attempts to derive universally valid moral principles -  or 
at least one such moral principle -  from the structure of language. The universal 
validity of norms is established through a procedure that is presupposed in the 
rules of argumentation, rather than through a process of reasoning from subjective 
interests to universal maxims. The relationship between the validity of norms and 
discourse can be understood at two levels. First, participation in discourse 
presupposes that the agent accepts certain rules of argumentation, such as logical 
rules of consistency, the sincerity of speakers, equal rights of all to participate in 
discourse, question any assertion, and so on.322 From these presuppositions, 
Habermas argues that one can derive a principle of universalisation (U), to which 
all participants of argumentation are implicitly committed. As he writes,
Every person w h o  accep ts the universal and n ec e ssa iy  com m u n icative
p resup position s o f  argum entative sp eech  and w h o  k n ow s w hat it m ean s to  ju s t ify  a
323norm o f  action  im p lic itly  presupposes as valid  the princip le o f  u n iv e rsa liza tio n ...” 
This principle (U) is a principle of argumentation, which grounds the universal 
validity of norms. For a norm to be universally valid, it must fulfil the condition 
established in (U), as follows:
(U ) A ll  a ffected  can accep t the con seq u en ces and the sid e e ffec ts  its g e n e r a l  
ob servance can be anticipated to  have for the satisfaction  o f  e v e r y o n e ’s  in terests  
(and the con seq u en ces are preferred to  th ose o f  know n alternative p o ss ib ilit ie s  for  
regu lation).324
The principle (U) thus signifies a second level at which discourse is 
related to validity claims. Not only does discourse imply acceptance of (U), but 
norms that are agreed under the conditions stipulated in (U) are universally valid. 
The two levels of universal validity correspond to second order and first order 
moral principles. (U) is a second order principle which grounds the validity of
321
For criticisms o f  this account, see Chapter Four, section two o f  the thesis.
322
See Jurgen Habermas, “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program o f  Philosophical Justification”, 
in M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, ed. Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1990), pp. 87-9.
323 Ibid, p. 87.
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moral norms. It establishes a universally valid procedure for agreeing substantive 
first order moral rules, a procedure which is supposedly free of substantive first 
order commitments. (U) is derived from the structure of language, and is thus 
neutral between different substantive norms. By contrast, the first order norms 
that are agreed through this procedure derive their validity from rational 
agreement between participants. The outcome of particular discourses is not 
determined in advance, but will vary depending on the particular social matrix of 
participants. Habermas does not see the task of the moral theorist as specifying 
substantive moral rules for societies, as, for example, Rawls does when he claims 
that his contractors will accept his two principles of justice. Habermas’ principle
(U) does not in itself generate any rights beyond the freedom to participate in
•  •  •discourse. Any additional rights must be justified through discourse.
Nonetheless, the outcome of such discourse is understood to have validity qua 
conforming with (U).
This of course means that discourse must meet a number of conditions, as 
set out in the hypothetical “ideal speech situation” (ISS). The ISS is characterised 
by the even distribution of chances to perform various speech acts. This prevents 
any constraints on argumentative reasoning or participation. Moreover, the 
participants are motivated to arrive at consensus through the search for valid 
norms, and are thus open to be convinced by the force of the better argument. 
Consensus is rationally motivated only if it is achieved through the participants’ 
free acceptance of arguments on the grounds of their rational cogency. Habermas 
does not claim that the ISS is often or perhaps even ever attained in practice. But 
these conditions are nonetheless presupposed when we engage in discourse, and it 
is precisely deviation from the ISS that gives rise to doubts about the validity of 
consensus.326 Even in cultures where such principles of discourse do not seem to 
feature at all in the derivation of moral norms, Habermas claims that they are 
nonetheless still implicitly embedded in speech.
324 / bid., p. 65.
325 Ibid, p. 86.
326 On this point, see Thomas MacCarthy, The Critical Theory o f  Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1984), p. 309.
327 Ibid., pp. 324-5.
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Prima facie, Habermas’ procedure appears to be fairly similar to the 
Scanlonian formulation of “reasonable agreement” discussed in Chapter Four. 
Indeed, Habermas acknowledges that Scanlon’s formulation is a step in the right 
direction, avoiding the Rawlsian split between rationality and moral 
motivation. Scanlon’s contractors are motivated to reach rational agreement by 
the desire to justify their actions to others, or what Barry terms the desire for 
reasonable agreement. Nonetheless, Habermas argues that the Scanlonian 
approach is still committed to a contractarian assumption of individual 
participants engaging in monological deliberation. This implies a conception of 
the self as “unencumbered” and reason as something exercised by isolated 
individuals, outside of social interaction. Habermas prefers a conception of the 
self as intersubjectively mediated, and rational deliberation as a dialogical 
exercise, through which participants revise or clarify perceptions of their interests 
by subjecting them to rational criticism from others. Engaging in discourse 
also has an important practical function of avoiding the (possibly unintentional) 
distortion of others’ interests. Discourse prevents participants from making 
inaccurate assessments of the interests or others, a problem that is encountered in 
monological interpretations of the Categorical Imperative.
In short, discourse ethics claims to address the weaknesses of the Kantian 
account, while retaining a cognitivist commitment to universally valid moral 
norms. It grounds its commitment to a principle of universalisation in the 
structure of language, rather than a transcendental account of the morally relevant 
capacities of all rational beings. And it justifies substantive moral norms through 
a dialogical process which rejects the individualist assumptions of most liberal 
accounts of the self, and guards against the potentially distorting tendencies of the 
Categorical Imperative.
328 Hence Habermas characterises his argument as a “transcendental justification". Ibid., p. 76.
329 Habermas, “Discourse Ethics” (pp. c/7.), pp. 66-7.
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3.3 Critique o f Habermas ’justification o f (U)
There have been many criticisms levelled at Habermas’ discourse ethics, 
but for our purposes the central concern is his derivation of (U) from the structure
“7 A
of language. Habermas’ claims about the presuppositions of argumentation are 
certainly plausible as an account of the rules embedded in speech acts. It does 
indeed seem to be the case that when we engage in discourse we implicitly accept 
a number of rules that have normative implications for our behaviour and 
intentions, the sorts of arguments that are acceptable, and the consideration we 
should give to other arguments. However, these norms should be understood as 
norms constitutive of the practice of discourse, rather than moral norms.
Now it may be true, as Habermas points out, that argumentation is such an 
inescapable feature of human interaction that this practice is not something we 
can choose whether or not to engage in. Since language is an all-pervasive, 
indeed a constitutive element of social interaction, we cannot opt in or out of 
commitment to the rules embedded in language depending on whether we choose 
to speak. There is simply no alternative mode of rational interaction. In this 
sense, the commitment to the presuppositions of argumentation is inescapable not 
only to those who have decided to engage in argumentation, but is inescapable for 
any rational agent interacting with others. Nonetheless, the point is that these 
rules are not in themselves moral. They may prescribe norms for discourse, but 
there is no in-built relation between these rules of discourse and moral obligation. 
If I violate these norms of speech, then I am perhaps being irrational but I am not 
behaving in an immoral fashion. I could indeed be accused of acting immorally if 
I preclude black people from participating in discussion on rules of justice. But 
the immoral nature of my act derives from my disrespect of black people, not 
from my failure to act in accordance with rules of argumentation. While there
330 For a selection o f  critiques, see MacCarthy, The Critical Theory {op. cit.), especially pp. 272- 
328; Steven Lukes, "Of Gods and Demons: Habermas and Practical Reason", in Habermas: 
Critical D ebates , ed. John B. Thompson and David Held (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 134- 
148; J. M. Bernstein, Recovering Ethical Life: Jurgen Habermas and the Future o f  Critical 
Theory (London and N ew  York: Routledge, 1995), especially pp. 38-135; Axel Honneth and Hans 
Joas, eds., Communicative Action: Essays on Jurgen Habermas's The Theory o f  Communicative 
Action  (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).
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may, in cases like these, be a coincidence between violation of rules of 
argumentation and moral norms, the coincidence is contingent.
We can clarify this gap between norms of discourse and moral norms 
through considering the way in which they diverge in their prescriptions. The gap 
is especially evident as concerns the relation between moral validity and the 
requirements of equal respect for participants of discourse. We saw that the aim 
of discourse as presupposed in any serious discussion was to find true, or 
universally valid norms. Now it does not follow from this objective of discourse 
that we should be committed to a rule of argumentation that guarantees equal 
rights of participation. What does seem to follow from the objective of truth is 
that we should subject our convictions to scrutiny from all possible viewpoints 
and arguments. But this does not imply a requirement to engage in argumentation 
with all potential participants. As Wellmer writes, “the obligation to enter into 
genuine discourse can therefore only stretch as far as the obligation to achieve a 
genuine and universal rational consensus, and it is therefore also not identical in 
meaning with universally conceived obligations to cooperation.”331 In other 
words, the presuppositions of argumentation are not sufficient to produce moral 
norms of equal participation. The aim of finding true norms may commit us to 
consider all possible rational objections, but it does not generate any 
commitments about with whom, or when, or on what subjects, I ought to engage 
in discourse. Again, it is worth quoting Wellmer, who argues that norms of 
rationality do not in themselves have any moral content.
Obligations to rationality refer to the acknowledgement of arguments, moral 
obligations to the acknowledgement of persons... Overstating the point a little, we 
might say that obligations to rationality are concerned with arguments regardless of 
who voices them, whereas moral obligations are concerned with people regardless of
331
Wellmer, "Ethics and Dialogue" {op. cit.), p. 187.
332
Admittedly, the rules o f  argumentation may well generate instrumental grounds for ensuring 
equal participation. Equal participation may be the best or only means o f  ensuring that all rational 
objections are considered. But again, the coincidence between moral norms and rules o f  discourse 
is merely contingent. The rules o f  equal participation would not in this case be embedded in the 
presuppositions o f  argumentation, but would be justified on instrumental grounds that were only 
contingently related to the structure o f  argumentation.
201
their arguments.333
Now the only way Habermas can bridge this gap between presuppositions 
of argumentation and equal participation is through a rather unusual conception of 
moral validity. We saw that if the goal of truth is a presupposition of 
argumentation, then it generates a requirement to consider all rational objections, 
but not necessarily to accord an equal right of participation in discourse. 
Habermas can, however, claim to derive such a moral norm from the goal of truth 
if he defines truth as consensus. In other words, if the truth of moral norms is 
grounded in their being the object of rational consensus, then he can claim that 
the search for truth generates a requirement to ensure the agreement of all 
participants. Truth, then, would be established through a process that necessitates 
the participation of all rational beings, hence the search for truth would generate 
rules of equal participation.
It should be noted that this line of argument involves shifting the level of 
justification form the claim that (U) is presupposed in argumentation, to the rather 
different claim that valid norms are those agreed on under conditions set out in 
(U). To understand this shift, we should recall the distinction made towards the 
beginning of this section between two senses in which discourse is related to 
claims of validity. First, (U) was valid as a meta-principle, presupposed in the 
structure of communication. As we have seen, Habermas cannot directly derive 
(U) from these presuppositions, except on the assumption of a rather unusual 
theory of truth as rational consensus. Second, substantive moral norms agreed to 
in conditions stipulated in (U) were defined as universally valid. It is this second 
grounding of validity in the fact of rational agreement that concerns us here. 
Given that Habermas’ justification of (U) relies on a consensus theory of truth its 
defence must now rest on the plausibility of the second claim. He must justify the 
validity of substantive norms through the fact that they generate rational 
consensus, i.e. a consensus theory of truth.
Further examination of the consensus theory of truth, however, unearths
Wellmer, "Ethics and Dialogue" (op. cit.), p. 185.
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more problems. The consensus theory claims that the truth of moral norms is 
dependent on their securing the rational agreement of all affected by their 
implementation. The role of rational consensus is not simply to prevent coercive 
imposition of norms or guarantee the compliance of subjects. If this were the 
case, then (U) would simply be a principle of legitimation, guaranteeing the 
agreement and cooperation of participants in discourse. Negotiated agreements or 
compromise would be acceptable forms of consensus.334 In Habermas’ theory, 
consensus plays a more fundamental role, grounding the universal validity or 
truth of norms. It cannot be based on compromise, because that would imply that 
participants were accepting a judgement or norm that they did not believe to be 
valid, but was simply the best available basis for reaching consensus. The 
consensus theory of truth therefore has to imply the possibility of real consensus 
on validity claims.
Part of the attraction of the consensus theory of truth seems to be based on 
an apparent parallel between the role of rational consensus in scientific 
knowledge and in moral norms. Habermas argues that consensus plays a similar 
justificatory role in moral questions as rational agreement does in science. There 
is, however, a problem with this supposed symmetry between truth claims in 
scientific knowledge and moral norms. Rational agreement plays a far more 
significant role in grounding truth claims in science than it does in the moral 
domain. In the scientific community, we may suppose that consensus on truth 
claims is based on common acceptance of detailed criteria for what constitutes 
knowledge. A large part of these criteria will be rules of rationality, such as 
consistency, coherence and the provision of relevant evidence. As Bubner writes, 
“rationality is one of the inalienable defining characteristics of knowledge”, 
indeed knowledge is not conceivable “without certain elements of rationality
334 And this is indeed the function o f  agreement in many social contract theories, as we saw in 
Chapters Four and Five. Nagel and Rawls (at least in his later work) seem to accord just such a 
political legitimising role to agreement - it serves as a procedure to guard against power 
distortions and to avoid conflict. Nagel in particular distinguishes between what he considers to 
be moral terms, and those which will secure the rational consensus o f  all contractors. See his 
Equality and Partiality {op. cit.), especially chapters three and four.
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which must be guaranteed in the structure of all knowledge.”335 But the same 
does not hold of moral judgements. In the moral domain, there is far less 
agreement on the criteria for what constitutes a valid judgement. Reason does 
play a role in ironing out inconsistencies, clarifying reasons for beliefs and 
ensuring general coherence. But these functions of reason will in many cases not 
affect the fundamental moral commitments of individuals or communities. And 
they will certainly not guarantee consensus on moral norms. Discourse may 
influence the individual’s moral beliefs by forcing her to justify and render 
coherent her judgements, through exposing them to rational criticism. Engaging 
in discourse with others with different interests and beliefs may also convince her 
to modify some of her judgements. But the outcome may well be a clarification 
of differences in moral judgement, rather than a consensus. There is no good 
reason - apart from a gut preference for simplicity in moral theory - to suppose 
that normatively neutral rules of reason will produce a consensus of convictions. 
In other words, discourse will not necessarily eliminate or even diminish moral 
conflict.
Now if one accepts the possibility of perennial pluralism in moral norms, 
then the consensus theory of truth must be rejected in favour of one of two 
alternatives. Firstly, one could hold that there are universal moral truths 
regardless of whether they generate consensus or not. For example, one could 
hold that universal moral truth exists independently of rational convictions, for 
example as divine law. This route is clearly unacceptable to Habermas. The 
second alternative would be to abandon the claim of the universal validity of 
moral judgements derived from rational consensus (although not necessarily the 
validity of (U)). In this case, one could still defend the value of rational 
consensus, but as a principle of legitimation rather than as a ground for truth 
claims. This is the route adopted by Rawls when he characterises agreement on
• •  •  nfihis conception of justice as “political, not metaphysical”. But Habermas
335 Rudiger Bubner, “Habermas' Concept o f  Critical Theory,” in Habermas: Critical D ebates, ed.
John B. Thompson and David Held (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 55.
336 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
14:3 (1985), pp. 223-51.
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refuses to take this route, defending a conception of moral validity grounded in 
the fact of rational consensus. On this account, the persistence of conflict 
between different moral convictions must indicate a failure of rational argument, 
or else imply that the issues under discussion are not truly moral questions. Lack 
of consensus on questions of justice must be attributed to the non-ideal conditions 
of speech or the subject matter of speech, rather than to a divergence of moral 
judgements.
The problem for Habermas seems to stem from his attempt to combine a 
principle of legitimation with a principle of universal validity. He seems to be 
basing his notion of consensus on a characteristically liberal intuition that only 
rationally agreed principles are morally legitimate. But the notion of the moral 
value of consensus in the liberal tradition, as we have seen, is firmly rooted in a 
conception of individuals as free and equal. It is this substantive commitment to 
freedom that grounds the validity of rational consensus. Rationally agreed norms 
are not valid in the sense of expressing true or universally valid judgements; but 
they are valid in the sense of guaranteeing the individual’s right to rational 
scrutiny and uncoerced consent to the principles governing social interaction. 
This notion of consensus grounded in a commitment to individual liberty allows 
for the possibility of conflict over substantive moral principles - indeed many 
liberal theories of justice are seen as a response to the problem of conflict 
between different moral judgements. But failure to reach consensus on basic 
moral convictions does not undermine the value of agreement achieved through 
negotiated compromise. The point about agreement on the liberal account is not 
that it grounds truth but that it ensures uncoerced compliance, and hence political 
legitimacy.
Habermas’ mistake in conflating this principle of legitimacy with a theory 
of universal moral validity can perhaps be understood if we consider his 
justification of the second order principle (U). This principle claims universal 
validity in virtue of the fact that it is presupposed in argumentation. But the 
validity of (U) - if it is to be accepted - should not be confused with the validity of 
norms generated through (U). As we have seen, these latter are best understood
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as valid in the sense of being legitimate, rather than in the sense of being 
expressive of moral truth. Yet if  we reject the consensus theory of truth, then 
there is no longer any good reason to accept (U) as universally valid. For if (U) 
cannot be justified on the grounds that norms agreed through the procedure 
specified in (U) are universally valid, then it must be justified on the grounds that 
it follows from the rules of argumentation, including the goal of truth. As we 
saw, the justification of this derivation was dependent on a conception of truth as 
rational consensus. Only on this understanding of truth could the goal of seeking 
true norms be achieved through the rule of equal participation in speech. And 
once we reject the consensus theory of truth, (U) cannot be derived from the 
presuppositions of argumentation.
Neither language, nor rational consensus, can in themselves guarantee the 
derivation of universally valid moral norms. In both justifications of validity - for 
the second order principle (U) and for the first order norms generating rational 
consensus - Habermas’ argument rests on a commitment to the value of persons 
as free and equal.
4. Reason in Morality and Motivation
Having rejected rationalist theories of motivation in the first part of the 
chapter, it is perhaps not surprising that we have also found the cognitivist 
accounts discussed to be untenable. In the case of rationalism, the criticisms 
centred on the question of how reason could motivate action without the presence 
of a desire. Kantian and neo-Kantian accounts all faced a version of this problem, 
leading us to consider the traditional Humean alternative. This too was found 
wanting, and the argument defended instead a theory of the interdependence of 
beliefs, reason and desire in motivation. The rejection of rationalism in principle 
left open the question of the role of reason in defining morality. A proponent of 
the interdependence thesis could either adopt a cognitivist account (although this 
would commit her to extemalism), or she could deny that moral duty is defined 
through reason. The third part of the chapter considered two main cognitivist 
theories, one constructed along Kantian lines, the second the discourse ethics of
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Habermas. While the structure of my critique was different for each, the thrust of 
the argument was similar in both cases: neither reason, nor the structure of 
language, can in themselves establish moral norms. Any derivation of moral 
norms is also dependent on commitment to more substantive conceptions of the 
good. The criticism was levelled against two types of cognitivism, but I believe it 
would apply to any such account.
It should be stressed that the rejection of moral cognitivism does not imply 
that there is no role for reason in moral motivation. As we saw, rational 
deliberation can modify desires and beliefs, thus helping shape conceptions of 
duty and indirectly influencing motivation. We shall also see in the next chapter 
that the individual’s cognitive capacities play an important part in moral 
development, through mediating both desires and beliefs of the individual to 
enable her to internalise intersubjective codes and deliberate on her own 
convictions. But reason - at least on this very narrow conception - plays an 
essentially neutral role in sorting through the coherence and consistency of 
beliefs, and helping to direct desires.
Finally, we should briefly consider the broader implications of this 
chapter’s conclusion for our conception of duties to refugees. Prima facie, the 
non-rationalist, non-cognitivist account would not seem to be a promising 
starting-point for constructing a conception of duties to refugees. We should 
recall, however, that universalist liberal theories were unable to define universal 
duties in such a way as to account for the significance of particular ties, or to 
motivate compliance with duties. This chapter has helped clarify the source of 
this problem of motivation, through critically examining rationalist theories of 
motivation. The proposed alternative, the interdependence thesis, provides the 
basis for a more sophisticated and empirically plausible theory of motivation. On 
this account, since motivation is generated by the individual’s emotional 
disposition and mediated by cognitive elements, we need not feel so anxious 
about rejecting cognitivism. If moral motivation is contingent on the agent’s 
emotional disposition, then the possession of the relevant desires is the most 
important precondition for moral action. In this case, the question of whether the
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agent exercises the relevant capacity for reason - while still important - is 
nonetheless secondary to the issue of her emotional disposition. Since the 
emphasis is now on an emotional disposition, the account need not rely so heavily 
on the role of reason to guarantee performance of moral duty.
Moreover, the emotional disposition - where effectively developed - 
already delimits the range of possible moral principles. So abandoning 
cognitivism does not have to imply a slide into absolute relativism. We are no 
longer dependent on a notion of universal reason, or cognitivism, to prevent the 
type of moral scepticism feared by rationalists. Some notion of duties to others is 
guaranteed by the development of the relevant emotional disposition in the 
individual. If this is the case, then this account of the role of desires in moral 
motivation can safeguard us against a radical relativist position. The next chapter 
will provide a more detailed elaboration of this emotional disposition, and how it 
generates moral motivation.
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Chapter Six 
The Psychology of  Moral Deve lopm ent
A number of contemporary philosophers have drawn on psychological 
theories to substantiate their moral theories. In particular, rationalist and 
cognitivist theorists have invoked theories of cognitive development to provide 
empirical support for their philosophical claims about motivation and moral
■ 5 1 7
norms. However, less attention has been devoted to elaborating psychological 
accounts that would substantiate the type of non-rationalist theory outlined in the 
last chapter. Thus while there is a large body of psycho-analytical and social 
psychological theory that could potentially be drawn on to support the claims 
made in Chapter Five, the links with these psychological accounts have not been 
clearly and systematically drawn out in existing literature. As in the case of moral 
philosophy, the cognitivist account of moral development has largely dominated 
the field in the past couple of decades. And non-rationalist theories have failed to 
develop satisfactory parallel psychological accounts to reinforce their claims 
about moral agency.338
337
In particular, Habermas’ use o f  Lawrence Kohlberg to substantiate his theory o f  discourse 
ethics prompted a wider discussion o f  cognitive developmental theories o f  moral development in 
political and moral philosophy, as well as discussions o f moral philosophy in the literature on 
development psychologists. See Jurgen Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action", in M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action , ed. Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1990), pp. 116-94; Brian Barry, Justice as Im partiality  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), Chapter Ten. See also Thomas E. Wren (ed.), The M oral Domain: Essays on the Ongoing  
Discussion between Philosophy and the Social Sciences (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 199); and 
Gertrud Nunner-Winkler, “Knowing and Wanting: On Moral Development in Early Childhood”, 
in Cultural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project o f  Enlightenment, ed. Axel Honneth
et al. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 219-43.
338 There have been some attempts to begin to build an alternative account, which w ill be 
elaborated in the course o f  this chapter. There is also a growing school o f  feminist theories o f  
moral development that posit the existence o f  an "ethics o f  care" as an alternative to the cognitivist 
account. These theories share some common elements with the account I shall construct in this 
chapter. However, the feminist theorists tend to restrict their claims to apply only to the moral 
development o f  women, contrasting "care" or "sentiment" based accounts o f  feminine ethics with 
typically male, cognitivist approaches. By contrast, my account is intended to apply to both men 
and women. For feminist accounts, see Gilligan, Carol, In a  Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women's Developm ent (Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1982); Carol 
Gilligan, "Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images o f  S elf in Relationship", in M apping the 
M oral Domain, ed. Carol Gilligan, Janie Victoria Wood and Jill McLean Taylor (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 3-19; and Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers, 
eds., Women and M oral Theory (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987).
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This chapter seeks to fill this lacuna by providing a psychological account 
of moral development that will elucidate and substantiate the philosophical 
account of the last chapter. It should be recalled that the last chapter emphasised 
the role of affective states in moral motivation. This thesis of the 
interdependence of reason and desire makes a psychological account especially 
crucial. Philosophical analysis in itself cannot shed much light on the source or 
nature of these affective states, or explain how they are related to reason and 
beliefs. What is required is a psychological theory that provides an explanation 
of: (1) the features of the individual’s emotional make-up that are relevant to 
moral motivation; and (2) how these are mediated by reason. This account should 
also give us a better idea of the relationship between the personal and ethical 
perspectives. The ultimate aim of the discussion is, it should be recalled, to 
demonstrate how the individual is motivated through this combination of personal 
disposition, reason and inter-subjective norms to extend duties to refugees.
The chapter provides such a psychological account through elaborating a 
theory of the development of moral motivation in the individual. The first section 
of the chapter will start by considering some issues raised by the role of 
psychology in the broader discussion of political theory and moral philosophy. I 
shall then consider the prevalent cognitivist account of moral development in 
section two. I shall argue that its exclusion of affective elements in explaining 
moral agency and motivation renders it both empirically implausible, and 
incomplete as an account of moral development and agency. Section three will 
elaborate an alternative conception of moral development, based on the 
disposition to empathy. Drawing on Kleinian psychoanalytic theory, it will 
suggest how the infant develops a capacity for other-regardingness, which is then 
mediated through its cognitive structure and intersubjective values to motivate 
more sophisticated forms of sympathy. However, empathy and its related, 
mediated forms of sympathy will not be sufficient to account for all conceptions 
of moral duty. The account of empathy will be supplemented in the final section 
by an explanation of the motivation to internalise intersubjective norms that are 
not obviously related to the empathic disposition.
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1. Psychology and Moral Motivation
Before reviewing different theories, it is important make a few remarks 
about the role of this psychological discussion in the overall argument of the 
thesis, and especially in relation to the moral philosophy discussion of the last 
chapter. In 1.2 I shall go on to consider the relationship between psychological 
accounts of the self and social theory.
1.1 Psychology and moral philosophy
Theories of moral motivation are necessarily based on a number of 
assumptions about human psychology. The rationalist and Humean theories 
discussed in the last chapter all assumed certain facts about the individual’s 
capacity for altruism and the source of this capacity in reason or sentiment. These 
accounts are in turn (usually implicitly) dependent on theories about the 
development of the individual’s capacity for morality. While it is clearly not the 
task of moral philosophers to formulate or even necessarily recount such theories, 
there are risks in failing to examine the plausibility of one’s psychological 
assumptions. Moral philosophy accounts of motivation may achieve conceptual 
coherence and accord with certain intuitions we have about motivation. But in 
the absence of a more comprehensive theory of psychology, which provides an 
account of the development and source of the desires and beliefs relevant to 
morality, moral philosophy accounts will remain essentially superficial and 
fragmented. A related problem will be an inability to modify theories in 
accordance with changes in prevalent theories of psychology, which change at 
least partly in response to new findings in empirical research. Indeed, one of the 
reasons for the implausibility of the rationalist account of moral motivation is its 
failure to correspond with widespread intuitions about psychology, many of 
which have been shaped by psycho-analytic theory and social psychology in the 
past half century.
339 This is certainly true o f  British moral philosophy this century, despite calls for more attention 
to psychology (see, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modem Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 
13:124 (1958), pp. 1-19; and William K. Frankena, “Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral
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Clearly, there are a number of different theories of psychology that could 
provide rival accounts of the development of morality and moral motivation. 
And moral philosophers will tend to choose a theory of psychology that broadly 
fits their prior philosophical assumptions about morality.340 The choice of moral 
theory will thus influence the selection of psychological theory, with the theorist 
keen to find empirical substantiation for her conception of morality. In the 
language of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium, one could characterise this as a 
search for the background theory of psychology that most closely fits certain 
philosophical convictions about the sources of moral motivation.
But quite apart from the “fit” with our account in Chapter Five, there are 
important criteria for accepting or rejecting a theory of psychology that are 
independent of its compatibility with the chosen philosophical framework. The 
theory of psychology must be coherent, internally consistent, and empirically 
plausible. The criterion of empirical plausibility implies the need for adequate 
empirical evidence, through clinical work or controlled scientific experiments. 
The scientific appraisal of primary empirical research is clearly beyond the scope 
of this thesis. But we can draw on theories developed by psychologists in the 
field of moral development who have carried out and evaluated such research. If 
such theories are considered in their own right according to the criteria 
mentioned, then the grounds for choosing a theory of psychology will not be 
exclusively dependent on one’s philosophical prejudices.341 Thus although moral 
philosophers will not approach psychological theory with total impartiality, this is 
not to say that psychological research does not have an important influence in 
shaping our views on these questions. There are a number of criteria for 
evaluating the adequacy of psychological theories, quite apart from whether or
Philosophy”, in Essays in M oral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University o f  Washington 
Press, 1958), pp. 40-81). It is less true o f  continental philosophy which has tended to be more
open to theories o f  psychology and psychoanalysis.
340 It is also the case that moral psychologists premise their empirical research on more or less 
explicit philosophical assumptions about moral norms, as indeed we shall see in the case o f
Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory.
341 Habermas discusses this potential problem o f  circularity in his "Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action", in M oral Consciousness and Communicative Action, ed. Jurgen 
Habermas (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 118.
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not they accord with the relevant philosophical account. Thus psychology does 
not merely substantiate philosophy, but can in itself undermine the plausibility of 
moral philosophical accounts where these are based on dubious psychological 
assumptions.
My evaluation of different psychological theories will therefore involve 
three main criteria. First, I aim to find a theory that broadly accords with the 
interdependence thesis of moral motivation, and more generally my commitment 
to an account of moral agency that rejects a dichotomy between personal and 
impartial perspectives. The other two criteria relate to the adequacy of the 
psychological account on its own terms. The second criterion is empirical 
plausibility; and the third is internal coherence. All of these criteria must be met 
in order for a theory to be considered an adequate account. I shall not reject 
theories simply on the grounds of the first criterion, but will also need to show 
that the theory in question fails on the second or third count. This way, the 
discussion will be assessing theories of psychology at least partly on their own 
merits, rather than simply reiterating the philosophical arguments of the previous 
chapter.
1.2 Self and society
The second point in need of clarification concerns the notion of the “self’ 
and its relation to society. In attempting to construct a psychological theory of 
moral development, I am already committing myself to certain ontological 
assumptions about the self as in some sense separable from her social context. I 
am assuming that it is possible to conceive of a self apart from her socially 
defined needs, values and beliefs. While these social features of the individual’s 
identity are necessarily constituted by her interaction with the social matrix, the 
conception of the self developed in this chapter is more abstract and minimal. 
The “self’ denotes the pre- or non-social elements of the subject, notably her 
affective and cognitive features, which enable and motivate her to interact with 
others and to develop the characteristics and capacities that are shaped through 
social intercourse. Thus while the individual’s identity is developed through
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interaction, one can nonetheless posit the existence of an entity that is in some 
sense prior to society.342 The self may be prior in a temporal sense, insofar as the 
unborn child or young infant may be said to have affective and cognitive features 
which have not yet been influenced by social norms and practices. But there is 
also a sense in which part of the individual will remain non-linguistic, and 
unmediated by society. Whether this is understood as the self s basic cognitive 
and affective structure, or a more complex unconscious world, most theorists 
would agree that it is meaningful to conceive of such a non-social self.343
The importance of developing such a conception of the self is two-fold. 
First, it will enable us to construct an account of the individual’s basic 
motivational structure. This will be vital for explaining why the infant is 
motivated to internalise and act in accordance with intersubjective norms, and to 
continue to be motivated to be moral throughout her life. As we saw in Chapter 
Five, different accounts of moral motivation may stress the respective importance 
of desires or cognitive capacities in this process, but all require some conception 
of a self as in principle separable from social norms. Otherwise the theory could 
offer no coherent account of why the self would be disposed to, and capable of,
i • 344moral action.
The second reason for developing a conception of the self is to help 
account for the possibility of an individual evaluating and criticising existing 
social practices. This does not imply that the self can abstract from her social 
matrix and objectively scrutinise the values of her community, as deontological
342 On this I am broadly in agreement with C. Fred Alford, The S e lf  in Social Theory: A 
Psychoanalytic Account o f  its Construction in Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rawls and Rousseau  (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), Chapter One.
343 “S e lf ’ in this context is not defined in an individualistic sense, and so is not open to sorts o f  
criticism advanced by Mead o f  individualistic theories o f  the se lf  as prior to society. Mead seems 
to be referring to the conscious se lf  - see George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago:
University o f  Chicago Press, 1934).
344
This does not mean that such a theory o f  the se lf  could provide an adequate basis for analysing 
moral norms or behaviour - this would o f  course require a social analysis. So I am not arguing for 
methodological individualism in the human sciences, but rather for some account o f  how 
individual motivation is possible.
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theorists often suggest.345 But it does provide scope for some capacity to order 
different values and goods, a capacity that is at least partly dependent on affective 
and cognitive features of the self These features of the self will never be clearly 
separable from social interaction. Nonetheless, some combination of socially 
mediated emotion and reason may provide the subject with a critical angle or 
lever for evaluating conventional practices. Such evaluation may take the form of 
an immanent critique which draws on internal tensions or conflicts within a 
practice or set of beliefs. Or it may be based on a gut emotional reaction which 
provides a non-rational basis for rejecting certain practices.346 (These questions 
will be developed more thoroughly in Chapter Seven.)
In short, constructing a conception of the self does not imply an ontology 
of the individual as “unencumbered” or “asocial”, but a conception of a subject 
whose basic desires and cognitive make-up are mediated from the outset through 
social interaction. But it is a self that must be conceived of as - at least in 
principle - separable from its social context. While its characteristics may not be 
factually ascertained through observation of people as they appear in society, the 
existence of such a self must be posited if we are to explain motivation and the 
possibility of social critique.347
345 See Michael J. Sandel’s critique o f  Rawls, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982).
346 The first route for establishing the possibility o f  critique is more typically Hegalian, or, in the 
terminology o f contemporary political philosophy, “communitarian". See, for example, Charles 
Taylor, Sources o f  the Self: The Making o f  Modern M odernity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1989); Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?  (London: 
Duckworth, 1988); and Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism  (Cambridge, Mass 
and London: Harvard University Press, 1987). The second route is broadly Humean, and would
also be favoured by many psychoanalytic accounts, as we shall see in section three o f  this chapter.
347 See Honneth and Joas, Social Action an d Human Nature {op. cit.), p. 7; and Alford, The S elf  
in Social Theory {op. cit.), Chapter One. It should be stressed that this account does not imply 
that a conception o f  the se lf  can be clearly definable in isolation from its social context: the 
theorist can o f  course only construct an approximation o f  the pre-social characteristics o f  a self. 
Even if  one could posit the existence o f  some kind o f  skeletal universalist structure independent o f  
society, it would be impossible to pin down exactly what its elements were. See Honneth and 
Joas, Social Action and Human Nature {op. cit.), p. 7.
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2. The Cognitive Developmental Account
Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development is probably the most 
widely acclaimed and thoroughly researched cognitive-developmental account. It 
is especially interesting for the purposes of our discussion because Kohlberg 
explicitly espouses a liberal universalist normative framework, i.e. that of Rawls 
in his Theory o f  Justice. The bearing of Kohlberg’s empirical research on moral 
theory has also been the subject of extensive discussion, largely prompted by 
Habermas’ use of his theory to provide empirical substantiation to discourse 
ethics. While Habermas has modified parts of Kohlberg’s account, he has argued 
that its theory of the development of cognitivist morality closely fits his own 
theory of communicative action.348 It therefore seems appropriate to consider the 
problems with this psychological theory, as a complement to our critique of 
cognitivism in the previous chapter. I shall provide a brief exegesis of 
Kohlberg’s account in 2.1, and then proceed to criticise it in 2.2 on grounds of 
empirical plausibility.
2.1 Kohlberg’s theory o f  moral development
Kohlberg characterises moral development as the ontogenetic progression 
of the individual through six different stages of moral judgement. The stages 
form an “invariant sequence” through which every child must proceed in the 
correct order, although individuals may regress from a higher to a lower stage, 
and at any one time their moral judgements may combine elements from more 
than one stage.349 The stages of development apply to the moral judgements of 
all individuals, regardless of cultural context. Thus “moral development is not 
merely a matter of learning the verbal values or rules of the child’s culture but 
reflects something more universal in development, something that would occur in
I f  A
any culture.” In cases where individuals or cultures do not reach the higher
348 See Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action" {op. cit.), p. 117.
349 Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy o f  M oral Development: M oral Stages and the Idea o f  
Justice  (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 120.
350 Ibid., p. 122.
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stages of moral development, this reflects “differences in stage or developmental 
status”, rather than the existence of a plurality of moral systems.351
Kohlberg explains the progression through these stages primarily in terms 
of cognitive development. As the child’s cognitive structure becomes more 
sophisticated, it structures its environment in more complex ways. The 
development of the cognitive capacity results in a succession of different stages of 
equilibrium between the cognitive self and the environment it is structuring. The 
equilibria thus correspond to new levels of cognitive structural organisation, and 
represent new “structured wholes” or “total ways of thinking”. Psychological 
development is explained as a function of this process, i.e. as the interaction of 
the child’s developing cognitive structure and the environment.
Kohlberg argues that these stages of cognitive development correspond to 
stages of moral development. At each successive stage of cognitive organisation 
of the environment, the individual is able to progress to a corresponding stage of 
moral development. There are six stages of moral judgement, grouped under 
three main levels: pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional morality. 
It is worth quoting Kohlberg’s account.
A . P recon ven tional L evel
A t th is le v e l the ch ild  is resp onsive to  cultural rules and lab els o f  good  and bad, right 
or w ron g  but interprets th ese lab els in term s o f  eith er the p h ysica l or the h ed onistic  
co n se q u en ce s  o f  action (punishm ent, reward, exch an ge o f  favors) or in term s o f  the  
p h ysica l p ow er o f  th ose w h o  enunciate the rules and labels. [ . . . ]
B . C on ven tion a l L evel
A t th is le v e l, m aintaining the exp ectation s o f  the in d iv id u al’s fam ily , group, or nation  
is  p erce ived  as valuable in its ow n  right, regardless o f  im m ediate and ob v iou s  
c o n seq u en ces. T he attitude is not on ly  on e o f  c o n fo rm ity  to  personal exp ectation s
351 Ibid., p. 126. Unfortunately I do not have space to discuss these universalist assumptions here. 
But if  it is rejected as an account o f  moral development for children from western liberal societies 
- which it will be - then the discussion o f  its application to other cultures becomes redundant in
any case.
352 Kohlberg, Philosophy o f  M oral Developm ent {op. cit.), p. 120
353 Ibid., p. 136.
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and soc ia l order but a lso  o f  loya lty  to them , o f  a c tiv e ly  m ain ta in in g ,, supporting, and 
ju stify in g  the order and o f  id en tify in g  w ith the p eo p le  or group in vo lved  in it. [ . . . ]
C. P ostcon ven tion a l A utonom ou s, or Principled L evel
A t th is le v e l, there is a clear effort to  d efin e m oral va lu es and p rin cip les that have
v a lid ity  and application  apart from  the authority o f  the groups or p eop le  hold ing
th ese  p rin cip les and apart from  the in d iv id u al’s ow n  id entification  w ith  th ese  
354groups.
Pre-conventional morality, then, is characterised by obedience to rules and 
avoidance of punishment (stage one) and serving one’s own interests (stage two). 
At the conventional level, morality is defined as conforming to expectations and 
gaining approval (stage three) and upholding the social and legal order (stage 
four). And level C comprises the stages of post-conventional morality, where 
moral judgements are oriented to principles of justice and welfare (stages five and 
six).
While Kohlberg sees moral development as parallel to cognitive 
development, he does not claim that cognitive capacity alone guarantees the 
corresponding moral judgements. It is possible that a person at a given cognitive 
stage will not have reached the equivalent moral stage. Cognitive development is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral development. However, this 
creates a gap between his theory of psychology and his account of moral 
development: the latter cannot be wholly explained through a theory of cognitive 
development. Kohlberg therefore draws on a second element relevant to moral 
development - the capacity for “role taking”.355 Role taking enables the 
individual to develop a capacity for a more social form of cognition, which goes 
beyond logical or intellectual ability. Role taking involves the capacity “to react 
to others as like the self and to react to the self s behaviour from the other’s point 
of view.”356 Moral development thus depends not only on the individual’s logical 
or pure cognitive capacity, but also on a form of social learning that involves the 
ability to adopt the perspective of another. The development of the capacity for
354 /6 /d , p. 379-81.
355 Ibid., p. 141.
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role taking is in turn dependent on various environmental factors that provide 
opportunities to practise this skill, such as the level of communication and
•  •  ♦ •  •  • l e iparticipation in family life.
Nonetheless, Kohlberg is at pains to stress that the emergence of this 
capacity is not dependent on a particular pattern of emotional development.358 If 
role taking is not purely cognitive, neither is it dependent on the child’s emotional 
disposition. Kohlberg dismisses the significance of affective elements in moral 
judgement early in his discussion. While he acknowledges that moral judgements 
can in fact involve affective as well as cognitive states, he does not consider 
emotional elements to be in any sense determinant of moral judgement. Rather, 
the quality “of affects involved in moral judgements is determined by its 
cognitive-structural development.” In other words, while affective elements 
may accompany moral judgements, the quality or moral significance of these 
affects derives from their being generated by cognitive judgements. This 
exclusion of the role of affective elements also characterises his account of role 
taking. Role taking seems to be an ability developed through learning, a skill 
involving essentially cognitive rather than affective elements. Acquiring this 
social skill is a question of practice rather than emotional disposition.
2.2 Critique o f Kohlberg’s account
Kohlberg’s neglect of the role of affective elements creates two main 
problems for his account. First, the exclusive reliance on cognitive capacities 
leaves a gap in his account, with Kohlberg unable to explain how cognitive 
development alone is sufficient to guarantee moral maturity. Second, the 
omission of affective elements - and more particularly the disposition towards 
sympathy - contradicts the findings of a body of recent empirical research on
Ibid., p. 141 
351 Ibid., p. 142.
358 Ibid., p. 142.
359 Ib id ,  p. 140
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moral development in young children. I shall consider each of these points in 
turn.
On the first question, we have seen that he introduces the notion of role 
playing in order to explain the gap between cognitive ability and moral 
development. He argues that where an individual has developed cognitive 
capacities but has not achieved the corresponding level of moral development, 
what is missing is the relevant role taking skills. But this fails to address the 
problem. It would be possible for an individual to be both cognitively able and 
adept at role taking, and still be morally deficient. Robert Selman, on whose 
work Kohlberg bases his notion of role taking, stresses that such perspective 
taking “is a ‘neutral’ social cognitive capacity and that higher levels of 
perspective taking can be used for good or evil, for decency or deception.”360 
While Kohlberg initially introduces role taking in order to account for the gap 
between cognitive and moral development, in another essay he too acknowledges 
that “a certain cognitive-logical stage...and a certain stage of social cognition or 
role taking...are necessary but not sufficient for the parallel moral judgment 
stage.”361 The admission suggests that the incorporation of a theory of role 
playing does not after all bridge the gap between his theory of psychological 
development and his claims about moral development. In short, his psychology 
of moral development is incomplete.
Rather than bridge this gap through providing a full psychological 
account, however, Kohlberg reverts to a series of claims about the philosophical 
justification of his stage model of moral development. He draws on 
deontological theories of justice, especially that of Rawls, to defend a conception
“\fs)of morality which has the features of formalism, cognitivism and universalism 
- in short, a theory that is in line with the cognitivist accounts reviewed in Chapter
360 Selman, Robert and William Dama, "The Necessity (but Insufficiency) o f  Social Perspective 
Taking for Conceptions o f  Justice at Three Early Levels", in M oral Development: Current Theory 
an d Research, ed. David J. DePalma and Jeanne M. Foley (Hillsdale, N ew  Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1975), p. 72.
361 Kohlberg, Philosophy o f  M oral Developm ent {op. cit.), p. 190-1.
362
See Habermas’ discussion in "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action" {op. cit.), pp. 
119-122.
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Five. As he writes: “The general criterion I use in saying that a higher stage’s 
mode of judgement is more adequate than a lower stage is that of morality itself, 
not of conceptions of rationality or sophistication imported from other 
domains.” Thus there is no psychological criterion for justifying the claim that 
higher stages are superior to lower ones. The point is simply that moral argument 
suggests that the deontological conception of justice is universally valid. By 
introducing this philosophical defence, Kohlberg is thus drawing on three types of 
justification for his theory: (a) empirical research which supports the fact that all 
children develop through his stage model; (b) a cognitive development theory that 
seeks to explain this progression; and (c) a moral philosophical justification of 
stage six as a superior conception of morality. Steps (a) and (b) are clearly 
necessary for establishing the empirical truth of his theory of psychology. But it 
is not clear how (c) can strengthen his claims about psychological development.
Now we saw in Chapter Five that moral philosophical arguments of the 
cognitivist variety do not succeed in grounding claims to universal validity. 
There is little point in rehearsing the philosophical arguments used by Kohlberg 
to establish the validity of this form of moral theory, which draw on the sorts of 
cognitivist theories already discussed. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
the plausibility of different psychological theories of moral development. 
Kohlberg’s recourse to arguments of moral philosophy will not be an acceptable 
substitute for an adequate psychological theory of moral development. While 
moral philosophical accounts are closely related to psychological theory, 
psychological accounts must nonetheless provide coherent and complete 
explanations of moral development in their own right. Arguments of variety (c) 
are conceptually useful in defining the concept “morality” assumed in theories of 
moral psychology. But they cannot be used to explain the development of moral 
capacity or motivation. Kohlberg’s theory does not provide a complete 
psychology of moral development. It provides a partial explanation of moral 
development as the development of cognitive and role taking capacities, but also 
recognises that such cognitive abilities are not sufficient to guarantee the right
363 Kohlberg, Philosophy o f  Moral Development {op. cit.), p. 169.
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moral judgements. And in order to defend the superiority of the higher stages of 
moral judgement - which do not after all seem to correspond directly to cognitive 
development - he resorts to moral philosophical arguments about the universal 
validity of justice as fairness.
The incomplete nature of Kohlberg’s psychological theory is especially 
problematic given the absence of an adequate explanation of the affective 
components of moral judgement. As we saw, Kohlberg acknowledges their 
presence in mental events, but does not accord them a role in influencing moral 
judgements. They may accompany moral judgements, but they derive their moral 
significance from their being generated by cognitive structural elements. Yet the 
absence of an affective component in Kohlberg’s theory seems strange if we 
consider his account of moral motivation. He claims that his empirical research 
does not suggest a significant gap between moral judgements and action at 
different levels. Children committed to a given stage will tend to be motivated to 
act in accordance with the requirements of that stage. Yet his claims about the 
sources of motivation - at least for the later stages of moral development - are 
strikingly non-rationalist. He gives a description of six different stages of moral 
motivation, which correspond roughly to the stages of moral judgement. Here is 
a slightly shortened account of the stages:
Stage 1. A ction  is m otivated  by avoidance o f  punishm ent, and “c o n sc ien ce” is  
irrational fear o f  punishm ent.
Stage 2. A ction  is m otivated  by d esire for reward or b enefit. P ossib le  gu ilt reaction s  
are ignored and punishm ent v iew ed  in a pragm atic manner.
Stage 3. A ction  is m otivated  by anticipation o f  d isapproval o f  others, actual or  
im agined hypothetical (for  exam p le, guilt).
S tage 4. A ction  is m otivated  by anticipation o f  d ishonor; that is, in stitu tionalized  
blam e for fa ilures o f  duty, and by gu ilt over concrete harm d one to  o th e r s ....
S tage 5. There is  concern  about m aintain ing respect o f  equals and o f  the com m u n ity  
(assum in g their respect is based on reason rather than em otion s). There is a lso  
concern about ow n self-resp ect; that is, to  avoid  ju d g in g  s e l f  as irrational, 
inconsistent, nonpurposive.
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Stage 6. There is concern about self-condemnation for violating one’s own 
principles.364
The motivation for the first stages is self-interested: young children obey 
rules for essentially egoistic reasons, to avoid punishment and disapproval. The 
account at the early stages is therefore thoroughly externalist. While the child “is
'l/'C #
responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad” , the motivation to 
comply with these moral rules does not stem from the recognition of duty, but 
derives from a separate, egoistic source. Moral rules are imposed on the child 
from the outside, as it were, obeyed through fear of punishment or expectation of 
gratification. In the conventional stages, moral motivation is essentially similar, 
although the child’s cognitive development provides her with a broader 
conception of punishment and reward, which takes the form of social approval 
and disapproval rather than physical pain or gratification. Cognitive development 
also enables her to anticipate such disapproval. In the higher stages, however, 
Kohlberg’s theory of moral motivation shifts to an internalist account, in which 
recognition of moral obligation triggers motivation. At stage six, “[t]he reason
for doing right is that, as a rational person, one has seen the validity of principles
*2 / : / :
and has become committed to them.”
Now this account of motivation entirely overlooks the significance of the 
emotional disposition - and especially the role of empathy - at each stage of moral 
development. A number of development psychologists have questioned this 
omission, drawing on empirical research that suggests an empathic tendency is 
present from early infancy. In an overview of recent themes in development
Ibid., pp. 121-2.
365 Ib id , p. 379.
366 Ibid., p. 412.
367 Martin L. Hoffman, “The Development o f  Altruistic Motivation,” in M oral Development: 
Current Theory and Research, ed. David J. DePalma and Jeanne M. Foley (Hillsdale, New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1975), pp. 137-152; Nunner-Winkler, “Knowing and Wanting” 
{op. cit.); Jerome Kagan, The Nature o f  the C hild  (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Jerome Kagan 
and Sharon Lamb, eds., The Em ergence o f  M orality in Young Children  (Chicago: University o f  
Chicago Press, 1987); and Tom Kitwood, Concern fo r  Others: A New Psychology o f  Conscience 
and M orality (London and New York: Routledge, 1990). Some feminists have also challenged the 
accuracy o f  Kohlberg’s findings in relation to moral development in girls. See in particular 
Gilligan, Mapping the M oral Domain {op. cit.).
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psychology, Jerome Kagan observes that cognitivist assumptions about moral 
development have been seriously undermined by recent empirical work, showing 
that by their second year “children from many cultures show uncertainty with 
regard to broken or flawed objects, empathy with the distress of another, and
• “i / r o
anxiety over possible task failure.” Even those who are more clearly on the 
cognitive developmental side are now arguing that there seems to be a gap in the 
cognitivist account of early moral development, i.e. the omission of an 
empirically observable disposition to empathy. Rather than obeying moral 
rules from purely egoistic motives, infants and young children seem to show a 
genuine concern for others, and a desire to relieve their distress. As Nunner- 
Winkler writes, “empathy and sympathy - a spontaneous interest in the welfare of 
the other - are already noninstrumental motives of moral action for the young 
child.” This disposition to empathy is subsequently channelled into more 
complex forms of sympathy and moral duty. The child’s cognitive development 
enables her to mediate the emotional disposition to empathy, so that it can 
eventually motivate broader obligations - for example, to assist members of one’s 
community, or alleviate poverty, or provide aid to refugees. If such empathic 
tendencies are present in infancy and can be channelled into more complex moral 
duties, there is no reason to suppose that it is not also a significant source of 
motivation in the later stages of moral development.
In fact, contrary to his rationalist claims, Kohlberg’s account of 
motivation at the post-conventional level does seem to presuppose certain 
emotional elements. The notion of self-condemnation at stage six must surely be 
understood as something more than a purely cognitive state. The distress caused 
by failure to live up to one’s own principles cannot be explained solely in 
cognitive terms, as a break down in logical consistency. The type of 
embarrassment caused by inconsistent reasoning or intellectual weakness is 
qualitatively distinct from the shame and guilt caused by a failure to do one’s 
duty. Establishing a link between moral failure and feelings of guilt seems to
368 Kagan, The Emergence o f  M orality in Young Children {op. cit.), p. x.
369 Hoffman, "Altruistic Motivation" (op. cit.); Nunner-Winkler, "Knowing and Wanting" {op. 
cit.).
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require additional assumptions about the relationship between commitment to 
certain principles and one’s emotional disposition. It would be far more plausible 
to explain the distress caused by moral inconsistency in terms of a deeper 
emotional need for social recognition, or guilt at causing distress to others. But 
the link between the urge to do one’s duty and the presence of such desires is not 
elaborated or explained by Kohlberg. Rather, as we have seen, he is keen to 
downplay the role of emotions and cling to a rationalist account of motivation.
We saw in this section that Kohlberg’s account of moral development is 
incomplete, and seems to suffer from the denial of any significant affective 
component. The same can be said for his theory of motivation, which switches 
from an egoistic account at the early stages of development to a rationalist 
account at the postconventional stages. He omits any account of the role of 
empathy in moral development and motivation, or the role of other desires that 
seem to be implied by his notion of guilt and conscience at the later stages of 
morality. And this leaves his account essentially incomplete, and empirically 
questionable. We shall now turn to the second category of theories, which 
provide a more plausible account of the role of emotion in moral development 
and motivation.
3. Psycho-Analytic Theory and the Other-Regarding Self
If cognitive developmental theory is problematic because of its exclusive 
reliance on cognitive capacities, then it makes sense to turn to theories of 
psychology that place greater emphasis on affective states. Psycho-analytic 
theory is likely to provide a better account of these affective elements of 
motivation. It is based on a conception of an unconscious self as a set of pre- 
linguistic, non-rational mental states. The images and desires contained in the 
unconscious are not ordered into logical categories, but can be understood as a 
continuation of the earliest mode of conscious thought - the pre-linguistic mental 
states of the infant. The unconscious continues to be deeply affected by these
370 Nunner-Winkler, “Knowing and Wanting” (op. cit.), p. 227.
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early infantile experiences of external objects, which shape subsequent 
unconscious feelings about oneself, one’s relationships, and about the world in 
general. The unconscious can be characterised as a set of relations between 
different images that have been internalised - or “internal objects” - which have
^ 7 1
very powerful emotional associations. The relations between these internal 
objects and one’s feelings about them, which begin to be formed through 
experiences in infancy, are crucial in shaping the person’s character and 
motivation.
Psychoanalytic theory claims that most of the individual’s mental life is 
not accessible to the conscious mind. Unconscious feelings and desires can 
motivate action without passing through a conscious stage of rational 
deliberation. Thus it is possible for psychoanalytic theorists to explain (at least 
some elements of) motivation as generated by the unconscious mind. 
Unconscious mental states may also be mediated by reason and beliefs and thence 
directed onto more specific objects.
This section will consider whether psycho-analytic theory, with its notion 
of the unconscious, can provide an account of moral development and motivation 
that avoids the empirical and explanatory deficiencies of Kohlberg’s account. It 
will begin in 3.1 with a brief look at Freud’s theory of moral development, but 
find that - as in the case of Kohlberg’s theory - Freud is unable to provide an 
explanation for the disposition towards concern or empathy in young children. 
Moreover, it is premised on an overly narrow definition of morality that fails to 
include sympathy-related forms of moral action. I shall then turn to the work of 
Melanie Klein (3.2), who provides a more sophisticated and plausible account of 
the capacity for concern, or what I shall term the “empathic disposition”. Having 
outlined her account of moral development, I shall consider in 3.3 and 3.4 how 
this empathic disposition is mediated by the cognitive structure and
371 Hence an important branch o f  psychoanalytic theory is known as “object-relations” theory - 
see the entry under “Object Relations School” in R. D. Hinshelwood, A Dictionary o f  Kleinian
Thought (London: Free Association Books, 1991), pp. 367-73.
372 Indeed, this is why Kitwood thinks the term “reasons for action” is misleading. Kitwood, 
Concern fo r  Others {op. cit.), p. 93.
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intersubjective beliefs to generate motivation to extend more complex forms of 
sympathy to others.
3.1 Freud and the psychology o f  moral development
On Freud’s account, the individual's motivation to conform to moral rules 
is initially generated through fear of authority, and subsequently through guilt. 
Freud characterised this process in terms of the relationship between super-ego 
and ego. The super-ego represents the internalisation of authority figures by the 
individual - initially parents, and subsequently religious and moral rules. The 
super-ego represents the moral conscience of the individual, which manifests 
itself to the individual as a critic of the ego. It points out the inadequacies of the 
person, and chastises her for her sexual and aggressive urges, producing a sense 
of guilt. This feeling of guilt motivates the individual to impose constraints on 
the satisfaction of her desires. According to Freud, it is this permanent conflict 
between internalised authority and natural desires that produced the sorts of 
neurotic conditions he was treating in his patients.
At the social level, Freud argued that there was a basic conflict between 
individual desires and moral obligations. Moral norms constrain the individual’s 
pursuit of her egoistic desires, obliging her to conform and repress her unsatisfied 
drives. The individual’s natural egoism is thus in conflict with the requirements 
of social interaction, which oblige her to sacrifice her sexual and aggressive urges 
to ensure social harmony. There is no compromise or resolution between these 
two forces, since, as Rieff observes, "the individual can neither extirpate his 
instincts nor wholly reject the demands of society".374 Individuals in society thus 
face an ongoing struggle between the demands of civilisation and individual 
happiness.375
373 Sigmund Freud, "Civilization and its Discontents" [1929], in Civilization, Society and Religion 
(London: Penguin, 1985), p. 316-7.
374
Philip Rieff, Freud: The M ind o f  the M oralist (London: Methuen, 1960), p. 28.
375 Freud, "Civilization and its Discontents" (op. cit.), p. 306, and pp. 334-5.
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In his essays on society and civilisation, Freud argued that it was only 
through ensuring respect for (at least some) regulative norms that certain benefits 
of civilisation could be assured, notably the absence of physical pain and 
conflict. Yet while Freud considered such rules to be a largely unavoidable 
feature of civilisation, he was critical of the stringent moral and religious codes of
inn  ^ m
his day. Prevalent moral and religious codes were too rigorous in their
•  •  • 1 * 7 0constraint of natural urges, producing strong feelings of inadequacy and guilt.
To avoid inflicting this guilt on the individual, Freud stressed the importance of 
taking into account people's desires in defining moral duty. Such desires, he 
argued, are an intrinsic part of human nature, and by overlooking them one risked 
simply increasing their force. Where moral obligations are seen as detached from 
and in opposition to personal inclination, obedience to the moral law will require 
the repression of these desires. When this is taken to extremes, the results may be 
counter-productive to the very aspirations of morality: “temptations are merely 
increased by constant frustration, whereas an occasional satisfaction of them
•  -570causes them to diminish, at least for the time being.” According to Freud, the 
search for moral purity or asceticism was a response to a particularly remorseless
IDA
super-ego. The person burdened with a harsh superego may become either 
unhealthily masochistic, or else rebel against the demands of the superego and 
indulge in delinquency. In the latter case, the guilt caused by the inordinate 
demands of morality as represented by the super-ego may lead the individual to 
seek relief from her guilt through disobedience and the resulting punishment. In
376 Freud argues that the state o f  nature does not guarantee satisfaction. Freud, "The Future o f  an 
Illusion", in Civilisation, Society and Religion  (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 194. As Wollheim  
points out, in Freud’s account these benefits are derived not so much from pleasure, as from the
absence o f  pain. See Richard Wollheim, Freud  (London: Fontana, 1971), p. 225.
377 Freud was ambivalent on the value o f  civilisation, suggesting that it could be both harmful for 
the individual but also necessary for the functioning o f  society. See "Civilisation" {op. cit.), p. 
340. But he was unequivocally critical o f  certain forms o f  b elief systems that imposed stringent 
rules on individuals, and particularly religion. See his "Future o f  an Illusion", {op. cit.); and 
Wollheim, Freud {op. cit.), p. 223.
378 Rieff, Freud {op. cit.), pp. 276-280.
379 Freud, "Civilization and its Discontents" {op. cit.), p. 318.
Richard W ollheim, "From Voices to Values: The Growth o f  Moral Sense", in The Thread o f  
Life, ed. Richard Wollheim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 202-3.
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this case, as Wollheim observes, morality “motivates what it denounces as its
101
own infraction,” thus having a counter-productive effect.
This concept of the interplay of super-ego and ego is plausible as an 
account of a certain type of fear or guilt based motivation to obey rules. Indeed, 
the dangers of excessively stringent moral obligations was raised as a problem for 
theories of impartial morality in the Introduction. But it is also based on a rather 
narrow conception of morality. Freud’s theory implies a coercive, punitive 
conception of moral duty, one that was perhaps characteristic of Victorian values 
and may still be a feature of some religious systems. But it is not a conception 
that finds widespread currency today. Most significantly for the current 
discussion, this notion of coercive moral constraints does not seem to take into 
account forms of moral duty based on sympathy. Moreover, partly because of his 
narrow definition of morality, Freud fails to appreciate that young children can 
and do display a capacity for concern. This capacity for empathy, as we saw in 
the last section, is evident in infants and young children from early on, certainly 
prior to the internalisation of authority figures in the super-ego that Freud 
describes. In short, Freud’s account faces the same empirical weakness as that of 
Kohlberg; and it employs a narrow definition of morality that provides only a 
partial description of moral agency.
On the normative level, we should note that Freud’s account assumes a 
sharp distinction between the self and society, positing a conception of the self as 
a set of egoistic desires that are defined independently of, or prior to, social 
interaction. Moral action is only possible because guilt and fear of suffering 
motivate the individual to check her egoistic desires, this process taking the form 
of the internalisation of moral norms through the super-ego. Intersubjective
381 Wollheim, "Voices to Values" (op. cit.), p. 204; Ernest Wallwork, Psychoanalysis and Ethics 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 290. Interestingly, Freud associated unhealthy 
ascetism in the individual with Kantian ethics. He considered that the Kantian conception o f  
rational and impartial ethics established a set o f  demands and a conception o f  moral agency that 
would be readily absorbed by a harsh super-ego, and would increase the individual’s feelings o f
guilt. See Wallwork, ibid.
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values do not shape the individual’s desires, except in the instrumental sense of 
directing a need for survival or desire satisfaction to the internalisation of social 
rules. Thus while he acknowledges the role of emotions, Freud’s account 
nonetheless shares an important feature with the cognitivist developmental 
account. It posits a conflict between individual desires and moral obligations. 
Moral norms constrain the individual’s pursuit of her egoistic desires, obliging 
her to conform and repress her unsatisfied drives.
Thus Freud’s account is unsatisfactory for normative as well as empirical 
and conceptual reasons. His theory of unconscious drives may accord a greater 
role to affective states than was the case with Kohlberg’s theory. But his failure 
to provide an account of the development for concern for others leaves his theory 
of moral agency incomplete, and reproduces the old problem of the assumed 
dichotomy between personal (egoistic) inclinations and the requirements of 
morality.
3.2 Klein and the desire for reparation
Kleinian psychoanalytic theory avoids this dichotomy model, and would 
seem to provide better prospects for constructing a psychology of moral 
development. Although trained in the Freudian school, Melanie Klein’s theory 
significantly departed from that of Freud, and her account of the self and its 
relation to others can be characterised as “relational” rather than individualistic. 
While Freud considered that the individual’s drives originated as tensions within 
the body, for Klein they were “emotions - passions - directed towards others, real 
or imaginary, from the very beginning of life.” Now these unconscious 
emotions were not necessarily egoistic drives that needed to be constrained by the 
super-ego. Rather, where the infant was able to develop positive object relations, 
she would develop a capacity for concern for others, which could provide a 
source of moral motivation. Klein’s theory therefore provides the basis for a
383
C. Fred Alford, Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory: An Account o f  Politics, Art and  
Reason Based on her Psychoanalytic Theory (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
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more positive and sympathetic account of moral development, which emphasises 
the role of love and empathy. On this account, the source of the capacity for 
morality is not located in an external set of duties which we obey from fear, but in 
our personal disposition, our preferences and sentiments. The capacity for 
concern initially develops in the infant through her relationship with her mother 
or other primary carer.
The infant is dependent on the mother to satisfy his need for nourishment 
and care, and when this desire is being gratified he feels intense love for her. But, 
as Klein writes, “when the baby is hungry and his desires are not gratified, or 
when he is feeling bodily pain or discomfort, then the whole situation suddenly 
alters. Hatred and aggressive feelings are aroused and he becomes dominated by 
the impulses to destroy the very person who is the object of all his desires...” 
Initially, the infant perceives the loved and the hated mother as two separate 
objects - a phenomenon described by Kleinians as “splitting”. Splitting 
involves the separation of objects into totally good and wholly bad parts. Thus 
the loved mother appears as a good object, whom the infant loves and wants to 
keep, while the hated mother is a bad object who is threatening and persecuting,
o o o
and towards whom the infant feels aggression. Under favourable conditions 
the child will gradually come to build up an internal experience o f a good mother, 
and the fear of the bad object, characterised by Klein as a kind o f paranoia, will 
diminish. As this occurs, the infant will be able to integrate the good and the bad 
objects, and recognise his mother as a whole person who is the object of both love 
and aggression. Through integrating his ambivalent feelings, the child is able to
384 Admittedly, these relational desires can be understood as ultimately derived from the 
individual's dependence on others for survival, and thus are in a sense egoistic. But the desires 
generated by this form o f  dependence arise as fundamentally relational rather than individualistic 
impulses. Unlike on the Freudian or Kohlbergian account, the sentiments and desires stemming 
from the organism's dependence on others involve a mesh o f  self-interested and other-regarding
impulses which are psychologically and conceptually inextricable.
385 For the sake o f  simplicity, I shall assume that the primary carer w ill be the mother, although I
am not precluding that this role could be competently performed by another woman or man.
386 Melanie Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945  (London: Vintage,
1998), pp. 306-7.
387 For a more precise definition o f  these terms, see Hanna Segal, Introduction to the Work o f  
Melanie Klein  (London: Hogarth Press/Institute o f  Psychoanalysis, 1973), p. 128.
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develop positive object relations in his unconscious mind, thus laying the 
foundations for a more trusting and confident experience of the world.
This integration of good and bad objects, however, produces a new 
anxiety in the baby and a fear of loss, as she becomes (at least unconsciously) 
aware of her destructive intentions towards the object of her love. This ushers in 
what Klein terms the “depressive position”, in which the infant feels guilt and 
distress at her own ambivalent feelings towards her mother. This anxiety about 
her destructive feelings generates a desire to repair the damage done or intended 
to the good object. And it is this desire for reparation that characterises love in 
the depressive position. As Klein explains:
S id e  by sid e  w ith  the destructive im pu lses in the u n con sc iou s m ind both o f  the 
ch ild  and o f  the adult, there ex ists  a profound urge to  m ake sacr ifices , in order to 
help and to  put right loved  p eop le  w h o  in phantasy have b een  harm ed or destroyed. 
In the depths o f  the m ind, the urge to  m ake p eop le  happy is  linked  up w ith  a strong 
fee lin g  o f  resp on sib ility  and con cern  for them , w hich  m anifests it s e lf  in genu ine  
sym pathy w ith  other p eop le  and in the ab ility  to understand them , as th ey  are and 
as they  fe e l.389
According to Klein, the capacity for concern is developed in the context of 
the infant’s relationship with her mother, specifically the anxiety caused by the 
integration of loved and hated object. This generates a form of concern for the 
well-being of the mother, which can be characterised as an empathic disposition 
(although Klein did not use this term). Elements of such an empathic disposition 
seem to be present in the infant from birth, when she is able to feel love for her 
mother as the provider of care and nourishment. But it is only in the depressive 
position, in response to the desire for reparation, that love takes on the quality of a 
more active concern for the other. As R. D. Hinshelwood writes, “With this step 
comes a new capacity for love. Concern, sorrow and love for the whole object 
are for  the object itself, not merely for the gratification it gives.”390 The
388
This feeling o f  persecution is in fact a projection o f  the infant’s own aggressive feelings
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389 Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation {op. cit.), p. 311.
390 Hinshelwood, Dictionary o f  Kleinian Thought {op. cit.), p. 141.
232
disposition to other-regarding concern develops at the point at which the infant 
starts to recognise her mother as a whole object, usually from the age of about six 
months. And it is only later on, in around the fifth year, that the Freudian super­
ego emerges. Klein does not deny the emergence of a moral conscience through 
this Freudian process of internalising authority figures. But she considers the 
prior relationship with the mother to be more significant in shaping subsequent 
relations with others.
Now while Klein’s account of the desire for reparation can help explain 
the capacity to feel concern for the mother, it is not prima facie evident how this 
will help us to explain moral concern for a broader group of objects. In fact, three 
main steps will be required to move from an account of the desire for reparation 
to the capacity for sympathy for a wider and more abstract set of objects. First, 
we need to explain how the desire for reparation can continue to motivate 
empathy or concern beyond the temporal phase of the early relationship between 
infant and mother. Second, we must establish that this concern can be applied to 
a wider set of objects, in other words that the scope of concern can be extended. 
And third, we need to show how the desire for reparation can be channelled into 
more complex forms of sympathy, as well as socially defined conceptions of duty, 
i.e. how its content can change. The remainder of the section will consider the 
first two steps, while the third step will be discussed in section 3.3.
In terms of the extension of the desire for reparation to other objects, it is 
important to stress the profound influence of the initial relation of the infant to 
her mother on the child’s subsequent relationships. The depressive anxiety 
experienced in the early relationship with the mother shapes the individual’s 
relations with other objects in the external world - initially family members, and 
eventually a wider circle of people. The individual’s relationships to some extent 
replicate the initial relation to the mother, combining elements of love and 
aggression, and generating guilt and a desire for reparation. Thus a similar 
pattern of guilt and concern will occur in the individual’s relation to society at 
large. The replication of this pattern of relations can be explained through the 
notion of the internal world, which, as we have seen, comprises a set of relations
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between internal objects. These object relations in the unconscious mind 
continue to affect how we view the world and our relationships with others. As 
Segal observes, the depressive position can be characterised as a “a specific 
configuration of object relations, anxieties and defences which persist throughout
■IQ 1
life.” The depressive position does not simply denote a developmental stage, 
but continues to influence relations with others, motivating reparative action in 
subsequent relationships. As we shall see, this desire for reparation can be 
extended to a more abstract group of objects, for example one’s community or 
nation, or a specific needy group such as the poor or sick. The more detailed 
specification of the scope and relevant characteristics of the group in question 
will be dependent on the particular shared values of one’s society, as will be 
explained in the next section.
Before moving to the question of how empathy is channelled into the 
performance of moral duty, it is important to stress the appeal of Klein’s 
relational account. As we saw in the discussion of Kohlberg’s theory, a number 
of development psychologists are keen to stress the important role of empathy in
'XQ'y •  •moral development. The early empathic disposition observed by these 
psychologists is pre-linguistic and nonrational, and cannot be explained with 
reference to conscious reason and cognitive capacities. Explaining a pre- or non- 
cognitive disposition by definition requires making assumptions about the 
nonrational and unconscious affective features of the self. The Kleinian account 
offers an account of the emergence of these features, an account which is in 
principle consistent with the more conventional scientific research of 
development psychologists who stress the role of empathy in moral development. 
In the absence of a fuller development psychology account of this pre-rational 
disposition, the Kleinian account seems to offer the most plausible and full
' I Q ' l
explanation of the early development of the capacity for empathy.
391 Segal, M elanie Klein (op. cit.), p. ix
392 See note 367, supra.
393 Winnicott also offers an account o f  early moral development, but his theory is essentially 
compatible with the Kleinian account, although it places relatively more emphasis on the child’s 
external environment than her internal states. See D. W. Winnicott, M aturational Processes and  
the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory o f  Emotional Developm ent (London: Hogarth 
Press, 1979).
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3.3 Mediation through the cognitive structure
The previous section suggested how the desire for reparation can generate 
concern for others. The reparative action initially triggered in the depressive 
position also set a pattern for subsequent relations with a wider circle of people. 
Now while the empathic disposition is present in most individuals from early on, 
it can only be channelled into more complex forms of sympathy as the individual 
develops her cognitive capacities. The empathic tendency is mediated through 
the child’s cognitive structure and through her society’s intersubjective beliefs to 
motivate various forms of altruistic action. In the discussion that follows, I shall 
start by considering the influence of cognitive mediation, and then examine the 
role of intersubjective beliefs.
It should be recalled that although the discussion on cognitive 
development theory criticised Kohlberg’s neglect of affective elements in 
explaining moral development, it did not deny that cognitive elements of the self 
play an important role in moral judgement. The individual’s cognitive capacities 
are clearly vital in helping direct and modify the empathic disposition. Without 
the influence of cognitive capacities, feelings of empathy would be unable to 
progress beyond infantile anxiety at the distress of others. In order to develop 
into forms of compassion and sympathy, empathy must be channelled in more 
intelligent ways. The question becomes that of how the affective disposition 
already explained by Kleinian theory can be mediated by the sorts of cognitive 
capacities described by Kohlberg and the like.
The development psychologist Martin Hoffman offers an account of this 
interaction, in an attempt to “pull together what is known about the individual’s 
affective response to another person’s distress, on the one hand, and cognitive 
development and role taking, on the other.”394 Hoffman does not espouse a 
Kleinian account, nor does he provide an alternative theory of the source of 
empathy. But he argues on the basis of his observations and empirical research
394
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that empathy seems to be a key element in explaining altruistic behaviour. 
However, since empathy is “a response to cues about the affective states of 
others”, it must also be dependent on the individual’s cognitive development.395
Hoffman attempts to clarify this interaction, distinguishing three main 
steps in cognitive development that will influence the empathic disposition. First, 
the infant must develop a sense of the other as a separate physical object. This 
cognitive capacity, usually developed in the second half of the first year, is a 
precondition for recognising that the object of empathy is a separate person.396 
Empathy can thus be channelled into a basic form of sympathy, understood as 
concern for a separate other, rather than a more general feeling of distress that 
does not distinguish between the self and other as experiencing distress. At this 
first stage, the infant is as yet unable to conceive of the other’s inner states (her 
thoughts, perceptions and needs) as different from her own. This is only possible 
at the second stage, where the child develops a sense of the other as having her 
own perspective. At this level, usually reached after the second year, the child 
can develop the capacity for basic role taking, and make a more active effort to 
put herself in the other’s place. She can thus orient her concern towards 
understanding and addressing the specific concerns of the other.397 At the third 
stage the individual develops an understanding of the other as having her own 
continuous personal identity, and thus as the subject of a whole series of inner 
states that extend beyond the immediate situation. Hoffman argues that this is 
likely to occur at around six to nine years. Empathy can at this stage be 
channelled into concern for the other’s longer term distress, her past suffering and 
future prospects, and whether or not these conform to an acceptable standard of 
well-being.398 So while at all of these stages it is the empathic disposition that 
motivates the individual to act, she can only truly be concerned and act on the 
distress of others once she has acquired the relevant cognitive capacities.399
Ibid., p. 139.
396 Ibid., p. 145.
397 Ibid., pp. 141, 146.
398 Ibid., p. 147.
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Hoffman has extended this account of the interaction of empathy and 
cognitive development to explain the possibility of commitment to certain moral 
values or ideological goals. In his later work, he went on to suggest a fourth level 
of cognitive development, at which the individual is able to understand social 
concepts and thus channel empathic feelings into concern for the distress of 
specific groups, for example victims of poverty or violence.
T h e com b ination  o f  em pathic a ffect and the p erceived  p light o f  an unfortunate group  
m ay be the m ost d evelop m en ta lly  advanced  form  o f  em pathic d istress. It m ay a lso  
provide a  m otive  base, e sp e c ia lly  in ad o lescen ce , for the d evelop m en t o f  certain  
m oral and p o litica l id eo lo g ie s  centered  around allev iation  o f  the p ligh t o f  
unfortunate groups.400
This account of empathy mediated by cognitive development may thus explain 
certain types of moral and ideological commitments to specific groups, or even to 
the rest of humanity.
3.4 Mediation through intersubjective values and beliefs
While there is clearly a link between empathy, cognitive development and 
more complex moral commitments to alleviate suffering, Hoffman’s account 
nonetheless omits a third important component of moral action: the role of 
intersubjective values and beliefs. These can be understood as the shared beliefs, 
values and moral norms of the child’s community, which shape her conceptions 
of virtue and moral duty, as well as her understanding of the social world and the 
conditions for well-being. These intersubjective beliefs and values will influence 
the empathic disposition in two main ways. First, shared moral norms and values 
may directly influence how the individual channels empathy. A society that 
defines charity as a virtue, or has a strong tradition of redistributive justice, may 
encourage the individual to channel her empathic disposition into helping the 
poor, or voting for progressive taxation. The relevant values need not be shared 
by the whole society, but may be espoused by a subset of the community, for
399 Ibid., p. 149
400 Martin L. Hoffinan, Martin L., "Empathy, its Limitations, and its Role in a Comprehensive 
Moral Theory", in M oral D evelopm ent through Social Interaction  ed. William M. Kurtines and 
Jacob L. Gewirtz (New York and Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1984), p. 287.
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example a religious group or social class. These values have a formative 
influence on the individual, shaping her beliefs about how she ought to realise her 
empathic disposition or desire for reparation.
Richard Wollheim seems to have this form of intersubjective mediation in 
mind when he argues that the desire for reparation can be matched symbolically 
to intersubjective values. As a philosopher influenced by the work of Kleinian 
psychoanalytic theory, he argues that moral development involves the individual 
finding a parallel or “match” between the desire for reparation and her society’s 
moral codes. Society provides the child with a channel or, in Wollheim’s 
language, a "metaphor" for reparative action, so that the internalisation of shared 
values is itself motivated by the desire for reparation.
For what the community does is to fix, or pin down, the otherwise unregulated 
discernment of match or correspondence. The metaphors of reparation, which is 
what reparative action sets itself to satisfy, come to the moral agent, even before 
that is what he is, encoded in sittlichkeit or custom. Even if the agent remakes 
these correspondences, reinvents them, which is what he will want to do if he is 
any way a critic of his society and its ways, they provide him with the initial 
exemplars of match.401 
This notion of correspondence is not fully elaborated by Wollheim, but 
nonetheless gives some indication as to how reparation and morality could be 
linked.
The second way in which intersubjective beliefs and values may mediate 
empathy is through their influence on the individual’s cognitive development. 
This type of influence is more indirect than the first: shared beliefs mediate the 
individual’s cognitive categories, which in turn influence her empathic 
disposition. While we have so far been assuming that the individual’s cognitive 
structure is neutral between different values, there are a number of ways in which 
its categories may be influenced by the particular social matrix. If we consider 
Hoffman’s three stages of cognitive development, we can see that the types of 
distinctions made by the child at different levels are likely to be influenced by her
401 Wollheim, "Voices to Values" {op. cit.), p. 217.
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society’s understanding of the social world, of human flourishing and the good 
life.
At the first stage of cognitive development, the recognition of the 
separateness of persons is likely to be unmediated by intersubjective beliefs, 
occurring as it does in the pre-linguistic stage, and before the infant is able to 
internalise social practices. However, stages two and three provide more scope 
for the influence of particular beliefs and values. At stage two, as the child learns 
to conceive of others as having separate needs and desires, she is likely to be 
influenced by intersubjective beliefs about which of these inner states are worthy 
of attention and categorisation. For example, in a culture that is stoical about 
suffering and where showing pain is a sign of weakness, children may be less 
inclined to discern this type of suffering in others. If certain levels of pain do not 
deserve concern and attention, such forms of suffering will not be treated as 
significant in the same way as other relevant forms of distress. These levels of 
pain are less likely to feature as categories influencing the individual’s perception 
of distress in others.
The influence of shared values is even more important at stage three, 
where the child learns to conceive of others’ inner states as persisting over time, 
thus triggering sympathy for their past or future condition. At this level, shared 
conceptions of the good life and conditions for human flourishing will feature 
heavily in determining the relevant features of others that may or may not 
generate sympathy. For example, in some cultures a life of self-imposed poverty 
may be esteemed or envied as the path to redemption; or dying in battle may be 
admired as a glorious sacrifice for the nation. Juvenile delinquency may evoke 
sympathy or criticism; and the lives of a dissolute poet or a religious martyr may 
trigger condemnation or sympathetic admiration, or perhaps no strong reaction at 
all. In these cases, conceptions of the good life will influence how the individual 
defines and recognises distress in others.
Finally, at Hoffman’s fourth level, the categories used to explain social 
phenomena - class, profession, ethnic groups, religion and so on - will influence 
how the child characterises the object of sympathy. Again, these categories will
239
vary according to intersubjective values, as well as the society’s interpretation of 
history and society.
Intersubjective values and beliefs will thus influence the individual’s 
cognitive development through shaping the categories she employs for 
distinguishing relevant inner states, and subsequently the conditions for well­
being and conceptions of the good life, as well as the social concepts used to 
characterise different groups. These cognitive categories will in turn mediate the 
individual’s empathic disposition, allowing for more precise specification of the 
objects of her concern. In the case of liberal values, intersubjective conceptions 
of justice encourage the individual to abstract from what are considered to be 
morally arbitrary features of individuals, such as nationality, race or religion. The 
scope of those to whom sympathy is extended will be influenced by shared liberal 
beliefs. The liberal tradition of moral thought identifies well-being with the 
exercise of a capacity for reason and autonomy. Again, this conception of well­
being will influence the individual’s definition of relevant categories of distress. I 
shall return to these issues in the final chapter.
In summary, both cognitive capacities and intersubjective values and 
beliefs help direct the empathic disposition. First, following Hoffman’s account, 
it is clear that cognitive structures mediate empathy to create more intellectually 
sophisticated forms of sympathy. Second, shared values also provide more 
detailed conceptions of moral duty that channel sympathy. And third, 
intersubjective values and beliefs shape the child’s cognitive categories, thereby 
indirectly influencing the interaction of empathic disposition and cognitive 
structure. It should be stressed that in all of these cases, motivation is generated 
by the individual’s emotional disposition, and then mediated by cognitive and 
cultural elements. The account of how empathy is channelled is therefore 
consistent with the interdependence thesis outlined in Chapter Five.
4. Internalising Intersubjective Norms
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The account of empathy developed in the last section aimed to explain 
how the individual is capable of sympathy and related forms of moral concern. 
The empathic disposition and its mediated forms are central to explaining the 
personal disposition to recognise and be motivated to respect moral duties. But 
the theory of moral motivation is still incomplete in two senses. First, it remains 
to be explained why the individual is motivated to internalise the intersubjective 
values that mediate her empathic disposition. Why should she be inclined to latch 
on to shared values as a guide for channelling empathy, rather than relying on her 
own affective instincts and cognitive structure? In answering this question, it is 
not enough to describe how the self is constituted by shared values, as some 
communitarian thinkers have done.402 Rather, one needs to show how the 
individual’s needs and desires dispose her to engage in the type of social 
interaction that enables this internalisation to occur.
The second reason the theory is incomplete is that it can only account for a 
limited - albeit important - category of moral action. Empathy mediated by 
cognitive elements can explain motivation to be guided by moral norms and 
values related to forms of sympathy, concern and altruism. But it cannot explain 
conformity with norms of justice that are not sympathy based - or at least it will 
not be able to explain them under the rubric of moral motivation.403 Now while a 
conception of duties to non-nationals is likely to fall within the category of 
sympathy based morality, I am nonetheless keen to show that the nonrationalist 
account of moral motivation can explain motivation to respect all types of moral
402 See, for example, Charles Taylor, Sources o f  the Self: The Making o f  Modern Identity 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989); Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits 
o f  Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Axel Honneth, The Struggle fo r  
Recognition: The M oral Grammar o f  Social Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1995). I will be examining communitarian accounts o f  the ontology o f  the se lf in the next
chapter.
403 This limitation o f  sympathy-based accounts can be traced back to Hume’s ill-fated attempt to 
define justice as an “artificial virtue”. Since the motivation to obey rules o f  justice could not in all 
cases be generated by sympathy, Hume argued that they must derive instead from the individual’s 
self-interest in agreeing to a set o f  rules to regulate human interaction in order to avoid conflict. 
See David Hume, A Treatise o f  Human Nature [1739], ed. Ernest C. Mossner (London: Penguin, 
1969), pp. 529-36. This account creates a “free rider” problem, and suggests that the motivation 
to obey rules o f  justice cannot be explained simply in terms o f  the self-interest o f individuals. See 
Barry Stroud, Hume (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 202-18. My account is not 
open to the free rider problem, as its theory o f motivation is “relational” rather than 
individualistic. But as we shall see in the next chapter, it must still confront the question o f  how to
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duty, including forms of justice for regulating conflict. I shall therefore devote 
this last section of the chapter to a brief examination of the source of this type of 
moral motivation.
4.1 The desire for affirmation
Both of the gaps in the empathy-based account referred to above can be 
bridged through an account of the individual's motivation to internalise 
intersubjective norms. As I suggested in Chapter Five, two main affective 
elements of the self are relevant to morality: the empathic disposition and the 
desire for affirmation. The desire for affirmation motivates the individual to 
internalise available intersubjective norms and values, thus explaining motivation 
to respect norms that are not evidently related to sympathy-based morality.
In order to explain the desire for affirmation, we need to return to the 
Kleinian account of the development of the capacity for concern. Now while this 
description of individual development focused on the emergence of the empathic 
disposition, it said little about the external environment required to ensure the 
relevant development. Klein’s work emphasises the infant’s development from 
the perspective of her internal states, rather than the external environment that 
enables this development. This question of the required external conditions - 
what Donald Winnicott calls the “facilitating environment” - is crucial for 
understanding the self s interaction with her social matrix.404 The infant requires 
a certain level of love and affirmation if she is to be capable of integrating good 
and bad objects and more generally of forming constructive relationships and 
developing a sense of concern for others. This affirmation enables her to develop 
a basic confidence in herself and her environment.
Affirmation is not only instrumental to developing a capacity for concern; 
it is also a more basic requirement for individual well-being. Affirmation
account for motivation to obey norms that are not directly linked to sympathy.
404 See D. W. Winnicott, Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in 
the Theory o f  Em otional Developm ent (London: Hogarth Press, 1979).
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reassures the individual that she is wanted, or belongs. The search for this form 
of reassurance influences the individual’s relation to her environment. The need 
for affirmation generates a certain pattern of interaction between the infant and 
her environment. It motivates the infant to internalise the standards and rules 
conveyed by her parents as the criteria for achieving affirmation. Conformity 
with these standards - whether this involves fitting shapes into the correct slots, 
learning a new word or being gentle with a younger sibling - will tend to provoke 
an affirming response from parents or carers, thus fulfilling the need for 
affirmation and approval from her loved objects. As Axel Honneth writes, “By 
putting oneself in the normative point of view of its interaction partner, the other 
subject takes over the partner’s moral values and applies them to its practical 
relation to itself.”405
The need for affirmation, like the desire for reparation, is not simply a 
temporal stage in the child’s development. It is an ongoing emotional need that 
motivates the individual to gain approval and respect from friends, relatives, 
school teachers, and eventually a wider social and professional community. Yet 
the relationship between the emotional need for affirmation in love relations and 
the need for more impersonal forms of social affirmation is highly complex. It is 
worth briefly considering how it has been dealt with in recent literature on 
“recognition”. A critical examination of these accounts will help clarify the steps 
needed to link affirmation to the internalisation of social norms. While broadly 
sympathetic with these accounts, I shall argue that they nonetheless fail to draw a 
satisfactory link between the personal desire for affirmation, and how this desire 
is socially mediated into a struggle for recognition.
A number of contemporary Hegelians - notably Charles Taylor and Axel 
Honneth - have attempted to explain the desire for recognition in the social and 
legal spheres in terms of a basic human need. The emotional need for recognition 
in love relations is broadened out to a parallel need for recognition in the sphere 
of legal rights, and in the ethical sphere. But it is not clear on these accounts how
405 Honneth, Struggle fo r  Recognition (op. cit.), p. 77.
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securing social esteem or being recognised as a legal rights-holder is related to the 
emotional need for affirmation. Honneth, for example, provides a cogent 
description of the individual’s need for recognition in the sphere of love relations, 
based on Winnicott’s theory of child development. He asserts that recognition in 
this personal sphere is a “precondition for the development of all further attitudes 
of self-respect”.406 But the question of how such a need influences the struggle 
for social and legal recognition remains obscure in Honneth's account. In what 
sense is the individual emotionally dependent on wider forms of social 
recognition for her well-being, and how is social recognition related to more 
intimate recognition in love relations?
Both Honneth and Taylor seem to assume that the need for social and 
legal recognition can be explained through an ontological account of the self as 
constituted through interaction with others. Drawing on Hegel and Mead, 
Honneth argues that the individual’s identity is constituted by an ever wider circle 
of partners. The individual is dependent on recognition from these other people 
and groups in order to develop a self-conscious identity. But this ontological 
account simply describes a process in which the individual’s self-conscious 
identity (or “self-relation” in Honneth’s terms) is formed through intersubjective 
relations. It does not explain why the self should be disposed to engage in such 
interaction in order to achieve this form of self-relation. Nor does it explain why 
the individual should be motivated to strive for respect and recognition from her 
community. It is a plausible ontology of the individual, but ultimately fails to 
explain what psychological factors drive the individual in this process. What is 
absent is an account of the role of the affective elements of the self in the struggle 
for recognition.
Honneth’s failure to link his psychoanalytic account to the social and legal 
spheres seems to be especially problematic in view of his account of the 
consequences of a breakdown in these forms of respect. He argues that this 
failure of recognition triggers an emotional reaction in the individual. Indeed, the
406 Ibid., pp. 106-8.
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possibility of such an affective reaction is a crucial assumption in his theory of 
how social resistance is motivated by the need for recognition.407 But despite the 
importance for his account of linking emotional need with the social sphere, he 
offers no explanation of how insult and disrespect would generate an affective 
reaction. The closest he comes to elucidating the emotional significance of social 
recognition is in a passage on social approval.
In order to acquire a successful relation-to-self, one is dependent on the 
intersubjective recognition of one’s abilities and accomplishments. Were one never 
to experience this type of social approval at some stage of one’s development, this 
would open up a psychological gap within one’s personality, into which negative 
emotional reactions such as shame or rage could step 408 
The leap from ontological description to emotional need in this passage is 
unjustified. A description of the importance of social recognition for cognitive 
development cannot explain the emotional need for recognition, nor the 
motivation to develop this form of self-conscious identity. As we saw in the case 
of Kohlberg’s account of motivation, cognitive failure alone cannot generate the 
affective reaction of shame or guilt. Instead, Honneth needs to show how this 
account of individual development in the sphere of love relations influences the 
struggle for recognition in the social sphere.
We can begin to elucidate such a link by considering why shame cannot 
be explained simply by reference to social disrespect. On Honneth’s account, the 
level of shame experienced seems to be a function of the extent of disrespect 
shown. Now social insult is clearly an intersubjectively defined form of 
disrespect. Unlike more intimate forms of personal violation such as those 
described by Honneth, the extent of shame felt at an insult will vary according to 
particular social conditions. Thus in a society that values courage, the accusation 
of cowardice will evoke more shame than in a society that sets store by prudence. 
Nonetheless, the extent to which individuals are dependent on social esteem also 
seems to vary in relation to their development in the sphere of love relations. The
407 As he writes, the central question for his account is: “how is it that the experience o f  disrespect 
is anchored in the affective life o f  human subjects in such a way that it can provide the 
motivational impetus for social resistance and conflict, indeed, for a struggle for recognition?” 
Struggle fo r  Recognition {op. cit.), p. 132.
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link between the need for personal and social affirmation is by no means simple, 
but it seems clear that the level of affection received in the personal sphere can 
significantly affect the desire for recognition in the social sphere. For example, a 
lack of attention from parents may generate a strong need for social recognition, 
channelled into either delinquency or professional ambition. Alternatively, 
affirmation through one’s personal relations could increase a person’s confidence 
to claim respect from others. Thus the relationship between the need for 
recognition in the personal and social spheres can take different forms. The point 
of these examples is not so much to explain the precise nature of this relationship, 
but simply to argue that the two spheres are not independent of one another. They 
are not “parallel” or “equivalent” in the sense suggested by Honneth - but rather, 
they influence one another in important ways.
What this suggests is that social recognition is closely linked to the 
emotional need for affirmation. The desire for respect and esteem is likely to vary 
at lesist partly as a function of the individual’s need for affirmation in the sphere 
of love relations. But this does not mean that the precise content of socially 
defined norms is not also relevant in determining the consequences of a break­
down in social respect. Shared values and norms will define the standards and 
criteria for recognition in the social and legal spheres. And the individual seeking 
affirmation - be it from her professional, religious or social community - will 
internalise the relevant standards in order to gain this affirmation. The desire for 
affirmation motivates the individual to latch onto intersubjective norms in much 
the same way as it motivates the child to respect the standards conveyed by her 
parents. She has a basic need for this form of approval in order to feel confident 
about herself. This basic need is best characterised as an affective element of the 
self, which motivates the internalisation of intersubjective norms.
m  Ibid., p. 136.
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4.2 The personal disposition to impartial morality
In conclusion, two affective elements of the self explain moral motivation: 
the empathic disposition and the desire for affirmation. The former provides the 
motivation to extend concern to others, thus explaining the possibility of 
sympathy based morality. And the desire for affirmation motivates the individual 
to internalise intersubjective norms and values, that both mediate the empathic 
disposition, and generate commitment to non-sympathy based moral norms. Both 
of these affective elements are shaped by the individual’s cognitive structure, as 
well as her society’s shared beliefs and vales.
This account should be contrasted to both the cognitive developmental 
and the Freudian theories of moral development criticised in section two. These 
accounts characterised moral duty as a constraint on the pursuit of self-interest. 
For Freud, morality required repressing natural drives; and for the cognitive 
developmental theorists, the moral agent was rationally motivated to abstract 
from her personal perspective to adopt an impartial point of view. The alternative 
nonrationalist theory of motivation developed in this chapter offers a very 
different conception of the relationship between personal and moral perspectives. 
Morality is not a constraint on self-interest, but is itself motivated by affective 
features of the self. The empathic disposition suggests that concern for others is 
an integral part of the person’s emotional makeup, helping shape her desires and 
interests. Far from being constrained by reason, this affective element is 
mediated by the individual’s cognitive structure to produce more complex forms 
of sympathy. The practical implication is that this personal disposition should be 
cultivated as a distinctively moral capacity, rather than constrained by reason.
Yet reason does play an important role in mediating affective elements to 
motivate more complex forms of moral duty. And the desire for affirmation 
motivates the individual to internalise intersubjective values that in turn influence 
the empathic disposition. Understood in this way, the relationship between the 
personal and moral perspective is not one of (necessary) conflict. The adoption of 
an impartial perspective is itself motivated by the personal disposition, as
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mediated by cognitive and intersubjective elements. It is precisely the 
individual’s emotional disposition that motivates her to engage in the form of 
deliberation required by theories of impartial ethics.
We should conclude by considering what bearing this account has on the 
role of the impartial perspective in moral agency. The first point to stress is that 
the impartial perspective does not tell us much about motivation, or the sources of 
morality. According to the theory of moral motivation sketched in this chapter, in 
the impartial perspective the moral agent is deprived of the very features or 
dispositions that generate motivation to be moral. Moreover, as she is required to 
abstract from the particular values of her society, she is also stripped of the 
intersubjective conceptions of morality and reason required for rational moral 
judgement. It is these inter-subjective values which provide her with the 
framework for engaging in practical reason and making moral choices. In the 
impartial perspective the individual is bereft of the personal and inter-subjective 
tools required for moral agency.
Yet while the concept of an impartial perspective may be a 
misrepresentation of moral agency, it still has an important role in moral 
reasoning. The notion of the impartial viewpoint is a neat device for describing a 
form of abstraction required for a particular first order conception of justice in 
the liberal tradition. It conveys a particular conception of equal liberty that 
should determine patterns of distribution and justice. The act of adopting this 
type of “impartial” perspective can help the agent to evaluate the moral 
desirability of different principles or acts, on the basis of whether they are 
consistent with the conception of justice in question. Whether this conception is 
best represented through the Kantian Categorical Imperative, the Golden Rule, 
Scanlonian impartiality or a Rawlsian original position, it will require a certain 
kind of abstraction and practical reasoning.409 Abstraction will require bracketing 
off certain characteristics and ties that are not considered by the theory to be
409 For an overview o f  these different conceptions o f  universalisation, see J. L. Mackie’s Ethics: 
Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977), pp. 88-89.
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morally relevant.410
But engaging in this form of abstraction should not be identified with 
moral agency. It is simply a useful device for helping the agent to work through 
the consistency of her actions or principles with the theory of equality in question. 
The impartial perspective is not the source of our moral values, as we saw in 
Chapter Five. Nor is it the adoption of an impartial viewpoint that motivates 
moral action, as was argued in this chapter. Rather, our motivation to engage in 
this form of abstraction derives from the empathic disposition and the desire for 
affirmation.
410 I have taken this notion o f  abstraction as “bracketing” certain characteristics from Onora 
O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f  Practical Reasoning  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 40.
Chapter Seven  
Community and Universal  Duties
The critique of cognitivism developed in the last two chapters exposed a 
number of weaknesses in universalist theories. It rejected the rationalist theory of 
motivation underpinning most of these accounts, instead locating the sources of 
moral motivation in the affective features of the self. And it questioned 
cognitivist claims about the role of reason in defining morality, opting for a 
conception of morality as shaped through intersubjective conceptions of the good. 
However, at the end of the last chapter, it was also suggested that this theory of 
morality and moral motivation was compatible with a commitment to a first order 
conception of impartial morality. The impartial perspective may not define 
morality, or motivate respect for moral duty, as claimed by the cognitivist and 
rationalist accounts. But it is a conception of moral agency central to the tradition 
of liberal political thought, and may be internalised through the types of processes 
described in the account of moral development in Chapter Six. The claim, then, 
is that this second order non-rationalist account of morality and moral motivation 
may be compatible with a first order commitment to liberalism.
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine just how this second order 
account and a first order liberal universalism could be combined. This is an 
important step in elucidating the implications of the non-rationalist account for 
the question of duties to non-nationals. For if second order non-rationalism 
precludes commitment to first order universalism, then the account of the last two 
chapters will clearly fail to meet the normative criterion established in the first 
chapter: it will not be compatible with a first order commitment to recognising 
duties to refugees. Not surprisingly, I will argue that it is possible to combine the 
two positions.
The chapter will start by locating the non-cognitivist account in the debate 
between liberals and their communitarian critics. Section one will argue that
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while the conception of the individual outlined in the last chapter can be labelled 
an ontological communitarian account, this does not commit one to according 
special weight to community ties. The communitarian conception of the 
individual may in principle be compatible with a conception of duties to all 
individuals, regardless of nationality. However, in section two I shall show that 
the second order account does undermine the foundational primacy of universal 
rights vis-a-vis other shared values. Thus the weight attached to universal duties 
will not be dependent on their universal validity, but is instead contingent on the 
particular historical social matrix. The discussion will consider criteria for 
establishing a hierarchy between these goods so as to encourage the relative 
priority of universal over special duties. In the third section, I shall tie together 
the discussion of the last three chapters, and consider its implications for the 
problem of motivation to extend duties to refugees.
1. The Communitarian Thesis
1.1 Ontological communitarianism
The term “communitarian” has been applied to the work of a number of 
contemporary political philosophers who have criticised individualist theories of 
justice, notably for their conception of the individual as in some sense 
methodologically or morally prior to her community. They have argued that 
liberals are committed to a conception of the individual as “radically 
disembodied”411, whose interests and identity are defined pre-socially, and who 
autonomously chooses her own values and ends.412 Communitarian theories 
stress the relevance of community in shaping the individual’s identity and 
conception of the good. For many theorists, this ontological account is used to 
justify normative claims about the moral relevance of community, and its
411 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982), p. 54.
412 Sandel, ibid.; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in M oral Theory (London: 
Duckworth, 1981), pp. 232-3; Charles Taylor, Sources o f  the Self: The Making o f  Modern Identity 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 514.
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contribution to human flourishing.413 This may in turn generate more specific 
prescriptions about the political and social institutions required to protect or 
promote community.
It should, however, be stressed that ontological accounts of the 
individual’s relationship to society are in principle distinct from moral and 
political theories of community. While the debate between liberals and 
communitarians is often couched in terms of opposing normative theories, those 
who embrace a communitarian ontology have divergent views on the prescriptive 
implications of the communitarian critique of liberalism 414 In the course of the 
discussion, I shall therefore distinguish between two sorts of communitarianism. 
The ontological thesis is essentially a theory of the factors that shape the 
individual’s identity and ends, and will have implications for questions of 
methodology, as well as the foundations of moral and political philosophy. 
Prescriptive communitarianism, on the other hand, refers to more normative 
communitarian theories about the moral significance of community. Prescriptive 
communitarianism may also refer to political theories of the social institutions 
necessary to achieve these moral goals.
The writers most famously associated with ontological communitarianism 
include Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Walzer and Charles Taylor. 
In the work of Sandel, the self is not prior to her values and goals, but instead 
constituted by the inter-subjective values of her community, an account which he 
terms “the constitutive conception of community”.415 As we saw in Chapter Six, 
Charles Taylor adopts a Hegelian account of the individual’s identity as
413 For examples o f  this kind o f  prescriptive communitarianism, see Charles Taylor, “The Politics 
o f  Recognition”, in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f  Recognition, ed. Charles Taylor 
and Amy Gutman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73; and Michael
Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice: A Defence o f  Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
414
The distinction between ontological and prescriptive communitarianism has been clarified by 
Charles Taylor, “Cross-Purposes: the Liberal-Communitarian Debate,” in Liberalism and the 
M oral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 
1989), pp. 159-182; and Axel Honneth, "The Limits o f  Liberalism: On the Political-Ethical 
Discussion Concerning Communitarianism", in The Fragm ented W orld o f  the Social: Essays in 
Social and Political Philosophy (New York: State University o f  N ew  York Press, 1995), pp. 231 -
46.
415 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice {op. cit.), p. 150.
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constituted through interaction with others. Similar conceptions of the 
communitarian sources of values are defended by Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Michael Walzer.416 Despite variations, we can summarise the central claims as a 
conception of the self as “encumbered”, or constituted by a set of intersubjective 
values and goals, which are shaped and perpetuated through the shared goods and 
practices of a community of people. For the sake of simplicity we shall refer to 
the individual as constituted by her “social matrix.”
This account of the encumbered individual is compatible with the account 
of moral agency outlined in the previous chapter. While my account defended a 
conception of the unconscious self as in some sense separate from society, it 
acknowledged that the individual’s self-conscious identity, goals, values and 
beliefs are constituted by the social matrix. And the account of moral 
development emphasised the fundamental role of intersubjective values in 
shaping the individual's conception of morality. This account of the sources of 
moral motivation can therefore be classified as a communitarian conception of 
the self.
But as mentioned above, many communitarian accounts take a step 
beyond this descriptive claim about the individual as constituted by her social 
matrix, arguing that this ontological account is a basis for attributing special 
moral relevance to the community. Since the individual is constituted by her 
community's language, values and conception of rationality, it is argued, these 
relationships and institutions should be accorded an ethical status denied by 
individualistic theories of moral agency. In terms of political theory, the 
normative implication is that since our social context is constitutive of our 
identity and well-being, the practices and ties which comprise this social matrix 
should be maintained and even strengthened. Given the commitment of this 
thesis to ontological communitarianism, we need to consider whether the account 
of the last two chapters also commits us to prescriptive communitarianism.
416 MacIntyre, After Virtue {op. cit.), especially Chapter 15; and Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice {op. 
cit.) and Interpretation and Social Criticism  (Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1987).
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The step from the description of the self as constitutively attached to her 
community to the political prescription that the community should be preserved 
or reinforced can be justified in two main ways. The first route, which is 
discussed in 1.2, argues for the preservation of the existing practices of 
communities. The second argument, considered in 1.3, argues for the 
strengthening of the processes through which individuals are constituted.
1.2 Ontological communitarianism and the politics o f  recognition
The first account of the link between ontological and prescriptive theses 
holds that the conception of the self as constituted by a particular culture provides 
grounds for protecting the practices of this culture. On this account, the 
communitarian ontology justifies political and legal arrangements to preserve a 
particular community and its way of life. This type of argument takes as its 
starting point a Hegelian notion of recognition similar to that discussed in the last 
chapter. The individual’s self-conscious identity is defined through interaction 
with others, and thus recognition by others is essential for positive individual 
development and self-realisation. The need for this type of recognition is not 
limited to the formative stages of development, but continues throughout the 
individual's life. The sphere of recognition also extends from an initial 
dependence on the family or carers, to the need for forms of social and legal 
recognition. As the individual begins to interact with a wider social sphere, her 
self-conscious identity is constituted by the intersubjective ethical values of her 
community. She becomes dependent on legal and social recognition from this 
wider sphere in order to achieve self-respect and affirmation.
Now we saw in the last chapter that Honneth’s attempt to move from an 
account of the psychological need for affirmation to the struggle for legal and 
social recognition was incomplete. Honneth failed to elucidate how the need for 
affirmation in love relations would generate a “parallel” struggle for recognition 
in other spheres.417 Nonetheless, I argued that there clearly was an important link
417 See Chapter Six, section 4.1.
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between individual psychology and socially defined forms of recognition, and 
thus there were strong grounds for linking a person’s well-being with the need for 
social recognition. Yet on Honneth’s account, all that this establishes is that 
individuals have reason to struggle for certain forms of recognition. Under the 
right social conditions, the need for recognition may motivate people to fight for 
legal rights and social respect, usually in the form of a struggle for the recognition 
of group rights. Historical struggles for the rights of social classes, racial 
minorities, religious groups or national minorities can all be characterised as the 
struggle by groups for social and legal recognition. For Honneth, the struggle for 
recognition may imply the need for forms of collective rights, but as a means of 
ensuring the recognition of individuals. This account of the need for group 
recognition is not enough to establish a claim about the intrinsic moral relevance 
of community. Collective rights are valued as a means to individual recognition.
In his essay on the “Politics of Recognition”, Charles Taylor takes the 
demands of recognition further, arguing that the need for recognition justifies 
policies to protect the distinct cultures of different groups.418 The argument here 
is not simply a version of Honneth’s claim about individuals’ need for legal and 
social recognition. It is the more group-oriented claim that communities with 
distinct practices require a form of collective recognition that goes beyond the 
legal and social recognition owed to their individual members. The justification 
of group recognition is not grounded in the needs of its current members, but 
seems to be based on a non-individualist conception of the value of particular 
traditions and practices. This point is emphasised in Taylor’s argument for the 
preservation of cultures that are struggling for survival. Taylor argues that there 
is a justification for over-riding certain individual rights in order to ensure the 
survival and reproduction of a culture that is in danger of extinction. Drawing on 
the debate about the cultural rights of French-speaking Canadians, he argues that 
the Quebecois were justified in introducing legislation to restrict freedom of 
choice regarding language. Since the French language was in danger of 
extinction, it was right, for example, that French-speaking Quebecois be legally
418 Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition" {op. cit.).
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obliged to educate their children in French. Linking this point back to his 
communitarian ontology, Taylor’s argument can be formulated as follows. 
Certain practices - in this case the speaking of French - are constitutive of the 
identity of Quebecois people. The recognition of the practice of speaking French 
is therefore a necessary condition for the self-realisation (positive self-relation) of 
French Quebecois people. Since the only means of ensuring the continued 
recognition of the practice is through legal provisions obliging French Quebecois 
children to attend French speaking schools, then such legislation is a pre­
condition for self-realisation.
Before examining the coherence of this argument, it is worth considering 
the practical consequences of this form of “politics of recognition”. The claim 
that community practices constitutive of people’s identity should be preserved has 
a number of implications not just for group rights but also for the rights of non­
members. If recognition is really dependent on the preservation of existing 
practices, then this would presumably justify protecting such practices from 
erosion or dilution by values and practices external to that community. This 
would imply the need to defend the community from the outside influence of 
other communities, and also to restrict the entry of groups that might jeopardise 
the survival of these practices. The need for recognition would thus justify 
special duties to preserve the community’s way of life, and by extension, 
undermine the moral relevance of universal duties to those outside of the 
community. If one accepts Taylor’s argument about the link between ontological 
and prescriptive communitarianism, the communitarian account of the individual 
outlined in Chapters Five and Six could commit us to a potentially restrictionist 
refugee policy. Taylor does not argue that the need for preservation should 
necessarily override individual rights, in fact in a subsequent piece he asserts that 
preservation of a culture may conflict with more important shared values.419 
Nonetheless, if such group rights to preservation do necessarily follow from a
419 Charles Taylor, "Charles Taylor Replies", in Philosophy in an Age o f  Pluralism: The 
Philosophy o f  Charles Taylor in Question, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), p. 251.
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commitment to ontological communitarianism, this could justify a more 
restrictionist refugee policy.420
Fortunately, the communitarian account of the individual need not commit 
one to any such conclusion. Taylor’s argument for deriving a collective right to 
preserve practices from the need for recognition is problematic on two fronts, one 
theoretical, the other empirical. First, it is not clear that the individual’s need for 
recognition does justify group rights on any other than individualist grounds. 
Presumably even Taylor would agree that the value of a community’s practices is 
contingent on the contribution of such practices to the flourishing of its members. 
Even if one accepts a communitarian ontology, one can quite consistently reject 
the notion that there is a transcending value attached to a particular culture, over 
and beyond the value derived from the people who make up the community. 
While the recognition of group rights may be instrumental for securing the 
recognition of its members, this does not ground a right to maintain these 
practices regardless of the wishes of members of the community. Thus although 
current members of the community may be concerned to pass down their 
practices to future generations, it is not clear that this over-rides the wishes of 
future generations, who may be critics of existing practices. The notion of 
intersubjectively defined identities does not preclude the possibility of change, 
and where such change occurs the members of a group may feel that recognition 
requires modifying or rejecting past practices. As Habermas writes, “the 
protection of forms of life and traditions in which identities are formed is 
supposed to serve the recognition of their members; it does not represent a kind of 
preservation of species by administrative means.”421
The problem can be expressed more clearly if one considers the possibility 
of conflict between the preservation of existing group practices, and the forms of 
recognition required by members. As we saw with Honneth’s account, a sense of
420 Walzer appears to take this route when he defends restricting the entry o f  large numbers o f  
refugees who do not have ethnic or ideological affinities with the receiving community. See 
Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice {op. cit.), pp. 49-50.
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grievance can motivate a struggle for recognition which generates social conflict 
and change. On this account, individuals’ need for recognition is best met 
through social change, rather than preserving existing practices. And this brings 
us back to the point that group practices are not intrinsically valuable, but derive 
their worth from their contribution to the well-being of their members. If one 
accepts the instrumental value of group rights, and also accepts the possibility of 
critique of existing practices, then it seems wrong to suggest that the need for 
recognition implies a commitment to the preservation of community practices. 
There is certainly a case for recognising and promoting particular community 
practices that are constitutive of individual well-being, and for making such 
practices available for future generations. But this recognition of the group will 
not necessarily over-ride the changing forms of struggle for recognition of its 
members. Indeed, Honneth argues that his communitarian ontology implies an 
ongoing struggle for new forms of social and legal recognition that involve 
rejecting existing practices. Whether or not we accept this account, the point is 
that Taylor and Honneth derive different prescriptions from a similar ontology. A 
commitment to protect existing communities does not necessarily follow from 
accepting communitarian ontology.422
The second point concerns not so much the coherence of Taylor's 
argument, as its empirical premises. Even if the protection of community 
practices can in principle be justified on these instrumental grounds, such 
protectionism would only be possible if there were in fact clearly definable 
communities. Yet the practices and values that constitute the individual are likely 
to be diverse and often conflicting, and derived from a number of different 
(possibly overlapping) communities. Any one individual is likely to be 
constituted by a unique configuration of values and practices, for example 
through religion, her family’s moral and political values, exposure to other
421 Jurgen Habermas, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State”, in 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f  Recognition , ed. Charles Taylor and Amy Gutman
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 130.
422 In fact, Taylor’s claims about cultural preservation seem strange in the light o f  his own views 
on the importance o f  reflection and critical evaluation for individual flourishing. As we shall see 
later in the chapter, other o f  his writings seem to imply a commitment to a more substantive liberal 
conception o f  autonomy.
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cultures through travel or education, as well as the more obvious influences of 
language, national and local political and administrative structures, and a shared 
interpretation of her community’s history and culture. There is rarely a single, 
dominant community, which can be said to be the sole source of the individual’s 
values, especially in multi-cultural societies. Still less plausible is the claim that a 
community is bounded, and cut off from the influence of other communities. In 
reality, different communities are constantly influencing one another through 
media, culture, migration, trade, and so on.423 In short, there is often no easily 
definable salient or ultimate community, let alone one exclusive group from 
which individuals can be said to derive their values. And even assuming there 
were, in all but the most extreme cases this community will not be bounded but 
fluid and partly shaped by the values and actions of other communities. The need 
for group recognition will in many cases fail to provide clear grounds for 
privileging certain sources over others.
There are evidently exceptions to this pluralist conception of the sources 
of identity. Some groups (or their leaders) claim that certain distinctive shared 
traits of their members - usually a distinct history or beliefs or physical 
characteristics - generate special moral or political claims. Such claims about 
group identity are often made in order to mobilise support for political goals - 
secession, imperialism or the restriction of immigration. As with the argument 
for preserving cultural practices, it is not clear why the communitarian ontology 
would commit one to recognising the claims of such groups, especially if such 
claims would conflict with the recognition of their individual members or the 
well-being of non-members. A second type of claim for group recognition, which 
often overlaps with the first variety, occurs where a group becomes politically 
relevant because they are perceived to have been the victims of unfair treatment 
in the past. In the case of minority groups with special needs, groups that have 
suffered discrimination or who are economically disadvantaged, there may be a 
clear case for singling out particular social groups for special treatment. Minority
423 See Ayse S. Caglar, "Hyphenated Identities and the Limits of'Culture'", in The Politics o f  
Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community, ed. Tariq Modood and 
Pnina Werbna (London and N ew  York: Zed Books, 1997), pp. 169-85.
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rights or affirmative action for selected groups may be justified on the grounds 
that such policies will redress a historical imbalance of treatment. Singling out 
particular social groups as the subject of collective rights is considered to be the 
best means of realising de facto equality. This would provide a justification, for 
example, for according certain group rights to Quebecois. But accepting the 
legitimacy of this form of group right does not mean one has to accept a 
communitarian argument that accords intrinsic value to the group’s culture. A 
liberal could also quite happily endorse collective rights designed to ensure the 
equal rights of all individuals.424 If these are the only sorts of collective rights 
implied by the communitarian ontology, there is no reason to suppose that it 
could not be compatible with first order liberalism.
To summarise, communitarian ontology does not seem to commit us to 
recognising the intrinsic values of existing community practices. The need for 
recognition does not justify prioritising recognition of groups over individuals. 
And even if  recognition of groups were justified, given the fact of pluralism, there 
would often be no empirical grounds for drawing clear-cut boundaries between 
groups or singling out the practices of certain groups for special treatment.
1.3 Communitarian ontology and participation
The second type of argument for prescriptive communitarianism 
emphasises the processes through which the individual is constituted, rather than 
the specific practices that are constitutive of its members. What is important on 
this account is not so much the preservation of the values of a given group of 
people, but rather the relations between an individual and the processes through 
which her values are formed and revised. This would imply according special 
moral weight to the processes through which the individual is constituted by the 
social matrix. On this account, the communitarian ontology would be used to 
justify political arrangements to promote certain forms of interaction between 
members of the community. It might provide grounds for encouraging
424
K. Anthony Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival”, Multiculturalism and the Politics o f  
Recognition, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 161.
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participation in social and political practices, or playing a more active role in 
community life.425
As with the first type of communitarianism, this could be used as an 
argument for justifying the moral relevance of special ties. The importance of 
cultivating special bonds and participating in shared practices would, on this 
account, give rise to duties to fellow participants, which would outweigh the 
importance of ties with those not participating in the said practices. However, the 
argument for participation could also justify ties with new members of the 
community, or even be a basis for encouraging interaction with different kinds of 
communities. If it is again based on a Hegelian conception of recognition, then it 
could be argued that recognition would be better achieved through interaction 
with a wider set of individuals or groups. There is nothing in the concept of 
recognition as shaping identity that implies there should be limits on the scope of 
interaction. If interaction is valued independently of the substance of shared 
norms - which on the participatory account it is -, then there seem to be no good 
grounds for restricting the participation of new-comers. Perhaps the claim would 
be that a history of interaction with certain groups creates a special pattern of 
interaction that would be disrupted by outsiders. But then this is already claiming 
something more for the significance of interaction, i.e. that it generates group 
practices that should be preserved. And this of course takes us back to the first 
argument for protecting existing practices, and we have seen that a justification 
for this form of group recognition cannot be derived from the ontological account 
of the individual as constituted by intersubjective recognition.
More generally, if the account of the self as constituted by the social 
matrix is a fact about human beings, then these processes will carry on occurring 
regardless of whether we make a point of nurturing them or not. In order to 
defend the claim that we should actively promote such ties, we would need an 
account of how the acknowledgement or strengthening of these ties would 
contribute to personal well-being. It is not enough to say that because certain
425 See, for example, Henry Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda fo r  Politics and Citizenship  
(London: Macmillan, 1988), pp.196-218.
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values and practices define the person, these values or the processes through 
which they define the person should therefore be protected or extended. What is 
missing is a defence of the contribution of this constituting process for human 
well-being. Thus a community that was committed to a substantive first order 
conception of the value of community life would have grounds for defending a 
political theory of communitarianism. But an individualist liberal society in 
which people did not attach value to community life would not be able to justify 
such a prescriptive communitarianism, even though the sources of their 
commitment to individualist liberal values could be explained through an 
ontological communitarian account. Prescriptive communitarian claims do not 
follow directly from the communitarian ontology, but need to be justified as first 
order moral goods.
To conclude, it is not clear how a prescriptive communitarian thesis can 
be established on the basis of a description of the self as encumbered or situated 
in an inescapable framework. The conception of the self as constituted by the 
social matrix does not in itself provide a moral justification for strengthening or 
protecting either the substance of the relevant values and practices, or the 
processes through which they are shaped and internalised.
2. The Status of Universal Duties
Although my ontological account does not necessarily commit me to 
prescriptive communitarianism, it does nonetheless delimit the range of possible 
moral theories I can embrace. Most importantly for this discussion, as I shall 
show in 2.1, it undermines the claim of justice to foundational supremacy. This 
section discusses the implications of this attack on justice (2.2 and 2.3), arguing 
that liberal universalism may nonetheless be accorded a special moral status 
amongst first order goods. The section concludes in 2.4 by considering how the 
communitarian ontological account can explain the possibility of individuals 
rejecting shared values, and different forms of social critique.
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2.1 Undermining the foundational and political primary ofjustice
One consequence of defending a communitarian ontology will be a 
rejection of the universalist and cognitivist claims of procedural liberalism. In 
Chapter Five, the conception of the individual as constituted by the social matrix 
was contrasted to the cognitivist account of the individual as a rationally 
motivated agent, capable of defining moral duty through reason. The alternative 
relational account of the moral agent is clearly incompatible with this notion of 
the individual as an autonomous chooser of her own ends. It is also incompatible 
with a theory of the foundational primacy of justice over the good. If we accept 
an account of the individual as constituted, justice can have no a priori claim to 
primacy over competing conceptions of the good. It is worth examining why this 
should be the case.
The liberal conception of the individual is closely linked to the liberal 
claim about the primacy of justice. As Michael Sandel argues, on the liberal 
deontological account, the individual is conceived of as prior to her own ends, as 
the autonomous chooser of her values and goals.426 Thus political institutions 
must be so structured as to allow individuals the maximum possible freedom in 
choosing their own ends. This freedom of choice is guaranteed through the 
deontological conception of justice, which views justice as a neutral, regulating 
principle that ensures all individuals have the freedom to choose their own goals 
and values. On this account, justice has primacy over particular conceptions of 
the good. By maintaining a neutral stance between different goods, the claim is 
that justice respects people’s capacity to choose their own goals and values. 
Unlike in teleological theories where the right is determined by the good, on this 
liberal account the right should be conceived of as prior to the good.
Moreover, on the deontological liberal account, justice is not only 
accorded moral primacy: it also has a privileged form of justification. Unlike 
conceptions of the good that are contingent on particular historical and social
426 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice {op. cit.), p. 9.
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factors, justice has a special foundational claim to universal validity. As we saw 
in Chapter Five, cognitivist theories hold that justice is a universal regulating 
principle applicable to all societies, grounded in the shared capacity of human 
beings for reason (or in Habermas’ case in their participation in discourse). The 
priority of justice thus follows from a particular conception of the individual as a 
rational agent, or as a participant in discourse; and it is accorded primacy over the 
good, reflecting a conception of the individual as capable of choosing her own 
ends.
It should be clear why this account of justice as primary is not compatible 
with a communitarian ontology. On the communitarian account, the individual is 
not a chooser of ends, but is constituted by her social matrix. And far from 
representing a neutral principle of right, the liberal notion of justice is shaped 
through shared conceptions of human flourishing and the good. On this 
communitarian ontological account, justice has no privileged foundational status, 
and no a priori claim to primacy.
If justice is denied this ontological primacy, are there alternative grounds 
for according it the status of regulating principle? After all, denying the 
foundational primacy of justice may not imply rejecting its moral primacy.427 
Two possible routes could be pursued in order to defend the moral primacy of 
justice, without embracing its ontological primacy. These correspond to the two 
strands of Rawls’ political conceptions of justice as fairness. As we saw in 
Chapter Four, Rawls argues that his conception of justice is political in the sense 
of being:
(a) a response to empirical conditions of conflict between individuals of 
roughly equal strength for moderately scarce goods; and
(b) worked up from the shared values of members of a liberal democratic 
society.
427
As Taylor points out, SandeFs ontological thesis does not entail advocating a communitarian 
moral or political theory, but simply a different “structure o f  the field o f  possibilities”. See 
Taylor, “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate” {op. cit.), p. 183.
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The first, empirical proposition might provide grounds for attributing political 
primacy to justice; the second could justify the moral primacy of justice amongst 
other goods. Both of these possible justifications will be examined in turn.
The political case for according primacy to justice was based on a 
characterisation of society as a competition between individuals of roughly equal 
strength for moderately scarce resources. These “circumstances of justice” 
necessitated a regulating principle to avoid conflict. In order to justify the 
primacy of this regulating principle over conflicting claims, justice would have to 
be accorded supreme status over all other goods. A political justification of the 
primacy of justice would therefore involve the claim that the circumstances of 
justice are the salient problem confronting society, and that addressing this 
problem must take priority over other goals. Such a defence would need to 
show that solving this problem of conflict was a prerequisite for realising other 
rights or goals, such as stability, or freedom.
There are two main obstacles to grounding the primacy of justice in the 
political necessities created by the circumstances of justice. First, if justice is to 
derive its primacy on the basis of the “circumstances of justice”, its primary status 
will clearly be contingent on empirical conditions. That is to say, the right is 
prior to the good insofar as there is an actual or potential conflict between 
different conceptions of the good and regulation of this conflict is the most urgent 
political task confronting us. As Hume, the original “circumstances of justice” 
theorist, observes: “Encrease to a sufficient degree the benevolence of men, or the 
bounty of nature, and you render justice useless.”429 Now we saw in the 
discussion of social contract theories that the circumstances of justice assumed 
three conditions: egoistically motivated individuals, o f roughly equal strength, 
competing for scarce resources. These conditions may indeed be said to be 
characteristic of distributional problems in some societies. In war-torn societies
428 Indeed, this is what Rawls means when he says that justice is “the first virtue o f  social 
institutions.” John Rawls, Theory o f  Justice (Oxford and N ew  York: Oxford University Press,
1971), p. 3.
429 David Hume, A Treatise o f  Human Nature [1739], ed. Ernest C. Mossner (London: Penguin, 
1969), p. 548.
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or failed states, conflict and instability may generate a struggle for scarce 
resources, rendering the need for some regulatory principle the salient and most 
urgent political goal. Even in more stable societies, the need to regulate conflict 
may be the most important task for a great many political institutions. For 
example, institutions to deal with criminal justice or taxation must all provide 
criteria necessary for deciding between competing claims. Regulating the 
conflicts of interests between criminals and victims, or between tax-payers and 
the recipients of government services, requires mutually acceptable principles for 
deciding on how to distribute benefits and burdens.
But this type of trade-off situation is not always the dominant feature of 
social interaction. Nor can it be characterised as the sole problem confronting 
political theorists. For a start, many goods are not subject to the sort of 
competition between individuals assumed by theories of regulative justice. What 
Joseph Raz terms “collective goods”, for example, clean air, public galleries or 
the benefits of living in a tolerant society, are not subject to this form of zero-sum 
distribution between individuals. Making these goods available to all is not a 
question of regulating competing claims, but of ensuring that they are preserved 
and remain accessible to those who benefit from them. The political questions 
raised by the need for such goods have little to do with distributional problems.
More fundamentally, it is simply wrong to characterise all members of 
society as egoistic individuals cooperating for self-interested reasons. We saw in 
Chapter Six that this was an untenable theory of motivation, relying on simplistic 
individualistic assumptions. It ignores the role of shared values in shaping 
interests, as well as the possibility of being motivated through concern at the 
plight of others. Rather than encouraging the development of such social virtues, 
theories of regulative justice dismiss them as largely irrelevant to the problem of 
guaranteeing cooperation. The favoured notion of egoistic cooperation is not only 
descriptively untrue, it also has negative practical implications. By encouraging 
people to conceive themselves as self-interests individuals, it actively endorses 
and perpetuates selfish behaviour. As Bernstein writes, “the idea of morality as a
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system of rules of cooperation draws its image of morality from what is a 
defective case, and then idealizes that case as composing the whole.”430
The second problem, as we saw in Chapter Four, is that consideration of 
the circumstances of justice alone will not provide sufficient grounds for deriving 
a conception of justice as fairness. The need to regulate conflict between 
individuals of roughly equal strength competing for scarce resources is more 
likely to produce a conception of justice as mutual advantage than justice as 
fairness. For Rawls, what swung the choice in favour of a more morally palatable 
theory of justice was the shared values of the contractors. When we talk about 
the primacy of justice, or justice as regulating all other goods, we are surely 
referring to this notion of justice as fairness rather than the establishment of a 
mutually beneficial modus vivendi. The circumstances of justice do not describe 
a necessary or permanent empirical condition, let alone one that provides an 
exhaustive inventory of the problems confronting political theory. Even 
assuming for the sake of argument that it did, it would not produce a justification 
for the primacy of justice as fairness.
This brings us to the second Rawlsian ground for according justice a 
primary status: its morally privileged position in the value system of the relevant 
society. Here the argument is less clear-cut. As we saw, in his later work Rawls 
argues that the precise terms of justice are worked up from the shared values of 
contractors, who are the inheritors of liberal values and democratic political 
institutions 431 These citizens of liberal societies will select principles of justice 
that conceive of individuals as morally equal and as autonomous choosers of their 
own ends. Now according to the communitarian ontological thesis, subjects 
embracing this conception of human autonomy must be understood as constituted 
by the social matrix. They have acquired this conception -  indeed their whole 
moral outlook has been shaped - by the intersubjective values and practices of 
their society. If they endorse the moral primacy of justice, it is as a product of the
430 J. M. Bernstein, “Moral Norms and Ethical Identities: On the Linguistification o f  the Sacred,” 
in Recovering Ethical Life: Jurgen Habermas and the Future o f  Critical Theory, ed. J.M. 
Bernstein (London and N ew  York: Routledge, 1995), p. 120.
431 See Chapter Four, section 3.3.
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value system and moral framework through which they are constituted. The 
moral primacy of justice in this sense may be reconcilable with ontological 
communitarianism. On this account, justice is not valued because it has an 
independent source of justification, as is claimed by deontological theories. Nor 
does this account imply accepting a characterisation of society as a conflict for 
scarce resources. Rather, justice may be qualitatively distinguished from other 
goods as conveying a conception of humans as autonomous and equal, a 
conception that is integral to our self-understanding.
2.2 The diversity o f  goods
Yet while the moral primacy of justice in this sense may be compatible 
with the ontological communitarian account, its status as trump over other goods 
is challenged by the empirical fact of diverse goods in liberal societies. Once we 
start examining the range of goods that define what is of value in our lives, it 
becomes more and more difficult to define any single and permanent ordering of 
goods. Recognising the diversity of values therefore delivers yet another blow to 
the primacy of justice. To understand why this should be the case, we shall look 
at Charles Taylor’s account of the sources of western liberal values.
In his Sources o f  the Self Taylor provides an account of the individual as 
situated in intersubjectively defined structures of beliefs and values, or 
“inescapable frameworks”.432 It is with reference to these frameworks that 
individuals can understand and articulate their beliefs about the good, their moral 
convictions and values. These frameworks also enable the individual to make a 
series of what Taylor calls “qualitative distinctions.”433 We employ these 
distinctions to differentiate between the value of actions or virtues or forms of 
life, some of which we mark out as morally higher or more worthwhile. These 
morally worthwhile virtues or actions are what Taylor terms “goods.” It is only
432 Taylor, Sources o f  the S e lf  {op. cit.), p. 3.
433
Charles Taylor, "The Diversity o f  Goods", in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: 
Philosophical Papers 2, ed. Charles Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 
234-8; and Sources o f  the S e lf  {op. cit.), pp. 53-98. The account that follows is primarily drawn 
from Taylor’s discussion in Part One o f  Sources o f  the Self.
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through recognising qualitative distinctions of these kinds that we will be able to 
understand and thus realise the goods embedded in our frameworks. A full 
understanding of what sorts of actions, goals, virtues and ways of life are morally 
worthwhile will require articulating these various qualitative distinctions. This 
articulation, Taylor argues, is only possible through tracing the historical 
evolution of our shared understanding of goods. Such an historical enterprise is 
necessary because one can only define and articulate goods through understanding 
how they have evolved. Tracing the historical evolution of articulations of goods 
is also the only means of retrieving those goods that have been suppressed by 
modem moral philosophy.434 Taylor’s conception of the self as constituted by an 
inescapable framework therefore implies the need to articulate the components of 
this framework, in order to achieve self-understanding and moral enrichment. 
Articulation is vital to human well-being, because it is only through reflection and 
examination of our qualitative distinctions that our moral convictions can make 
sense. It can also help to motivate us to realise the goods we have articulated.435
Given the need for articulation, Taylor is critical of deontological 
liberalism for attempting to abstract from our frameworks and thus suppressing 
an understanding of the goods they affirm. Procedural liberal theories of the kind 
espoused by Kant, Nagel, Rawls, Scanlon and Habermas are all guilty of this type 
of suppression. According to Taylor, these “strange, cramped theories” have the 
“paradoxical effect of making us inarticulate on some of the most important 
issues of morality.”436 They attempt to cover up the more messy and troublesome 
reality of a diversity of goods that often prescribe conflicting courses of action or 
ways of life. The attempt of procedural liberalism to divorce the individual from 
her constitutive frameworks is not only doomed to failure, it is also profoundly 
damaging to the moral life of the individual. It thwarts her moral awareness and 
understanding of what is worthwhile in life, “making us inarticulate on some of 
the most important issues of morality.”437 Taylor calls instead for an articulation
434
Taylor, Sources o f  the S e lf  {op. cit.), p. 103.
435
Ibid., p. 92.
436 Ibid., p. 89.
437 Ibid., p. 89.
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of the goods embedded in our frameworks, in order for us to understand and thus 
realise the goods concerned.
This stress on the need for articulation is of interest to the current 
argument for two reasons. First, his account of the diversity of goods and how 
they might be ordered may help us understand the relationship between universal 
and special duties. It will not provide us with clear-cut formulae of the kind 
promised by deontological theory, but it can point us in the direction of a more 
sophisticated conception of duties to non-nationals. Secondly, Taylor argues that 
articulating the goods underlying our commitment to procedural liberalism can 
help motivate respect for the requirements of universal rights. I shall return to 
this second point in section 3. The remainder of this section will be devoted to 
elaborating the first question.
Taylor identifies commitment to liberal universalism as a substantive first 
order conception of morality reflecting a particular conception of human 
flourishing. The form of modem liberalism that we have inherited gives central 
weight to the values of freedom, reason and avoidance of suffering. We saw in 
the critique of cognitivist theories in Chapter Five that the norms of rights and 
justice based on these values cannot be derived solely from reason, but reflect 
commitment to certain conceptions of the good. These ideas about the good can 
be traced back to the early modem period and have evolved through Deist and 
Enlightenment forms to the contemporary conceptions of universal justice and 
human rights with which we are familiar. But liberal conceptions coexist m 
modem western culture with other, potentially conflicting strands of moral 
thought, including those that accord moral weight to particular ties or community 
life. As we uncover the “layers of suppression”, Taylor argues, we will begin to 
discover a wide range of different goods.439 The central conflict in western 
culture over the past two centuries has been between the goods associated with
Ibid., p. 495.
439 The diversity and frequent incompatibility o f  different goods is likely to be characteristic o f  all 
cultures, although Taylor is not concerned with (and would probably view him self as unqualified 
to speak for) cultures other than his own. Instead, he traces the evolution o f  the articulation o f  
different moral goods for “modem, Western people.” Sources o f  the S e lf  {op. cit.), p. 111.
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Enlightenment ideals of universal rights or duties of benevolence, and goods 
associated with the Romantic strand of western thought. As Taylor writes, “A 
series of disputes of this form runs through modem culture, between what appear 
to be the demands of disengaged freedom, and equality and universality, on the 
one hand, and the demands of nature, or fulfilment, or expressive integrity, or 
intimacy, or particularity, on the other.”440
Taylor argues that it is simplistic and misguided to assume we should 
have to choose between different goods. In the case of justice, “The fact that the 
theory designating one [of these conceptions] is valid need not mean that 
designating the other is confused and invalid.”441 Different conceptions of justice 
may be appropriate for different contexts, and likewise we may prioritise different 
goods or values over justice for certain moral questions.
Taylor is certainly not the first to locate the contemporary conflict 
between universal and special duties in the debate between rationalist liberalism 
and romanticism. Indeed, in Chapter One I traced the origins of the current 
conflict between refugee rights and national interests to a similar tension between 
notions of universal rights and nationalism. However, what I did not discuss in 
this first chapter - and what most other accounts of the history of ideas do not 
address - is the issue of the foundational status of these values, and their relative 
moral status. What is distinctive about Taylor's account of the history of ideas is 
his conception of the source of these values, and his acceptance of the 
phenomenon of value conflict. Taylor conceives of shared values as 
intersubjectively defined and so particular to different groups and historical eras. 
So both the rationalist liberal and the romanticist or nationalist strands in western 
thought were shaped by the historically contingent evolution of political and 
moral thought in western culture. He also recognises the moral relevance of both 
strands of thought, which are constitutive of the identities of members of western 
societies.
Charles Taylor, “After MacIntyre” in After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work o f
A lasdair MacIntyre, ed. John Horton and Susan Mendus (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p. 38
271
In descriptive terms, this clears up a number of confusions. It explains 
why members of liberal democracies have a strong commitment to national ties, 
and why these could be felt to have special moral significance even where they 
conflict with universal rights claims. And by understanding our commitment to 
liberal rights as shaped by shared values, it becomes clearer how people could be 
motivated via the desire for affirmation to internalise these norms. So this 
account of the sources of liberal values can avoid the rationalist's problematic 
dichotomy between the individual's contingent will and the requirements of 
reason. Yet characterising liberal universalism as historically contingent does 
seem to create a new set of problems. It might imply demoting the status of 
universal duties. If impartial justice is denied foundational and absolute moral 
primacy, surely there is no guarantee that it will feature on the top of the list of 
valued goods.
What Taylor provides, however, is some indication as to how one might 
evaluate and order these different goods. While he refuses to attribute any 
foundational or overarching moral primacy to universal justice, Taylor does 
suggest that liberal values could have the status of higher-order goods. Such 
goods are singled out from the plurality of goods in virtue of their importance in 
giving direction to our lives, determining action or helping us to order other 
goods. As Taylor writes, they are “goods which not only are incomparably more 
important than others but provide the standpoint from which these must be 
weighed, judged, decided about.”442 These higher order, or “hyper”-goods may 
be seen as having moral primacy in many situations, although their primacy is not 
a priori or foundational as in the case of procedural liberalism. Hyper-goods are 
not derived and justified independently of other goods. Rather, they have the 
status of one good amongst many, which may often - but do not necessarily -  
trump other goods. So while higher order goods would usually be considered to 
trump other goods and values, there may be situations in which an individual does 
not consider a hyper-good to be primary. He may, for example, be a committed 
universalist for many issues, but nonetheless decide on reflection to give a
442 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self {op cit.), p. 63.
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donation to the local hospital rather than to help victims of famine in another 
country, because of a commitment to helping his community. This notion of 
higher-order goods is worth unpacking in the context of liberal universalism and 
duties to non-nationals.
2.3 Liberal universalism as a higher-order good
There are a number of senses in which liberal universalism could be said 
to have the status as a higher-order good in liberal cultures, depending on which 
type of liberal theory one embraces. For the precise status of liberty as a higher 
order good will vary according to the specific conception of how liberty 
contributes to human well-being or flourishing. A teleological liberal theory, for 
example, might hold that human-beings are distinguished from other species by 
their capacity for reflection, and from this justify a system of rights that 
guarantees the maximum scope for exercising this capacity.443 Liberal theories 
based on conceptions of interests or needs would ground rights in the shared 
interests of all human beings in security, subsistence and liberty, or some 
equivalent list.444 The needs-based account may also be combined with a theory 
of basic or preconditional rights that are instrumental for realising all other goods 
and rights.445 Each of these accounts provides a moral justification for marking 
out liberal universalism as a higher-order good, a good that is uniquely important 
to human flourishing. According to these theories, given its vital function in 
contributing to the good life, liberty should take precedence over other goods in 
most or even all circumstances. These types of justification for liberalism are 
likely to be familiar and intuitively persuasive for those brought up in liberal
443
One can finds this type o f  approach in the work o f  Honneth. See “The Limits o f  Liberalism” 
{op cit.); and Struggle fo r  Recognition {op cit.). Weinstock also argues that this should be the 
normative implications o f  Taylor’s conception o f  the self. See Daniel M. Weinstock, Daniel M., 
“The Political Theory o f  Strong Evaluation,” in Philosophy in an A ge o f  Pluralism: The 
Philosophy o f  Charles Taylor in Question, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994), pp. 171-193.
444 See, for example, Alan Gewirth, "Can Utilitarianism Justify any Moral Rights?", in Human 
Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1982),
pp. 43-5.
445 As we saw in Chapter Three, Shue justifies rights as preconditional to the enjoyment o f  all 
other rights and goods. See Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign 
Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).
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cultures. Conceptions of human interests and flourishing similar to these have 
shaped our beliefs about the value and goals of human life.
The special status of liberal values as higher-order goods thus reflects 
their central role in shaping the identities, values and goals of those socialised in 
liberal cultures. While we are deeply committed to these conceptions, this 
commitment does not reflect the objective superiority or validity of liberalism. 
Rather, it is a product of the trajectory of political and moral thought over the past 
two millennia, a trajectory which was both historically contingent and, at least 
initially, particular to European culture. There was no inevitability about 
liberalism emerging as the salient good in contemporary western culture: perhaps 
the emphasis could equally have been on some alternative good, such as universal 
benevolence and the avoidance of suffering; or a teleology with more specific 
content, such as a form of virtue ethics or communism; or alternatively a welfare 
based conception of well-being that accorded a lesser status to individual 
rights.446 But whatever the reasons for the current configuration of values and 
beliefs in western liberal societies, these goods are not something we can now opt 
in or out of. The commitment to liberal values may be historically contingent, but 
this does not render it any less constitutive of the identities of members of liberal 
societies. This is surely the case with conceptions of liberal rights, whose 
persistence and extension of scope seems to point to a special sort of appeal. The 
extension of rights in liberal political theory from their initial application to 
wealthy white males, to universal coverage of all human beings (plus or minus 
unborn children, the mentally handicapped and insane, and so on), is not 
something that is easily revocable. Whatever the reasons for their extension (and 
it is beyond the scope of this discussion to examine these) once extended they are 
difficult to retract.
446 I do not have space here to go into the historical reasons why the liberal conception prevailed 
over others. For accounts o f  the emergence o f  these concepts see MacIntyre, After Virtue {op. cit.), 
and Whose Justice, Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988); and Taylor, Sources o f  the 
S elf {op. cit.). More specifically on the evolution o f  rights theories, see lan Shapiro, The 
Evolution o f  Rights in Liberal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). For a 
classic Marxist account, see C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory o f  Possessive Individualism: 
Hobbes to Locke (Oxford and N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1962).
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One reason for this lies in the moral grounding of such rights in a first 
order commitment to a conception of human interests or flourishing. Once the 
relevant characteristics - be they reason, material needs or interest in happiness - 
are attributed to all human beings, it becomes logically inconsistent to limit the 
application of rights. Indeed, a genuine and consistent denial of the moral claims' 
of liberal rights theories would be extremely difficult for those with minimal 
intelligence and mental health who have been socialised in liberal democracies. 
While these societies clearly value a range of other goods - such as those 
associated with particular ties and community life, protecting the environment or 
promoting the arts, and so on -, the liberal conception of the individual 
nonetheless shapes discourse and practice in the economic, social and political 
spheres of liberal democracies. It is a deep-seated (although often unarticulated) 
conviction that does not necessarily take precedence in all political questions, but 
is one which members of liberal societies automatically factor in to political 
decisions, and at least take into account even where other goods seem to over-ride 
these considerations. For those who have successfully internalised liberal values, 
the denial of their universal ascription would be logically incoherent. Nowadays 
western liberals cannot consistently defend a conception of individuals as free and 
equal whilst denying the right to freedom of the subjects of colonial rule, or 
illiterate rural communities, or refugees.447
Of course there are a number of possible justifications for limiting the 
duties generated by universal rights. One could argue that rights would be more 
effectively realised through a division of responsibility into national units, or that 
intervention to ensure the rights of other peoples may be counterproductive in the 
longer-run.448 Or it could be claimed that realising universal rights would conflict 
with other goods, such as ensuring a good standard of living for fellow nationals, 
or encouraging a greater sense of responsibility for members of one’s own 
community. Yet the point remains that in contemporary liberal thought, the
447 The only routes for retracting the rights o f  certain groups would be through a form o f  cultural 
relativism that denied that liberal norms should be extended to those in non-liberal cultures; or 
through denying the moral claims o f  liberal rights discourse altogether. These two possibilities are 
considered in section 3. below.
448 Some o f  these arguments were examined in Chapters Two (section 3.1) and Three (1.1).
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moral grounds for the ascription of rights is based on a conception of relevant 
human characteristics that does not include race, nationality or religion. Once 
people are committed to such a conception of rights as grounded in shared 
characteristics - and the vast majority of those within liberal democracies will 
find resonance in such a conception - then there is a strong moral case to be made 
for recognising universal duties. The types of considerations used to justify 
women’s rights or impartial justice at the national level would equally imply 
commitment to universal rights. The consistent application of rights theories, 
then, logically commits one to a universal conception, at least in principle.449
The universalist implications of rights theories are reinforced by a second 
characteristic of liberal rights. The extension of rights is difficult to retract not 
only on grounds of moral consistency, but also because of the effect of the actual 
ascription of rights in mobilising people to protect these rights. Once rights have 
been ascribed, rights holders tend to be extremely resistant to attempts to have 
them rescinded. Those who have acquired and exercised certain types of 
individual freedom seem to become rather rapidly accustomed to a conception of 
themselves as autonomous choosers, or as the instigators of social change. Once 
mobilised in this way, right-holders are likely to be more critical than before of 
attempts to limit their freedoms 450 This characteristic of rights, what one might 
term their tendency to be self-reinforcing, makes it difficult to obtain consent for 
pursuing goals that may involve restricting individual rights. In liberal 
democracies, the restriction of rights usually only secures widespread consent 
where vital goods are under immediate threat.451 Richard Rorty makes a similar 
point about the tenacity of rights, rejecting the claim that denying the 
metaphysical foundations of liberal values will undermine commitment to these
449 Andrew Linklater has made a similar point about what he terms one o f  the "ambiguities o f
citizenship": insofar as citizenship rights for particular groups are justified on universalist grounds,
this gives such concepts "radical potential" to be extended to include other excluded groups. See
The Transformation o f  Political Community (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 193
45°This may be one reason why the language o f  individual rights seems to have more widespread
appeal than related goals such as development or full employment. The struggle for freedom
seems to be especially strong where liberty is defined in terms o f  individual rights, perhaps
because the immediate benefits o f  such rights are more tangible to individuals.
451 In Britain, for example, public opinion seems to support the possibility o f  tax increases only in 
times o f  perceived crises in public services.
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goods. He locates the appeal of liberal values in its ability "to tell stories about 
future outcomes which compensate for present sacrifices".452 A conception of 
liberal values as contingent may not be able to promise an afterlife or redemption, 
but it can paint "plausible political scenarios", enabling people to believe that 
"things might get better, and to see no insuperable obstacles to this story's coming 
true."453
These considerations, while far from conclusive, help to explain why 
liberal universalism may be expected to continue to have the status of a higher- 
order good for many or most members of liberal democratic societies. 
Recognising the historical contingency of liberal universalism need not imply that 
it is easily swept aside. Liberal rights have universalist implications that are 
difficult consistently to deny, and those exercising such rights tend to be 
tenacious in their defence.
3. Moral Alienation and Internal Critique of Liberal Universalism
Despite the robust nature of rights discourse in liberal cultures, there are 
clearly a number of circumstances under which individual or groups in liberal 
societies may fail to be moved by, or positively reject, liberal rights. In cases 
where members of liberal democracies do appear to have abandoned liberal rights 
theories altogether, it may be attributed to a failure to internalise intersubjective 
norms. Those who have been socialised in liberal societies and who nonetheless 
reject liberal values in favour of religious fundamentalism, extreme nationalism 
or generalised violence may be said to lack the psychological predisposition to 
empathy or the desire for affirmation that motivate individuals to internalise 
shared values.454 Where whole groups of society reject these shared liberal
452 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), p. 86.
453 Ibid., p. 86.
454 I am also assuming that these individual do not suffer from extreme forms o f  economic 
deprivation or social ostracism - these factors could be a cause o f  moral alienation, even in cases 
where individuals had developed the relevant psychological disposition and had been socialised in 
liberal societies. I shall return to this question later in the section.
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values, we may attribute this form of alienation to a lack of social recognition of 
the group in question, again linked to the psychological need for affirmation.
The causes of such forms of alienation are extremely complex, and it is 
beyond the scope of the current discussion to provide a complete theory. The 
account of moral development set out in Chapter Six indicated that the sources of 
moral alienation may be found in a failure to meet the psychological needs of the 
infant or child, thus resulting in the child's incapacity to feel concern for others or 
to be motivated to internalise shared values in a positive way. Alternatively, it 
may be caused by a subsequent failure to meet psychological needs in their 
socially mediated forms, i.e. where they have been channelled into a need for 
social or legal recognition. This form of total rejection of shared values - which 
should be distinguished from a critique of existing practices - can therefore be 
characterised as a form of social pathology. It should also be distinguished from 
the issue of societies affected by acute poverty or violence. In these cases, the 
inability to meet the basic needs of citizens may generate a different sort of 
motivation to reject liberal values, based on the very real threat to one’s material 
and physical security. This is an interesting case, but one that I am assuming does 
not characterise most members of western liberal democracies.
The case of outright rejection of liberal values needs to be distinguished 
from the rather different question of internal critique of existing values. It was 
suggested in the Introduction that members of a particular culture may challenge 
existing norms and values through highlighting tensions between different goals, 
or through demonstrating the inadequacy of existing norms and values in the face 
of changing conditions. The first type of internal critique is most likely to be 
generated by tensions in the practical demands of different goals. The classic 
example of this form of tension within the liberal tradition is between the values 
of freedom from constraint and equality, and there have been recurrent debates on 
the correct balancing of the two values.455 Commitment to an extreme
455 See, for example, Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and U topia  (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 
especially Chapters Seven and Eight; and Steven Lukes, "Equality and Liberty: Must they 
Conflict?", in Political Theory Today, ed. David Held (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), pp. 48-66.
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prioritisation of one of these values over the other may justify, respectively, right- 
wing libertarianism, or radical redistribution of wealth. Other examples might 
include conflicting views on the preconditions for ensuring liberty, or conflict 
between liberty and other goods. The second type of critique may be triggered by 
the inadequacy of existing norms in responding to new challenges. For example, 
an environmental crisis or economic decline may call for the re-evaluation of 
previously accepted goals.
The point of these examples is not so much to demonstrate the diversity of 
goods, but to illustrate how the values of a particular society may allow 
significant scope for rational critique and social struggle. Where such formb of 
internal critique gain sufficient credence, they may in turn generate social change. 
Demands for equal treatment of women, or judicial reform, or the alleviation of 
poverty are likely to be viewed as legitimate by many citizens partly because they 
invoke a conception of the equal worth of all individuals, the right to impartial 
treatment, or the value of enabling people to fulfil their potential. These forms of 
critique are not external to the sorts of goods that are valued in liberal societies, 
but gain resonance precisely because they draw on shared beliefs. There may be 
disagreements on how these goods are prioritised, and even different grounds for 
holding these beliefs (e.g. religious or secular). But most of us can intuitively 
understand the appeal of the goods in question, even if on reflection we do not 
accord them priority over others.
Obviously, the emergence of perceived tensions and inconsistencies in 
goals does not guarantee social critique: individuals must be willing and able to 
engage in critique. The impetus to criticise existing norms and practices stems 
from a combination of social conditions and the individual characteristics of 
critics. Regarding individual traits, the willingness and capacity for critique 
seems to depend on three main elements: the individual’s affective disposition, 
her cognitive capacities, and the unique configuration of values and beliefs that 
constitute her. The influence of the individual’s cognitive capacities is fairly 
obvious, especially in the case of intellectuals. Those with greater insight or 
conceptual ability will be in a better position to highlight and explain tensions
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between different concepts. But not all critics have exceptional cognitive 
capacities, or articulate critique in the form of new theories. The impetus and 
capacity to find flaws in available concepts is also a function of the individual’s 
particular experiences and social influences, which may make her better placed to 
criticise certain goods. A person who has suffered extreme deprivation, or has 
been exposed to a different social and economic system may draw on these 
experiences as a source of critique. Thirdly, there is also an important affective 
element involved, which can both motivate the individual to engage in criticism; 
and even influence the substance of her critique. I shall briefly consider the 
psychological sources of these forms of critique, looking in turn at the role of 
individual psychology in motivating critique, and in influencing the substance of 
critique.
The first question of what personal psychological factors motivate 
individuals to criticise their society is immensely complex, and I can only hint at 
the types of affective elements that may play a role. We say in the last chapter 
how the desire for affirmation may be channelled into a struggle for social or 
legal recognition. Where this psychological need is especially strong, it may 
provide the motivation to challenge existing social arrangements in order to gain 
recognition for oneself or the relevant group of which one is a member. But there 
are other ways in which the desire for affirmation could generate social critique. 
An academic could seek affirmation through the widespread recognition of the 
originality of her thought, or a campaigner for social justice could seek 
recognition through demonstrating her commitment to a worthy cause. In the 
case of militants, radical critique may be at least partly motivated by the wish to 
provoke a reaction - what one might term a desire for negative recognition. In 
using these examples, it is not my intention to reduce the explanation of social 
critique to a theory of individual psychology. The more modest aim is to show 
that certain affective dispositions are probably a necessary - but not sufficient - 
condition for such critique.
The second point concerns the influence of affective elements in 
motivating individuals to oppose particularly cruel practices. Those who have
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successfully developed a sense of concern for others are likely to instinctively 
recoil at forms of torture, rape or mutilation, especially when they are directly 
exposed to such practices. There are some exceptions to this. First, even where 
people have developed a concern for others through their early relationships, this 
may be mediated through intersubjective beliefs into a strong sympathy for 
members of their community but not outsiders. This may decrease the force of 
revulsion at cruel practices, since conscious emotional responses are likely to be 
influenced by shared values. Second, in other cases cruelty may be considered to 
be justified as a means to more important collective goals. Again, an instinctive 
emotional reaction may be repressed and thus fail to motivate critique. And 
finally, under circumstances of extreme fear, deprivation or insecurity, one might 
expect the struggle to avoid starvation or massacre to take precedence over 
considerations generated by the empathic disposition.
These qualifications do of course suggest that social context can play a 
significant role in shaping emotional reactions to the extreme suffering of others. 
Nonetheless, the exceptions described are fairly extreme cases of exclusivist 
cultures or societies in crisis. One can still posit a conception of a "healthy” or 
"well-attuned" individual who, given a stable social environment, would develop 
a capacity for sympathy for those who are suffering from particularly cruel 
treatment. If this is the case, then one could further claim that this form of 
instinctive sympathy with the suffering of others may generate a critique that is 
not derived from available social norms and values. Pressing the point a little, 
one might argue that the empathic disposition constitutes a form of thin 
universalism, albeit contingent on developing the right psychological disposition, 
and given adequate social conditions. It offers the personal resources for 
rejecting particularly cruel practices, regardless of cultural context.
4. Conclusion: Motivating Universal Duties
This chapter has covered a range of rather different issues, in order to tie 
up some of the loose ends of the non-rationalist account outlined in Chapters Five 
and Six, and to draw out the implications of this account for political theory. It
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has considered the question of whether the non-rationalist account could be 
combined with a commitment to liberal universalist values; the status of liberal 
rights in relation to other values and norms; and the possibility of critique and 
outright rejection of norms within liberal societies. The first two of these three 
issues are especially important to the argument of this thesis, and it is worth 
recapitulating the claims I made.
In the first section of the chapter, I located the non-rationalist account in 
the context of communitarian political thought. The discussion rejected the 
notion that the ontological account of moral agency outlined in the previous two 
chapters committed one to prescriptive communitariansim. Those socialised in 
liberal democratic societies would be likely to retain a strong commitment to the 
notion of universal rights. Nonetheless, the account did concede in section two 
that on this ontological account, liberal universalist values would lose their 
foundational and political primacy. The account of liberalism as historically 
contingent and culturally specific implied denying it any privileged form of 
justification or absolute moral supremacy over other goods. Even according 
liberal universalism the status of higher-order good will not provide as robust a 
grounding as the claims to universal validity and moral primacy made by 
cognitivist theories. So in what sense has the account of the last three chapters 
advanced the goal of motivating duties to refugees?
We need at this point to return to Taylor’s claims about the need for 
articulation. Taylor argues that there has been a tendency in liberal theory to 
suppress the goods that underly notions of universal rights, and that this has made 
us lose sight of the sources of our commitment to such values. The demands of 
these universalist values are difficult to sustain, for their sources are suppressed 
by “the dominance of proceduralist meta-ethics, which makes us see these 
commitments through the prism of moral obligation, thereby making their 
negative face all the more dominant and obtrusive and pushing the moral sources 
further out of sight.”456 Taylor stresses the need for better articulation of the
456 Taylor, Sources o f the Self {op. cit.), p. 518.
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sources of liberal values, in order to help sustain our commitment to these 
ambitious moral norms and goals. He argues that articulating the goods 
embedded in our frameworks will help motivate respect for them: “articulation 
can bring us closer to the good as a moral source, can give it power.”457
This claim needs more detailed substantiation, which can be provided by 
returning to the non-rationalist theory of motivation. The first point to stress is 
that articulating the goods underlying commitment to universal rights might help 
to motivate duties to those in distress. If duties to refugees can be understood as 
an extension of sympathy, then the empathic disposition may generate increased 
commitment to refugee rights. More extensive public discussion of the types of 
values that shape our commitment to universal rights would help people to clarify 
the grounds for their moral beliefs, hopefully triggering sympathy-based 
motivation.
Secondly, by emphasising that this conception of duties is a shared value, 
articulation may help link respect for these duties to the desire for affirmation. If 
respecting norms is seen as a means of securing affirmation, it will encourage a 
more thorough internalisation of such norms. In a sense this point is rather trite - 
most people could readily accept the influence of respected figures and prevalent 
social norms in motivating ethical behaviour. But my account of the desire for 
affirmation provides a fuller psychological explanation for this. It also helps 
explain how articulation could assist moral motivation. Articulating a shared 
commitment to the ethical goal of helping those in distress could encourage 
people to internalise this standard as a means of securing affirmation.
If we further accept a linkage between the need for individual and group 
recognition - or at least group recognition as a means of ensuring individual 
recognition - then there may also be a strong case for articulating shared values to 
those outside one's community of values. External recognition of these shared 
characteristics may strengthen the commitment of members to the goods in
457 Ibid., p. 92.
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question. In this sense, it might be possible to build a conception of duties to 
refugees as constitutive of a nation’s identity, and thus an integral component of 
national interest. I shall consider this possibility in the Conclusion.
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Conclusion
1. Summary of the Argument
1.1 Revisiting the criteria for an adequate conception
In its search for an adequate conception of duties to refugees, this thesis 
has examined a range of political, philosophical and psychological theories. The 
initial review of liberal universalist theories in the first part of the thesis revealed 
theoretical problems that necessitated a more extensive exploration of 
conceptions of moral agency and motivation. So although its starting-point was 
an essentially practical problem - the goal of promoting a more generous refugee 
policy - the thesis developed a more general critique of rationalist and cognitivist 
assumptions in liberal political theory. The critique of rationalism and the 
alternative non-rationalist account offered in Chapter Five were substantiated by 
an examination of psychological theories of moral development. These 
discussions of philosophical and psychological theory, I argued, were essential in 
order to address the policy problem of extending duties to refugees.
The need for this more profound critique of moral agency becomes clear if 
one considers the failure of liberal universalism to meet the criteria for an 
adequate account of duties to refugees. By way of recapitulation, I shall therefore 
briefly summarise the main steps of the argument in relation to these criteria.
In the Introduction I set out three main criteria for assessing the adequacy 
of a conception of duties to non-nationals: normative desirability, practical 
feasibility, and internal coherence. I then proceeded to evaluate a range of 
contemporary liberal universalist accounts of duties to non-nationals on these 
three criteria. First, in Chapter Two I argued that utilitarian accounts failed to 
meet the criterion of normative desirability. They produced conceptions of duties 
to refugees that conflicted with liberal notions of justice and rights. By contrast, 
pure right-based universalist accounts met this normative criterion, but failed the
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test of practical feasibility. They generated overly stringent and thus unrealistic 
ethical obligations. Chapter Three considered whether thin universalist accounts 
could retain a right-based universalist account whilst addressing the problem of 
feasibility. I argued that such accounts either failed to address the problem of 
feasibility, or else produced conceptually incoherent accounts. The third set of 
universalist theories to be considered were social contract theories, which claimed 
to address the problem of motivation. I argued in Chapter Four that social 
contract theories failed either on the grounds of normative desirability (as in the 
case of Hobbesian theories), or alternatively on the criterion of feasibility (as in 
the case of more ethically driven theories of justice).
The second part of the thesis attempted to elucidate the underlying 
weakness in liberal political theory that generated these tensions. In particular, it 
focused on the theoretical sources of the problem of practical feasibility, defined 
more specifically as the problem of moral motivation. For this more abstract 
discussion of moral motivation, the argument required a rather different set of 
criteria. While the three initial criteria of normative desirability, practical 
feasibility and internal coherence were appropriate for the evaluation of 
normative prescriptions, the discussion of moral agency and motivation was more 
abstract and less directly related to prescriptive questions. Hence the adequacy of 
conceptions of moral agency and motivation depended on the criteria of empirical 
plausibility and internal coherence. The criteria of normative desirability and 
practical feasibility would only kick in once the normative implications of these 
conceptions of moral agency had been elaborated.
Focusing on these criteria of plausibility and coherence, the thesis 
considered the adequacy of liberal conceptions of moral agency from two 
perspectives. First, in Chapter Five it examined the adequacy of the rationalist 
and cognitivist philosophical assumptions underlying liberal conceptions of moral 
motivation and agency. I argued that both the rationalist account of moral 
motivation and the cognitivist theory of morality were untenable. They inflated 
the importance of reason in motivating moral action and in defining moral norms. 
Second, Chapter Six provided a more detailed critique of the empirical
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plausibility of the rationalist/cognitivist account of moral agency, through 
considering psychological theories of moral development and motivation. I 
offered a more descriptively plausible account of the development of motivation 
to extend duties to others, and showed how this moral disposition could be 
channelled into recognising duties to refugees. Finally, in Chapter Seven I 
clarified this non-rationalist account in relation to communitarian political 
theories, and showed how a non-rationalist theory of moral agency and 
motivation was compatible with a substantive commitment to refugee rights.
The argument has thus came full circle back to the practical question of 
duties to refugees. The non-rationalist account, I have argued, is better equipped 
to fulfil the three practical criteria of an adequate account. It should certainly 
meet the requirement of internal coherence, which I hope has been demonstrated 
through the discussion of the last three chapters. The criteria of normative 
desirability and practical feasibility require more consideration, and I shall deal 
with each in turn.
1.2 Normative desirability
First, on the question of normative desirability, I suggested in Chapter 
Seven that embracing a non-rationalist account did not commit one to prescriptive 
communitarianism. Although rejecting the cognitivist premises of liberal 
universalism, the non-rationalist account could be combined with a commitment 
to a substantive conception of universal duties. As I argued in the last chapter, 
recognising the historical and cultural contingency of liberal values does not 
imply that such commitments are easily cast aside. Rather, these liberal beliefs 
are constitutive of the identities of those socialised in liberal democratic cultures, 
and pervade political and moral discourse in these societies. Acknowledging how 
these ideas have shaped and continue to shape our values and beliefs will not 
undermine their influence on conceptions of moral duty, but should instead help 
strengthen our commitment to them. Thus the rejection of a cognitivist derivation 
of universal duties does not imply abandoning notions of refugee rights, but 
would hopefully help us to articulate and realise our shared values.
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Of course, the compatibility of the non-rationalist account with a 
substantive commitment to universal duties is contingent on the existence of the 
relevant beliefs and values in the society in question. Societies that are not 
committed to liberal universalist values may reject the right-based conception of 
duties to refugees, and in such cases there will be no Archimedean point from
^ c o
which to criticise non-liberal practices. This does create a tension between the 
first order beliefs of those from liberal societies, and the second order non­
rationalist account of moral agency. On the one hand, the depth of our 
commitment to liberal universalist conceptions of human flourishing makes it 
practically impossible to see non-liberal practices as anything other than morally 
aberrant. Yet at the same time, we should recognise at a more abstract level that 
these liberal beliefs are particular to our historical cultural context.459 While we 
would be in some sense denying our identity to reject these deep-seated beliefs, 
we should acknowledge that our commitment to them is not derived from some 
essential characteristic of human beings or the structure of language, but from a 
particular tradition of moral and political thought.
This claim about the historically contingent sources of moral beliefs may 
suggest a retreat into some form of cultural relativism. Cultural relativism is the 
view that the validity of moral beliefs depends on the norms and practices - or 
value system - of a particular group, and that there is no universal standpoint from 
which to evaluate the worth of different value systems.460 But the relativist thesis
458 Although o f  course, non-liberal societies may have an equally or even more generous 
conception o f  duties to refugees. See, for example, Gaim Kibreab, African Refugees: Reflections 
on the African Refugee Problem  (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985), p.68 - although 
Kibreab doubts that the African tradition o f  hospitality is sustainable under conditions o f  extreme
poverty.
459 Richard Rorty expresses this recognition o f  a split between first order liberal values and their 
historical contingency as a form o f  irony (see his Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), particularly pp. 73-95. While I am in agreement with many o f  
Rorty's claims - especially as regards the contingency o f  liberal beliefs, and the dichotomy 
between substantive ethical or political commitment and metaphysical foundations - 1 do not find 
the concept o f  irony in the private sphere helpful to the current argument. It implies a form o f  
private cynicism vis-^-vis liberal values, rather than the sort o f  public acceptance o f  shared values 
espoused by Charles Taylor. I argue instead for the positive celebration o f  shared values, and a 
public recognition o f  their historical and cultural roots in liberal democratic societies, which - as I 
shall argue below - can help motivate the extension o f liberal duties.
460 For discussions o f  human rights and the question o f  relativism, see Alison Dundes Renteln, 
International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism  (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990); John 
Charvet “The Possibility o f  a Cosmopolitan Ethical Order Based on the Idea o f  Universal Human
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only holds on the empirical assumption that the world is split into separate, 
bounded communities. In fact, cultures have influenced one another in a 
multitude of ways, spreading values and beliefs through migration, conquest, 
trade and more recently through various forms of media and communications.461 
So although values and beliefs may be derived from particular communities rather 
than from the essential characteristics of human beings, this does not mean there 
can be no evaluation between cultures. Where there is an overlap of values, or 
where a set of beliefs is shared by more than one society, some form of evaluation 
will be possible.
A second reason for questioning the relativist thesis is that the non­
rationalist account was committed to a qualified universalism, based on the 
psychological disposition to empathy. It was argued that under favourable 
conditions the individual should develop a capacity for concern that would 
encourage her to reject extreme forms of cruelty. The empathic disposition alone 
did not yield specific and detailed moral norms, but would generate a more 
general tendency to feel concern at the extreme suffering of other human beings. 
However, the development of this form of empathy in individuals is dependent 
not only on the individual’s personal psychological development, but also on the 
existence of certain political and social conditions - notably the absence of 
extreme forms of deprivation or fear. The scope of this psychological 
universalism was therefore limited in practice, contingent on both individual 
development and socio-political context. Nonetheless, the psychological account 
of the development of empathy could provide a conception of a “well-attuned”, 
ideal typical individual, denoting a person who had been able to develop such a 
disposition.462 In short, the rejection of the rationalist cognitivist assumptions of
Rights”, Millenium  27:3 (1998), pp. 523-41; and John R. Vincent, Human Rights and  
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in association with the Royal
Institute o f  International Affairs), Chapter 3.
461 See Ayse S. Caglar, "Hyphenated Identities and the Limits o f  'Culture'", in The Politics o f  
M ulticultural ism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community, ed. Tariq Modood and
Pnina Werbna (London and New York: Zed Books, 1997), pp. 169-85.
462 I shall not pursue the arguments for and against this form o f  universalism here. It is not 
directly relevant to the thesis, which is after all concerned with conceptions o f  duties to refugees in 
liberal cultures. So the question o f  the extent to which those from other cultures would be or
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liberal universalism need not undermine our commitment to refugee rights. Nor 
need it imply that we cannot or should not evaluate the practices of other groups. 
The non-rationalist account could therefore meet the criterion of normative 
desirability.
1.3 Practical feasibility
If one were to choose between the liberal universalist and the non­
rationalist accounts solely on the grounds of normative desirability, then it would 
not be evident why one should prefer the non-rationalist account. After all, it was 
not on this first order criterion that I rejected liberal universalist accounts. Rather, 
the problem with liberal universalism that emerged in the course of the first part 
of the thesis was that of feasibility: liberal universalist theories defined moral 
duties that seemed overly stringent, and insisted that the individual must respect 
these duties from an impartial perspective. It also claimed that this impartial 
perspective was in conflict with and should serve to constrain the personal, 
particular perspective.
Now at one level, the non-rationalist account could be accused of a similar 
problem of feasibility. For insofar as it retains the same first order conception of 
universal duties, its moral requirements must surely be just as demanding as those 
of the universalist conception. The difference between the two accounts is not so 
much in terms of the moral duties it has defined, but in the way it relates these 
duties to moral agency and motivation. On the rationalist account, the moral 
perspective was defined as an impartial, rational viewpoint, in which the 
individual is abstracted from her personal and social characteristics and ties. This 
assumed dichotomy created difficulties explaining how a person would be 
motivated to respect the requirements of morality. The non-rationalist account, 
by contrast, asserted that the individual is motivated to respect liberal norms 
precisely by virtue of her personal characteristics and shared beliefs. The 
individual’s empathic disposition and her desire for affirmation motivate her to
should be committed to some form o f  moral universalism does not directly arise, although it would 
o f  course be relevant for the question o f  the scope o f  commitment to these values.
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extend sympathy to others, and to internalise the intersubjective values of her 
community. Her psychological disposition to act morally is mediated through her 
cognitive capacities and the shared beliefs and norms that she acquires through 
socialisation. In liberal societies, these beliefs and norms are likely to include a 
liberal conception of autonomy and human flourishing, generating a moral 
commitment to respect individual human rights.
The non-rationalist account of motivation is not simply a better 
description of moral agency, but also helps address the problem of practical 
feasibility. It rejects the notion of a necessary split between self-interest and 
moral duty, instead positing the existence of two types of affective dispositions 
that motivate moral action. The first was the psychological desire for affirmation, 
which implies that the individual has an interest (often an unconscious one) in 
being moral and in respecting the norms of her community. Internalising shared 
values and acting in a way that is recognised and approved by the relevant 
community is important for the well-being and self-confidence of the 
individual.463 And second, the empathic disposition is generated by a form of 
anxiety that is alleviated through extending sympathy and assistance to others. 
Showing concern for the plight of others does not run counter to self-interest, but 
is a way of overcoming feelings of guilt experienced at the suffering of others. 
This account of the psychological sources of moral motivation thus rejects any 
necessary dichotomy between self-interest and moral duty, helping to explain why 
and how people could be motivated to respect universal duties.
The rejection of a split between interest and duty is not only relevant to 
the question of individual motivation, but is also applicable to conceptions of 
national interest and refugee rights. In the Introduction to the thesis I suggested 
that it was simplistic to assume that there was a conflict between national 
interests and refugee rights. Rather, shared values and beliefs play an important 
role in shaping conceptions of individual and collective interest. Such values can 
not only shape conceptions of what is in the self-interest of the nation, for
463 I argued in the last chapter that this does not imply total submission to prevalent norms - see 
Chapter Seven, section three.
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example by influencing national policy objectives to achieve social stability or 
full employment. But more importantly for the issue of refugee rights, the 
intersubjective values of a community can also generate an interest in extending 
moral duties to non-nationals. In other words, there can be a national interest in 
recognising the rights of refugees, even if this does not contribute to narrowly 
defined economic or political interests.
While I was somewhat tentative in presenting this hypothesis at the 
beginning of the thesis, I can now substantiate the claim through drawing on the 
discussion of the sources of individual moral motivation. First, we should 
consider how the notion of an empathic disposition could be relevant to the 
question of national interests and duties to non-nationals. The empathic 
disposition was characterised as a tendency to feel concern and sympathy, 
generated by anxiety about the suffering of others. Clearly this psychological 
disposition is characteristic of individuals rather than groups, and it would be 
methodologically unsound to attribute such a disposition to a group of people, 
over and beyond the psychology of its individual members. Nonetheless, 
individual members of a society are likely to be motivated by this form of anxiety, 
and may channel the anxiety into efforts to influence national policies towards 
refugees. Insofar as members of a society can be said to have an interest in 
extending sympathy to refugees, an interest generated by the need to alleviate 
distress at the suffering of others, then this empathic disposition could be said to 
influence conceptions of national interest.464
Far more significant for the question of conceptions of national interest, 
however, is the role of the desire for affirmation. I argued that the desire for 
affirmation motivates people to adhere to shared values and norms as a means of 
gaining positive recognition, love and respect. Now individuals seek affirmation 
not only for their individual characteristics and actions, but can also have an 
interest in ensuring the positive recognition of shared characteristics and actions. 
Where individuals have a strong sense of membership of a particular group,
464 I shall discuss the possible channels for influence in the next section.
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where they are conscious of a common history and shared values, then the 
positive recognition of these characteristics by others can be an important source 
of affirmation. By articulating and acting on common values and beliefs the 
group both emphasises the characteristics that are common to its members, and 
seeks the affirmation of these characteristics from those outside of the group. In 
the case of nations, the desire for group affirmation will not necessarily generate 
benign behaviour - imperialism and ethnic conflict could both be said to be 
manifestations of a desire for group affirmation. Yet where the shared values and 
beliefs of the nation are shaped by a liberal commitment to universal human 
rights, then the group may be affirmed through securing international recognition 
of its human rights policy, or its generous treatment of refugees. This positive 
recognition of the shared liberal values of a nation may be an important source of 
affirmation for the members of the group. Again, this implies that extending 
duties to refugees may not conflict with the interests of the nation-state, but may 
positively contribute towards the well-being of its members. The effectiveness of 
these factors in motivating a more generous refugee policy is of course contingent 
on a range of other factors, and it would be naive to be overly optimistic about the 
possibilities for changing current conceptions. Nonetheless, the analysis of moral 
motivation does suggest a number of practical approaches that could encourage 
more generous treatment of refugees. In this final section, I shall outline some of 
the practical implications of the non-rationalist account of moral motivation.
2. Implications for Refugee Policy
What, then, are the implications of this account of moral motivation for 
refugee policy? We need at this point to return to the conceptual impasse in the 
policy debate, as set out in the Introduction. It was observed that the prevalent 
conception of the refugee problem was that of a conflict between national 
interests and refugee rights. Given that granting asylum to refugees was 
considered to run directly counter to the national interest, liberal universalist 
notions of duties to refugees seemed utopian and were at risk of being perceived 
as irrelevant to the policy debate. The task of the theoretical analysis was to
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salvage liberal universalist values from this fate, through re-working liberal 
assumptions about motivation and the relationship between self-interest and duty.
On the basis of this analysis, it is possible to suggest ways in which we 
might begin to re-conceptualise the problem and thereby avoid this perceived 
conflict between duties to refugees and duties to compatriots. Most of the 
critique of this assumed dichotomy was levelled against liberal universalism’s 
attachment to a similar dichotomy at the level of individual moral agency. But as 
I hope to have shown, and will further elaborate below, the question of individual 
moral agency on the one hand, and the ethics of national policy on the other, are 
closely inter-linked. What follows, then, is a brief outline of the possible ways in 
which citizens of liberal democracies could be encouraged to re-conceptualise the 
refugee question, and adopt a more liberal (i.e. generous) approach to refugee 
rights.
2.1 Refugee rights and individual/group affirmation
The first way of transcending the assumed conflict between refugee rights 
and national interests is to encourage the development of group identities that 
incorporate a commitment to liberal universalist values. There are two main ways 
in which groups may play a role in encouraging a more generous approach to the 
rights of non-nationals. First, where liberal universalist norms are seen as 
constitutive of a group’s identity, then the realisation of these values should be a 
source of affirmation for members of the group. It should strengthen the group’s 
explicit attachment to these values, reinforcing the sense of common purpose and 
thereby providing positive affirmation to group members. In this sense, the 
group’s commitment to refugee rights and its achievement of these goals could be 
perceived as a source of fulfilment, rather than as running counter to the interests 
of its members. Second, individual members of a group can also derive 
affirmation from their personal actions in promoting liberal universalist goals. If 
such actions are commended by other group members, there should be an 
incentive for individuals to engage in activities to promote refugee rights. This 
source of affirmation is not so much linked to the sort of fulfilment derived from
294
a sense of common purpose: rather, it relates to the desire for affirmation of one’s 
personal characteristics or behaviour, and the influence of this desire on an 
individual’s acts.
I have chosen to refer to “groups” instead of states, since in liberal 
democracies there are likely to be a number of different, mainly sub-national 
spheres that could provide a source of affirmation for individuals.465 Religious 
communities provide perhaps the most obvious example of this. For example, in 
the past (and to some extent still today) the Christian Church has played an 
important role in encouraging sympathy to those in need, and affirming members 
for their good deeds (or chastising them for bad ones). The Church provides a 
good example of the two types of affirmation mentioned above. First, its 
commitment to duties of universal benevolence and the alleviation of suffering 
represents a set of shared norms and collective goals that help shape the values 
and interests of its members. The Church's achievements in this sphere - for 
example its charitable activities - are a source of pride and affirmation for its 
members. Second, it encourages its individual members to act in what it 
considers to be a morally commendable way, providing spiritual or social 
affirmation to those who extend duties to those in need 466
There are other important spheres that can provide a source of affirmation 
for the ethical behaviour of members. The values and activities of political 
parties, pressure groups and other associations with normative goals may 
incorporate a commitment to liberal universalist goals. They may provide a 
source of moral motivation to members through engendering a sense of collective 
purpose, and through affirming the actions of individual members. Institutions
465 Janna Thompson describes a similar pattern o f  sub-national groups which are constitutive o f  
the individual's values and goals, which she refers to such groups as "overlapping communities". 
See Thompson, Justice and World Order: A Philosophical Enquiry (London and N ew  York: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 169-71. However, she uses these as a basis for constructing a Rawlsian 
conception o f  overlapping consensus - a route which I do not want to take.
466 O f course, the Church’s influence has declined substantially over the last century, but it can 
still exert some influence when it intervenes in the policy debate - not just over its members but 
also over non-members who respect some o f  its values. See, for example, media coverage o f  the 
Church o f  England’s contribution to the asylum debate ("Don't get emotive on asylum - 
archbishop", The Guardian, 24 April 2000).
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such as schools, parent-teacher associations, professional organisations or groups 
of colleagues may also endorse liberal universalist goals, again shaping the values 
and interests of members and motivating action to respect the rights of refugees. 
Other relevant groups may include social classes, ethnic groups, neighbours, 
friends or extended family, all of which may be committed to liberal values and 
thus motivate collective or individual actions to assist refugees. In a looser sense, 
those whose values are influenced by a particular soap opera or pop group can 
also be understood to be members of a community of shared values, and thus may 
be motivated to act in accordance with the values conveyed through these media.
This account of the influence of communities on moral motivation is still 
somewhat vague. We need to consider how these kinds of group influence can be 
translated into practical action to promote a more generous refugee policy, and 
what sorts of measures could be taken to increase this form of influence. I shall 
keep my comments brief. On the first question, sub-national groups may have an 
impact on refugee policy either through their direct actions, or through 
influencing policy makers to adopt more liberal policies. In the first case of direct 
action, groups or their individual members could be engaged in charity work, or 
give donations to assist refugees. In the second case, groups and their members 
could influence policy through voting and various forms of political activity and 
lobbying.467 One would also expect policy makers themselves to be influenced 
and affirmed by the groups of which they are members - be they the person’s 
political party, professional association, church or constituency -, some of which 
may be committed to liberal universalist values.
On the second question of how to increase this form of influence, the most 
obvious routes would be through education and media. Campaigners for refugee 
rights should encourage schools to educate children on refugee issues and to 
develop a sense of responsibility for guaranteeing refugee rights. In particular, 
through the teaching of history, religious or citizenship studies, children should be
467 For a history o f  how local campaigns and activism have influenced policy on refugees, see 
Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, Refugees in an Age o f  Genocide  (London and Portland, OR: 
Frank Cass, 1999). They argue that this form o f  public pressure has been the most significant
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encouraged to develop a sense of collective identity that incorporates a 
conception of duties to refugees. This type of identity formation could also be 
influenced by the media, for example through news reporting and popular 
entertainment. It is clearly important to involve popular and respected public 
figures who may influence public perceptions of these issues. Finally, there is a 
need to explore ways of affirming individuals and groups that extend duties to 
refugees. In the case of individuals and groups there are a range of possible 
means of openly affirming action to promote refugee rights, including awards, 
media coverage, and positive encouragement from popular role models.
These suggestions for encouraging the extension of duties to refugees may 
seem familiar, and indeed one can find examples of all of these approaches in 
liberal democratic societies. But the psychological and philosophical analysis 
provided in this thesis can help explain why such techniques, many of which 
intuitively seem to be appropriate, can indeed have an impact on moral 
motivation. These forms of positive recognition of individuals and groups 
respond to a psychological need for affirmation, a need that many campaigners 
have instinctively understood, but which is not captured by prevalent (cognitivist) 
theories of moral motivation. A detailed psychological investigation along the 
lines sketched in Chapter Six would doubtless yield more specific proposals for 
mobilising public support. Further research on the psychology of moral 
motivation could therefore be helpful in better targeting campaigns to extend 
duties to refugees.
2.2 National identity and liberal universalist values
In addition to the sorts of influence exerted by these communities, there 
may be scope for political leaders to help develop a sense of national identity that 
incorporates a more liberal approach towards refugees. Where a nation defines 
itself partly through adherence to certain values, then the realisation of these 
ethical goals can constitute a source of national pride. This seems to have been 
one of the ideas behind the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’s much derided
determinate in generating more generous policies.
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attempt to introduce an “ethical dimension” to British foreign policy. The notion 
of linking national pride to respect for human rights is also evident in the rhetoric 
of United States foreign policy, and seems to influence some of the policies of 
smaller states that are keen to promote an image of themselves as more neutral
A f i Q
and humanitarian members of the international community. Canada, Sweden 
and Norway are good examples o f this latter tendency, and are all reputed for 
their relatively generous provisions for refugees. Whether or not these states live 
up to their liberal reputation is of course debatable. But the point is that once the 
national identity is partly defined by a commitment to these values, then the sharp 
line between national interest and moral duty becomes blurred. Moreover, such 
rhetoric can serve to strengthen the commitment of the public to liberal values 
and goals. By articulating shared liberal universalist values and encouraging 
pride in these aspirations, politicians and public figures can mobilise support for 
more generous treatment of non-nationals.469
In terms of more concrete strategies for promoting liberal universalist 
policies, once ethical goals are explicitly articulated, they provide a standard 
against which to evaluate and criticise the government in question. This can 
provide a good lever for exerting pressure on policy makers. Robin Cook’s 
"ethical dimension" could be said to have had this type of effect on British foreign 
policy. His actions on human rights are now constantly evaluated and criticised 
by pressure groups according to whether they meet his own criteria. This in turn 
gives him an additional motive for ensuring that they do; and when he has taken 
measures to this end, he makes a point of publicising them, again articulating and 
reinforcing the government’s commitment to these values. The resulting changes 
in the government’s human rights policy may not be radical, but surely represent
468 Vice President George Bush invoked this idea in a 1984 speech (although it should clearly not 
be taking at face value!): "One o f  our country's finest traditions is the help and haven given to 
refugees throughout the world...Our tradition o f  refugee assistance reflects deep principles and 
abiding commitments". Cited in Goran Rystad, "Victims o f  Ideological Oppression or Ideological 
Weapons? Aspects o f  US Refugee Policy in the Postwar Era", in Goran Rystad ed., The 
Uprooted: Forced M igration as an International Problem in the Postw ar Era, ed Goran Rystad
(Lund: Lund University Press, 1990), p. 220.
469 Scanlan and Kent make this point in their discussion o f  United States immigration policy. See 
John A. Scanlan and O. T. Kent, "The Force o f  Moral Arguments for a Just Immigration Policy in 
a Hobbesian Universe", in Open Borders? C losed Societies?: The Ethical an d  Political Issues, ed.
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an improvement on previous practice.470 The improvement could be greater if 
political leaders emphasised the importance of human rights as a component of 
Britain’s identity. If the link between national identity and liberal universalism 
were more forcefully drawn, the national interest would become more integrally 
bound up with respect for liberal universalist values than is currently the case. I 
should add that if the Home Secretary Jack Straw were to make public statements 
about adopting an ethical approach to refugee policy, we might expect a similar 
dynamic of pressure groups influencing him to respect this commitment, as well 
as an erosion of the notion of a conflict between refugee rights and national 
interests. Although it would also be likely provoke a strong backlash from other 
groups who were strongly committed to the dichotomy conception of refugee 
rights and national interests. I shall return to these issues later in section 2.4.
Finally, at the international level there is also scope for exerting influence 
on national policies, through affirmation from those outside the state. Liberal 
democratic states are especially sensitive to international criticism of their 
treatment of refugees, and refugee rights activists often use this form of critique 
as a means of applying pressure on states to respect refugee law. The discussion 
of the role of affirmation in moral motivation suggests the need for a shift of 
emphasis in this respect. Rather than adopting an exclusively critical approach, it 
may be more effective to explicitly affirm states where they are displaying 
generosity in their treatment of refugees. Where their policies fall short of the 
relevant standards, refugee rights activists should express concern about the 
state’s failure to meet its own ethical and historical standards, rather than failure 
to conform to a set of externally imposed, “universal” criteria.
Mark Gibney (New York and London: Greenwood, 1989), pp. 61-107.
470 Although they do o f  course raise a new set o f  problems related to the consequences o f more 
robust policies to promote human rights abroad, as in the case o f  the 1999 K osovo campaign. The 
current discussion, however, focuses more narrowly on the challenge o f  generating motivation to 
extend universal duties, regardless o f  the consequences o f  this form o f  extension for other areas o f  
foreign policy.
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2.3 Sympathy and duties to refugees
I suggested in the discussion of the psychology of moral motivation that 
the empathic disposition could be channelled into more sophisticated forms of 
sympathy, including recognising duties to refugees. The notion of appealing to 
sympathy in order to motivate action to assist those in need is certainly not new -  
charities and pressure groups often adopt this type of approach in publicity and 
fund-raising campaigns. Consider, for example, the impact of photographs of 
starving children or victims of land mines in mobilising public support for these 
causes.
But while these methods are widely used by many human rights and 
development campaigners and non-governmental organisations, they could be 
more effectively employed to encourage the extension of duties to refugees. For 
although there is often substantial media coverage and public campaigning for the 
victims of human rights abuses or conflict, there are relatively few attempts to 
link these cases to the question of granting asylum to refugees. Indeed, there 
seems to be a sharp distinction between media treatment of conflict and 
persecution on the one hand, and the question of how refugees should be treated 
once they reach countries of asylum on the other. Debate on the treatment of 
asylum seekers and refugees tends to revolve around the financial costs of 
processing claims, social security benefits for asylum seekers, and social tensions 
arising from the presence of large numbers of refugees in receiving communities. 
These are certainly important issues, and the problem of “non-genuine” asylum 
seekers needs to be addressed. But any discussion of the refugee question should 
also be placed firmly in the context of the causes of flight, and the sorts of 
persecution or violence from which many asylum-seekers are fleeing. As a 
newspaper editorial observed, “The connection has to be drawn in the public 
mind between horrific atrocities we see on our television screens, and the 
frightened families who end up in the bed and breakfast at the end of our 
street.”471 The type of sympathy incited by media coverage of famines or ethnic
471
The Guardian, 10 February 1999.
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conflict should also be harnessed to encourage the extension of sympathy to 
asylum-seekers and refugees. These linkages between the causes of flight and the 
treatment of refugees in countries of asylum could be emphasised not only by 
media coverage and publicity campaigns, but also in school education, and in the 
public statements of politicians.
There is a second aspect of the empathic disposition that may be of some 
help in encouraging sympathy to refugees. It should be recalled that empathy is 
generated by anxiety about the suffering of others, suffering that is 
(unconsciously) felt to have been caused or intended by the agent. So where 
relevant, it may be useful to point out any degree of responsibility the receiving 
country has for bringing about a situation that generates refugees. For example, 
where a history of colonisation, intervention during the Cold War, or 
economically damaging trade terms have had a negative impact on development 
and stability in the country, there may be an additional case for adopting a liberal 
stance towards refugees. I am not arguing here for a heavy emphasis on 
collective guilt, but simply for a more general awareness of the causes of human 
rights abuse and conflict, and the extent to which they may have been influenced 
by the actions of other states. A sense of at least partial responsibility can give 
rise to a greater level of anxiety at the suffering of those fleeing these situations. 
Again, in practical terms this implies a more comprehensive analysis of the 
causes of refugee flows in the media and education.
2.4 Moral motivation and the current British policy dehate on asylum
I mentioned above the (albeit limited) attempts of the current British 
government to develop an ethical dimension in its foreign policy. Unfortunately, 
similar attempts to emphasise the ethical dimension of refugee policy have been 
noticeable for their absence. Indeed, recent debates on questions of asylum and 
immigration have if anything shifted away from any explicit affirmation of 
Britain's duties to refugees, with both main political parties competing to 
demonstrate their readiness to restrict access to asylum systems. It is not the 
place here to explain the political reasons for this move towards a more explicit
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endorsement of restrictionism.472 Of more relevance to the current discussion is 
the question of what bearing my theory of moral motivation has on the current 
British policy debate. In particular, how can the theory help explain the present 
unwillingness to recognise and extend duties to refugees? And could some of the 
practical measures to motivate more generous treatment of refugees outlined 
above help to counter the current trend?
Current anxieties about the costs of asylum seekers clearly reflect very 
real public concerns, and should not simply be disregarded. Nonetheless, the 
current media and political debate has undoubtedly exaggerated the real "costs” 
and engendered a sense of crisis that obscures or marginalises more ethical 
impulses and values. I argued in Chapter Seven that the empathic disposition and 
the motivation to extend duties through a desire for affirmation will emerge only 
under two conditions. First, it will emerge where the individual has had adequate 
care in her personal relations, enabling her to develop the psychological 
disposition to empathy and a desire for affirmation. And second, these affective 
dispositions may be constrained where the individual or society is exposed to 
deprivation or insecurity. The first psychological condition is likely to be met for 
the vast majority of the public. However, it appears that current concerns about 
the social and economic impact of asylum-seekers have generated a level of 
anxiety that is akin to a (perceived) threat to socio-economic stability. Anxieties 
about "floods" of foreigners threatening current standards of living or national 
culture are of course likely to be irrational: they are not for the most part 
grounded in a realistic assessment of the impact of current levels of influx on 
British society. But irrational or not, such anxieties serve to constrain the 
psychological disposition to empathy, and to undermine the force of shared liberal 
values as a source of affirmation. Under these conditions, arguments about duties 
to refugees become obscured by what are perceived to be more urgent and
472 I have argued elsewhere that it reflects the government's concern to reassure the electorate that 
it will protect the privileged socio-econom ic rights o f  national vis-a-vis outsiders, especially in the 
face o f  current anxieties about welfare reform, globalisation and the changing role o f  the state. 
See "European Values and the Asylum Crisis", International Affairs 76:3 (2000) pp. 537-57.
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pressing claims about the survival of current social practices and standards of 
living.
If one accepts the assumption that such fears are ill-grounded under 
present conditions - that current levels of influx are not likely to have any 
significant impact on national wealth or social conditions - then two sets of policy 
prescriptions emerge as especially important. First, the government, media and 
other influential individuals or groups should seek to defuse current anxieties 
about the costs of asylum-seekers and refugees. This implies providing better 
public information on refugee and migration issues, including on the costs of 
asylum systems in relation to overall levels of public expenditure, and the positive 
economic effects of many forms of immigration. The government should also 
continue to reassure the electorate that costs will remain manageable, through 
making asylum systems more efficient, and through enhanced regional 
cooperation to manage influx and alleviate migratory pressures in regions of
■ •  473origin.
These efforts to reassure the public about the limited costs of asylum 
should not imply introducing more restrictive policies. Rather, they should be 
understood as a means of allaying the types of anxieties that have rendered the 
current debate on refugee policy so polarised. By reassuring the public that influx 
does not represent a fundamental threat to their well-being, the government could 
encourage a greater willingness to recognise duties to refugees.
In tandem with this attempt to allay public concerns, the government 
should gradually adopt a more positive message about national duties to refugees. 
This should involve invoking the two strands of moral motivation - the empathic 
disposition and the desire for affirmation - in order to generate more tolerance of 
refugees and asylum-seekers. Thus the second policy prescription would be to 
encourage people to make a link between the plight of asylum-seekers and the 
causes of flight, and to encourage the recognition of a shared commitment to
473 See Boswell, "European Values and the Asylum Crisis" (pp. c/7.), pp. 554-7.
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protect refugees. I have already sketched some of the possible ways of generating 
this form of moral motivation. The point to stress here is that given the level of 
anxiety about the impact of influx on nationals, this approach will need to be 
adopted with caution. If the government presses the point too hard it may be 
perceived as imposing excessively stringent demands, and thus run the risk of its 
policy being counter-productive. Hence the need for a gradual change in rhetoric, 
in combination with measures to reassure the public that the costs will not be 
inordinate.
Finally, it may well be the case that policy makers will also be able to 
invoke an economic argument for immigration. It has been argued that Britain 
will increasingly need foreign workers to meet labour supply shortages and to 
compensate for ageing populations.474 It is debatable how far this demand for 
labour will coincide with the profile of asylum-seekers, or indeed whether 
immigration would be a long-term solution to the pension crisis.475 Moreover, 
such an argument in favour of immigration would be contingent on continued 
economic growth and full employment, and as such would not provide a 
particularly stable ground for admitting refugees. Nonetheless, insofar as the 
economic argument could help alleviate anxiety about the socio-economic costs 
of asylum, it should certainly be employed to strengthen the case for admitting 
refugees.
3. Conflicts between Refugee Rights and National Interests
I would like to finish by making some more general points about refugee 
rights and conflict. I argued in the thesis that where liberal universal values are 
constitutive of a person’s identity, respecting their claims and being recognised 
for so doing can be a source of personal affirmation. Moreover, most people have 
a psychological disposition to extend some form of sympathy to others, which can 
be channelled into a recognition of the duties defined by liberal universalism. As 
I hope to have shown, this implies reconceiving the relationship between interest
474
"Europe's Need for Immigrants", The Economist ( 6 - 1 2  May 2000).
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and morality, specifically a rejection of the notion of any necessary conflict 
between moral duty and self-interest.
But even if these sorts of measures are effective in increasing sympathy 
towards refugees, there will still be some limit on the numbers that can be 
admitted. By changing conceptions of duties to refugees one may be able to shift 
where this threshold is considered to lie, or hopefully to dispense with the notion 
of any clear, objectively definable threshold at all. In industrialised liberal 
democratic states (although not necessarily in poorer and less stable receiving 
states) I believe that there is scope for absorbing more refugees than are currently 
admitted, and so this attempt to change conceptions of duties to refugees could 
have some effect. This is why I characterised current anxieties about the costs of 
refugees in Britain as largely ill-founded, and advocated policies to counter this 
misperception and encourage a more generous policy. But there must eventually 
be limits to the capacity of even industrialised states. Where there is undeniable 
evidence of a serious conflict between the interests of nationals and refugees, and 
there is little scope for changing public perceptions of this conflict, then liberal 
universalists should avoid chastising failure to live up to the ideal of absolute 
impartiality. I have argued that imposing stringent demands on the nationals of 
receiving countries may be counter-productive -  it makes the liberal universalist 
case appear unsympathetic to the interests and concerns of people, as well as 
unrealistic. My suggested modification of the ontological and psychological 
claims of liberal universalism implies adopting a different approach.
Where duties to refugees seem to conflict with other goals, we should not 
present ourselves with a stark choice between a “moral” or a “self-interested” 
course of action. This is the traditional liberal universalist approach, which posits 
a conflict between the two and castigates any failure to realise universal duties as 
unethical. This polarised approach to moral duty is precisely what makes the 
liberal universalist position appear so harsh and uncompromising where it is 
perceived as conflicting with other goals. My suggested alternative is to conceive
47S
Christina Boswell, "Asylum: Total Failure", in The World Today 56:8 (2000), p. 5.
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of these conflicts as a normal and predictable feature of the diversity of values -  
values which were shaped through the evolution of particular traditions of 
political and moral thought. In so doing, we provide a better basis for attempting 
to realise both sets of values. We do not necessarily have to choose between self- 
interest and moral duty, but can explore ways of realising both sets of claims. So 
that even where other claims seem to over-ride universal duties to refugees, and 
we fail to meet the standards of liberal universalism, this does not imply 
resignation to a self-interested or non-ethical course of action. Rather, we should 
seek other, “second best” solutions to refugee problems. I mentioned some of 
these in the Introduction and Chapter One -  the protection of refugees in regions 
of origin, forms of temporary protection in industrialised states, or internationally 
monitored repatriation.476 While the liberal universalist would be likely to reject 
such measures as failing to meet ideal standards, the advantage of the 
communitarian ontological account of the sources of moral values is that it can 
recognise the existence of diverse and often conflicting values. Rather than 
presenting us with a trade-off calculation, it provides scope for seeking to 
maximise a range of different values.
Liberal universalism leaves us with a dual choice: either act consistently 
with moral norms, or accept that your behaviour is unethical and self-interested. 
It is little wonder that the ethical arguments for recognising duties to non­
nationals appear unappealing and utopian. The revised, non-rationalist account of 
duties to refugees offers a superior set of options: aim to realise the higher order 
goods of liberal universalism, as these have a special place in our society’s values 
and beliefs; respecting these duties does not necessarily conflict with self interest, 
but can be a source of affirmation and a means of channelling an empathic 
disposition; and if these higher order values do conflict with other goals and ties, 
explore ways of realising both sets of values. I hope to have shown why this
476 These policies were discussed in Chapter One, section 2.4. They include measures to address 
the causes o f  flight (conflict prevention, development, intervention, and so on); mechanisms for 
ensuring that refugees are protected in their regions o f  origin (protection o f  internally displaced 
persons, safe havens or measures to protect and assist returning refugees); or alternative forms o f  
protection that fall short o f  the provisions o f  the Geneva Convention -  for example the temporary 
protection regimes adopted in Europe and North America to protect refugees from the former
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second account avoids the descriptive and practical limits of liberal universalism, 
and why it would provide a better conceptual framework for encouraging a more 
generous policy towards refugees.
Yugoslavia. See Christina Boswell, “The Conflict Between Refugee Rights and National 
Interests”, Refugee Survey Quarterly 18:2 (1999), pp. 64-84.
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